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Foreword
This is the final report from the EU Observatory on the Social Situation, Demography and the Family regarding
developments concerning families in the EU15 member countries. It started in 1989 as an European
Observatory on National Family Policies, changed its name in 2000 to the European Observatory on Family
Matters and we completed the work under its present   name. The name change symbolised a shift from con-
centration on family policy to a broader social science perspective which still took the family as its starting
point.
In the last six years the observatory was coordinated by the Austrian Institute for Family Studies with a
coordination team initially led by Helmut Wintersberger, followed by Rudolf Richter and finally Brigitte Cizek.
The members of the final coordination team were Wolfgang Lutz, Christiane Rille-Pfeiffer, Johannes Pflegerl,
Rudolf Richter and Rudolf Karl Schipfer. Among other tasks, they decided to ask experts to write general moni-
toring reports about the situation of the family in their own country. This publication comprises the final
reports, giving the essentials of the social situation of the family from the point of view of experts from the
EU15 countries before enlargement.
The Observatory possessed many advantages and its structure is rather exemplary for scientific counselling.
It consisted of independent experts, one from each of the EU15 countries. They were not representatives of
their country, but excellent scholars in the fields of sociology, demography, statistics, economics and other social
sciences.They have general expertise in their disciplines which is not nationally bound. But they had also detai-
led knowledge of the situation in their own country. Since they were not representatives of their country or any
particular interest group, but are only responsible to their scientific knowledge, they could act and work inde-
pendently and the European Commission appreciated this independent position.
The country reports in this volume cover different fields and are integrated in a synthesis report. All
European countries face similar problems but these problems vary in their importance.Thus fertility is discussed
as well as family forms, including leaving the family household, generational relationships, relationships between
family members, especially the situation of young people. Children and the elderly, family policies, measures for
reconciling work and family, pension and health systems are also among the numerous issues raised.
The reader will thus obtain fundamental knowledge about diverse and similar situations within the EU15
and will glean detailed knowledge of the countries by reading individual country reports.The publication can be
seen as a handbook on the family situation in Europe before the enlargement.
In my role as coordinator and also as an expert, I would like to thank all members of the Austrian Institute
for Family Studies who helped to coordinate 15 different experts.This task cannot be underestimated, as every-
body who tries to organize scientists knows. Thanks are also due to the experts who tackled the different tasks
asked of them, writing reports, preparing papers for a broader audience and participating in various events all
over Europe, thus making this Observatory a challenging, intercultural and interdisciplinary organization, a truly
European enterprise for everyone.
Finally, I want to thank the ”heart” of our Observatory, Sylvia Trnka, who was not only in charge of admini-
stration but also took part in all the discussions, often guiding them with her calm sensitivity when practical
work was required.We greatly appreciated her contribution.
I trust the reader will enjoy reading the final reports as much as we enjoyed working on the issues.
Rudolf Richter
Member of the Co-ordination Team and National Expert for Austria
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WALTER BIEN
The situation of families in EU-15 
A synthesis based on the national reports
Introductory considerations
The family is a cornerstone of European societies.This applies regardless of whether EU bodies have or obtain
competences in family matters or whether the activities of such bodies, both implicitly and explicitly, focus on
families. Eventually, the future of the EU will be defined by Europeans who are now in their childhood and, in
the medium and long run, their own children and grandchildren. Human resources, i.e. the people and their abi-
lities and skills, provide the affluence of Old Europe. Promoting and optimising such human resources thus is the
premier prerequisite to ensure that the European Union will retain its internationally competitive position.The
family as a space for reproduction, socialisation, regeneration, and—at least equally important—potential buffer
against the ubiquitous hazards of life is typically underrated, underestimated and given less than its due. Almost
all social segments, be it in a regional, national or supranational context, fail to perceive how dependent they are
on the output of their own population and thus on well-functioning families.The young, i.e. the coming genera-
tions, present and future families, the succession of generations, determine the present and future of Europeans
to a much greater extent than is accounted for in legislation, economic relations and discussions of the current
decision-makers in the European Union.
The European Observatory on the Social Situation, Demography and Family provides a meeting point for
individuals from a range of nations and sciences, men and women from different generations, of different life-
styles and different views. They are not representative of their country of origin (nor can they be) but they
stand for the heterogeneity of Europe.Their exchange of views in a common language, on a common subject,
with a common objective and more or less regardless of their nationality is an example for a desirable future
co-operation in Europe. A young mother discussing with an experienced grandfather, the psychologist meeting
with the population scientist, and the female expert from the north exchanging opinions with the male expert
from the south—all this has produced a lively discourse on the subjects within the brief of the European
Observatory and is reflected in its national reports. Just as these national reports cannot span the variety of
individual countries, so does this summary fail to provide a representative picture of all the national reports. It
images the subjective angle of an individual expert in viewing the joint discussion.The point of this summary is
to excite the curiosity of readers to turn to individual national reports and perceive the diversity as well as
common aspects of family life in Europe.
The national reports and discussions of recent years have left the author with the impression that they
concentrate on deploring aspects that are hoped to be changed by proper intervention. But what is insuffi-
ciently discussed in the countries is the goals which are to be achieved by intervention and, even more, the
consequences which are to be expected when these goals are achieved.Thus it is widely deplored globally that
birth rates are too low, yet nobody is able to state specifically which birth rates are proper now or will be in
the future. If life expectancy were to remain unchanged, the generational intervals remained identical, net migra-
tion were zero and we were to achieve a stable labour market as well as other stable parameters, a birth rate
of just over 2.0 would be useful and desirable in the mid to long term. But for as long as many young adults are
unable to get into the labour market, life expectancy continues to grow and net migration is positive, such a
figure cannot be a useful target. But what is the proper target for today and the next years? Proposals for interven-
tion will make sense only when you have targets.Targets will make sense only when you understand and accept
their consequences.
A country or region obtains and maintains its affluence by competing with other countries or regions. For
Europe to keep its level of affluence, politicians should always keep in mind how their actions impact on com-
petition between the nations to achieve a good position in the future. Considering that Europe’s strength is its
human resources and social infrastructure and that Europe so far enjoys a good competitive position interna-
tionally, efforts in this field translate as investments in a good future.
The social infrastructure underlying Europe as a successful model is based on a system of solidarity which strives,
both at institutional and informal level, to establish and maintain fairness and equity between all involved. In such
a system, intergenerational exchange, whether institutionally through transfers or informally within families, plays
a crucial role.To this end, the concept of the ‘family’ should be broadly defined rather than reduced to the co-
habitation of parent(s) and minors in a single household. An example of this problem would be defining the
family as a social unit which cares for and raises one or more children—a definition used in the Netherlands. In
contrast to Durkheim—i.e. family as a spousal and parental partnership—this model uses parenting and thus
the parent/child relationship while the child grows up as the sole characteristic to define a family. Such a defini-
tion fails to include the reality of families that span three or more generations and ignores their positive effect
on future society.The Forum Familie in Bayern describes a family as a long-term solidarity community that, as a
rule, includes more than one generation.The purpose of this definition is to identify a subunit that will support
much of the current growth and future problem-solving capacity.
The following report comprises a (subjective) selection of problems that will—ultimately—be found in all
countries but are dealt with differently in current discussions. Accordingly it is useful to look at all national
reports individually, so as to understand the wide range of country-specific discussion patterns and approaches
as a basis for interpretation.
In asking experts to summarise and digest in a few pages almost a decade of family developments, family
problems and approaches to their solution in their respective countries, they were given a very demanding and
challenging task.Yet their varying approaches, weightings and nuances derived from their different origins have
produced a fascinating mosaic of the situation of families in Europe, the discussion of the family and efforts by
politicians and governments to deal with these problems. Obviously, the experts’ individuality has made a mark
on reports, but it is this mixture of individual views, that have not been pressed into a Procrustean bed of gen-
eral applicability and thus mediocrity, which ensures the attractiveness of co-operation within the Observatory
and its national reports, guaranteeing that all the reports and activities merge into a representative image of
European variety.
The following table offers an overview, or rather an enumeration, of subtopics dealt with during the period
under review and found in the national reports.
All these topics are more or less covered in all countries. A mark in bold typeface means that the relevant
topic is explicitly dealt with in the national report, whereas a mark in normal typeface means that the subject is
referred to implicitly in the report or has been assigned to a country from oral reports and discussions at the
European Observatory.The national reports, as well as discussions in individual countries, show that each coun-
try deals with specific problems which are assumed not to elicit the full understanding of other countries. Yet
when we look at the national reports overall and at the supraregional discussions at the Observatory over the
past years, we see that countries have much more in common than had been expected. Ultimately, all the prob-
lems listed actually occur everywhere, even though at different levels of intensity and different development sta-
ges.The interesting point of a Europe-wide discussion is that it offers a comparison between internal problems
and those experienced in other EU Member States that have already overcome a given stage. In this way,
successes as well as failures can be utilised to improve one’s own understanding of and response to the 
situation.
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Family relations
Family forms
Leaving family household (empty
nest)
Marriage rate, registered cohabi-
tation, homosexual marriages
Relationships, divorce, separation,
child contact in separated 
couples
Lone mother households
Childless women
Demographic situation
Birth rate
Timing of children
Large families
Birth out of wedlock
Abortion
Gender relations
Relationship (male, female, gen-
der)
Fathers
Female labour
Work-family balance (reconcilia-
tion)
Family violence
Generational relations
Well-being of children
Child care
Education system
Young people (unemployment)
Young people (family)
Situation (care) of the elderly
Socio-economic situation of
families
Employment, labour market
Housing
Family (child) poverty
Support, family network
Citizenship, migration
Convergence on EU mean,
regional view
Family policies
Family services
Role of family in society (family
policy)
Family mainstreaming, family as a
general discussion
Reducing public spending
Pension systems
Family transfer discussion
Family reporting
Family competence, family
education
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x
x x x
x x x x x
x x
x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x
x x x
x x x x x x x x
x x
x x x x
x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x
x x x x x
x x x x
x x x x x x
x x x
x x x x
Table 1: Overview of the subjects dealt with in the national reports 
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Examples of current debate at national level
The above table is yet another example of the variety and commonality found, but also of the difficulty en-
countered in systematising the subjects. It is the result of numerous but vain attempts to discover an overall
order that would be self-explanatory. In the end, the only option remaining was to approach the problem in an
enumerative and exemplary manner, foregoing the desire for a comprehensive and congruent structure. For
this, the following provides pointers to the current discussions at regional level.
In Belgium, a broad debate aimed at abolishing discrimination between family and gender forms has shaped
legislation, combined with efforts to improve the situation of families beyond financial transfers and the provi-
sion of services.Thus, child care is no longer seen exclusively from the angle of reconciliation between work and
family but, ever more expansively, as an investment in the future. Public discussion tends away from a family
policy to boost birth rates, towards a family-friendly policy, i.e. from a deficit policy to an investment policy for a
better future. Seen this way, Belgium is typical of European institutions. Although competency for most family
policies is vested in the regions, the government makes use of its central competencies as a key to creating a
better and safer future without negatively interfering with the delicate balance of subsidiary relationships.
Another example is Spain. Here, the birth rate appears to have reached its lowest point. With GDP 
growing and work prospects for women improving, these decisive factors are expected to continue their 
positive course. Yet young couples are still limited in their options to establish their own households, so that
housing policy and interventions to improve the housing market should contribute most to improving the situa-
tion in the future.
In Italy, the family has arrived at a mid-point between tradition and modernisation. While the family con-
tinues to be the centre and apex of life, its structures are gradually changing to resemble the European main-
stream. In contrast to central and northern Europe, providential services are still a family matter in Italy. The
number of families is growing while their size is shrinking. Partnerships are entered at a later date, weddings
become more infrequent, and separations and divorce are spreading.
One of the greatest changes in the Netherlands over the past decade is the development of a multitude of
transitional forms between leaving the parental nest and establishing a marital family. Same as in most countries,
divorce is on the rise in the Netherlands, but at the same time is increasingly seen as a negative lifecycle event
that should preferably be avoided.
The greatest change in Finland over the past ten years is that while the number of single households is 
higher than ever, there have never been as many people cohabiting as today.
In Greece, the current situation is typically interpreted as a weakening of family relations, but in actual fact
family forms appear to undergo a change such as has been taking place for a long time in other European coun-
tries.Yet Greece is still free of problems that have become acute elsewhere.
France holds a theoretically founded discussion on family rhetoric with the following dimensions:
 Family as an individual affair (problem or happiness) vs. family as an important subsystem of society for
which the government/politicians are responsible (duty of intervention).
 Family as a vision of how it could be if the actual problems did not exist vs. traditional family as a living real-
ity with all its problems and weaknesses. This tempts debaters to perceive the vision as positive and see
reality as being negative.
 Family affected by a change in values, where the negative progression towards individualisation is countered
by a desire for positive solidarity.
 Family in the centre of a debate on inequality, in terms of specific situations depending on the family phase
or constellation.
Debates of this sort are necessary and useful to ensure that options and conditions, and thus also needs, will be
preserved in their variety and not used for marginalisation in the political fight over the distribution of funds. But
they are always interacting with current problems.
While a high labour participation rate among women is perceived to be positive, due to the growing num-
ber of double-earner households it comes with a number of problems also in France: (a) directly for the part-
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ners themselves, e.g. through the need to renegotiate the share of household work and the need for more
child care facilities; (b) for society at large, because it will in the future be faced with the problem of how to dis-
tribute the gainful work available, because in an ageing society it will be not just the young who enter the labour
market but also the ‘young old’ who will look for access to work in order to preserve the social transfer
systems.The growth of double-earner households and a prolongation of active working life will also impact on
the care of the very old and those in need of nursing among the older generation, which services are no longer
provided by family members. It is also necessary to review the intergenerational contract and re-assign institu-
tional and family nursing. That there is a need for the latter (not just in France) was made ominously clear by
the heat wave in the summer of 2003, where more than 15,000 people died in France alone, a consequence
also of the changing intergenerational relationships in today’s families compared to former decades.
In Germany, efforts are made to develop a future scenario in the Agenda 2010, where the family and fami-
ly policy play an important role. The purpose is to find a social consensus, with the various actors (politics,
business, government, associations (a strong factor in Germany), as well as individual citizens) together devel-
oping an environment where family and child promotion are given more importance and the ‘structural incon-
siderateness’ diagnosed in former family reports is to give way to a positive child- and family-friendly environ-
ment.
Family relations and family forms
Generally speaking, families in the EU now have altogether more living space which has enabled a new level of
quality in family relations: intimateness at arm’s length—family members now live at a greater distance from
each other, compared to former times when large families lived in the same household or under the same roof.
In order to describe how families live together in their various forms and in real life, the usual practice of official
statistics, which record families solely as ‘households’, is no longer adequate. The problem is not so much that
EU Member States use different definitions of what constitutes a ‘household’. Where statistics go wrong is 
rather that they cannot depict families living in several households either under one roof or in neighbouring
houses interacting with their actual family links. Statistically viewed, multigenerational households dissolve into
individual and isolated households even when (to use an example) the new house of the young generation is
built in the orchard behind the house used by the parent generation and when their family life continues at the
same intensity but at a higher quality of living.
Longer and, quite possibly, more heterogeneous life courses constitute another problem for the statistical
depiction of families. Children leaving the nest, couples separating, lone parents remarrying or the death of a
family member—these are events only partly reflected in the statistics of family and household forms. Thus,
parents become statistically ‘childless’ when their grown-up children leave home. And when statisticians find an
increase in single households, this does not necessarily indicate that people turn away from family life to em-
brace individual life forms: many single households consist of widows after their family life or young adults before
starting a family. Such changes in life courses and in the cycle of family phases need not affect actual family
bonds but may impact on the overall statistical distribution of household and family arrangements in a given
country or in the EU overall and cause misinterpretations when statistics tell only of the number of households
and household members and the size of available living space without regarding actual family networks.
Specifically, the major changes in southern Europe need to be seen less as value changes and more in connec-
tion with non-intended changes attendant to the transition to modernity.
Greece has similarly seen an increase in the number of households whereas their size has declined. It is the
result of growing affluence and an resultant improvement in living conditions which enable people to enjoy 
intimacy at arm’s length. The greatest growth rate is in single households (from 16% to 20%). In Greece, the
modernising thrust for families means that the classical marriage is retreating, the first child is born later, mar-
riage phases are shorter, divorce and separation are on the increase, non-marital cohabitation becomes more
widespread, as do births out of wedlock.Yet in spite of all this, young grown-ups remain long with their parents:
over the past ten years, the age at which young men and women leave their parents’ home has on average
risen from 29 to 31 and from 24 to 27 respectively.
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In Italy, the young are even more reluctant to leave the nest, opting for partnership, marriage and childbirth
even later in life. Apart from objective reasons (longer education/training, problems in entering the labour mar-
ket, finding a suitable flat), this is also due to a subjective feeling of well-being, i.e. a positive balance between
parental support and supervision. Since parents similarly welcome and support their children’s longer stay, all
those involved appear to be satisfied with the parental home turning into a ‘Hotel Mama’. Altogether, both
generations consider the loss attendant to an early retreat to be greater than the advantages of the status quo.
Nevertheless, such personal profit maximisation gives rise to social problems: a widespread delay in starting on
young families causes demographic losses; getting used to the protection of the family may impair the ability to
lead an independent life at a later date; investment into education will remain fallow for a long time; and once
the family shield is lost, society cannot offer any adequate replacement from institutional services.
Portugal similarly records fewer and later weddings, an increase in non-marital cohabitation and births out
of wedlock, a rise in divorce and remarriage rates and a decline in birth rates. Here too the average household
size has shrunk since fewer children and fewer generations live under the same roof.The number of single house-
holds is growing because young grown-ups leave earlier and older persons (such as the grandparents) fre-
quently exchange the multigenerational household for a home of their own in order to improve their living
conditions.The largest group is made up of married couples.There is a rise of sole parents, particularly of never-
married sole parents (many of whom live with their parents) and a decline of multigenerational households.
Marriage, non-marital and registered (homosexual) cohabitation
The discussion of non-marital and registered partnership models is a smokescreen for innumerable debates
that focus on values. From a meta-point of view, modern secular societies have no reason not to review tradi-
tional forms of relationships and develop different, possibly better, frameworks, especially when tradition fails to
include other types of partnership such as non-marital or homosexual cohabitation or life-course changes such
as separation and divorce. Considering today’s higher life expectancy, marriage vows (‘until death do us part’)
no longer mean what they meant a few decades ago.Today it is customary and usual for many people to enter
into sequential partnerships prior and after a child-raising phase, regardless of marital bonds. Yet this certainly
does not mean that marriage has lost out in all or most of the countries.
Most youth studies and investigations of conditions required by potential parents to meet the wish for prog-
eny show that a reliable partnership is a crucial objective and prerequisite for a fulfilled life. Thus in Germany,
the probability of a child living with his/her own parents for the first 18 years of life is 80% for married parents
and 20% in non-marital partnerships. Accordingly the question is not: either registered partnership or mar-
riage—both forms are important, depending on the situation and expectations. Any public discussion, such as is
unfortunately all too common, where each side champions its own form and disparages the other will only be
harmful. An open discussion accepts that two adults may wish for a partnership in the spirit of solidarity but
outside marriage, but that on the other hand marriage as an institution is (at least so far) still the preferred 
option for many if not most of the future or present parents, and that both types should be fostered in re-
sponse to specific life situations.
In Belgium, the discussion of registering non-marital partnerships, homosexual marriage and acceptance of
private contracts to regulate cohabitation has resulted in full recognition of ”non marital cohabitation” as well as
”same-sex marriage”. Indeed, the LTC (Living Together Contracts) was institutionalised in 1996; whereas ”same-
sex marriage” was introduced January 30th 2003.
Since 1999, France has been offering the option of a pacte civil de solidarité (PACS) as a partnership model
for hetero- and homosexual couples. By 2003, some 100,000 such pacts had been registered. As a result, the
number of unmarried couples with children has grown, and marriage is no longer a prerequisite for couples
who want children. One outcome of this new situation is a rising birth rate.
In Finland, the marriage rate (married persons as a share of all over-15-year-olds) declined significantly be-
tween 1990 and 2001 (from 27.9% to 23.9% among men and from 23.7% to 20.6% among women). One 
reason for this is the postponement of first marriages, from 28.6 to 31.4 years (for men) and from 26.6 to 29.1
years (for women), another (e.g. for the lower marriage rate among women) is the longer lifetime (widow-
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hood), as well as the high share of non-marital partnerships. Since 2002 and following a long and still ongoing
debate, Finland has been offering gay and lesbian couples the option of a registered partnership.
Ireland is recording a dramatic rise in the number of non-marital as well as same-sex (non-marital) part-
nerships.
Similar to the situation in other southern European countries, non-marital partnership is a rather rare phe-
nomenon in Spain, although acceptance is growing among the populace. In the future, both non-marital part-
nerships and, consequently, the rate of births out of wedlock, are expected to grow. Legal recognition of non-
marital partnership is currently not an option.
Separation and divorce
Across Europe, separation and divorce vary in incidence and in the form of social recognition, and different
forms of legal acceptance and procedures have developed in the different countries of Europe. Generally, sepa-
ration and divorce are accepted as a reality in all of Europe, and their rates are steadily rising. One reason for
this certainly is the rise in life expectancy, a factor which by itself makes divorce and separation more probable
over a longer lifetime. Are such changes relevant for social discussion or are they simply unavoidable, welcome
or regrettable developments in a modern Europe?
Growing-up is associated with embarking upon partnerships which need not necessarily end up in a life-
long association.Terminating such a partnership may well be painful for those involved, but will not normally be
life-threatening, and is usually accepted by society. Problems will begin to abound when a partnership grows
into a family, i.e. becomes a community of grown solidarity that spans expectations of reliable support between
partners, between parents and their minor children, and between grandparents and grandchildren.
For most Europeans, the family as a reliable partnership is closely tied to a future that is worth living and
desirable.When such a system breaks and when broken families have much more problems than intact ones in
accessing resources, practical issues will crop up, away from any debate of values, that concern measures to sup-
port those affected and—even more important—preventive measures both to sustain relationships and to
cover periods after their breakup. Such measures to sustain families do not mean mandatory legal measures nor
efforts to preserve disrupted marriages at all cost. Prevention means taking serious the desire for a reliable
partnership, and thus taking preventive action against any avoidable potential for separation caused by inade-
quate conflict-handling know-how.This is where an investment of efforts yields greater interests than any sup-
port after separation. Preventive measures after separation include, i.e., gender equality in access to education,
training, jobs and careers, and a gender balance in the job and family work. It is only thus that gender-specific
poverty risks can be effectively prevented after separation.
Divorce rates in France have risen from 9% (1965) to over 40% (since 2000). Attendant to this, the num-
ber of sole parents and patchwork families (step-families) has similarly grown.
Austria similarly records a rise in divorce rates to, at present 46%. When looking at divorce rates we need
to understand that they are current divorces in terms of current weddings, i.e. divorce rates refer to a lower
base rate for marriages. An average marriage (the period between wedding and divorce) lasts for 9.5 years in
Austria. In Austria and in western Germany, some 80% of children below the age of 19 see their parents divor-
cing; 25% find their parents separated or divorced before they are 18 years old; 5% have never lived together
with both parents.
As a consequence of growing divorce and separation rates, lone parent households are similarly growing. In
Finland, the share of children with lone mothers rose from 9% in 1985 to 17.2% in 2002, that of children with
lone fathers from 1.1% in 1985 to 2.4% in 2002. Figures are even higher in Sweden, where 23% of children
below age 17 live with their lone mother and 5% with their lone father ; whereas 72% live with both biological
parents. Compared to this, only 1.5% of households in Greece are lone-parent ones, of which four-fifths are
lone mothers.
Ireland introduced a new and more liberal divorce law in 1997, in consequence of which divorces went up
by some 50%, which also increased the share of lone mothers.
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Even though the number of lone parents (and in particular that of lone mothers) is on the increase in most EU
Member States, we cannot claim that this is a new family form chosen as an alternative to a two-parent family.
With a very few exceptions, lone parenting is either the result of an unplanned pregnancy outside a steady rela-
tionship or it comes about when a jointly planned partnership breaks up. One indicator is the fact that in many
countries child poverty (to the extent defined) affects mostly the children of lone mothers. For this reason,
initiatives to improve the situation of lone mothers, by transfer benefits or, even better, by opening opportuni-
ties for them to participate in working life, need to be complemented by measures to prevent avoidable sepa-
rations and divorces: conflict management, improved couple management, couple and family counselling and
preventive conflict assistance are always preferable to post-fact help.
Childless women 
Germany exemplifies the many facets encountered in the debate on childlessness.There are hardly any reliable
figures on the subject, since even the microcensus does not ask about own children, but only about own child-
ren ‘in the household’.With this, each mother suddenly becomes ‘childless’ once the last grown-up child has left
the household. Discussions accordingly are pregnant with problems. A recent forecasts tells of more than 40%
of the female university graduates being permanently childless. This is frequently interpreted as women being
career-driven, selfish and refusing to bear children. As usual, appearances are deceptive, as are hastily drawn con-
clusions.
For one, there has always been a high share of permanently childless women (and men) in Germany (the
percentage of childless women at the end of the 19th century is exactly the same as that in the late 20th cen-
tury). Secondly, it is open to dispute whether, at a given birth rate, it is better for all women to get one child or
for many women to get two or three children and others to get none at all.Thirdly, the actual number of child-
ren is not representative of what people actually wish for. Same as other young people, students both male and
female at German universities wish to raise two or three children in a family, but obviously many of them fail to
fulfil their wish. Some don’t because they have no partner and choosing a partner is postponed and because—
with women marrying above their social status and men marrying below theirs—the growing qualification of
women makes the market increasingly difficult for highly qualified women. A second reason is shown up in near-
ly every European and national study: Many women who are forced by circumstances to choose between a
career and child now decide to postpone (but not give up) their wish for a child which, for biological reasons,
leads to their remaining childless. The attempt to marry above their status or embark on a career is often
connected to efforts to create conditions where future children would have better opportunities than if they
were born now. Post-modernist reasonings for childlessness—anticipated selfishness, individualisation that is
hostile to the community, and refusal to undertake the maternal role due to a consumer-driven conflict of inte-
rest—abound in the public debate, but fail to appear in empirical studies. Quite often the real reason for child-
lessness is not a rejection of children but rather an excessive ideal perception of optimal conditions for raising
children.
Seen against this background, the growing number of childless women—and especially of women with a
high qualification level—is certainly worrying but there is a range of influencing and intervention options open
to us other than appealing to allegedly unwilling women to undertake their maternal duties.
Births and birth rate 
In Austria, as in the rest of Europe, the own family is the most important reference group for the young. A con-
stant partnership and children are part and parcel of life planning for young people. Nevertheless, marriages are
steadily postponed, even though young Austrians leave the nest at a relatively early age, and the birth rate
remains at a relatively low level.
Compared to central and northern European states, it is Spain, Italy and other EU Member States in the
south-east of Europe which have the lowest birth rates. Apart from other trends comparable to the remaining
EU Member States, the south is characterised by two special features:
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 Young people leave their parental home at an extremely late date; thus delaying the first partnership and
birth. More supervision of the young people’s compliance with social standards means that the low legiti-
mate birth rates are not compensated by births out of wedlock as is customary in the northern and cen-
tral European states.
 Young people are equally desirous to reconcile job and family as are their peers in the rest of Europe.Yet
opportunities, especially for married women, to achieve a balance between work and children are substant-
ially fewer than hoped for. As a result, birth rates continue to decline or remain stable at a low level.
Owing to its specific socio-cultural background, Portugal is proceeding on its own course. After more than 50
years of dictatorship, the 1974 revolution caused a multiplicity of changes. Over the past quarter century, the
demographic behaviour and family forms have changed considerably. Recent years have been marked by conso-
lidation rather than dramatic change, but existing trends have continued. Portugal complies with the southern
European pattern, i.e.:
 strong ideological family bonds,
 late in joining the demographic change that has gripped central and northern Europe,
 more family-focused lifestyles,
 rudimentary explicit family policy.
Portugal experienced a steep drop in its birth rate during the 1980s and 1990s. Over the past 15 years, it has
remained relatively stable at 1.5, with most women expressing a wish to have two to three children. As the rea-
sons for the gap, women state:
 difficult circumstances (housing situation, standard of living, children being dependent for a long time, cost of
education),
 problems in reconciling job and family,
 health and age of the mothers.
At 1.3, Greece currently has a very low birth rate. Among the 30–39-year-olds, the trend is seen to be chan-
ging, i.e. at this age declining birth rates are reversed and rates are slowly creeping up again. Among the 25–29-
year-olds, a slight increase is found, while the under-25-year-olds continue to show declining rates. Long-term
expectations assume that the birth rate will grow and become stable at 1.7. In spite of the declining birth rate
and shrinking of households, Greece has the largest number of large households in the EU. Half the population
lives in households of four and more persons, and just 7% live in single-person households.
Ireland has seen a marked change in its demographic behaviour over recent years. The population has
grown as a result of net immigration and a surplus of births over death. Following a sharp drop prior to 1994,
births have slowly risen over the past years.The other indices demonstrate the same development that can be
found in other EU Member States: reduction of the household size, number of childless couples, the young
postpone leaving the nest, starting partnerships and giving birth to their first child, a higher number of births out
of wedlock, which is currently above the EU average.
In Finland, the cohorts from low-birth years have arrived at their age of fertility.Together with a reduction
of the birth rate from 1.84 to 1.71, this has cut births from 65,000 (1992) to 55,000 (2000).
Other than in the remaining EU, the marriage rate has recovered in France, as has the birth rate, which
rose from 1.68 (1994) to 1.91 (2003), even though the age of mothers at their first birth increased from 28.8
(1994) to 29.5 (2003). One reason for the increase in births is a high share of illegitimate births, partly deriving
from registered (non-marital) partnerships.
Same as in much of Europe, the birth rate in Austria (1.44) is substantially lower than the wish for children
(two compared to, e.g., Finland with 2.4).
In the Netherlands, only 20% of women were dissatisfied with the timing of birth (12% believed it was too late,
while 8% felt it was too early). Considering that the number of actual births correlates with the age for the first
birth, it will be necessary to influence women to wish for giving birth at an earlier age if higher birth rates are
desired.
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Abortion 
In Greece, gender equality is a subject of public debate and currently discussed from the angle of contraception.
The high abortion rate (one out of four women has already undergone an abortion) is to be reduced by the
use of modern contraception methods, thus eliminating implicit causes for abortion.
In Spain, abortion continues to be an unsettled issue. Adding abortion on social grounds to legal abortion
options is currently a subject of heated discussion, and the number of abortions demanded by young and very
young pregnant women is increasing.
In Portugal, the general consensus against abortion is much clearer than in the rest or average of Europe.
In Ireland, abortion continues to be illegal, but the known incidence has been rising since 1980, because
women make use of services in other European countries.
Gender relations
Fuelled by the high education level attained by Finnish women, gender relations have undergone a dramatic
change in Finland.The country has one of the highest labour participation rates of women in Europe, combined
with women making up a high share of the full-time working population. A special feature of the Nordic welfare
state is its consideration of women’s needs. A wide range of child-care facilities and closely knit social network
reduce their dependence on family networks. Nevertheless, the average income of Finnish women is still at
about 80% of the male income. Household work is still mostly done by women and larger families still practise
the classical male breadwinner model. Parental leave is taken by women, and the average working hours of
women are strongly influenced by the age of their children.
Sweden perceives itself at the cutting edge of worldwide efforts to eliminate gender inequality. Ever more
men contribute to household work and child care and take parental leave (17.5% of parental leave days are
taken by men). In Sweden (as in Germany), overall gainful employment in a family is equally distributed between
the two sexes, yet, as is the case in Germany, in terms of internal work-sharing, men tend to be more gainfully
employed while women put in more work for the family.
In Austria, child care and household work is designated female work (especially after the birth of the first
child). Parental leave is usually taken by women. In contrast to other parts of Europe, women in Germany and
Austria find it very difficult, at a subjective level, to reconcile family and work, even though both countries have
for many years made efforts in their family policies to improve this situation. Quite possibly, the negative assess-
ment is not based on the actual facts and options to reconcile family and job, but rather on a maternity ideol-
ogy which requires mothers to devote most of their day to their children. Faced with a different situation in
actual practice, this generates dissatisfaction. Gender relations have undergone substantial change in recent
decades, and this development will continue. Nevertheless, studies have found that two out of three women
and three out of four men are satisfied with their traditional role assignment. If we look at satisfaction levels
across family phases, we find a U-shaped curve: satisfaction in the partnership is down to a minimum after the
birth of the first (and also second) child, only to recover later.Violence in the family is a subject that is debated
and for which solutions at a political and administrative level are searched; fortunately, it is a problem only for a
minority of families.
In Belgium the antidiscrimination debate with regard to gender equality was focused on two subjects: divi-
sion of paid and unpaid work between the sexes and the naming of babies as a mark of relationship, especially
with regard to births out of wedlock. Belgium replaced a system that provided for a break in gainful employm-
ent within the scope of balancing family work, gainful employment and voluntary work with a time management
system which allows opting out of gainful employment for one year (or five years subject to special agreement).
The former scheme had been almost exclusively used by women, but the new system is distinctly more attrac-
tive to men and the utilisation rate has accordingly risen. People (and particularly men) are also taking more
parental leave, which can be combined with the new system.
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In the southern EU Member States, the issue of reconciling family and work is perceived as closely connected
to the low birth rate problem, combined with high unemployment, rather than as a problem of wasted ‘human
resources’ produced by an (enforced) withdrawal of women into their family.
In Spain, some initial steps are being taken to strengthen a more active paternal role, e.g. by granting gender-
independent parental leave. Over the past two years, the public debate has begun to focus on violence in the
family. The situation of women has improved since they can now react to violent behaviour by complaining to
the police. However, there has been a concordant rise in the number of women killed by their partners. Public
discussion and legislators strive to respond and work towards further improvement in the situation of women.
A higher labour participation rate of women and their better education have combined in Portugal to
reduce the number of male sole earners, so that double-earner households are now prevailing (two out of
three couples have double incomes, with a preponderance of full-time employment). One problem perceived is
that families are extremely dependent on grandparents to deliver child-care, since there are not enough inex-
pensive institutional child-care facilities. Portuguese women also suffer from a double burden because men’s
involvement in child-raising is totally inadequate. In terms of gender roles, Portugal is among the most conser-
vative countries: only 7% of the men say that they look after the children (EU-average: 15%).
For Greece, a change towards more gender equality can be found, but it is also clear that the country still
has a long way to go.Violence in the family is very high: 9% of all women experience violence in the narrower
sense, and 50% in a wider sense. The educational gap has been almost bridged, as is the case in other EU
Member States. Same as in these other countries, Greece still shows marked gender gaps with regard to in-
come, unemployment and average working hours. In spite of a dearth of job opportunities, the labour part-
icipation rate of women is steadily growing.
Well-being of children 
The Finnish are increasingly worried about the psychological burdens imposed on children, so that the country
has extensively invested into child psychiatry, which is to be combined with preventive counselling and parental
training for better-quality parenthood.
A number of studies performed in the Netherlands show that it is not structural features  (family forms,
poverty, migratory background, etc.) which chiefly impair the quality of the children’s growing-up process, but
rather procedural features, i.e. relations within a partnership and between parents and children.This also applies
when the quality of growing-up is measured against hard indicators, such as deviant behaviour at a later age. A
well-functioning family can serve as a buffer for structural problems (family form, poverty, disease, etc.). The
greatest risk of deviancy is borne by families whose internal relations are damaging to its members (regardless
of which structural characteristics define the family’s situation). This importance of procedural features is fre-
quently disguised by the correlation between problem behaviour and structural factors. But if we separate
those two, we find that procedural factors are five times as effective as the structural ones.
Compared to other countries and times, the children in Sweden now enjoy the highest standard of living.
Yet there is a high incidence of psychosomatic problems and obesity.
Child care
In contrast to the rest of Europe, Belgium is experiencing a gradual transition from informal to formal child care
for the under-three-year-olds. A multitude of facilities and types of care is offered, and considerable attention is
given to improving the quality of child care in order to ensure that the new generation will be fit for the future.
Similar to the situation in Belgium, France has a complex child care system which, in view of the high labour
participation rate of both parents, offers a wide range of services to enable parents to reconcile work and 
family.
In the Netherlands, legislators and society are in the middle of a debate on changes in the child care
system. Families continue to see child care exclusively as the women’s responsibility.There is an ongoing discus-
sion of the dangers attendant to institutional care and the positive effect of natural (maternal) care.This debate
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(which does not always remain at the scientific level) mirrors wide-spread resentment against parents who
leave their children to child-care facilities (the situation is similar in Germany and Austria).
In Greece, the range of child-care facilities on offer is far from adequate.The traditional model of care provi-
ded by grandparents is petering out but no substitute has yet been developed in the form of additional facilities.
Traditionally, public child care in Ireland was perceived only as a stop-gap measure in an emergency. Parents
were expected to find private arrangements.Yet in recent years, with women increasingly welcome to partici-
pate in working life, with parents calling for high-quality child care and seen from the angle of international
developments, demand for more public investment in child care services has been growing.
In Denmark there is a general consensus that early childhood is the base from which to ensure optimum
development of skills and abilities, with due regard to balancing the parents’ commitment to family and work.
The population agrees that the parents are responsible for raising their children and that the state/society needs
to provide the prerequisites that this claim will be optimally supported.
Generational relations 
When discussing the ageing society and its effects on human resources, only a few strategies can be pinpointed
which may preserve our work-based economic potential when the rate of the economically active population
(early 20s to early 60s) declines vis-à-vis the share of over-60-year-olds:
 Further boosting productivity.
 Delaying the retirement age, given generally better health and greater performance up to a ripe old age.
 Reducing the number of young adults ‘parked’ in training systems, a practice common in Europe, and substi-
tuting their training by life-long on-the-job learning.
 Human capital is increased not by the number of working people but by the quality of their education and
training. Investment into training of the young and life-long learning may help Europe retain its 
competitiveness even at a reduced labour force.
 Any mid- to long-term increase in the birth rate, even when only incremental, to a rate nearer to the
replacement level is one (but only one!) of many strategies which may impact in the future.
 Another strategy to be pursued may be efforts to reduce the death rates among the young caused by 
traffic accidents and suicide.
Seen altogether, no region within Europe can afford to waste its human resources. Provided that all individuals
are optimally educated and trained in line with their capacities and find their place in the employment and eco-
nomic system, and provided that nobody is left out due to their gender, socio-cultural origin, migratory back-
ground or other reasons, we have a good chance to survive for the next decades even without massive migra-
tion into EU-Europe in spite of a relatively low birth rate and an ageing society.
In Austria, generational relations (within the family and in the community) are a major subject of public dis-
cussion (in the media) and of great relevance in every-day politics (transfer debate). Even though in Austria, like
in many other countries, much of the nursing care accorded to the elderly is provided by the family, it is still
noticeable that the process of dying is increasingly shifted from the family to institutions.
The family support network in Italy continues to be strong and closely knitted. Yet there are signs of 
change, i.e. due to demographic changes (fewer children, more elderly) and the higher labour participation rate
of women.
In Greece, the family continues to enjoy great importance. Family networks are the constituent parts of the
overall social network, especially with regard to nursing care for the elderly.
Portugal has very few institutional facilities for the old (only 26% of the over-80-year-olds live on their own,
compared to an EU average of 45%). Nursing care is typically provided within the scope of the family.
Ireland has traditionally been one of those countries that emphasise private responsibility for the social
situation. Accordingly, the provision of nursing care for the elderly is mostly undertaken by the families (and
here again by the women). Public intervention is perceived to be a substitute for private nursing, although the
effects of demography are watched with concern.
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Belgium is different in that a large part of the nursing care for the elderly is supported by institutionally-pro-
vided assistance.
Denmark is governed by the maxim of individual responsibility and the objective for people to remain self-
sufficient in their own household for as long as possible. Once this is no longer possible, public services are pro-
vided for support and accommodation.
In Europe overall it appears that the old-age retirement systems are no longer sustainable if they continue
along present lines.The problem is unemployment and the link between retirement systems and gainful work,
the bulge of post-war births now moving towards retirement, combined with a low birth rate and a substan-
tially lower number of women of childbearing age compared to past decades. Efforts to solve the problems by
creating a new baby boom through appealing (especially to young women) to raise the birth rate are, in many
respects, short-sighted.The problem is chiefly that only a booming economy can pay for the transfers required
for a higher birth rate. Another problem is inadequate eligible gainful employment which, when the retirement
system is linked to work, will produce wide gaps. Either we need to raise the number of gainfully employed (i.e.
reduce unemployment) or break up the link between pension fund financing and gainful employment, always
providing that there is any cake left to distribute. Any rapid succession of baby boom and baby bust years will
cause problems in the future that are similar to those facing us now. Babies and children do not contribute to
the gross domestic product but act as a drain on the working part of the population.Young women and men
will not be motivated to get children just because of problems facing the social system. Quite on the contrary:
a progressively growing and constantly stoked fear that the social systems might break down is one reason for
the large gap between the number of children wanted by young adults and those they actually get.
Sweden discusses the ageing society and the ratio of old-age pensioners to active working population in
terms of migration and higher birth rates.Within the EU, Sweden already has the highest labour market partici-
pation rate of older persons.
Socio-economic situation of families 
Over the past years, Ireland has experienced rapid economic and social development. Nevertheless, different
strata of its population have profited to a different extent. Poverty is still widespread in Ireland: 12.3% of the
population are poor. Greece combines strong economic growth with a high degree of income inequality and
high unemployment, especially for young grown-ups and women.There, poverty is determined less by the chan-
ge of family structures (e.g. family size) than by a combination of low educational level, unemployment and rural
location, affecting the older rather the young parts of the population. Portugal experiences brisk economic 
growth, combined with high income inequality and high unemployment, especially for young adults and women.
A large part of its population is at risk of suffering poverty (21% vs. the European average of 15%). Over the
past three years, the economic boom has weakened and stagnated, as a consequence of which social benefits
have been substantially reduced.
Greece and Portugal have found themselves transformed from emigrant to immigrant countries. This has
had an enormous impact on their self-perception, on their administrations and on everyday life, causing prob-
lems that both countries are now required to solve.
France is faced with a paradox in its socio-economic situation: unemployment is declining, support 
measures are expanding, while at the same time inequality and the gap between wealth and poverty are wide-
ning, with available work increasingly shifting to low-paying ‘Macjobs’. For the families, this trend has meant a rise
in the number of double-earner couples.The situation is extremely problematic for lone parents whose single
earnings frequently place them markedly below average incomes.
In Finland, the gap between the bottom and top income strata has widened. Due to cuts in family transfers,
families, and especially lone parents, bear a greater risk of descending into poverty.
Italy records a higher rate of relative income poverty, exacerbated by a widening gap between its northern
and southern regions. Poverty continues to be a function of family size: the larger the family (i.e. the more child-
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ren), the higher is the risk of poverty. As a result, Italy is among the countries with the highest child poverty
rates in Europe. Families at the bottom end of society suffer particularly because the compensatory effect of
the social system does not have the level of efficiency that is standard in the rest of Europe.
Family policies
The family is in the grip of change. The number of states belonging to the European Union has shot up in
recent years.The resultant new Europe is striving to find its proper place in the world, to accept the commona-
lities and heterogeneities within the EU and to continue to grow together, all within the framework of eco-
nomic developments in the region as much as globally. National developments, EU activities, joint activities and
competition form a conglomerate which, while making it difficult to act congruently, offers great opportunities
for the future. Like much else, it is difficult to envisage the role that the family will play in a future Europe. But it
is undisputed that the family will continue to be the backbone of European society and bear a central part in
everyday life.
Rhetorically, ‘family policies’ are an important keyword. In some countries, administrative activities that
impact on the families’ day-to-day routine:
 are planned and implemented explicitly in line with family policy objectives,
 are reasoned, planned and implemented in other ways without naming explicit family policy objectives,
either because those ministries that execute them do not have a family policy brief, or because family policy
is not the responsibility of the relevant body, e.g. for reasons of subsidiarity.
Regardless of such rhetoric allocation, activities that affect family life can be found in all countries and regions of
the EU, at individual state, subregional and community level. When looking at family policies, we thus need to
consider the different rhetorical approach in reasoning activities pursued by countries and regions, which show
up different images of family policies without necessarily leading to differences or similarities in everyday life and
reality. A comparison of family-relevant activities within the EU, between the Member States and regions needs
to be done without much regard to family rhetoric. Actual marginal conditions, activities performed by indivi-
dual political institutions, regardless of whether they do or do not call them family policies, have a direct impact
on the real life of families in each country.
A comparison of laws, policies, services and transfer systems that relate to families is almost impossible to
do since such interventions frequently are not listed under or allocated to the ‘family policies’ category. A com-
parison of changes undergone by interventions in the various countries or between countries is even more dif-
ficult, since such interventions are described and recorded in the national reports by rhetorical changes, by the
use of standards, but not necessarily by their effect on actual changes in the life situations, family forms and fami-
ly phases.To give some examples:
Other than the central and south-eastern European countries, Denmark, in line with other Nordic coun-
tries, is pursuing a policy of entitlements, services and interventions directed at individuals rather than families.
Accordingly, the rise of births since 1983 is a consequence not of any pro-natalistic policy but of measures to
allow women to better reconcile family and work.
The Finnish report indicates the margin available for family support measures:
 strengthening relations between parents,
 birth rate,
 identity and legitimacy of children,
 child care,
 socialisation and education of children,
 protection and support of families,
 emotional support of families, and
 reconciliation of work and family.
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Finland concentrates on comprehensive family policies that cover all areas of intervention, even though their
intensity varies between sectors. As in many other countries, internal arrangements between partners are a
matter of privacy, which means that state interventions are scarce but also that couples are mostly left to their
own devices.
Family policy in the Netherlands shows little response to the current birth rate and hardly any efforts to
boost it. Families wish to resolve their problems themselves, and state bodies strive to accommodate them
since the other approach (i.e. offering institutional solutions) was rejected. For this reason, child care is provided
essentially by private networks.The state is retreating from institutional child care. However, this is counterpro-
ductive when an attempt is made to influence the strengthening of human resources by quality child care. In
summary it can be said that, in practical terms, there is no family policy taking place in the Netherlands at the
moment.
Sweden is pursuing a policy against inequality which closely links gender and family policies. As it is under-
pinned by the principle of universality and individual rights, it does not provide for family status categories: each
parent and each child is eligible for the same entitlements.
In Austria, family policy and family policy measures are key constituents of current political activities. Family
policy refers to financial transfers as much as family counselling, and also includes the promotion of family-
friendly businesses identified by family audits.
France has, for the past decade, assembled an almost innumerable array of family-relevant decisions and
laws on the one hand, and at the same time experienced a development of family indices (such as the birth
rate) that many experts consider exemplary, especially when compared to other Member States. However, no
proof can be found whether this development was prodded by the promotion of multi-child families, graduated
child care, reconciliation of job and family, by individual measures, by the entire bundle of measures or by some-
thing entirely different.
The change in the situation of families in Italy in recent years has led to pressure on the legislators which in
turn has effected change: amendments in the transfer payments, launching parental leave, an improvement of
access to the housing market, the introduction of tools to visualise social problems, such as collecting socio-poli-
tically relevant data. Family policy rhetoric has also undergone change: the family is increasingly accepted and
explicitly considered as a major factor in the social system. An active family policy to raise birth rates by direct
financial grants has recently been put in place. Italy is on its way from a traditional to a modern society, yet it
appears to be driven by its budget deficit rather than any proactive future vision of a society of tomorrow.
In Spain, political intervention for the benefit of families is driven mostly by tax incentives. Regional govern-
ment bodies are increasingly directing their efforts towards family policies.Very low birth rates in some regions,
together with immigration problems require local action, even though such problems are not yet fully recog-
nised at the national level.
Family values and opinions have experienced a great change in Portugal:
 from rejection to acceptance of divorce, i.e. from the standard lifelong partnership to patchwork families
and life phase partnerships,
 from the dominance of church-consecrated marriage to secular partnerships,
 from ignorance to knowledge of family planning methods (birth control methods),
 from gender-limited roles to partnership-based relations, where both parties are gainfully employed and
share the family work.
What has been left untouched is the great importance accorded to the family in everyday life, in the norms and
expectations. In Portugal, the idea of any explicit family policy tends to be rejected, even though a large number
of family-relevant amendments and laws have been adopted.
Prior to the International Year of the Family (1994), Ireland did not know any explicit family policy, but since
then the family and family policy have a fixed place on the national agenda.
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For Europe overall, the conclusions supplied by a contribution presented to the conference on Families, Change
and Social Policy in Europe at the occasion of the Irish Presidency might be helpful:1
 For the citizens of Europe, good family relations are key demands for their quality of life.
 (Potential) parents do not accept any political interference with family structures, family size, birth rates and
pro-natalist measures.
 Solidarity within the family is a double-edged sword: it may help to unburden the welfare state, but it may
also overburden the family, which in turn burdens the welfare state.
 There is no war between the generations in the families: intergenerational relations are much better 
described as solidarity within the family, even though there are frictions between the generations in every-
day life.
 The family acts as a buffer to alleviate social marginalisation. Nevertheless, two groups can be found in
Europe who feel marginalised in many countries: lone parents with little children and the long-term unem-
ployed.
 Lone parents in particular feel not just marginalised but are also disadvantaged in many other respects.
Here the welfare state is challenged to help without creating long-term (inherited) dependency on support
systems.
 The ability to reconcile work and family (especially in families with small children) appears to be a key pre-
requisite to improve the situation, albeit at different levels:
 reducing unemployment, i.e. access to work, ensuring (potential) parents a reliable income from work;
 reconciling work and family by offering child care services, flexible working hours, consideration of fami-
ly needs in the organisation of work, fair sharing of family obligations and work by both partners;
 lifecycle-focused career paths; i.e. efforts to avoid the collision of periods of high job demands, long
working hours and stressful work and periods of high-stress family work in caring for small children;
 reliable welfare state services of a foreseeable price, including transfer payments when work and family 
cannot be reconciled.
Altogether it appears that a climate of acceptance, recognition and potential as much as  foreseeable support in
problem situations is at least as (or perhaps even more) important for (potential) parents to take the step
towards family life and children. It is just as necessary to establish such a climate of trust among (new) families
as it is to offer concrete help and support in the event of a problem. Europe needs a climate of family-friend-
liness, family mainstreaming in debate and action, that provides a foundation so that citizens (whether justified
or not) no longer have cause to delay their essential wish for a stable family. Establishing such a climate is not
exactly helped when the various levels of responsibilities fight for competencies within the scope of subsidiary
activities. Opting for a family is a personal decision, interpreting the context within which such a decision is
made is a personal decision, but the effects of such a decision will affect the future of the entire region. Quite
possibly it would be better for European and national institutions to enter into the wishes and problems of
their citizens and adapt their political activities accordingly, than continue to foster illusions that they might be
able to adapt their citizens to their institutions.
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1 Summarised and collated by Hubert Krieger : Family life in Europe – Results of recent surveys on ‘Quality of Life’ in
Europe. Contribution to the Irish presidency conference Families, change and social policy in Europe, Dublin Castle,
13–14 May 2004.
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WALTER BIEN
Die Situation der Familien in EU-15:
Eine Synthese der nationalen Länderberichte
Vorüberlegungen
Familie ist der zentrale Orientierungspunkt im Leben der Menschen. Dies gilt unabhängig davon, ob die
Institutionen der Europäischen Union eine Zuständigkeit für Familie haben oder sich nehmen, und ob das
Handeln dieser Gremien implizit oder explizit auf Familien ausgerichtet ist. Die Zukunft der EU wird auf die
Dauer von den jetzt noch jungen EuropäerInnen und mittel- und langfristig auch durch deren Kinder und Enkel
bestimmt werden. Die Menschen und ihre Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten, also das Humankapital ist der Reichtum
des alten Europa. Die Förderung und Optimierung des Humankapitals ist damit die wichtigste Voraussetzung für
die Platzierung der Europäischen Union im internationalen Wettbewerb. Familie als Reproduktions-, Soziali-
sations- und Regenerierungsraum und, fast noch wichtiger, als potentieller Puffer für allgegenwärtige Gefähr-
dungen des Lebensverlaufs wird meist unterschätzt, unterbewertet und eher suboptimal gestützt. Nahezu alle
gesellschaftlichen Segmente sowohl im regionalen, nationalen oder übernationalen Kontext, übersehen ihre
Abhängigkeit von den Leistungen der eigenen Bevölkerung und damit von gut funktionierenden Familien. Die
Jugend, d. h. die nachfolgenden Generationen, die jetzigen und zukünftigen Familien, das Miteinander der
Generationen, bestimmen Alltag und Zukunft von EuropäerInnen in weitaus stärkerem Maße, als die Gesetz-
gebung, die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und die Diskussionen der Verantwortlichen in der Europäischen Union dies
berücksichtigen.
In der Europäischen Beobachtungsstelle zur sozialen Situation, Demographie und Familie treffen Personen
aus verschiedenen Nationen und unterschiedlichen Wissenschaftszweigen, VertreterInnen der beiden
Geschlechter und verschiedener Generationen, sowie Menschen mit unterschiedlichen Lebensweisen und
Sichtweisen der Problematik zusammen. Sie sind weder repräsentativ für ihr jeweiliges Herkunftsland und kön-
nen es auch nicht sein, sondern stehen eher für die Vielfältigkeit Europas. Der Austausch in einer gemeinsamen
Sprache, zu einem gemeinsamen Thema, mit einem gemeinsamen Ziel und relativ unabhängig von der
Nationalität ist ein Beispiel für die wünschenswerte zukünftige Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Die junge Mutter in
der Diskussion mit dem erfahrenen Großvater, der Psychologe im Gespräch mit dem Bevölkerungswis-
senschaftler und die Expertin aus dem hohen Norden im Austausch mit dem Experten aus dem Süden – dies
alles hat zu einer lebendigen Auseinandersetzung mit den Themen der Europäischen Beobachtungsstelle geführt
und spiegelt sich in den einzelnen Länderberichten wider. Genauso wenig wie die einzelnen Länderberichte die
Vielfalt jedes einzelnen Landes umfassen können, genauso wenig kann diese Zusammenfassung repräsentativ für
alle Länderberichte sein. Sie bildet die subjektive Wahrnehmung eines einzelnen Experten in der Wahrnehmung
der gemeinsamen Diskussion ab. Sinn der Zusammenfassung ist es, neugierig auf die einzelnen Länderberichte
und die Vielfalt und Gemeinsamkeit europäischen Familienlebens zu machen.
Die Länderberichte und die Diskussionen der letzten Jahre hinterließen beim Autor den Eindruck, dass viele
Dinge im Status quo beklagt werden, von denen erhofft wird, dass sie sich in der Zukunft durch die richtigen
Interventionen ändern werden. Was in den einzelnen Ländern oft zu wenig diskutiert wird, sind die
Zielvorstellungen, die durch die Interventionen erreicht werden sollen, und erst recht nicht die Konsequenzen,
die mit der Erfüllung der Zielvorstellungen zu erwarten sind. Z. B. ist die Klage, dass die Geburtenraten zu nied-
rig sind, international weit verbreitet, ohne dass irgendjemand sagen könnte, was denn hier und heute und in
Zukunft die richtigen Geburtenraten sein werden. Falls die Lebenserwartung sich nicht verändern würde, der
Generationenabstand gleich bliebe, die Nettomigration gleich Null wäre und wir einen stabil bleibenden
Erwerbsarbeitsmarkt hätten und noch andere Parameter stabil blieben, dann (und nur dann) wäre mittel- und
langfristig eine Geburtenrate knapp über zwei sinnvoll und erstrebenswert. Solange aber viele junge
Erwachsene nicht auf dem Erwerbsarbeitsmarkt unterkommen, die Lebenserwartung weiter steigt und die
Nettomigration positiv ist, kann diese Zahl nicht als Zielvorstellung dienen.Was aber ist die richtige Zielvorgabe
für heute und die nächsten Jahre? Interventionsvorschläge können nur dann sinnvoll sein, wenn man Zielvor-
gaben hat. Zielvorgaben sind nur dann sinnvoll, wenn man die Konsequenzen kennt und zu ihnen steht.
Der Wohlstand eines Landes oder einer Region wird im Wettbewerb mit anderen Ländern bzw. mit anderen
Regionen errungen und erhalten. Damit Europa seinen Wohlstand erhalten kann, sollte das politische Handeln
immer die Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb der Nationen um einen guten Platz in der Zukunft berücksichti-
gen. Da die Stärke Europas im Humankapital und der sozialen Infrastruktur liegt und bis jetzt Europa im inter-
nationalen Wettbewerb hierdurch gut positioniert ist, sind Anstrengungen in diesem Bereich Investitionen in
eine gute Zukunft.
Die soziale Infrastruktur, auf der sich das erfolgreiche Modell Europa etabliert hat, basiert auf einem
Solidarsystem, das sowohl institutionell wie informell versucht, Fairness zwischen den Beteiligten aufzubauen
und zu halten. In diesem System spielt der Austausch zwischen Generationen institutionell über Transfer und
informell in Familien eine bedeutende Rolle. In diesem Sinne sollte Familie eher weit gefasst und nicht auf das
Zusammenleben mit minderjährigen Kindern im Haushalt reduziert sein. Ein Problembeispiel ist die Definition
von Familie als soziale Einheit, in der ein Kind oder mehrere Kinder betreut bzw. aufgezogen werden, wie sie in
den Niederlanden vorgenommen wurde. Anders als im durkheimschen Sinne – d. h. Familie als Partnerschaft
und Elternschaft – wurde hier die Elternschaft und damit die Eltern-Kind-Beziehung in der Zeit des
Aufwachsens der Kinder als ausschließliches Familiendefinitionsmerkmal gewählt. Die Realität von Familien, die
über drei und mehr Generationen gelebt werden, wird durch eine solche Definition nicht erfasst und ihre posi-
tive Wirkung auf die zukünftige Gesellschaft wird unterschlagen. Das Forum Familie in Bayern beschreibt Familie
als eine auf Dauer angelegte Solidargemeinschaft, die in der Regel mehr als eine Generation umfasst. Ziel-
setzung dieser Definition ist es, eine Subeinheit der Gesellschaft zu definieren, auf der ein Großteil der gegen-
wärtigen Wohlstandsentwicklung und der zukünftig zu erwartenden Problembehandlung liegen wird.
Der nachfolgende Bericht zeigt eine (subjektive) Auswahl von Problemen, die letztendlich in allen Ländern vor-
handen sind, aber in der aktuellen Diskussion unterschiedlich wahrgenommen werden. Daher ist es sinnvoll, sich
alle einzelnen Länderberichte anzuschauen, um die gesamte Variation der länderspezifischen Diskussionsmuster
und Lösungsansätze als Interpretationsbasis zu erschließen.
Die Aufgabe an die einzelnen ExpertInnen, fast zehn Jahre Familienentwicklung, Familienprobleme und
Ansätze zur Lösung im eigenen Land zusammenzufassen und dies auf wenigen Seiten niederzulegen, war sehr
anspruchsvoll und schwierig zu realisieren. Trotzdem ergeben die unterschiedlichen Angehensweisen, Gewich-
tungen und Färbungen aus der unterschiedlichen Herkunft der ExpertInnen ein faszinierendes Mosaik von der
Situation der Familien in Europa, der Diskussion um die Familie und den Bemühungen von Politik und
Administration, auf diese Probleme einzugehen. Sicherlich hat die Individualität der einzelnen ExpertInnen die
Berichte gefärbt, aber gerade die Mischung dieser individuellen Sichtweisen, die nicht in das Procrustes-Bett
einer generellen Repräsentativität und damit Mittelmäßigkeit gepresst wurde, macht den Reiz der Zusammen-
arbeit in der Beobachtungsstelle und bei den Länderberichten aus und stellt sicher, dass über alle Berichte und
Aktivitäten hinweg ein repräsentatives Bild der Vielfalt in Europa gezeichnet wird.
Die nachfolgende Tabelle (S. 28) bietet einen Überblick oder besser eine Aufzählung über die einzelnen
Subthemen, die im Berichtszeitraum angesprochen wurden und sich in den nachfolgenden Länderberichten
wiederfinden.
Alle genannten Themen sind in allen Ländern mehr oder weniger präsent. Die fett gedruckten
Ankreuzungen bedeuten, dass die Themen explizit in den jeweiligen Länderberichten angesprochen und hervor-
gehoben sind. Die schwächer gedruckten Ankreuzungen bedeuten, dass die Themen implizit in den Berichten
erwähnt werden bzw. aus den mündlichen Berichten und Diskussionen in der Europäischen Beobachtungsstelle
den einzelnen Ländern zugeschrieben wurden. Die Länderberichte und zum Teil auch einzelne Diskussionen in
den verschiedenen Ländern zeigen, dass sich jedes Land in einer gewissen Weise mit spezifischen Problemen
beschäftigt, von denen angenommen wird, das hierfür bei anderen Ländern nicht unbedingt Verständnis voraus-
gesetzt werden kann. Betrachtet man die Länderberichte aber insgesamt sowie die Diskussionen, die in den
letzten Jahren überregional in der Beobachtungsstelle geführt wurden, merkt man, dass die Gemeinsamkeiten
der verschiedenen Länder sehr viel größer sind als erwartet worden war. Letztlich treten alle genannten
Probleme überall auf, allerdings mit unterschiedlicher Intensität und in unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsstadien.
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Das Interessante für eine europäische Diskussion ist dabei, die aktuelle Problemlage im eigenen Land mit der in
anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten zu vergleichen, die über dieses Stadium bereits hinausgekommen sind. So können
Erfolge wie auch Misserfolge dazu genutzt werden, die eigene Situation besser zu verstehen und angemessener
darauf zu reagieren.
Beispiele für aktuelle Debatten in einzelnen Ländern
Die Tabelle ist ein weiteres Beispiel für Vielfalt und Gemeinsamkeit, aber auch für die Schwierigkeit, eine
Ordnung der Themen zu erstellen. Sie ist das Ergebnis einer Vielzahl von vergeblichen Versuchen, eine übergrei-
fende Ordnung, die aus sich heraus verständlich ist, zu finden. Letztendlich bleibt nur die Möglichkeit, sich auf-
zählend und beispielhaft der Problemvielfalt zu nähern ohne den Wunsch nach einer umfassenden, in sich kon-
gruenten Gliederung erfüllen zu können. Dafür sind die folgenden Aussagen zu aktuellen Auseinandersetzungen
in den einzelnen Regionen ein Hinweis.
In Belgien hat in den letzten Jahren eine breite Debatte gegen die Diskriminierung von Familienformen und
sexuellen Orientierungen die Gesetzgebung bestimmt, verbunden mit einer Sicht auf die Verbesserung der
Situation von Familien auch jenseits von finanziellen Transfers und der Bereitstellung von Dienstleistungen. So
wird z. B. die Betreuung von Kindern nicht mehr ausschließlich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Vereinbarkeit von
Beruf und Familie gesehen, sondern mehr und mehr als Investition in die Zukunft. Der Trend der öffentlichen
Diskussion führt weg von einer Familienpolitik zur Hebung der Geburtenrate, hin zu einer familienfreundlichen
Politik, also von einer Defizitpolitik zu einer investiven Politik für eine bessere Zukunft. Belgien kann insofern als
Beispiel für europäische Institutionen gelten. Zwar liegt auch hier die Verantwortung für die meisten familienpo-
litischen Bereiche bei den Regionen, aber die Regierung nutzt ihre zentralen Zuständigkeiten insbesondere für
die Familie als einen Schlüssel zu einer verbesserten und gesicherten Zukunft, ohne in das Feinwerk subsidiärer
Beziehungen negativ einzugreifen.
Ein anderes Beispiel ist Spanien. Hier sieht es so aus, als ob der tiefste Punkt der Geburtenrate erreicht
wäre. Ein steigendes Bruttosozialprodukt sowie verbesserte Erwerbsaussichten für Frauen sind hierfür aus-
schlaggebend und werden sich wohl weiterhin positiv entwickeln. Die Möglichkeit für junge Paare, einen eigenen
Haushalt zu gründen, ist jedoch nach wie vor sehr beschränkt, so dass sich die Wohnungspolitik mit
Interventionen zur Verbesserung des Wohnungsmarktes in Zukunft wohl am stärksten auf eine Verbesserung
der Situation auswirken wird.
In Italien ist die Familie mitten auf dem Weg zwischen Tradition und Modernisierung. Sie ist weiterhin der
Lebensmittelpunkt, obwohl sich die Familienstrukturen in Richtung des europäischen ‚Mainstream’ verändern.
Anders als in Mittel- und Nordeuropa, ist Vorsorge in Italien weiterhin Familiensache. Die Zahl der Familien
nimmt zu, während die Familiengröße abnimmt. Der Beginn von Partnerschaftsgründungen verschiebt sich nach
hinten, die Zahl der Eheschließungen wird kleiner und Trennungen und Scheidungen werden etwas häufiger.
In den Niederlanden ist eine der größten Veränderungen in den letzten zehn Jahren, dass es zwischen dem
Auszug erwachsener Kinder aus dem Elternhaus und dem Übergang in die eheliche Familie eine Vielzahl von
Übergangsformen gibt. Wie in den meisten Ländern nehmen auch in den Niederlanden die Scheidungen zu,
aber gleichzeitig wird die Scheidung mehr und mehr als ein negatives Lebensereignis gesehen, das es, wenn
eben möglich, zu vermeiden gilt.
In Finnland besteht die größte Veränderung der letzten zehn Jahre darin, dass es einerseits so viele
Einpersonenhaushalte gibt wie niemals zuvor, andererseits aber auch so viele Menschen in Partnerschaften
zusammenleben wie niemals zuvor.
In Griechenland wird die gegenwärtige Situation zwar häufig so interpretiert, dass die Familienbeziehungen
schwächer werden, aber es handelt sich wohl eher um einen Wandel der Familienformen, wie er in anderen
europäischen Ländern schon seit längerer Zeit vor sich geht. Andererseits hat Griechenland viele Probleme
noch nicht, die woanders schon akut geworden sind.
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Familienverhältnisse
Familienformen
Auszug aus dem Familienhaushalt
(leeres Nest)
Heiratsquote, eingetragene
eheähnliche Gemeinschaften,
homosexuelle Ehen
Beziehungen, Scheidung,Tren-
nung, Kinderkontakt bei getrenn-
ten Ehepartnern 
Haushalte von alleinstehenden
Müttern 
Kinderlose Frauen 
Demographische Situation 
Geburtenrate
Gebärabstand 
Großfamilien 
Uneheliche Kinder 
Abtreibung
Beziehungen zwischen den
Geschlechtern
Beziehungen (männlich, weiblich,
Gender-Fragen)
Väter
Frauenarbeit
Vereinbarkeit von Arbeit und
Familie 
Gewalt in der Familie 
Beziehungen zwischen den
Generationen 
Kinderwohl 
Kinderbetreuung
Schulsystem 
Jugendliche (Arbeitslosigkeit) 
Jugendliche (Familie) 
Situation (Pflege) der Alten 
Sozioökonomische Situa-
tion der Familien 
Beschäftigung, Arbeitsmarkt 
Wohnsituation
Familien- (Kinder-)Armut 
Unterstützung, Familiennetz 
Staatsbürgerschaft, Migration 
Konvergenz zum EU-Mittel,
regionale Ansicht
Familienpolitik 
Familiendienste 
Rolle der Familie in der
Gesellschaft (Familienpolitik) 
Familien-Mainstreaming, Familie in
der allgemeinen Diskussion 
Reduzierung der öffentlichen
Ausgaben 
Pensionssysteme
Diskussion von
Familientransferleistungen 
Familienberichte
Familienkompetenz, Ausbildung in
der Familie
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Tabelle 1: Überblick über die Themen in den Länderberichten
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In Frankreich findet eine theoretisch fundierte Diskussion um Familienrhetorik in folgenden Dimensionen statt:
 Familie als individuelle Angelegenheit (Problem oder Glück) versus Familie als wichtiges Subsystem der
Gesellschaft, für das die Administration bzw. die Politik zuständig ist (Interventionspflicht).
 Familie als Vision, wie sie sein könnte, wenn es die realen Probleme nicht gäbe, versus traditionelle
Familie als gelebte Realität mit Problemen oder Schwächen. Eine derartige Diskussion verführt dazu, die
Vision positiv zu besetzen und die Realität daneben negativ.
 Familie unter den Auswirkungen einer Werteveränderung, die einer negativen Entwicklung zur
Individualisierung eine positiv gewünschte Solidarität entgegensetzt.
 Familie im Rahmen einer Ungleichheitsdebatte, bezogen auf die spezifischen Situationen je nach
Familienphase oder Familienkonstellation.
Solche Debatten sind notwendig und sinnvoll, damit die Möglichkeiten und Bedingungen und damit auch die
Bedürfnisse in ihrer Vielfalt erhalten bleiben und nicht im politischen Verteilungskampf zu Ausgrenzungen
benutzt werden. Sie stehen aber auch immer in Wechselwirkung mit aktuellen Problemen.
So positiv die hohe Erwerbsbeteiligung von Frauen gesehen wird, sie bringt sie auch in Frankreich durch die
zunehmende Zahl von Doppelverdiener-Haushalten eine Reihe von Problemen mit sich: (a) unmittelbar für die
Partner z. B. eine neue Aushandlung der Verteilung von Hausarbeit und Bedarf an mehr Kinderbetreuungsmög-
lichkeiten; (b) gesamtgesellschaftlich stellt sich für die Zukunft das Problem der Verteilung der Erwerbsarbeit, da
durch das Älterwerden der Gesellschaft neben den Jungen, die auf den Erwerbsarbeitsmarkt drängen, auch
‚junge Alte’ einen Zugang zum Erwerbsarbeitsmarkt suchen, um die sozialen Transfersysteme erhalten zu kön-
nen. Die Zunahme der Doppelverdiener-Haushalte und die Verlängerung des aktiven Erwerbslebens haben
auch Auswirkungen auf die Betreuung der sehr Alten und Pflegebedürftigen in der älteren Generation, die
immer weniger durch Familienangehörige erfolgt. Notwendig ist also eine neue Bestimmung des Generationen-
vertrags bzw. eine andere Verteilung zwischen institutioneller und familialer Pflege. Dass hier (nicht nur in
Frankreich) ein Handlungsbedarf besteht, zeigte die letzte Hitzewelle im Sommer 2003, bei der allein in
Frankreich über 15.000 Menschen starben, bedingt auch durch ein verändertes Generationenverhältnis in den
Familien heute, verglichen mit den Jahrzehnten davor.
In Deutschland wird versucht, mit der Agenda 2010 ein Zukunftsszenario zu entwickeln, in dem Familie und
Familienpolitik eine wesentliche Rolle spielen. Das Ziel dabei ist, einen gesellschaftlichen Konsens zu finden, in
dem die unterschiedlichen Akteure – Politik, Wirtschaft, Administration, die in Deutschland starke Verbands-
struktur, aber auch die einzelnen BürgerInnen – gemeinsam eine Umgebung entwickeln, in der Familie und
Nachwuchsförderung einen höheren Stellenwert haben und die ‚strukturelle Rücksichtslosigkeit’, die in früheren
Familienberichten diagnostiziert wurde, einer positiven kinder- und familienfreundlichen Umgebung weichen soll.
Familienbeziehungen und Familienformen
Generell gilt für die EU, dass die Familien insgesamt über mehr Wohnraum verfügen und deshalb eine neue
Qualität von Familienbeziehungen möglich geworden ist: Intimität auf Distanz. Das heißt, dass die
Wohnentfernungen zwischen den Familienmitgliedern größer geworden sind im Vergleich zu früher, als größere
Familien im gleichen Haushalt oder unter einem gemeinsamen Dach zusammenlebten. Um das tatsächliche
Zusammenleben von Familien in verschiedenen Formen der Wirklichkeit angemessen zu beschreiben, reicht die
übliche Praxis der Amtlichen Statistiken nicht aus, die Familien nur als Haushalte erfassen. Das Problem ist weni-
ger, dass die Definition von Haushalt in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten der EU unterschiedlich ist. Der Mangel der
Statistik besteht vielmehr darin, dass sie Familien, die auf mehrere Haushalte unter einem Dach oder in benach-
barten Häusern aufgeteilt leben, nicht in ihrem tatsächlich gelebten Familienzusammenhang erfassen kann.
Statistisch lösen sich Mehrgenerationenhaushalte in isolierte Einzelhaushalte auf, auch wenn z. B. das neue Haus
der jungen Generation im Apfelgarten hinter dem Haus der Elterngeneration steht und das Familienleben in
gleicher Intensität und mit höherer Lebensqualität weitergeführt wird.
Ein weiteres Problem für die statistische Erfassung der Familie stellen längere und damit eventuell auch
heterogenere Lebensläufe dar. Der Auszug der Kinder aus dem elterlichen Haushalt, die Trennung von Paaren,
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die Neuverheiratung alleinstehender Eltern oder der Tod eines Familienmitglieds spiegeln sich nur zum Teil in
den Verteilungen der Familien- und Haushaltsformen wieder. Zum Beispiel scheinen in der Statistik Paare als
‚kinderlos’ auf, nachdem die erwachsenen Kinder aus dem elterlichen Haushalt ausgezogen sind. Oder wenn sta-
tistisch eine Zunahme von Einpersonenhaushalten festgestellt wird, muss dies nicht eine Abkehr vom Familien-
leben und eine wachsende Konkurrenz durch Individualisierung bedeuten, denn in vielen Einpersonenhaus-
halten leben zum Beispiel Witwen nach der aktiven Familienzeit oder junge Erwachsene vor ihrer
Familiengründung. Solche Veränderungen in den Lebensläufen und im Laufe der verschiedenen Familienphasen
müssen keine Auswirkungen auf die tatsächlich gelebten Familienzusammenhänge haben, können sich aber stati-
stisch in der Gesamtverteilung aller Haushalts- und Familienkonstellationen eines Landes und der EU auswirken
und zu Fehlinterpretationen führen, wenn nur die Zahl der Haushalte und der Haushaltsmitglieder und die
Größe des benutzten Wohnraums erfasst werden und die gelebten Familiennetzwerke unberücksichtigt bleiben.
Insbesondere die großen Veränderungen in Südeuropa sind weniger im Bereich Wertewandel als im
Zusammenhang mit nicht intendierten Veränderungen des Übergangs in die Moderne zu verstehen.
Auch in Griechenland hat die Anzahl der Haushalte zugenommen, ihre Größe allerdings abgenommen. Dies
ist auf die Zunahme des Wohlstands und die folglich besseren Wohnbedingungen zurückzuführen, welche es
ermöglichen, Intimität auf Distanz zu leben. Den größten Zuwachs findet man bei Einpersonenhaushalten (von
16% auf 20%). Die Modernisierung der Gesellschaft von Griechenland bedeutet im Bezug auf die Familien einen
Rückgang der klassischen Ehe, eine Verschiebung der ersten Geburt nach hinten, kürzere Phasen des
Verheiratetseins, verbunden mit einer Zunahme von Scheidungen und Trennungen, einer Zunahme von nicht-
ehelichen Lebensgemeinschaften und damit auch einer Zunahme von nichtehelichen Geburten.Trotzdem blei-
ben die jungen Erwachsenen lange bei ihren Eltern. In den letzten 10 Jahren ist der Durchschnitt des
Auszugsalters bei jungen Männern von 29 auf 31 und bei jungen Frauen von 24 auf 27 gestiegen.
In Italien verbleiben die jungen Leute noch länger im elterlichen Haushalt, entscheiden sich später für
Partnerschaften, Heirat und Geburten. Einer der Gründe dafür ist neben objektiven Ursachen (späteres Ende
der Ausbildung, Probleme des Eintritts in den Erwerbsarbeitsmarkt, Finden einer angemessenen Wohnung) auch
das subjektive Wohlbefinden, d. h. eine positive Bilanz zwischen elterlicher Unterstützung und Kontrolle. Da
auch die Eltern den längeren Aufenthalt positiv sehen und unterstützen, scheinen alle Beteiligten mit der
Entwicklung der elterlichen Wohnung zum ‚Hotel Mama’ zufrieden zu sein. Insgesamt werden von beiden
Generationen die Verluste bei einem früheren Auszug höher eingeschätzt als die Vorteile des Status quo.
Allerdings gibt es durch diese persönliche Gewinnmaximierung gesellschaftliche Probleme. Die Verschiebung
der Familiengründung nach hinten führt zu demographischen Verlusten; das Gewöhnen an den Familienschutz
kann die spätere Unabhängigkeit negativ beeinflussen; die Investitionen in die Erziehung bleiben über lange Zeit
brach liegen; wenn der Familienschutz einmal entfällt, kann die Gesellschaft über institutionelle Hilfen keinen
adäquaten Schutz liefern.
Auch in Portugal werden Eheschließungen weniger und finden später statt, nehmen nichteheliche Lebens-
gemeinschaften und uneheliche Geburten zu, wachsen Scheidungs- und Wiederverheiratungsraten und liegen
die Geburtenziffern niedrig. Auch in Portugal hat sich die durchschnittliche Haushaltsgröße verkleinert, weil
weniger Kinder und weniger Generationen in einem Haushalt zusammenleben. Entsprechend steigt die Zahl der
Einpersonenhaushalte, weil junge Erwachsene ihre Familien früher verlassen und ältere Personen (wie z. B. die
Großeltern) häufiger aus dem Mehrgenerationenhaushalt ausziehen und alleine leben, um ihre Wohnverhältnis-
se zu verbessern. Die größte Gruppe bilden verheiratete Paare. Es gibt eine Zunahme von Alleinerziehenden,
insbesondere von niemals verheirateten Alleinerziehenden (viele davon leben bei ihren Eltern) und eine
Abnahme von Mehrgenerationen-Haushalten.
Heirat, nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaften und eingetragene
(homosexuelle) Lebensgemeinschaften
Hinter der Diskussion um nichteheliche bzw. eingetragene Partnerschaften verbirgt sich eine Vielzahl von
Wertediskussionen. Aus einer Metasicht gibt es in modernen, säkularisierten Gesellschaften keinen Grund, tradi-
tionelle Beziehungsformen nicht zu überprüfen und gegebenenfalls bessere und andere Rahmenbedingungen zu
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schaffen, insbesondere wenn die Tradition andere gelebte Partnerschaftsformen wie z. B. nichteheliche oder
homosexuelle Lebensgemeinschaften oder lebenslaufbedingte Veränderungen wie Trennung und Scheidung
nicht einbezieht. Mit der höheren Lebenserwartung bedeutet die eheliche Bindung („bis dass der Tod euch
scheidet”) heute etwas ganz anderes, als dies noch vor ein paar Jahrzehnten der Fall war. Heute gehört es zur
Realität, dass viele Menschen sequentielle Partnerschaften vor und nach einer Phase mit Kindern eingehen,
unabhängig von ehelichen Bindungen. Auf der anderen Seite bedeutet dies aber nicht, dass damit das
Partnerschaftsmodell der Ehe in allen oder der Mehrzahl der Länder weniger Bedeutung hätte oder gar
abgelöst wäre.
Die meisten Jugendstudien und Untersuchungen der Bedingungen für die Realisierung eines vorhandenen
Kinderwunschs zeigen, dass eine verlässliche Partnerschaft das wesentliche Ziel und die Voraussetzung für ein
erfülltes Leben darstellt. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein Kind die ersten 18 Jahre seines Lebens bei seinen bei-
den leiblichen Eltern lebt, liegt z. B. in Deutschland in Ehen bei 80 % und in nichtehelichen Lebensgemein-
schaften bei 20 %. Demnach kann die Frage nicht heißen, eingetragene Partnerschaft oder Ehe, sondern beide
Formen haben, je nach Lebenssituation und Erwartungen, ihre Bedeutung. Eine öffentliche Diskussion, wie sie
leider oft geführt wird, in der eine der beiden Formen zu Lasten der anderen propagiert wird, kann nur schäd-
lich wirken. Eine offene Diskussion akzeptiert, dass außerhalb der Ehe gewünschte Solidargemeinschaften zwi-
schen zwei Erwachsenen existieren, dass aber andererseits die Institution Ehe für viele, wenn nicht sogar für die
meisten der zukünftigen oder bereits realisierten Elternschaften eine zumindest jetzt noch konkurrenzlose
Lebensform ist, und dass beides lebenssituations-spezifisch gefördert werden sollte.
In Belgien hat die Diskussion um die Registrierung nichtehelicher Lebensgemeinschaften, homosexueller
Ehen und das Akzeptieren privater Verträge zu Regelung des Zusammenlebens zu einer vollständigen Anerken-
nung sowohl von „nicht-ehelichen Lebensgemeinschaften“ als auch von „gleichgeschlechtlichen Lebensgemein-
schaften” geführt. Der LTC (Living Together Contracts) wurde 1996 institutionalisiert, gleichgeschlechtliche
Lebensgemeinschaften wurden am 30. Jänner 2003 in diese Regelung mitaufgenommen.
In Frankreich gibt es seit 1999 die Möglichkeit des pacte civil de solidarité (PACS) als Partnerschaftsform für
hetero- und homosexuelle Paare. Bis 2003 wurden etwa 100.000 PACS registriert. Als Folge davon haben die
Paare ohne Trauschein mit Kindern zugenommen, Heirat ist in Frankreich nicht länger Voraussetzung, wenn man
Kinder haben will. Eine Folge davon sind steigende Geburtenraten.
In Finnland ging die Verheiratetenrate (% Verheiratete an allen über 15-Jährigen) von 1990 bis 2001 deutlich
zurück (bei Männern (m) von 27,9% auf 23,9%, bei Frauen (w) von 23,7% auf 20,6%). Ein Grund ist die
Verschiebung der Erstheirat von 28,6 auf 31,4 Jahre (m) bzw. von 26,6 auf 29,1 Jahre (w), ein anderer Grund (z.
B. für die niedrigere Verheiratetenrate der Frauen) ist die längere Lebensdauer (Witwenschaft), aber auch der
hohe Anteil von nichtehelichen Partnerschaften. Nach einer langen und immer noch aktuellen Debatte gibt es
seit 2002 in Finnland die Möglichkeit, homosexuelle und lesbische Partnerschaften eintragen zu lassen.
In Irland nimmt die Anzahl der nichtehelichen Gemeinschaften stark zu, ebenso jene der gleichgeschlechtli-
chen (nichtehelichen) Lebensgemeinschaften.
Ebenso wie in anderen südeuropäischen Ländern sind in Spanien nichteheliche Partnerschaften eher selten.
Die Akzeptanz in der Bevölkerung wächst allerdings mehr und mehr. Für die Zukunft sind daher mehr uneheli-
che Partnerschaften und damit auch mehr uneheliche Geburten zu erwarten. Eine rechtliche Anerkennung von
nichtehelichen Partnerschaften steht zurzeit nicht zur Debatte.
Trennungen und Scheidungen
Trennungen und Scheidungen werden in Europa unterschiedlich häufig realisiert, sind gesellschaftlich unter-
schiedlich anerkannt und die rechtliche Akzeptanz bzw. die Ausgestaltung des Trennungs- und Scheidungs-
verfahrens hat sich über die letzten Jahrzehnte in den verschiedenen Ländern unterschiedlich entwickelt.
Generell ist in ganz Europa Trennung und Scheidung als Realität anerkannt und die entsprechenden Raten neh-
men kontinuierlich zu. Ein Grund hierfür ist sicherlich auch die steigende Lebenserwartung, die allein über die
längeren gelebten Zeiträume Scheidungen und Trennungen wahrscheinlicher macht. Sind diese Veränderungen
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in der gesellschaftlichen Diskussion relevant oder nur unvermeidbare, begrüßenswerte oder zu bedauernde
Entwicklungen in einem modernen Europa?
Zum Erwachsenwerden gehört das Einlassen auf Partnerschaften, die nicht unbedingt in lebenslange
Verbindungen münden müssen. Die Auflösung solcher Partnerschaften ist zwar für die Betroffenen manchmal
schmerzhaft, aber nicht unbedingt für das Weiterleben gefährdend, und in den meisten Fällen auch gesellschaft-
lich akzeptiert. Schwieriger wird es, wenn die Partnerschaften sich zur Familie weiterentwickeln, also zu gewach-
senen Solidargemeinschaften werden, mit Erwartungen an verlässliche Unterstützung innerhalb der Partner-
schaft, zwischen Eltern und noch nicht erwachsenen Kindern und zwischen Großeltern und Enkeln.
Familie als verlässliche Solidargemeinschaft ist für die meisten Einwohner Europas fest mit einer lebenswer-
ten und gewünschten Zukunft verbunden. Wenn solche Systeme zerbrechen und dann noch der Zugang zu
Ressourcen für zerbrochene Familien sehr viel schwieriger ist als für intakte, stellen sich von einer Wertedis-
kussion losgelöste lebenspraktische Fragen, sowohl hinsichtlich Unterstützungsmaßnahmen für Betroffene als
auch – noch wichtiger – hinsichtlich Präventionsmaßnahmen für den Erhalt von Beziehungen bzw. für die Zeiten
nach deren Zerbrechen. Mit Präventionsmaßnahmen zum Erhalt von Familien sind weder gesetzliche
Zwangsmaßnahmen noch ein Erhalt zerrütteter Verhältnisse um jeden Preis gemeint. Prävention bedeutet, den
Wunsch nach verlässlicher Partnerschaft ernst zu nehmen und ist damit eine Vorbeugung gegen vermeidbares
Trennungspotential, das durch mangelndes Wissen im Umgang mit Konflikten entsteht. Hier ist jede Investition
besser angelegt als eine nachträgliche Unterstützung nach erfolgter Trennung. Prävention für die Zeit nach der
Trennung meint u. a. Geschlechtergerechtigkeit beim Zugang zu Bildung, Aus- und Fortbildung, Erwerbstätigkeit
und Karrieremöglichkeit, sowie Geschlechterbalance in Erwerbs- und Familienarbeit. Nur so kann sichergestellt
werden, dass nach einer Trennung nicht geschlechtsspezifische Armutsrisiken auftreten.
Die Scheidungsraten sind in Frankreich von 9% (1965) bis auf über 40% (seit 2000) gestiegen. Damit hat
auch die Zahl der Alleinerziehenden und Fortsetzungsfamilien (Stieffamilien) in Frankreich zugenommen.
Auch in Österreich steigen die Scheidungsraten, derzeit liegen sie bei 46%. Bei Scheidungsraten ist zu
berücksichtigen, dass es sich um aktuelle Scheidungen bezogen auf aktuelle Heiraten handelt, d. h. die
Scheidungsraten beziehen sich auf eine gesunkene Basis von Heiraten. Die durchschnittliche Ehedauer (die Zeit
zwischen Heirat und Scheidung) beträgt in Österreich 9,5 Jahre. In Österreich und im Westen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland erleben etwa 80% der Kinder unter 19 Jahren eine Scheidung ihrer Eltern. 25 %
der Kinder erleben bis zum 18. Lebensjahr eine Trennung oder Scheidung der Eltern, 5 % haben nie mit beiden
Eltern zusammengelebt.
Eine Konsequenz der Zunahme von Scheidungen und Trennungen ist die Zunahme von Alleinerziehen-
denhaushalten. In Finnland stieg der Anteil der Kinder bei alleinerziehenden Müttern von 9% (1985) auf 17,2%
(2002), bei alleinerziehenden Vätern von 1,1% (1985) auf 2,4% (2002). Noch höher sind diese Anteile in
Schweden, hier leben 23% der unter 17-Jährigen bei einer alleinerziehenden Mutter, 5% bei einem alleinerzie-
henden Vater, 72% zusammen mit ihren beiden biologischen Eltern. In Griechenland dagegen sind nur 1,5% der
Haushalte Alleinerziehende, vier Fünftel davon Frauen.
In Irland gibt es seit 1997 gilt ein neues, liberaleres Ehescheidungsgesetz. In der Folge stiegen die Eheschei-
dungen um etwa 50% und damit erhöhte sich auch der Anteil der alleinerziehenden Mütter.
Obwohl die Zahl der Alleinerziehenden – und vor allem die der alleinerziehenden Mütter – in den meisten
EU-Mitgliedstaaten steigt, kann nicht behauptet werden, dass es sich hierbei um eine neue Familienform handelt,
die als Alternative zur Familie mit beiden Eltern gewählt wird. Bis auf wenige Ausnahmen ist das Alleinerziehen
entweder das Ergebnis einer ungeplanten Schwangerschaft außerhalb einer festen Beziehung oder die Folge der
Trennung einer ursprünglich gemeinsam geplanten Partnerschaft. Ein Indikator hierfür ist, dass in vielen Ländern
Kinderarmut, so weit sie ausgewiesen wird, am stärksten die Kinder alleinerziehender Mütter betrifft. Deshalb
wird es neben Initiativen zur Verbesserung der Situation von alleinerziehenden Müttern durch Transferleistungen
oder – noch besser – durch Möglichkeiten ihrer Beteiligung am Erwerbsleben, ebenso wichtig, durch vorbeu-
gende Maßnahmen vermeidbare Trennungen und Scheidungen zu verhindern: Konfliktmanagement, verbessertes
Paarmanagement, Paar- und Familienberatung und präventive Hilfen im Konfliktfall sind immer besser als Hilfen
hinterher.
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Kinderlosigkeit
Am Beispiel Deutschlands kann die Mehrdeutigkeit der Diskussion um Kinderlosigkeit sichtbar gemacht werden.
Zum einen gibt es kaum zuverlässige Zahlen, da auch im Mikrozensus nicht nach eigenen Kindern, sondern nur
nach eigenen Kindern ‚im Haushalt’ gefragt wird. Damit wird jede Mutter nach dem Auszug des letzten erwach-
senen Kindes plötzlich ‚kinderlos’. Entsprechend schwierig sind die Diskussionen. Zurzeit besagt eine Prognose,
dass über 40% aller Akademikerinnen dauerhaft kinderlos sind. Dies wird häufig als Karrieredenken, Eigennutz
und Gebärverweigerung interpretiert. Wie immer sind der erste Augenschein und daraus voreilig gezogene
Schlussfolgerungen nicht ganz richtig.
Erstens gab es in Deutschland (und Mitteleuropa) immer schon einen hohen Anteil von dauerhaft kinderlo-
sen Frauen (und Männern) (so entspricht z. B. der Prozentsatz kinderloser Frauen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts
exakt jenem am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts). Zweitens lässt sich streiten, ob es bei einer gegebenen Geburten-
rate besser ist, dass alle Frauen ein Kind bekommen oder dass viele Frauen zwei bis drei Kinder bekommen und
dafür andere Frauen gar keine. Drittens sagt die tatsächliche Kinderzahl nichts über den Kinderwunsch aus.
StudentInnen an deutschen Universitäten haben ebenso wie die anderen jungen Menschen den Wunsch, einmal
zwei bis drei Kinder in der Familie aufzuziehen, aber augenscheinlich verwirklichen ihn viele nicht. Einer der
Gründe dafür ist, dass sie keinen Partner haben, weil die Partnerwahl im Lebenslauf weiter nach hinten gescho-
ben wird und weil – bei Aufwärtsheirat in der sozialen Hierarchie bei Frauen oder Abwärtsheirat von Männern
– mit steigender Frauenqualifikation der Markt für hochqualifizierte Frauen immer dünner wird. Ein zweiter
Grund ist, wie nahezu alle europäischen und nationalen Studien zeigen:Viele Frauen, die sich situationsbedingt
gezwungen sehen, hier und jetzt zwischen Karriere und Kind zu wählen, entscheiden sich für eine Aufschiebung
(nicht Ablehnung) der Realisierung ihres Kinderwunsches, was aber aus biologischen Gründen oft dazu führt,
dass sie kinderlos bleiben. Der Versuch, aufwärts zu heiraten oder jetzt noch Karriere zu machen, ist ebenfalls
oft verbunden damit, Bedingungen zu schaffen, in denen die gewünschten Kinder bessere Möglichkeiten haben,
als wenn der Kinderwunsch sofort realisiert würde. Postmodernistische Begründungen für Kinderlosigkeit – anti-
zipierter Eigennutz, gesellschaftsfeindliche Individualisierung und Verweigerung der Mutterrolle aus konsumbe-
gründeten Interessenkonflikten – findet man zwar häufig als Zuschreibung in der öffentlichen Diskussion, aber
nicht in empirischen Untersuchungen. Sehr oft ist nicht die Ablehnung von Kindern, sondern das übersteigerte
Ideal von einer optimalen Bedingung für das Aufwachsen von Kindern der wirkliche Grund für Kinderlosigkeit.
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist die wachsende Zahl der kinderlosen Frauen – und insbesondere derjenigen mit
hohem Ausbildungsniveau – zwar nicht weniger besorgniserregend, aber es bieten sich ganz andere
Einflussmöglichkeiten und Interventionen an als das Appellieren an die angeblich nicht vorhandene Bereitschaft
zu Mutterpflichten.
Geburten und Geburtenrate
In Österreich wie im Rest Europas ist die bedeutendste Referenzgruppe für junge Menschen die eigene Familie.
Eine dauerhafte Partnerschaft und Kinder gehören in Österreich fest zur Lebensplanung. Allerdings schiebt sich
das Heiratsalter weiter nach hinten, obwohl die jungen Österreicherinnen relativ früh ihr Elternhaus verlassen,
und die Geburtenrate bleibt auf einem relativ niedrigen Niveau.
Spanien, Italien und andere südeuropäische Mitgliedstaaten der EU haben, verglichen mit den mittel- und nor-
deuropäischen Staaten, die niedrigsten Geburtenraten. Neben anderen mit den restlichen EU-Mitgliedstaaten
vergleichbaren Entwicklungen zeigen sich im Süden Europas zwei Besonderheiten:
 Junge Menschen ziehen extrem spät aus dem elterlichen Haushalt aus; dies verschiebt die erste Partner-
schaft und die Geburt nach hinten. Außerdem führt die höhere Kontrolle zur Einhaltung von Normen dazu,
dass der in nord- und mitteleuropäischen Staaten übliche Ausgleich von niedrigen ehelichen Geburtenraten
durch außereheliche Geburten praktisch nicht stattfindet.
 Der Wunsch nach Vereinbarkeit von Erwerbstätigkeit und Elternschaft ist in den südlichen EU-Mitglied-
staaten bei jungen Leuten genauso groß wie im Rest Europas. Die Möglichkeiten, insbesondere für verheira-
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tete Frauen, Kinder und Beruf wirklich miteinander zu vereinbaren, sind aber deutlich geringer als erhofft.
Dies führt dazu, dass die Geburtenraten weiter sinken bzw. auf niedrigem Niveau stabil bleiben.
Bedingt durch seinen soziokulturellen Hintergrund geht Portugal seinen eigenen Weg. Nach mehr als 50-jähri-
ger Diktatur hat die Revolution von 1974 zu einer Vielzahl von Veränderungen geführt. In den letzten 25 Jahren
haben sich das demographische Verhalten und die Familienformen in Portugal stark verändert. Allerdings sind
die letzten Jahre eher durch eine Konsolidierung gekennzeichnet als durch dramatische Änderungen, doch die
vorhandenen Trends haben sich durchaus weiterentwickelt. Portugal entspricht dem südeuropäischen Muster,
d. h.
 starke ideologische Bindung zur Familie,
 späterer Einstieg in die demographischen Veränderungen als in Mittel- und Nordeuropa,
 mehr familienorientierte Lebensformen,
 und eine nur rudimentäre, explizite Familienpolitik.
In Portugal ist die Geburtenrate in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren stark gefallen und in den letzten 15 Jahren
bei etwa 1,5 relativ stabil geblieben, bei einem von den meisten Frauen geäußerten Wunsch von zwei bis drei
Kindern. Als Gründe für die Differenz nennen Frauen
 schwierige Lebensumstände (Wohnungssituation, Lebensstandard, lange Abhängigkeit der Kinder, Bildungs-
kosten),
 Probleme mit der Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und Familie,
 Gesundheit und Alter der Mütter.
Griechenland hat derzeit eine sehr niedrige Geburtenrate von 1,3. Bei den 30–39-Jährigen vollzieht sich eine
Trendwende, d. h. das Absinken der Geburtenraten in diesem Alter hört auf und die Geburtenraten steigen
langsam wieder an. Bei den 25–29-Jährigen wird ein geringer Anstieg, bei den unter 25-Jährigen ein weiterer
Abfall verzeichnet. Die langfristigen Erwartungen für diese Entwicklung gehen von einem Anwachsen und einer
darauf folgenden Stabilität bei 1,7 aus. Trotz sinkender Geburtenrate und kleiner werdenden Haushalten hat
Griechenland in der EU die meisten großen Haushalte. 50 % der Bevölkerung leben in Haushalten mit vier und
mehr Personen, nur 7 % leben in Einpersonenhaushalten.
In Irland hat es in den letzten Jahren deutliche Veränderungen im demographischen Verhalten gegeben. Als
Folge von Nettoimmigration und eines Geburtenüberschusses über die Sterbezahlen hat die Bevölkerung zuge-
nommen. Nach einem scharfen Abfall vor 1994 sind die Geburtenzahlen in den letzten Jahren langsam wieder
angestiegen. Die anderen Kennzahlen zeigen die gleiche Entwicklung wie in den anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten:
Verringerung der Haushaltsgröße, Zahl der kinderlosen Paare, Erhöhung des Alters beim Auszug aus dem elter-
lichen Haushalt, bei Partnerschaftsbeginn und bei der ersten Geburt, eine höhere Zahl von nichtehelichen
Geburten, die derzeit über dem Mittelwert der EU liegt.
In Finnland sind die geburtenschwachen Jahrgänge ins Fertilitätsalter gekommen. Dies hat zusammen mit
einer Reduzierung der Geburtenrate von 1,84 auf 1,71 zu einer Reduktion der Geburten von 65.000 (1992)
auf 55.000 (2000) geführt.
Anders als in der restlichen EU hat sich in Frankreich die Heiratsrate erholt, ebenso die Geburtenrate: sie
stieg von 1,68 (1994) auf 1,91 (2003), obwohl das Alter der Mütter bei der Erstgeburt von 28,8 (1994) auf
29,5 (2003) gestiegen ist. Ein Grund für die Zunahme der Geburten ist ein hoher Anteil nichtehelicher
Geburten, die zum Teil in registrierten (nichtehelichen) Partnerschaften erfolgen.
In Österreich wie auch in weiten Teilen Europas ist die Geburtenrate (hier 1,44) deutlich niedriger als der
Kinderwunsch (hier 2, in Finnland z. B. 2,4).
In den Niederlanden waren nur 20 % der Frauen nicht zufrieden mit dem Zeitpunkt der Geburt (12 %
waren der Meinung, er sei zu spät, für 8 % war er zu früh). Da die Zahl der realisierten Geburten mit dem Alter
bei der Erstgeburt korreliert, wird man, wenn höhere Geburtenraten erwünscht sind, Einfluss darauf nehmen
müssen, dass es mehr Wünsche zu Geburten in früheren Lebensabschnitten gibt.
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Abtreibung 
In Griechenland ist Geschlechtergerechtigkeit ein Thema der öffentlichen Debatte und wird derzeit unter dem
Aspekt der Empfängnisverhütung diskutiert. Insbesondere die hohe Abtreibungsrate (ein Viertel aller Frauen hat
schon einmal abgetrieben) soll durch modernere Empfängnisverhütungsverfahren gesenkt und damit implizite
Zwänge, die zu Abtreibung führen, beseitigt werden.
In Spanien ist die Abtreibungsproblematik weiterhin eine offene Frage. Die soziale Indikation als zusätzliche
Möglichkeit einer erlaubten Abtreibung wird derzeit widersprüchlich diskutiert, die Zahl der Abtreibungen bei
jungen und sehr jungen Schwangeren nimmt zu.
In Portugal lehnen die meisten Menschen eine Abtreibung ab, sehr viel deutlicher als im Rest bzw. im
Durchschnitt Europas.
In Irland ist der Schwangerschaftsabbruch weiterhin illegal, trotzdem nehmen die bekannten Zahlen seit
1980 zu – durch ein Ausweichen auf andere europäische Länder.
Geschlechterbeziehungen
In Finnland haben sich die Geschlechterbeziehungen mit dem hohen Bildungsniveau der finnischen Frauen dra-
matisch geändert. Finnland hat eine der höchsten Frauenerwerbsraten in Europa, verbunden mit einem hohen
Anteil an Vollzeiterwerbstätigkeit. Frauenfreundlichkeit ist eine der Besonderheiten des nordischen Sozialstaats.
Eine Vielzahl von Kinderbetreuungsangeboten und ein umfassendes Sozialnetz verringern die Abhängigkeit vom
familialen Netzwerk.Trotzdem liegt auch in Finnland das durchschnittliche Einkommen von Frauen nur bei etwa
80% des männlichen Einkommens. Hausarbeit wird weiterhin überproportional von Frauen durchgeführt und in
den größten Familien ist das klassische Modell (male breadwinner) üblich. Elternzeit wird von Frauen genom-
men und die durchschnittliche Arbeitszeit von Frauen stark durch das Alter ihrer Kinder beeinflusst.
Schweden sieht sich weltweit führend im Abbau von Geschlechterungerechtigkeit. Mehr und mehr Männer
beteiligen sich auch an Hausarbeit und Kinderbetreuung und nehmen an der Elternzeit teil (17,5 % aller Tage,
die als Elternzeit genommen werden, werden von Männer genommen). In Schweden (wie auch in Deutschland)
ist die Summe von Familienerwerbsarbeit über beide Geschlechter gleich verteilt. Allerdings ist die interne
Verteilung auch in Schweden so, dass Männer mehr erwerbstätig und Frauen mehr in der Familienarbeit enga-
giert sind.
In Österreich sind Kinderbetreuung und Haushaltsführung Frauensache (insbesondere nach der Geburt des
ersten Kindes). Elternzeit wird hauptsächlich von Frauen genommen. Anders als sonst in Europa finden es
Frauen in Deutschland und Österreich subjektiv sehr schwer, Familie und Beruf zu vereinbaren, obwohl die
Familienpolitik in diesen beiden Ländern seit Jahren versucht, diese Situation zu verbessern.Wahrscheinlich liegt
der negativen Einschätzung nicht die objektive Situation einer möglichen Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf
zugrunde, sondern eine bestimmte Mutterideologie, die verlangt, dass sich Mütter den Großteil des Tages ihren
Kindern widmen. Da die objektive Situation anders ist, provoziert sie Unzufriedenheit. Die Geschlechterbe-
ziehungen haben sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark verändert und werden sich auch weiterhin verändern. Bei
Befragungen sind trotzdem zwei Drittel der weiblichen und drei Viertel der männlichen Bevölkerung mit den
traditionellen Rollenzuschreibungen zufrieden. Betrachtet man die Zufriedenheit über die Familienphasen, liegt
die Zufriedenheit auf einer U-Funktion. Insbesondere nach der Geburt des ersten und auch des zweiten Kindes
sinkt die Zufriedenheit auf ein Minimum. Später steigt die Zufriedenheit mit der Partnerschaft wieder an.
Gewalt in Familien ist ein Thema, das diskutiert und politisch und administrativ angegangen wird, es ist aber zum
Glück nur ein Problem in einer Minderheit von Familien.
Die Antidiskriminierungsdebatte in Belgien im Bereich Geschlechtergerechtigkeit hatte zwei Schwerpunkte:
die Aufteilung von bezahlter und unbezahlter Arbeit zwischen den Geschlechtern und die Namensgebung als
Verwandtschaftskennung, insbesondere im Bereich nichtehelicher Geburten. In Belgien wurde das System der
Unterbrechung von Erwerbsarbeit im Bereich des Ausgleichs zwischen Familienarbeit, Erwerbsarbeit und ehren-
amtlicher Tätigkeit durch ein System von Zeitmanagement ersetzt, das es erlaubt, während des Erwerbslebens
ein Jahr (bzw. aufgrund besonderer Vereinbarungen bis fünf Jahre) aus dem Erwerbsleben auszusteigen.
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Während Erwerbsunterbrechungen bisher fast ausschließlich von Frauen gewählt wurden, ist das neue System
deutlich attraktiver für Männer und wird von ihnen vermehrt genutzt. Die Nutzung von Elternzeit, die mit die-
sem System verbunden werden kann, hat in den letzten Jahren ebenfalls deutlich – mit einer verstärkten
Nutzung durch Männer – zugenommen.
In den südeuropäischen Mitgliedstaaten wird die Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Erwerbstätigkeit, verbunden
mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit, eng mit dem Problem der niedrigen Geburtenraten gesehen und weniger als
Problem von nicht ausgenutztem ‚Humankapital’, das bei einem (erzwungenen) Rückzug der Frauen in die
Familie brachliegt.
In Spanien werden erste Schritte unternommen, die aktive Vaterrolle z. B. durch eine geschlechtsunspezifi-
sche Elternzeit zu stärken. In den letzten zwei Jahren ist in Spanien die Gewalt in Partnerschaften stärker in die
öffentliche Debatte gerückt. Die Situation der Frauen hat sich verbessert, seit sie auf ihnen gegenüber ausgeüb-
te Gewalt durch Anzeige reagieren können. Allerdings hat es auch eine Zunahme von Tötungen von Frauen
durch ihre Partner gegeben. Die öffentliche Diskussion und die spanische Gesetzgebung versucht, darauf zu rea-
gieren und die Situation der Frauen weiter zu verbessern.
In Portugal hat eine höhere Erwerbsbeteiligung von Frauen sowie deren höhere Bildung zu weniger männ-
lichen Alleinverdienern und statt dessen zu einer Dominanz von Doppelverdienerhaushalten geführt (zwei
Drittel aller Paare leben als Doppelverdiener mit einer Dominanz von Vollzeiterwerbstätigen). Als Problem wird
die hohe Abhängigkeit der Familien von der Betreuung der Kinder durch die Großeltern gesehen. Es gibt zu
wenig billige institutionelle Kinderbetreuung. Auch in Portugal leiden die Frauen unter einer hohe Belastung, da
die Männer viel zu wenig in die Kindererziehung involviert sind. Portugal ist bezüglich der Rollenteilung eines der
konservativsten Länder, nur 7% der Männer geben an, dass sie nach den Kindern schauen (der EU-Durchschnitt
liegt bei 15%).
In Griechenland lässt sich eine Veränderung zu mehr Geschlechtergerechtigkeit feststellen, aber es wird
auch deutlich, dass noch ein weiter Weg bis dorthin zurückzulegen ist. Die Gewalt gegen Frauen ist in
Griechenland hoch. 9% aller Frauen erfahren Gewalt im engeren Sinne, ca. 50% im weiteren Sinne. Die
Bildungsunterschiede zwischen den Geschlechtern sind allerdings fast aufgehoben, wie dies auch für andere EU-
Mitgliedstaaten nachgewiesen ist. Ebenfalls wie in diesen anderen Ländern gilt, dass es noch deutliche
Unterschiede bezüglich Einkommen, Arbeitslosenrate und durchschnittlicher Arbeitszeit gibt. Trotz der ver-
gleichsweise schlechten Chancen auf Arbeit ist eine stetige Zunahme der Frauenerwerbsquoten zu verzeichnen.
Wohl des Kindes 
In Finnland ist man zunehmend besorgt über die psychischen Belastungen von Kindern, weshalb Finnland stark
in die Kinderpsychiatrie investiert hat. Sie soll verbunden werden mit präventiver Aufklärung und der Ausbildung
zu einer qualitativ besseren Elternschaft.
In den Niederlanden zeigen verschiedene Studien, dass nicht strukturelle Eigenschaften (Familienformen,
Einkommensarmut, Migrationshintergrund, etc.) die Qualität der Situation des Aufwachsens von Kindern domi-
nant beeinflussen, sondern prozessuale Eigenschaften, also der Umgang miteinander in der Partnerschaft und im
Eltern-Kind-Verhältnis. Das gilt auch, wenn die Qualität der Situation des Aufwachsens an so harten Indikatoren
wie späterem devianten Verhalten gemessen wird. Eine gut funktionierende Familie kann als Puffer für struktu-
relle Probleme (Familienform, Armut, Krankheit, etc.) dienen. Das höchste Risiko, deviant zu werden, haben
Familien, in denen die innerfamilialen Beziehungen verletzend wirken (unabhängig davon, welche strukturellen
Eigenschaften die Situation der Familie definieren). Diese Bedeutung prozessualer Eigenschaften wird häufig
überdeckt durch die Korrelation von Problemverhalten und strukturellen Faktoren. Trennt man die beiden,
ergibt sich aber, dass die prozessualen Faktoren fünf Mal so stark wirken wie die strukturellen.
Verglichen mit anderen Ländern und anderen Zeiten haben Schwedens Kinder jetzt den höchsten Lebens-
standard. Psychosomatische Probleme und Übergewicht lassen sich trotzdem im erheblichen Maße nachweisen.
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Kinderbetreuung
Anders als im übrigen Europa gibt es in Belgien einen fortschreitenden Übergang von informeller zu formeller
Betreuung bei den unter Dreijährigen. Es wird eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Betreuungsformen angeboten. Die
Verbesserung der Qualität der Betreuung im Sinne der Zukunftsfähigkeit der nachwachsenden Generation
spielt dabei eine große Rolle.
Ähnlich wie in Belgien gibt es auch in Frankreich ein ausdifferenziertes System der Kinderbetreuung, das
angesichts der hohen Erwerbsbeteiligung beider Eltern unterschiedlichste Möglichkeiten anbietet, um Beruf und
Familie besser miteinander zu vereinbaren.
In den Niederlanden führen Gesetzgeber und Gesellschaft Diskussionen über Veränderungen in der
Kinderbetreuung. Nach wie vor wird aber von den Familien Kinderbetreuung als Frauensache angesehen. Es gab
und gibt eine Diskussion um die Gefährlichkeit institutioneller Betreuung und die positiven Effekte natürlicher
(mütterlicher) Betreuung. Diese (nicht immer wissenschaftlich geführte) Debatte spiegelt die verbreiteten
Ressentiments gegen Eltern wider, die ihre Kinder in institutionelle Betreuung geben (ähnlich ist die Situation
auch in Deutschland und Österreich).
In Griechenland reicht das Angebot institutioneller Kinderbetreuung bei weitem nicht aus. Das bisher vor-
herrschende Modell der Betreuung durch Großeltern wird zunehmend schwächer, ohne dass Ersatz durch
zusätzliche institutionelle Betreuungsangebote geschaffen wird.
Öffentliche Kinderbetreuung in Irland wurde traditionsgemäß nur als Hilfe in besonderen Notfällen angese-
hen. Von Eltern wurde erwartet, dass sie private Arrangements finden. In den letzten Jahren ist infolge der
gewünschten Entwicklung zu einer höheren Partizipation von Frauen am Erwerbsleben, durch den Anspruch
der Eltern an eine qualitativ hohe Betreuung und aufgrund internationaler Vergleiche die Forderung nach höhe-
ren öffentlichen Investitionen im Kinderbetreuungsbereich gewachsen.
In Dänemark herrscht Einverständnis darüber, dass die frühe Kindheit die Basis für die optimale Entwicklung
der eigenen Fähigkeiten ist – unter der Randbedingung einer Balance zwischen Familien- und Erwerbsengage-
ment der Eltern. Es herrscht auch Konsens darüber, dass die Eltern verantwortlich für das Aufwachsen der
Kinder sind und der Staat bzw. die Gesellschaft die Bedingungen für eine optimale Unterstützung dieses
Anspruchs bereitstellen müssen.
Generationenbeziehungen
Diskutiert man das Älterwerden der Gesellschaft und die Auswirkungen auf das Humankapital, so lassen sich
nur relativ wenige Strategien identifizieren, die bei einem Rückgang der heute erwerbstätigen Bevölkerung im
Alter zwischen Anfang 20 bis Anfang 60 im Verhältnis zu den über 60-Jährigen die auf Erwerbstätigkeit beruhen-
de Wirtschaftskraft weiter erhalten können:
 Die Produktivität kann weiter gesteigert werden.
 Bei allgemein verbesserter Gesundheit und Leistungsfähigkeit der Bevölkerung bis ins hohe Alter kann das
Renteneintrittsalter nach hinten verschoben werden.
 Das in Europa vielfach vorgenommene ‚Parken’ von jungen Erwachsenen im Ausbildungssystem kann redu-
ziert und die notwendige Bildung durch ein berufsbegleitendes lebenslanges Lernen ersetzt werden.
 Nicht nur die Anzahl der erwerbstätigen Personen, sondern vielmehr die Qualität der Ausbildung ist für
einen Anstieg des Humankapitals verantwortlich. Investitionen in die Ausbildung der Jungen und in lebens-
langes Lernen kann dazu führen, dass auch bei einer geringeren Anzahl von Erwerbstätigen die
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas erhalten bleibt.
 Ein mittel- bis langfristiges Ansteigen der Geburtenrate, auch in kleinen Schritten, auf eine Zahl deutlich
näher an das Bestandsniveau von 2,1 ist eine der Strategien (aber auch nur eine!), die auf die Zukunft
gerichtet wirken kann.
 Eine weitere Strategie kann das Absenken der durch Verkehrsunfälle und Suizide bedingten Todesraten in
jungen Lebensjahren sein.
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Insgesamt gesehen kann es sich keine Region in Europa mehr erlauben, Humankapital zu vergeuden. Wenn
jeder, seinen Möglichkeiten entsprechend, optimal ausgebildet wird und seinen Platz im Erwerbs- bzw. Wirt-
schaftssystem findet, und niemand wegen seines Geschlechts, seiner soziokulturellen Herkunft, seines Migra-
tionshintergrunds oder aus anderen Gründen ausgegliedert wird, besteht trotz relativ niedriger Geburtenrate
und dem Älterwerden der Gesellschaft eine gute Chance, die nächsten Jahrzehnte auch ohne massive Migration
in den EU-Raum zu überstehen.
In Österreich sind auch die Generationenbeziehungen (in der Familie), das Generationenverhältnis (in der
Gesellschaft) in der öffentlichen Diskussion (Medien) und im politischen Alltag (Diskussion der Transfer-
beziehungen) von hoher Relevanz. Obwohl auch in Österreich die Pflege älterer Menschen zu einem hohen
Anteil von der Familie geleistet wird, fällt auf, dass das Sterben immer häufiger aus den Familien in die
Institutionen verlagert wird.
Das innerfamiliale Unterstützungsnetzwerk in Italien ist weiterhin sehr stark und weit verbreitet. Allerdings
gibt es Anzeichen, dass sich dies ändert, unter anderem durch die demographischen Veränderungen (weniger
Kinder, mehr Ältere) und durch die höhere Erwerbsbeteiligung von Frauen.
In Griechenland hat die Familie weiterhin eine sehr hohe Bedeutung. Die familialen Netzwerke sind der we-
sentliche Bestandteil des gesamtgesellschaftlichen sozialen Netzes, insbesondere auch für die Pflege der Älteren.
In Portugal gibt es eine sehr geringe Rate von institutioneller Betreuung der Älteren (nur 26% der über 80-
Jährigen leben alleine – im EU-Durchschnitt 45%). Die Pflege findet meist innerhalb des Familiensystems statt.
Irland ist traditionell eines der Länder, in denen die private Verantwortung für die soziale Situation betont
wird. Die Betreuung älterer Menschen wird daher auch zu einem großen Teil von den Familien – und hier von
den Frauen – übernommen. Öffentliche Interventionen werden eher als Substitution der privaten Pflege gese-
hen, allerdings werden die Auswirkungen der demographischen Entwicklung hierbei mit Sorge betrachtet.
Anders in Belgien: Hier wird die Betreuung der älteren Bevölkerung zu einem großen Teil durch institutio-
nelle Hilfen unterstützt.
In Dänemark ist die Maxime die individuelle Verantwortung und damit das Ziel, solange wie möglich im
eigenen Haushalt für sich selber verantwortlich zu sein. Ist dies nicht mehr möglich, dann gibt es öffentliche
Angebote der Unterstützung bzw. Unterbringung.
In Europa hat die Entwicklung dazu geführt, dass die Organisation der Rentensysteme im derzeitigen Ver-
fahren nicht mehr haltbar zu sein scheint. Dies war bedingt durch die Arbeitslosenquote und das Anbinden von
Pensionssystemen an die Erwerbsarbeit, durch das Hereinwachsen des Nachkriegsgeburtenbergs ins Pensions-
alter, verbunden mit einer geringen Geburtenrate und einer deutlich niedrigeren Zahl von Frauen im gebärfähi-
gen Alter im Vergleich zu den letzten Jahrzehnten. Der Versuch, die Probleme durch einen neuen Geburtenberg
zu lösen, also Appelle – insbesondere an junge Frauen –, die Geburtenrate zu erhöhen, erweist sich in vielerlei
Hinsicht als kurzsichtig. Das Hauptproblem ist, dass nur eine florierende Wirtschaft die für eine höhere
Geburtenzahl nötigen Transferleistungen überhaupt erst möglich machen würde. Das nächste Problem sind
niedrige Erwerbsarbeitszahlen, die bei Anbindung des Pensionssystems an die Erwerbstätigkeit zu hohen
Ausfällen führen. Hier muss entweder die Zahl der Erwerbstätigen erhöht, d. h. die Arbeitslosigkeit verringert,
oder aber die Finanzierung der Pensionskassen von der Erwerbstätigkeit gelöst werden, vorausgesetzt dass in
der Volkswirtschaft etwas zum Verteilen vorhanden ist. Schnelle Wechsel zwischen Geburtenbergen und
Geburtentälern führen in der Zukunft zu ähnlichen Problemen, wie jene, die wir jetzt haben. Kleine Kinder tra-
gen erst einmal nichts zum Bruttosozialprodukt bei, sondern belasten den erwerbstätigen Teil der Bevölkerung.
Junge Frauen und Männer lassen sich nicht durch Probleme der Sozialsysteme motivieren, Kinder zu bekom-
men. Im Gegenteil, die ständig wachsende und geschürte Angst vor dem Zusammenbruch der Sozialsysteme ist
ein Grund für die große Diskrepanz zwischen Kinderwunsch und seiner Realisierung bei jungen Erwachsenen.
In Schweden wird das Älterwerden der Gesellschaft und damit das Verhältnis der Rentner zur erwerbstäti-
gen Bevölkerung in Relation zu Migrationsbedürfnissen und höherer Geburtenrate diskutiert. In der EU hat
Schweden jetzt schon die höchste Partizipationsrate von älteren Menschen am Arbeitsmarkt.
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Sozioökonomische Bedingungen
In den letzten Jahren hat Irland eine schnelle ökonomische und soziale Entwicklung erfahren. Allerdings haben
unterschiedliche Gesellschaftsschichten sehr unterschiedlich von dieser Entwicklung profitiert. Die Armutszahlen
in Irland sind weiterhin hoch, 12,3% der Bevölkerung leben in Armut. In Griechenland ist starkes ökonomisches
Wachstum verbunden mit hoher Einkommensungleichheit und hoher Arbeitslosigkeit, insbesondere für junge
Erwachsene und Frauen. In Griechenland ist Armut weniger durch Veränderung der Familienstrukturen (z. B.
Familiengröße) bestimmt als durch die Kombination von niedrigem Bildungsgrad, Arbeitslosigkeit und ländlicher
Region und betrifft eher die ältere als die jüngere Bevölkerung. In Portugal ist starkes ökonomisches Wachstum
verbunden mit hoher Einkommensungleichheit und hoher Arbeitslosigkeit, insbesondere für junge Erwachsene
und Frauen. Ein sehr hoher Anteil von Personen lebt mit dem Armutsrisiko, 21% vs. 15% als Durchschnitt in
Europa. In den letzten drei Jahren hat sich der Aufschwung abgeschwächt und stagniert, und als Folge davon
wurden Sozialleistungen deutlich gekürzt.
Griechenland und Portugal haben sich von Auswanderungs- zu Einwanderungsländern gewandelt. Das hat
gewaltige Veränderungen im Selbstverständnis, in der Administration und im Alltag zur Folge, an deren
Bewältigung beide Länder nun leiden.
In Frankreich ergibt sich die paradoxe sozioökonomische Situation, mit einem Rückgang der Arbeitslosigkeit,
einer Zunahme von Unterstützungsmaßnahmen bei gleichzeitiger Zunahme der Ungleichheit und Reichtums-
Armuts-Ausdifferenzierung durch eine Verlagerung von Erwerbstätigkeit in Billiglohnjobs. In den Familien war
diese Entwicklung mit einer Zunahme von Doppelverdiener-Paaren verbunden. Sie ist insbesondere für
Alleinerziehende hochgradig problematisch, denn diese liegen mit nur einem Verdienst in vielen Fällen deutlich
unter dem Durchschnitt.
In Finnland hat sich die Schere zwischen den unteren und oberen Einkommensschichten geöffnet; verbun-
den mit einer Rücknahme der Familientransfers ist das Risiko für Familien, in Armut zu geraten gewachsen, ins-
besondere für Alleinerziehende .
In Italien ist eine Zunahme von relativer Einkommensarmut zu verzeichnen, verbunden mit einer weiteren
Öffnung der Schere zwischen den nördlichen und südlichen Regionen. Armut ist weiterhin von der Familien-
größe abhängig. Je größer die Familien (d. h. je mehr Kinder), desto höher ist das Armutsrisiko. Das führt dazu,
dass Italien eines der Länder mit der höchsten Kinderarmutsrate in Europa ist. Der Druck auf Familien am unte-
ren Segment der Gesellschaft ist insbesondere deshalb so hoch, weil in Italien die ausgleichenden Wirkungen
des Sozialsystems nicht mit der Effizienz greifen, wie sie in Europa Standard sind.
Familienpolitik
Europa ist im Umbruch. Die Zahl der Staaten, die zur EU gehören, ist in den letzten Jahren stark gewachsen.
Dieses neue Europa versucht seinen Platz in der Welt zu finden, die Gemeinsamkeiten und Heterogenitäten
innerhalb der EU zu akzeptieren und ein weiteres Zusammenwachsen zu realisieren. Die wirtschaftliche
Entwicklung in der Region, aber auch weltweit, gibt dabei die Rahmenbedingungen vor. Die nationalen
Entwicklungen, die EU-Aktivitäten, das Miteinander und die Konkurrenzen bilden ein Konglomerat, welches das
Handeln nicht einfacher macht, aber auch große Chancen für die Zukunft bietet.Welche Rolle die Familie in der
Zukunft Europas genau spielen wird, ist – wie vieles – schwer absehbar. Dass die Familien aber weiterhin das
Rückgrat der europäischen Gesellschaft bilden und im Alltag der Menschen eine zentrale Rolle spielen werden,
ist unumstritten.
In der Familienrhetorik spielt der Begriff ‚Familienpolitik’ eine zentrale Rolle. In manchen Ländern werden admi-
nistrative Aktivitäten, die Auswirkungen auf den Familienalltag haben,
 explizit unter familienpolitischen Zielen geplant und umgesetzt,
 ohne dass explizite familienpolitische Ziele genannt sind, anders begründet, geplant und umgesetzt, da
Familienpolitik entweder nicht in den Zuständigkeitsbereich der Ressorts fällt, die solche Aktivitäten durch-
führen, oder aber Familienpolitik, z. B. aus Subsidiaritätsgründen, nicht in den Zuständigkeitsbereich der ent-
sprechenden Körperschaft fällt.
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Von dieser rhetorischen Zuordnung unberührt finden sich in allen Ländern und allen Regionen der EU, bei ein-
zelnen Staaten, Subregionen und Kommunen solche Aktivitäten mit starker Auswirkung auf den Familienalltag.
Bei der Betrachtung von Familienpolitik muss man also den unterschiedlichen rhetorischen Umgang in der
Begründung von Aktivitäten zwischen den Ländern und Regionen beachten, die sehr unterschiedliche Bilder von
Familienpolitik aufzeigen, ohne dass sie notwendigerweise im Alltag oder der gelebten Realität zu Unterschieden
oder Ähnlichkeiten führen müssen. Relativ unabhängig von der Familienrhetorik ist der Vergleich von familienre-
levanten Aktivitäten in der EU, zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten und zwischen den Regionen zu bewerten. Die
tatsächlichen Randbedingungen, die Aktivitäten, welche die einzelnen politischen Institutionen durchführen, egal
ob sie sie Familienpolitik nennen oder nicht, haben eine direkte Einwirkung auf die gelebte Realität der Familien
in den einzelnen Ländern.
Ein Vergleich von Gesetzen, Maßnahmen, Dienstleistungen und Transfersystemen, die familienwirksam sind,
ist nahezu unmöglich, da die wirksamen Interventionen sehr oft nicht unter dem Namen ‚Familienpolitik’
beschrieben oder dieser zugeordnet sind. Ein Vergleich von Veränderungen solcher Interventionen in den einzel-
nen Ländern und über die Länder hinweg ist noch schwieriger, da vielfach solche Interventionen durch rhetori-
sche Veränderungen, durch Setzung von Normen, aber nicht unbedingt durch Auswirkungen auf tatsächliche
Veränderungen der Lebenslagen, Familienformen und Familienphasen explizit beschrieben oder umfassend in
den hier vorliegenden Länderberichten erfasst sind. Nachstehend einige Beispiele:
Anders als in den mittel- und südeuropäischen Ländern hat Dänemark, wie die anderen skandinavischen
Ländern, eine eher an Individuen und nicht an Familien gerichtete Politik von Ansprüchen, Angeboten und
Interventionen. So ist auch der Anstieg der Geburtenrate seit 1983 keine Folge einer pronatalistischen Politik,
sondern von verbesserter Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Erwerbsarbeit für Frauen.
Der finnische Report zeigt den Möglichkeitsraum für Unterstützungen von Familien:
 Stärkung der Beziehungen zwischen den Eltern,
 Geburtenrate,
 Identität und Legitimität von Kindern,
 Kinderbetreuung,
 Sozialisation bzw. Bildung von Kindern,
 Schutz und Unterstützung von Familien,
 emotionale Unterstützung von Familien und
 Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Erwerbsarbeit.
Finnland macht eine intensive Familienpolitik, die alle Interventionsbereiche umfasst. Allerdings werden die ein-
zelnen Bereiche mit unterschiedlicher Intensität angegangen. Wie in vielen anderen Ländern ist die interne
Ausgestaltung von Partnerschaften Privatsache, was mit einer sehr starken Zurückhaltung staatlicher
Interventionen verbunden ist, aber auf der anderen Seite auch heißt, dass die Paare weitgehend alleine gelassen
werden.
Die Familienpolitik in den Niederlanden zeigt wenige Reaktionen auf die aktuelle Geburtenrate und kaum
Versuche, sie zu heben. Die Familien wollen ihre Probleme selber lösen, die staatlichen Interventionen versu-
chen, dies zu berücksichtigen, nach dem der andere Weg (nämlich institutionelle Lösungen anzubieten) nicht
akzeptiert wurde. Die Kinderbetreuung findet aus den oben genannten Gründen im Wesentlichen durch priva-
te Netzwerke statt. Daher zieht sich der Staat mehr und mehr aus der institutionellen Kinderbetreuung zurück.
Dies ist aber kontraproduktiv, wenn man versucht, durch Qualität der Kinderbetreuung verstärkten Einfluss auf
den Aufbau von Humankapital zu nehmen. Zusammengefasst lässt sich sagen, dass Familienpolitik in den
Niederlanden derzeit mehr oder weniger nicht stattfindet.
Schweden hat eine Politik gegen Ungleichheit, in deren Rahmen Geschlechterpolitik und Familienpolitik
stark verbunden sind. Da dem ein Prinzip der Universalität und der individuellen Rechte zugrunde liegt, gibt es
z. B. keine Bevorzugung von Familienstandskategorien. Jeder Elternteil und jedes Kind hat die gleichen verbrief-
ten Ansprüche.
GENERAL MONITORING BERICHT 2004 SYNTHESE
40 | ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23
In Österreich bilden Familienpolitik und familienpolitische Maßnahmen wichtige Bestandteile der aktuellen
Handlungen. Familienpolitik bezieht sich sowohl auf finanziellen Transfer und Familienberatung wie auf die
Unterstützung familienfreundlicher Unternehmen, die durch ein Familienaudit sichtbar gemacht werden.
In Frankreich hat es in den letzten zehn Jahren einerseits eine schier unüberschaubare Zahl familienrelevan-
ter Entscheidungen und Gesetze gegeben, und andererseits –verglichen mit den anderen Mitgliedstaaten, eine
Entwicklung familiennaher Indikatoren, wie z. B. der Geburtenrate, die von vielen als vorbildlich angesehen wird.
Ob die Förderung von Mehrkindfamilien, die ausdifferenzierte Kinderbetreuungssituation, die Vereinbarkeit von
Familie und Beruf, einzelne Maßnahmen, das gesamte Bündel oder etwas ganz anderes ursächlich für diese
Entwicklung waren, lässt sich allerdings nicht nachweisen.
Die Veränderungen in der Situation von Familien in Italien über die letzten Jahre haben Druck auf die
gesetzgebenden Organe ausgelöst, die einige Veränderungen bewirkt haben: Veränderungen in den Transfer-
zahlungen, den Einstieg in die Elternzeit, Verbesserungen beim Zugang zum Wohnungsmarkt bis hin zur
Einführung von Instrumenten zur Sichtbarmachung  sozialer Probleme, z. B. durch Erhebung von sozialpolitisch
relevanten Informationen. Ferner hat sich die familienpolitische Rhetorik geändert: Familie wird mehr und mehr
als ein wichtiger Faktor im sozialen System akzeptiert und explizit berücksichtigt. Aktive Familienpolitik zur
Anhebung der Geburtenraten durch direkte finanzielle Zuwendung wurde in letzter Zeit ebenfalls etabliert.
Italien ist auf dem Weg zwischen Tradition und Moderne, scheint dabei aber eher durch einen Defizitzwang
getrieben zu werden statt durch eine offensive Zukunftsvision der Gesellschaft von Morgen.
In Spanien sind steuerliche Anreize die Hauptquelle politischer Interventionen zugunsten der Familie. Immer
stärker intervenieren regionale Körperschaften im Bereich Familie. Sehr niedrige Geburtenraten in einigen
Regionen, verbunden mit Immigrationsproblemen, erzwingen lokales Handeln, auch wenn auf nationaler Ebene
die Probleme noch nicht so stark wahrgenommen werden.
Die Werte und Einstellungen zur Familie haben sich in Portugal stark verändert:
 von der Ablehnung zur Akzeptanz von Scheidungen, d. h. von der Norm der lebenslangen Partnerschaft zu
Patchwork-Biographien und Lebensabschnitts-Partnerschaften,
 von der Dominanz kirchlicher Heirat zur säkularisierten Partnerschaft,
 von der Ignoranz zur Kenntnis von Familienplanung (empfängnisverhütende Maßnahmen),
 von geschlechtsspezifischen Rollenverteilungen zu partnerschaftlichen Beziehungen, in denen beide erwerb-
stätig sind, mit einer Teilung der Familienarbeit.
Unverändert geblieben ist die hohe Bedeutung der Familie im Alltag, in den Normen und in den Erwartungen.
In Portugal trifft die Vorstellung einer expliziten Familienpolitik eher auf Ablehnung. trotzdem ist eine Vielzahl
von familienrelevanten Änderungen und Gesetzen erlassen worden.
Vor dem Internationalen Jahr der Familie (1994) gab es in Irland keine explizite Familienpolitik, seitdem ste-
hen Familie und Familienpolitik auf der nationalen Tagesordnung.
Für Europa insgesamt können die Schlussfolgerungen in einem Beitrag hilfreich sein, der anlässlich der unter
der irischen EU-Präsidentschaft durchgeführten Konferenz zum Thema Familie,Wandel und Sozialpolitik in Europa
präsentiert wurde.1
Für die BürgerInnen Europas bedeuten gute Familienbeziehungen den Schlüssel dafür, die Lebensqualität zu
gewährleisten.
 (Potentielle) Eltern akzeptieren keine politischen Einflussnahmen auf Familienstrukturen, Familiengröße,
Geburtenraten und pronatalistische Zielvorgaben.
 Innerfamiliale Solidarität hat zwei Seiten: Einerseits kann sie helfen, den Sozialstaat zu entlasten, anderseits
kann sie zur Überlastung der Familien führen, was wiederum den Sozialstaat belastet.
 Der Krieg der Generationen findet in den Familien nicht statt, innerfamiliale Solidarität beschreibt reale
Generationenbeziehungen wesentlich besser, auch wenn der Alltag zwischen den Generationen nicht ganz
unproblematisch verläuft.
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1 Zusammengefasst und in Ausschnitten nach Hubert Krieger : Familienleben in Europa – Ergebnisse neuerer Umfragen
zur Lebensqualität in Europa. Beitrag zur Konferenz der Irischen Ratspräsidentschaft zum Thema Familie, Wandel und
Sozialpolitik in Europa, Dublin Castle, 13.–14. Mai 2004.
 Familie wirkt als Puffer abmildernd auf die Tendenzen der sozialen Ausgrenzung. Trotzdem lassen sich in
Europa zwei Gruppierungen finden, die sich in vielen Ländern als Familien ausgegrenzt fühlen: Allein-
erziehende mit kleinen Kindern und Langzeitarbeitslose.
 Insbesondere Alleinerziehende fühlen sich nicht nur ausgegrenzt, sondern sind in vielerlei Hinsicht benach-
teiligt. Hier ist der Sozialstaat gefordert zu helfen, ohne längerfristige (vererbte) Abhängigkeiten von
Unterstützungssystemen zu generieren.
 Die Vereinbarkeit von Erwerbstätigkeit und Familie – insbesondere in Familien mit kleinen Kindern – scheint
eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für die Verbesserung der Situation zu bedeuten, allerdings auf verschiede-
nen Ebenen:
 Verringerung der Arbeitslosigkeit, d. h. Zugang zur Erwerbstätigkeit, Verlässlichkeit von Erwerbseinkom-
men bei (potentiellen) Eltern.
 Vereinbarkeit bei vorhandener Erwerbstätigkeit durch Angebote der Kinderbetreuung, Flexibilität der
Arbeitszeit, Berücksichtigung von familialen Bedürfnissen bei der Organisation von Erwerbsarbeit,
Fairness zwischen den Geschlechtern in der Verteilung von familialen Verpflichtungen und Erwerbs-
arbeit.
 Lebenslauforientierte Karrieremöglichkeiten, d. h. Entzerrung von Zeiten hoher beruflicher Belastung
mit langen Arbeitszeiten und hohem beruflichen Stress von Zeiten hoher familialer Belastung bei der
Betreuung kleiner Kinder.
 Verlässliche und kalkulierbare sozialstaatliche Angebote, inklusive Transferzahlungen, wenn Vereinbarkeit
nicht möglich ist.
Insgesamt scheint es so zu sein, dass ein Klima der Akzeptanz, der Anerkennung und der potentiellen, berechen-
baren Unterstützung bei Problemsituationen für (potentielle) Familien mindestens genauso wichtig – wenn
nicht sogar wichtiger –für das Einlassen auf Familie und das Umsetzen der vorhandenen Familienwünsche ist.
Die Herstellung dieses Vertrauens bei Familien(gründern) ist ebenso notwendig wie die konkreten Hilfen und
Unterstützungen, wenn der Problemfall eingetreten ist. Europa braucht ein Klima der Familienfreundlichkeit, ein
Familien-Mainstreaming in der Diskussion und im Handeln, das die Basis dafür liefert, dass sich aufgeklärte
BürgerInnen nicht länger (berechtigt oder unberechtigt) veranlasst sehen, die Umsetzung des vorhandenen
Grundbedürfnisses nach stabilen Familien vor sich herzuschieben. Für den Aufbau eines solchen Klimas ist
Kompetenzgerangel zwischen den verschiedenen Ebenen von Zuständigkeiten im Rahmen subsidiären
Handelns wenig hilfreich. Das Einlassen auf Familie ist eine persönliche Entscheidung, die Interpretation des
Kontextes, in dem die Entscheidung fällt, ist eine persönliche Entscheidung, die Auswirkungen dieser Ent-
scheidungen sind aber zukunftswirksam für die gesamte Region.Wahrscheinlich ist es für europäische und natio-
nale Institutionen daher besser, auf die Wünsche und Probleme ihrer BürgerInnen einzugehen und das politische
Handeln darauf abzustimmen, statt Illusionen weiter zu pflegen, die BürgerInnen den Bedürfnissen der
Institutionen anpassen zu können.
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Austria
Family relationships
Demographic situation
Austria is a typical social welfare state with low rates of infant mortality (0.5%), an extensive social security
system, high quality of life and high life expectancy. In Austria women are expected to live to 82 years and men
to about 76 years. In terms of demography, Austrian family patterns are quite characteristic for societies within
the EUR pean Union (EU).The number of marriages is declining, while at the same time the number of divorces
is rising.The fertility rate is rather low. In Austria about two million people are married or cohabit. More than
half of them (about 55%) have children. The number of single parents is steadily increasing and at present 
amount to about 400,000.
While the importance of marriage has significantly decreased, this has not affected the importance of the
family as an institution. Family and having children means a lot to Austrian people and more than 80% see it as
one of the most important aspects of their lives. This might explain why the number of families, including co-
habiting couples with children, as well as single parents, has risen in the last decades. While in 1971 there were
about 2 million families, in 2001 there were about 2.3 million families. Furthermore, the number of families with
children has also risen from 1.3 million to 1.4 million.
However, the fertility rate at 1.31 in 2001 is quite low, corresponding to a reproduction rate of 0.63.This
decline in population has led to severe socio-political problems, which are currently the subject of intense dis-
cussions by politicians, social scientists and other experts.
In this context, it is interesting to note that although couples, and especially women, usually would like to
have two or more children; in most cases they in fact only have one.There is no real explanation for this gap
between wish and reality. It is probably due to a combination of factors such as the economic situation, indivi-
dual values and experiences with the first child (first child shock according to Nave-Herz 2002). Nevertheless,
social scientists have found that a couple’s wish to have children has decreased and that it is now more 
common to only have one child, or none at all. If this pattern continues the fertility rate will decrease further
and immigrant families living in Austria will not even offset this decline.
Although the fertility rate is higher among immigrants, who represent about 10% of the Austrian popula-
tion, this will not redress the population imbalance in the next generation. This development has far-reaching
consequences for pension schemes in Austria, which are based on the transfer of insurance contributions from
the working population to retirees. On the other hand it can be argued that a smaller number of young people
would mean savings on childcare or education costs.
Low fertility arises from multiple political, social and economical factors which have an important impact on
people’s wish for a child: feasibility to combine work and family, financial circumstances, need for personal free-
dom, housing conditions or the perception of society as child-friendly. In Austria there is a large number of care
institutions available and on average 80% of children between three and six years attend a kindergarten.
Family forms
New forms of living together 
As a consequence of numerous patterns of cohabitation and the increasing number of divorced families, new
forms of families with specific structural features are emerging.These are the single parent family, the step fami-
ly or the patchwork family.
Single parent families may either be the result of separation of unmarried couples or of divorce. In the youngest
age group it often happens that a man leaves his partner because of an unintentional pregnancy and the
woman’s decision to give birth to their child. In the higher age bracket single parents are mostly the result of
divorce. At present 15% of children under 15 live in single parent households. In the majority of cases, 93% to
be precise, children live with their mother.While young, single mothers often suffer severe financial hardship and
are on the verge of poverty, single parents in their forties are self-supporting and better off.
Remarriage often results in step families, but it is somewhat unclear how many there are. For households
with independent children it is estimated that this figure increases to about 6%. Where one’s own children are
brought into a new marriage and further children are subsequently born, we talk about patchwork families.
Unfortunately, there are no exact statistical data of the number of step- or patchwork families in Austria.
As the number of divorces has increased so has the number of children affected by them.
Living Together Apart (LATs) as ‘separated marriage’?
Whereas remarriage was the common practice when divorce rates began to increase, this tendency is now in
reverse. A new kind of partnership seems to be emerging, the so-called LATs (Living Apart Together). Couples
are living in different households, independently of whether they are married or not. This might be for pro-
fessional reasons or for personal reasons.They might think that living in separate households will strengthen their
partnership rather than weaken it. It is very difficult to figure out how many people are living in such a partner-
ship. This is especially true when young couples living with their parents are counted as LATs. However, these
young couples do not represent the typical LATs. LATs are rather a form of partnerships in a higher age group
when both partners follow individual careers and other life experiences leading to this kind of living apart
together.
Leaving home and marriage
The mean age at the time of marriage has risen considerably and is now nearly at 30 years.This is due to the
fact that people prefer to date someone without sharing a household or live together in non-marital cohabita-
tion rather than marrying shortly after having met.The time displacement of marriage creates a new phase in
life, the so-called post-adolescence or early adulthood, which is characteristic for young people in Austria be-
tween the ages of 20 and 30.They might have a partner but do not necessarily live together.They might cohabit,
but this does not implicitly mean that they will get married.Therefore, they find themselves in quite an ambiva-
lent situation, in which they try to become independent and yet are in constant touch with their parents.
In Austria young women leave their parental home for the first time on average at the age of 20, young
men about two years later at the age of 22.5 (Pfeiffer & Nowak 2001). Now fewer young adults leave home at
an early age. In Austria 39% leave home before the age of 25 (this figure is 7% in Italy and 75% in Denmark).
In young people’s minds values such as family and friends play an essential role and are of great importance
for their well being. According to the Youth Value Study in Austria (Österreichisches Institut für Jugendforschung
2001) apart from the family whose importance has remained stable for the last decade, friends represent the
most important social reference group for young people (see also Großegger 2001).
More than 50% of young people in Austria between the ages of 15 and 24, and in particular girls, wish for
a permanent partnership and plan for children later on in their twenties or thirties. Boys and young people in
their teens prefer to enjoy their youth before seriously pairing up and setting up a family. Generally speaking,
young people connect partnership to faithfulness, trust and having fun. Sharing a household does not seem
important to them at this point of time.
Cohabitation
While the number of marriages has declined, non-marital cohabitation has become more and more popular.
However, it is very difficult to give exact figures and to analyse the quality and duration of these relationships.
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People living together in cohabitation are for the most part in their twenties. However, following the definition
of cohabitation as living together and sharing a household with a partner over a number of months, the actual
figure of people living together has been underestimated.Various forms of cohabitation exist. Both partners can
live in one household during the week but can visit their parents separately or together on weekends.They can
also live together in one household but officially one or both partners can still live with their parents. In this way
non-marital cohabitation precedes marital cohabitation, rather than taking its place. The Family and Fertility
Survey 1996 (Doblhammer et al. 1996) has shown that more than 50% of cohabiting couples marry after six
years of cohabitation.
In the context of these developments the number of children born into non-marital relationships has risen
considerably since the late 20th century. In 1960 13% were born out of wedlock, in 2001 33% were born to an
unmarried mother. In contrast to the previous practice that couples married when they were expecting a child,
it is now more common for them to remain unmarried or marry later on.
At this point it might be interesting to go back and make a comparison to a pre-industrial or developing
industrial society. During the 19th century Austria was an agricultural society and more than 70% of the popula-
tion were involved in agriculture. At this time men could only marry when their parents’ property and house
was handed down to them.This was usually at the age of 30 when the old farmer was about to die.Therefore,
the age at the time of marriage was the same as nowadays.
Furthermore, marriage was closely connected to income and property. This is why, for example, girls and
farm labourers of lower classes could not marry. However, they had children and consequently the rate of
extramarital births was also rather high—even though the reasons are different from those of today.
In many ways, cohabiting couples resemble married people in sharing similar values, such as fidelity for
example. However, the risk of separation is higher than among married couples. Austrian law still differentiates
between married couples and couples living together in non-marital cohabitation. Consequently, different legal
obligations and rights apply. However, the law concerning cases of divorce or separation of families has largely
been equalised concerning maintenance obligations, the amount of financial support for children and the custody
of children.
Divorce and separation
In Austria the rate of divorces has risen considerably during recent decades. At present the divorce rate stands
at 46% and is expected to remain stable at this level. However, this does not mean that 46% of marriages will
end in divorce.The divorce rate takes into account the number of divorces and the number of marriages per
year and relates them to each other. Therefore, the divorce rate automatically rises as the marriage rate falls.
This is exactly what has happened over the last three decades.
Divorced families have steadily become a natural constituent part of Austrian society. While only 1.1 per
1,000 inhabitants divorced in 1961, at the turn of the 21st century 2.5 per 1,000 inhabitants divorced. This
represents a 100% increase. In numbers, this means 8,000 divorces in 1961 and 20,600 in 2001.
The age of people at the time of divorce has risen from the early thirties to the late thirties.This develop-
ment can largely be explained by the higher age of people at the time of marriage and by the increasing durati-
on of marriages. At present, marriages in Austria last on average 9.5 years. Consequently, the number of divor-
ces of long-lasting marriages rises. However, if we investigate further we find that most divorces take place wit-
hin the first years of marriage and that the number of divorces reaches its peak in the fourth year.
Many people who divorce marry again. About 60% of divorced people under the age of 30 remarry. However,
after the age of 30 there are significant gender differences, so that 55% of divorced men but only 46% of divorced
women marry again within ten years of divorce. Generally, partnerships after remarriage are lifelong and only
very few people divorce a second and third time.
About 20% of children up to the age of 19 are affected by the divorce of their parents. According to Haller
(1998) who focused in his study on the risk of separation and divorce of on children, the quality of the relation-
ship between parents and children after divorce is of essential importance for the well being of the children and
their later partnerships.
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Gender relationships
Gender roles and gender differences in society constitute an extensive research topic. Some crucial points are
summarized below.
In Austria demography continuously indicates gender differences in life expectancy. Since the beginning of
the 21st century the life expectancy for women is 82 years, and for men 76 years. As a result of this difference
the proportion of widowed women is higher than that of widowed men. While about 51% of women aged
over 75 live alone, only 17% of men at the same age outlive their wife. Consequently, there are more old
women than men requiring continuous health care. In many cases their daughters, only 20 to 30 years younger,
take on this care.
Although women tend to search for men with an equal or higher level of education, they increasingly marry
men with lower educational standards. This is due to the increasing number of women in the tertiary educa-
tional system, which sometimes even exceeds that of men (Schwarz & Spielauer 2002).
The distribution of household chores is considered as one of the most useful indicators concerning dispari-
ties between men and women. Household chores are even today mainly done by women, even though changes
have taken place. While in 1983 about 75% of men reported that they would not do any chores, in 1995 this
dropped to 60%. This development can partly be explained by the increasing number of men living in single
households during recent decades, and also by the increasing number of men participating in doing the chores,
young men doing significantly more than older men.
It would seem that the portion of work done is usually overestimated. For example: depending on age, 50%
to 75% of men report that their spouse does the cooking, while 70% to 90% of women say they cook them-
selves. Therefore, indications of percentages, if based on questionnaires rather than on daily protocols, are
somewhat imprecise and only indicate trends concerning the distribution of housework.
It is remarkable that the distribution of household chores changes significantly after the birth of the first
child. Men do fewer household chores than before, neglecting activities such as cooking, shopping, cleaning,
washing and ironing. Marital satisfaction of both men and women decreases when children are born (Werneck
& Rollet 2001: 132). Although these data are from 1992, they are still relevant today. Considering job and house-
work together, women work on an average one hour more than men, independently of how many hours they
work in paid labour.
Childcare requires a great deal of time and usually women care for their children. Most men are only part-
ly involved and dress, feed or play with their children on a rather irregular basis. Because of this irregularity, men
spend less absolute time on childcare than women do.Young men care more for their children than older men.
Parental leave is mainly claimed by mothers. Although at least 19% of men can imagine taking leave at least for
a short time, only about 2% actually do so. As a new qualitative study (Gräfinger 2001) has indicated, several
social factors exert a significant impact on men’s attitude to parental leave. Most men argue that the main rea-
son for not taking parental leave is their substantial income and the risk of losing it. Furthermore most men feel
that their employer would not look positively on parental leave. However, men who did take parental leave
have reported that, surprisingly, they had far fewer difficulties than they had expected. It is interesting to note
that men’s parents and parents-in-law do not want their son or son-in-law to stay at home and care for his
children. However, sisters-in-law are more amenable to this arrangement. Once men take parental leave, they
are surprised how many household chores have to be done.
Such topics are about to enter public debate, since most studies, which investigate the combination of family
and work, focus on women’s perspectives and only recent studies have taken into consideration men and their
points of view.
Although Austrian law allows parents a maximum of three years of paternal leave, on condition that men
take at least half a year, only very few men take advantage of this opportunity. As a result, very few families take
leave for three years.
Apart from the issue of the division of household chores, family research also deals with the question of
how partners negotiate the division of work. Mikula & Freudenthaler (2002) investigated the distribution of
household chores from a psychological point of view.Their secondary analysis of data of the Family and Fertility
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Survey 1996 shows that about one third of women perceive the division of household chores as unjust. This
feeling is closely related to the time effectively spent on chores by women themselves. Furthermore, women
emphasise that their partner comes off well in comparison to other men, and the better he performs the more
women are comfortable with the actual division.
Marital status and income also contribute to the evaluation of equity. In comparison to unmarried women,
married women feel the division of chores to be more unjust, and the lower their income the more they are
dissatisfied. Therefore, the perception of equity or inequity strongly depends on women’s social relationships
and their social network, rather than on real differences and inequalities. However, in most partnerships the dis-
tribution of household chores does not lead to any fundamental conflicts.
One of the most essential functions of modern family is the care of its members, especially of children and
of the elderly. In 1999, it was estimated that this work amount to 58 billion EURs if counted as a minimum
wage, including hours of overtime. About 80% of this work is done by women.
In contrast to other EUR pean countries, it is remarkable that women in Austria, as well as in Germany, find
it particularly difficult to combine work and family, although modern caring facilities are available and family poli-
cies are amongst the most advanced in EUR pe. (EUR pean Commission 1996).
This might be due to the prevailing idea that children have to be cared for by their mother—and only by
their mother. Because of this social norm most women feel obliged to care for their children and stay at
home—at least as long as their children are under three.
Marital relations
Traditional roles are losing their importance and partners continually have to arrange and negotiate their relation-
ship in everyday life. Emotional closeness and mutual understanding are found to be of great importance for
successful partnerships. Although violence in families exists, it is not widespread. In most cases, even separations
and divorces are consensual and carried out carefully and rationally.
Marital satisfaction changes in the course of marriage. Usually it resembles the run of a U-curve. At the
beginning marital satisfaction, mutual love and affection is very high as long as no children are born. At the time
of childbirth, each partner’s contentment with their marriage significantly declines.This is partly due to the fact
that men desist from doing household chores. When the second child is born, men even work longer hours
and spend less time at home with their family. When children reach puberty, satisfaction falls to the lowest
point. Gradually satisfaction rises again and marital relationships reach a high level of intimacy and common
understanding (Federal Ministry of Environment,Youth and Family 1999).
Couples without children face a similar pattern. However, childlessness can also cause severe conflicts. Affection,
good communication, love and tenderness as well as sexuality are very important for partnerships.Young cou-
ples in particular try to maintain their individuality and freedom in order to pursue professional goals and other
activities in order to advance their personal development.
Family stress and violence
Partnerships perpetually have to meet new challenges in everyday life. In this context, numerous studies indica-
te that children constitute an important stress factor, in particular for women who try to combine work and
family.
In Austria, children go to school in the morning and in the early afternoon. Consequently, childcare after
school requires deliberate time management in families where both parents are working full time. Some
schools offer after-school day care, however, this is difficult for low-income families to afford.
Children’s school achievements represent another possible stress factor, as well as disagreements between
parents with regard to bringing up their children. Unfortunately, there are as yet no relevant studies. Stress can
be one cause of domestic violence, although it cannot be an excuse. In the majority of cases violent hands are
laid on children and women, although men can also be victims.
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The Vienna Youth Health Report (Magistrat der Stadt Wien 2002), a representative study of young people aged
between 15 to 24 living in Vienna, indicates that 11% of young girls and boys often or occasionally experience
physical violence. However, significant gender differences exist. Whereas boys are more often suffer physical
abuse, girls tend to be subjected to verbal and psychological violence. Furthermore, boys report that two thirds
of violent episodes originate from their father and about 40% from their mother. Conversely, girls experience
58% of violence from their mother. However, more than 50% are critical about their parents’ actions and one
third of the interviewed boys and 44% of the interviewed girls say that their parents allow themselves to be
contradicted.
Newspapers and media increasingly report on sexual harassment. Out of 622 reported cases of physical
violence against children within one year, 259 were sexual. In most cases children under the age of 10 or 11 are
affected. These data were furnished by doctors in 1994. There is no clear profile of the delinquent. Therefore,
violent behaviour and sexual harassment might relate to the attitude toward sexuality rather than to social
milieus.
Concerning violence against women, it is estimated that 5–10% of women experience violence in their
partnership. Major crimes against women are often committed out of jealousy. Low income, financial difficulties
and alcohol abuse play a significant role in such crimes.The increasing number of reported cases during recent
years may be explained by the greater willingness of women to report them rather than a real increase in vio-
lent crime.There is a law under consideration, which will define sexual harassment within marriage as a crime.
This will have significant consequences on criminal proceedings.
Generational relationships
In Austria about 50% of families consist of three generations and 27% of families even of four generations.The
elderly are involved in generational relationships and therefore seldom isolated. In many families grandparents
actively take part in family life and some 40% of the elderly live with their children or children-in-law and an-
other 23% live nearby.
The relationship between grandparents and grandchildren is reported to be very good, and would seem to
be even better than between grandparents and their own children.
At this point it is worth mentioning that individuals tend to rate their personal relationship to other genera-
tions better than they perceive or assume intergenerational relationships between young and old people in
general to be. Thirty-eight percent of Austrians fear that intergenerational relationships will decline. Pessimism
prevails particularly among the age group 46–60 years old, i.e., the upcoming older generation: 48% fear that
the situation will deteriorate, as compared to 32% of young people.
In Austria education is marked by tolerance and cooperation between children and their parents. Parents feel
that it is important to make their children responsible (85%), independent and tolerant persons with good
manners (78%). In contrast, they do not insist on obedience—only one quarter agrees that their children
should be obedient.
Though it is shown through quantitative empirical data that micro social relations between generations are
generally close, they might be qualitatively structured by ambivalence, a hypothesis introduced by Pillemer &
Lüscher (2003). Alongside a relationship of solidarity and mutual help, they distinguish the dimensions of
emancipation, atomization and captivation. By emancipation they mean a relationship oriented also to innova-
tion. Personal development and independency is furthered without losing contact. Atomization of a family is
characterized by conflicting separation and the family is fragmentized into individuals. Finally, captivation might
often occur in the situation of care for the elderly. One generation dominates and makes the other feel guilty
for not caring enough.
Over the last decade public opinion has considerably changed with regard to old people. In 1989, only 35%
called upon old people to renounce their rights and interests and to make way for young people. Almost ten
years later, 53% expressed this opinion. However, even older people support this idea, at least at a verbal level.
At present, only half of the population thinks that the current compensation of interests between the genera-
tions is fair.
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At the macro level the proportion of the total payroll redistributed to the parents’ and children’s generations is
shown to be a useful indicator for the quality of intergenerational relationships. It is worth mentioning that the
transfer of social and economic resources from aging people to the younger generation is higher than the other
way round, even when the necessary care of older people is taken into consideration (see Rosenmayr 2000:
236).
The elderly can expect emotional, social or material help from their family. Only about 2% cannot expect
help through their family when needed. In most cases old people are cared for by their daughters. Therefore
help might often be considered as being female. Employment is the main reason (far more frequently than any
other) why people either do not want or are not able to care for their parents. Incidentally, this is cited even
more often by women than by men.
If children care for their old parents they do so out of gratitude or obligation rather than for the abstract
reason of family solidarity. It seems that the more parents helped their children, the more they can count on
their children’s help later on. However, looking at all age groups in society, young people experience more situa-
tions that require help than the elderly do.They need someone to talk to, to do housework and maintenance,
and to look after each other in case of illness and so on.
The Generations Study of 1998 concluded that the conflict between generations is more apparent in the
public media and social policy discourses than in the family sphere itself (Majce 2000).
The socio-economic situation of families
One of the central issues in family policy as well as in social policy is the socio-economic situation. Within the
family situation there is a relatively high poverty risk.The comparison between people with and without child-
ren is obvious. If you take a single person without children you will find that about a quarter of that group is at
the risk of poverty, in the EU-15 average as well as in Austria. If you look at single parents, about a third is in
that group (35% in the EU, 32% in Austria). The poverty risk is especially high in families with three or more
children: about a third are at the risk of poverty. No difference could be found in 1998 between families with
one or two children where both parents live within the household with their dependents. In those groups the
risk of poverty is 11%. Although poverty is not a common phenomenon in welfare states, we have to face the
fact that in Austria families with more than three children, as well as single parents, have a poverty risk well
above the average.
This affects the social situation of children. It is due less to the fact that they have little money to spend than
to the habit of saving and of feeling excluded from the activities of their peers. Parents and single mothers try
to hide poverty as much as possible by spending money, especially on the children, which leads again to more
poverty in the household. Aggressive behaviour of children might be the result.This can be alleviated by an inte-
grated and friendly family atmosphere. Poverty in welfare states is biographically structured. This means that
being born into a social situation of poverty and remaining in a poor family throughout one’s lifetime is not 
typical, even though it exists. Rather, poverty is a risk, which can occur at any phase of one’s life. A period of
unemployment is one such phase or as mentioned earlier, the phase when three or more dependent children
are living in the household. Also divorce can lead to a poverty risk situation, not only for the single mother, but
also for men.This biographical figuration of poverty makes it hard to fight with simple measures.
Family policies
Family policy is one of the central political issues concerning family.Within the EUR pean Union it is assigned to
the individual countries and is not the responsibility of the EUR pean Commission.We will discuss some crucial
developments of Austrian family policy since the late 1990s after the Year of the Family in 1994.
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The Family Fund (FLAF)
The Family Fund, which was introduced in 1954, constitutes an effective tool to support families by financing
specific family policy measures at the federal level. Every taxpayer pays a certain amount to the FLAF, and the
money is distributed to those families in need.
Family allowance, for example, is to cover the maintenance costs of children. Over the past 20 years the
Family Fund has increasingly developed into an instrument to finance an even greater range of family policy
measures, but has failed to tap new financial resources. Its main resource is a payroll tax of 4.5%1 (6% before
1980).
In 1999, 60% of the Family Fund’s expenditures were designed for family allowance (compared to some
88% in 1970). Another 20% was primarily intended to be used for other measures, such as parental leave and
the mother-child pass scheme of payments in return for medical checkups (compared to 2.8% in 1975). Finally
9% was intended for children’s free travel to school and free schoolbooks. Since 2001 the Family Fund also
funds family-related research studies.
Depending on the individual’s income, a specific percentage of payroll tax is transferred to the FLAF. The
Fund’s distributive effect includes a strong vertical component: up to the sixth income decile, households with
children are net recipients.The lowest quartile contributes 9.8% of the Fund’s revenues and receives 29% of its
expenditures; the top quartile contributes 44.7% and receives 19.2%.
There is an ongoing discussion whether the FLAF should be retained or not. One opinion is that in times of
low fertility the FLAF produces a surplus, which is not efficiently redistributed.Though families benefit from the
money, families are still in danger of poverty and financial contributions did not, in the past, lead to higher fertili-
ty rates. Thus there is always a tendency to abolish this instrument and to make family policy through general
laws, which would influence individual primary income directly, however, experts in family policies would prefer
to retain the FLAF.
In 2001 the Austrian government enacted a law which transformed the previous child benefit that was only
intended to support parents who had worked before parenthood into a general benefit payable to all parents,
regardless of whether they were employed or not. Consequently, for example, students also receive child 
benefit.
At present child benefit is EUR 430 for up to 30 months. Where the father also takes leave for half a year,
child benefit is allocated for a further six months. For additional income a ceiling of about EUR 1,136 per month
was introduced. Although childcare benefit is very controversial and carries the risk that women are unlikely to
work again, at present there is no political party that calls for its abolition. However, evaluations have shown so
far that childcare benefit only has minor effects on women’s participation in the work force, but it does lower
the level of poverty.
In 2003 a new pension scheme was established which implicates substantive changes to both the private
insurance system and the state-run insurance system. In Austria the central problem is that many employees
retire quite early. Consequently only one third of Austrians between the ages of 55 and 65 who would have
been able to work really do work.The new scheme envisages a continual rise in the retirement age and will no
longer permit early retirement. In addition, those years that women spend caring for their children are counted
as man-years.
The ‘2000 Family Package’ adopted at the end of the decade more than compensated for the reductions in
family allowances made in 1995 and 19962 and doubled the child credit to ATS 700 (about EUR 51) per child
per month, for the first child.
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1 For 2001, these revenues are expected to be 3.2 billion  euros, out of total Fund revenues of 4.4 billion  euros.
2 The family allowance is determined on a sliding scale, according to the age and total number of children per family. In
2001, the following amounts were paid per month: for the first child up to 10 years of age, EUR 105.38; between 10
and 19 years of age, EUR 123.55; between 19 and 26 years of age, EUR 130.81.The amount increases by EUR 12.72
for the second child and by EUR 25.45 for each additional child. As of 2002, the family allowance went up by EUR 7.27
for children as of their fourth birthday. Added to the family allowance is the uniform tax credit referred to above.
As a result of the above reduction programme, parental leave was actually cut which caused substantial prob-
lems concerning care for very young children.The Family Ministry therefore commissioned the Austrian Institute
for Family Studies (ÖIF) to prepare a study on childcare in Austria. One finding of this study led to the discus-
sion of a childcare voucher, and in June 2001, the Austrian Parliament enacted the childcare benefit scheme,
effective as of 1 January 2002. This benefit turned the parental-leave benefit, payable only to working parents
into a general benefit, payable to all parents in a similar situation, regardless of whether or not they are employ-
ed. Because of its fundamental importance, the measure is discussed in more detail below.
Childcare vouchers and childcare benefit
As already mentioned, the idea of a childcare voucher was first voiced as a consequence of a study on state
support for part-time care for preschoolers. A feasibility study took up the idea, developing it into a concept
with several budgetary options to cover its costs. The idea was embedded in a general welfare concept, with
due consideration given to intergenerational and gender relationships and to the development of a wide range
of measures. Seen objectively, the voucher is a general, unspecified measure to extend standardised support
(under a ‘concept of minimum standards’) for part-time childcare to parents within the scope of parental 
responsibility.The voucher indicated a change in paradigms: rather than the type of work the parent does, it is
the child and his/her need for care that constitutes both the voucher’s point of departure and its objective. It
gave fundamental responsibility for childcare to the parents; by making purchasing power available to them, they
themselves can then decide on whether to provide part-time care themselves and/or to purchase it from
external sources. Once the child is four years old, parents are given a strong incentive to utilise external care
services (such as kindergartens) by using the vouchers.
In addition to the money and the vouchers, the time spent by the parents themselves on providing child-
care is recognised as a qualifying period for old-age pension claims. A separate empirical study was made, that
involved asking almost a thousand persons what their views were on the various voucher models and what
they expected their impact to be. Generally, 71% of those polled saw the voucher scheme as an improvement
(positive utilisation difference); the positive response rate was particularly high among women (74%), those
under 40 (80%), persons with children under the age of six (85%), and single parents (84%).
The childcare benefit adopted by Parliament in June 2001, while based on the findings of the feasibility
study, still differs from it in two aspects: it introduced a ceiling for additional income of about EUR 1,133 per
month and limited the maximum claim per parent to 30 months. Both restrictions were substantially the result
of budgetary restraints and had not been foreseen in the feasibility study model.
Evaluation of the childcare voucher is in progress. Up to the present time, the policy has been very contro-
versial. The possibility of working, in addition to receiving the voucher, is considered as a contribution to com-
bining family and work. It seems that the limited amount of additional earnings contradicts the structure of the
policy and this might be changed in the future. Beside this more ideological debate, questions are raised which
mainly concern the financial affordability for the state. At the present time, there is no political party in 
parliament, which wants to abolish the voucher.
Joint child custody after divorce
In addition to equal-rights concerns, measures against violence—especially in the family—and the introduction
of mediation—especially in the case of separation—the issue of joint custody after divorce was to become a
major legal subject for discussion.This was finally adopted in 2001. During the 1970s, when family law underwent
reform, child custody was specifically reserved to one parent. By the 1990s, however, a movement had develo-
ped that advocated the child’s right to both parents. Researchers added their suggestion of introducing a 
‘non-obligatory provision’ that allows courts the option of joint custody based on specified criteria.The new law
enables divorce courts to grant custody to both parents, a measure that appears sensible at least for some
aspects of the relationship between parents and that may also have positive effects for the children. Similar 
provisions have been introduced by other EUR pean states over the past few years.
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The generation policy
One of the central issues in Austrian policy focuses on the change to a new pension system. So far very little
has been achieved. One central issue is the increase in the age of early retirement. Austria has one of the 
highest early retirement rates in EUR pe.The issue has been dealt with in recent years and initial results showed
a reduction in early retirement. But this is not enough to solve the expected pension problems.The strategy is
to narrow the gap between early retirement and planned retirement age. An additional point of discussion is
equalizing the retirement ages for men and women. Currently, the official planned retirement age for women is
60 and for men 65.
Regionally, and especially in urban areas, a great effort is being made concerning housing for the elderly.This
does not mean only better age-adequate equipment in flats but also integration into the urban setting. The
ideology behind this policy is to integrate the generations, not to separate them.There are, as yet, no results to
show how successful these projects are.
In Austria, some 22.8% of the total payroll, plus a substantial contribution from the federal budget, is paid as
old-age pensions to the retired. Out of the total payroll 3% is spent on family allowance to a similar number of
children. There are several policy measures for the support of the elderly. The Austrian government recently
introduced the possibility to take leave to look after severely sick children or dying persons, while social security
provisions, as in the case of dismissal protection, continue.
Counselling and parental education
These days families and family members face rapid changes, which frequently exhaust their capacities.Therefore,
a supportive and preventive backup system is of great importance. Family counselling and parental-education
systems currently in place undertake this task of supporting families. Counselling is provided in accordance with
the 1974 Act to Promote Family Counselling. In 2000 there were about 305 family counselling centres with a
staff of about 2,000 counsellors throughout Austria.
Over time most centres have become specialised, focusing on specific target groups and specific issues.They
range from educational counselling to marriage counselling and their work concentrates on problematic issues
concerning relationships, separation/divorce and education. In many cases, interdisciplinary teams have been very
successful. As a consequence many counsellors dream of so-called ‘multifunctional centres’ which offer a variety
of different psychological and social services. At the federal level parental education has been somewhat neglected
so far, although there has been some improvements since the Year of the Family in 1994. Finally, the federal
government substantially increased funding for parental education from 0.22 to 2.2 million  euros in 2000.
Family Audit
In Austria the government encourages the so-called Family Audit. Initially the Family Audit was intended to ana-
lyse firms with regard to their family friendliness and later on it was extended to communities and villages.The
prime objective with regard to firms is the improvement of the combination of work and family. Firms, which
participated and reached a high standard of family friendliness, were honoured by the government with the title
of ‘family-friendly firm’. Communities are also subject to extensive analysis of their family and child friendliness.
As a result of this analysis, programmes for improvement have been implemented.The participation of the local
population and of children in particular is essential to ensure success. In 2003 the first family-friendly community
was honoured by the Austrian government.
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WILFRIED DUMON
Belgium
In the period covered by this monitoring report (July 1996–June 2004) three major trends can be identified
upon which this report will focus.
 Active promotion of equality and combat against any form of discrimination in terms of gender, sexual 
orientation, or family form (life style).
 Expansion of family policy orientation beyond the transfer of money and the expansion of services. For
example, the promotion and enhancement of non-material goods such as quality of life, or governmental 
concern about parenting and the balance between work and family life.
 Refocusing on ‘family’ at the federal level.
Gender equality and life style 
Belgium is often compared with a particular musical instrument, the saxophone, created by a Belgian musician,
Adolphe Sax, in 1846, 13 years after the creation of the country in 1830.The saxophone is characterized by its
complexity; it is difficult to play but if handled well, the sound it produces is pleasing. Belgium (population about
10,000,000) is a federal state composed of three language communities: Dutch, French and German. In the
Belgian vocabulary they are referred to as the communities, each headed by a (cultural) government, organising
education and cultural matters as well as issues concerning welfare, including family welfare and health.To make
it more complex, this cultural division is paralleled by a regional repartition of the country into three regions:
Flanders (Northern part), Wallonia (Southern part) and Brussels (central part), representing about 60%, 40%
and 10% respectively of the population. The regional governments attend to economic matters including
employment, housing, etc.The regions, except for Brussels, almost overlap with the language communities to the
extent that cleavages tend to reinforce each other. Moreover, all the governments (federal, regional, cultural or
linguistic) tend to be coalition governments composed of at least two parties (in Belgian jargon: political fami-
lies). In order to handle this complex situation and perform adequately, Belgian policy making is characterized by
reaching compromises or making a ‘fair deal’.
In the period covered here, a textbook example of this highly developed technique is to be found in the
domain of ‘equality’ achievement between the different family forms: marriage versus cohabitation. At the turn
of the century, 1998–1999, a compromise was reached between the two major groups in Belgian society:
a more progressive one advocating recognition of same-sex couples versus a more conservative tendency
stressing the importance of marriage. Both tendencies manifested themselves in the attempts of political parties
to rectify the situation, which was labelled as discrimination. In late 1998, the problem was solved by a deal
whereby legal recognition of same-sex couples was to be achieved on the condition that the fiscal ‘discrimina-
tion’ of married couples versus persons living in cohabitation would be eliminated.
Family forms: equity in taxation
In Belgium the trend towards non-discrimination between family forms is focused on tax equality for married
and unmarried couples. Social changes in couple formation, and in particular the increasing number of un-
married people cohabitating had an unintended impact on the taxsystem. Two unmarried persons living
together had two advantages over married couples, tax-free minimum and tax deduction for children.
Tax-free minimum
In order to ensure that individuals (or a family group) obtain the basic necessities (food, clothing, housing), in the
Belgian system, as in many other systems, a basic minimum of the total income is tax free.
Until recently, the so-called ‘tax free’ amounts were differentiated according to marital status.The amounts
for singles were substantially higher than those for married couples (n/2 owing to the fact that married couples
usually share housing (including utilities), food, etc.
In this respect, in the late 1990s, unmarried persons living together were sometimes referred to as two
‘fake’ singles. Whatever the labelling persons living together had fiscal advantages over married couples.
Estimates at that time (1998) could result in a difference of some Euro 500 a year.This difference was branded
in the pre-election period as ‘discrimination’.The theme became a key element in the political campaign that led
to the election of June 13, 1999. After the election the new government, in its October 1999 declaration, an-
nounced a ‘fiscal reform’.
A bill introducing a new tax system, qualified as ‘neutral’ as to family form (i.e.,, non-discrimination between
married and unmarried couples) was passed by Parliament in August 2001 (B.S./M.B. September 27th, 2001).
The cost was estimated at 1.5 billion Euros. It gradually removed discrimination and will take full effect in
2005. It does not only relate to the so-called basic minimum. One of its main features concerns dual income
families. As of 2004 the full income of each partner will be taxed separately, whereas formerly it was to a large
extent added to that of the partner with the higher income.Therefore, from 2005 on (income 2004), for tax
purposes, the marital status of couples will be almost irrelevant.
Tax allowance for children
The new law of August 10th 2001, erasing the differences for couples whatever their family form, does not
remove all the difference in tax reduction for dependent children. In some respect the differentiated treatment
isótheoretically and judiciallyóincreased. In sociologicalical terms the outcome is not overly dramatic.Two situa-
tions are at stake, tax free income earned by children and a special system for children of divorcees.
All children can earn, or have income from other sources (such as child support) or gifts from grand-
parents/kin, up to a certain sum. If this sum is exceeded they loseófor tax purposesótheir status as ‘dependent
persons’. For dependent persons tax deductions apply.
 Children of married persons may earn up to EUR 1,500 before they lose the status of dependent persons.
All amounts are indexed according to the consumption prices index. For children of singles these amounts
may run up to ±EUR 2,600 (formerly EUR 2,250).The discrepancy was due to the fact that many of those
children receive ‘child support’, so in order not to lose the status of ‘dependent child’, this measure was
taken.
 Children of divorcees.The same law of August 10th includes a new provision regarding ‘child support’. Child
support is no longer tax deductable up to an amount of EUR 1,800. Combined with the measure indicated
above, the amount reaches EUR 1,800 + EUR 2,600 = EUR 4,400. It does not matter whether these chil-
dren live with one parent or in a cohabitation situation. As a result, in some instances, married couples
where all circumstances are similaróare, at least theoretically at a disadvantaged position.
Currently the item of ìdiscriminationî is no longer a matter of discussion in the socio-political debate.
Inheritance tax
With regard to inheritance, at the beginning of the period under consideration, 1969, married couples were far
better off than cohabiting couples: a reversed ‘discrimination’.
Inheritance tax are not set by the Federal Government but subject to regional legislation. Consequently
they tend to differ between Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia.
The example given is that of Flanders (the most populous region) since in that region discrimination was
removed in two phases. In the two other regions similar measures are yet to be taken.
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 Phase 1: Cohabiting couplesóliving together for three yearsópay a reduced inheritance tax.The highest rate
went down from 65% to 50% (the one discrepancy remaining is that his figure is 30% for spouses). This
measure was taken by a previous government in October 1997.
 Phase 2: A new government removed any discrimination between cohabiting and married couples.
Moreover, the definition as ‘cohabiting couples’ was extended in two ways: all cohabiting couples registered
at the town hall were included and for the non-registered the time provision was reduced from three years
to one.
Moreover, the maximum rate went down (both for married and cohabiting couples) from 30% to 27%.
Sexual orientation: same-sex couples
This important matteróin terms of public attention as well as in terms of symbolic importanceóconcerns the
socio-public debate and the dramatic change in policy regarding same gender couples. Even a new word was
coined: ‘holebis’. Although its concern is a minority group, ±10% of the population, its symbolic value is im-
mense, since these measures involved were assessed as involving key institutions in society such as marriage and
institutionalised gender relationships. In the period under consideration four phases can be identified:
 1996–1998: confusion and conflict,
 1998–1999: compromise and deal-making,
 2000–2001: consensus and outcomes,
 2002–2004: fine tuning and new issues.
These phases are not clearly separated but do overlap to some extent.There are four steps in the process of
recognition and institutionalisation of same-sex marriage general unease about
 discrimination;
 recognition of private cohabitation contracts;
 registered partnership;
 same-sex marriage.
 Anti-discrimination
Anti-discrimination
In May 1996, the two major political parties, which constitute the government, put forward an anti-discrimina-
tion bill in parliament, to the effect that discrimination of ‘homosexuals’ and ‘lesbians’ became a felony.The socio-
political debate that followed focused on two issues. Some claimed the bill was unnecessary and redundant,
since according to the constitution ‘all citizens are equal under the law’, whereas the protagonists referred to
the law dealing with anti-racism, which turned any expression of racism into a felony. A second objection was of
a more technical nature, how to specify which actions are punishable and which actions can still be tolerated
under the proposed Act.Thus, necessity as well as feasibility were at stake.
The socio-political debate was rather intensive but short-lived. In September 1996, one of the major parties
withdrew its unconditional support. As a consequence the proposal to introduce an anti-discrimination law was
killed.
(Private) living together contracts
The period 1996–1997 was marked by confusion and conflict over the so-called ‘new forms of living together’.
Three forms were at stake, registered partner relationships, ‘homosexual marriages’ and recognition of private
living together contracts.
These three forms were neither clearly defined nor clearly separated.
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Meanwhile some action was taken. Antwerp was the first town in Belgium to accept the registration of private
cohabitation contracts. 1995 marked the first public acknowledgement of the private contract. Registration
included the name and address of the notary. In early 1996 (March) the coalition government (Social
Democrats and Christian Democrats) prepared a decree to the effect that all local communities should offer
this service. Owing to the intense controversy concerning same-sex marriage, which became a heated issue in
that year, the decree was stillborn.
Institutionalisation of living together contracts (LTC)
Discussion concerning recognition and institutionalisation of the so-called ‘living together contracts’ started in
1996. The debate was lively but confused. The confusion was not limited to the issue of institutionalisation of
living together situations, but also concerned the sexual orientation of the persons who could qualify to enter
these new institutions, which were yet to be created.The main issue was whether or not heterosexuals could
enter such new legalized form, or whether it should be reserved for homosexuals exclusively. So in 1996 two
issues were at stake. Firstly, whether the LTC were in accordance with the Constitution or not.The debate was
not conducted exclusively in legalistic terms but also ‘ethical’ and ideological considerations were at stake, the
arguments ranging from “can one experiment with marriage” to ”can any Christian tolerate discrimination“:
rigidity versus compassion.The second issue, LTC open to heterosexuals or reserved for homosexuals, created
even more confusion.
Indeed, both issues cut across each other since, in September 1996, one major party proposed a deal with
the other major party (which together constituted the government of that period) where they agreed to intro-
duce the LTC exclusively for ‘homosexuals’ and marriage exclusively for heterosexuals.The rhetoric ran: ”these
institutions have to be kept differentiated but of equal value“. In 1997 the issue was a matter of debate be-
tween the major political parties and was at the centre of socio-political debate. In 1999 the debate continued
and the former government made a deal whereby LTC was accepted in principle but should only become
effective after the removal of fiscal discrimination for married couples.The two issues should be linked together.
At the end of 1999 the new government disconnected the two issues and on November 23rd, 1999 parlia-
ment adopted the Bill institutionalising the LTC. The law makes provisions for two persons sharing a home: a
homo- or heterosexual couple, siblings, two friends, etc. who can legally be considered as ‘living together’. The
new bill provides a legal basis for their relationship.The law came into effect on January 1st, 2000.The first cere-
mony took place in the Brussels town hall on January 5th, 2000.Two same-sex couples (males) were the first to
sign the LTC.Therefore, legalized partnership has been in force in Belgium since 2000.
Later, in October 2003, certain fiscal measures were passed in order to remove unequal treatment between
legal cohabitees and married couples. As of 2005, the two groups will enjoy the same income tax assessments.
More particularly, cohabitees living in a breadwinner family situation will profit. As to the two earner/two income
cohabiting families, only moderate income families will have some advantage, whereas two-career partners, both
with high incomes, will hardly see any difference. So, the measure taken is symbolic in nature for all concerned.
Yet, it still brings a real bonus to middle-income as well as to lower-income cohabiting couples.
Same-sex marriage
Already in 1996 some people advocated ‘homo-marriages’ if only to prevent the emergence of a new type of
legalized cohabitation in the same style as ‘contract of living together’ or LTC At the end of 1996 the de facto
union of same-sex couples received some legal recognition not only in civil law but also in social law, e.g. social
protection. For example, by Royal Decree, effective from September 1st 1996, in the de facto union same-sex
couples, one partner was recognized as being the ‘head of the family’ to the extent that in terms of social
protection one of the partners received a higher amount for example, in terms of unemployment benefits, etc.
As a matter of fact, the sums of this compensation money tend to be significantly higher than for ‘dependents’
or ‘co-residents’.
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As far as civil recognition was concerned a breakthrough was made at the end of 1997 when a coalition of
members of parliament across all major parties agreed on a kind of same-sex marriage under the style of 
‘registered partnership’ to be set up exclusively for homosexuals. But in 1998 this project was put at ‘calendas
graecas’ meaning that no further action was taken. Early in 2000 the proposal was reanimated and renovated.
The ‘registered partnership’ would remain exclusively geared towards ‘same-sex couples’ as a reflecting mirror
of marriage reserved for heterosexuals. Additional provisions were to the effect that both partners were res-
ponsible for providing for each other (as included in the marriage contract), that both gained kinship relations
(in-laws and so forth), just as in marriage. One exception was adoption. As a couple they could not adopt chil-
dren.With regard to this exemption, reference was made to ‘international contracts’ and ‘international law’.The
question of adoption remained on the political agenda. At the end of 2000 the Minister of Justice announced
that cohabiting couples (either same-sex or heterosexual) would be allowed to adopt ‘Belgian’ children from
early 2001. In mid-2001, parliamentary action was taken to that effect but in mid-July 2001 the situation changed:
the same Minister of Justice announced the forthcoming provision of a new Bill: homosexual marriage.
In mid-July 2001 the Cabinet agreed that same gender couples could get married as of early 2002, the
expected date was around Easter 2002, and at the latest mid-2002. The law would become effective four
months after its publication in the Official Bulletin (Belgisch Staatsblad/Moniteur Belge). The provisions of the
new Bill stated that same-sex couples will enjoy/are submitted to exactly the same rights and obligations as
heterosexual couples. This is in terms of procedure for marriage, both in terms of its provisions as well as in
terms of its effects, but with some limitations and restrictions.The limitations concerned cross-national marria-
ges. Cross-national, same-sex marriage is exclusively open to citizens of a country providing similar arrange-
ments. At that time this was only the case for the Netherlands. The single restriction states that the same-sex
couple cannot adopt children as a couple.The announcement was met with great enthusiasm by non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) advocating the rights of homosexuals.To them, same gender marriage represen-
ted a symbol of equal treatment.These euphoric feelings were met by total silence from any group which had
previously concern over the issue. It was as if this new phenomenon of ‘same sex marriage’ is fully accepted by
society. In 2001 the adoption question remained on the political agenda. Some members of parliament indicated
their opposition to the exception and announced that they would take action to eliminate any differentiation.
At the end of 2001, the supreme Council, the body responsible for testing each law on constitutional 
grounds, pronounced its verdict. In late November it declared a bill legalizing ‘same-sex marriage’ to be un-
constitutional.Two key arguments were put forward to substantiate its verdict:
 same gender couples cannot enter into marriage, since this union, by nature, is not child bearing oriented,
and 
 the government itself, in making an implicit difference between heterosexual couples and same-sex couples
by excluding the latter from the right to adopt a child, had manifestedly proved the need for a differentiated
treatment of the two forms.
The government immediately announced its intention not to take this advice into consideration. Groups advoca-
ting same gender marriage blamed the high Council for its ‘social blindness’ and ‘for living in an ivory tower’.The
negative advice of the High Court did not fuel any opposition by any social group to the new provisions.
Yet it took until 2003 before the new bill ‘opening up marriage’ to same-sex couples was introduced.The
bill was passed in Parliament on 30 January, 2003, published in the Official Bulletin (BS/MB) on 28 February, and
came into effect on 1 June, 2003. On Friday, 6 June, the first same-sex marriage was registered in a village near
Antwerp (Kapellen) where two women exchanged nuptial vows. The institutionalisation of same-sex marriage
does not constitute any new form of marriage, it only allows for same-sex couples to enter into the existing
institution of marriage.Thus, the so-called ‘holibis’ have exactly the same rights and obligations as a heterosexual
couple. However, there are two exemptions:
 Parentage: in the case of the death of the biological mother, the partner does not automatically get custody
of the child(ren) of the partner.
 Adoption: same-sex couples are not (yet) permitted to adopt children.
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 BELGIUM
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 61
Currently both issues feature as an argument in socio-political debate.The former (parentage) is qualified as a
technicality which can be solved in the near future, in contrast the latter (adoption), which is a more delicate
issue and is becoming an item on the agenda of the holibi-movement, which qualifies this exemption as a form
of ‘new discrimination’.
Yet, in the course of 2004 some fine tuning was made to the provisions. In early 2004, marriage between same-
sex couples was opened up to foreigners, e.g. Belgians can now marry a non-Belgian partner, provided they are
both Belgian residents.
In spring 2004, another development, minor in scope yet not without symbolic overtones attached to it,
occurred. In one case on April 28th 2004, a judge in a juvenile court accorded visiting rights to the co-mother
although this was against the firm will of the biological mother of the child.This ruling represented a shift in the
traditional way of handling this issue. Moreover, it fuelled the claim for new legislation allowing the co-parent to
adopt and/or legally recognize children of one of the same-sex spouse.
Gender
For decades gender equity has been at the centre of socio-political debate. In the period under discussion, two
family-related issues were at the centre of this debate: division of labour in terms of paid and unpaid work and
identification of kinship in terms of ‘name giving’ of the children (the surname).
Division of paid and unpaid labour
In 1979 the Minister for equal opportunities launched an extensive publicity campaign, including huge posters
and flyers showing males performing so-called typical female tasks such as childcare and females performing
male tasks such as plumbing. This campaign was supported by a large NGO, the largest family organisation in
Belgium, whichóunder the slogan of ‘A family is a two-person job’óconducted investigations, but more im-
portantly, designed an instrument, a tool kit, enabling families to measure by themselves the degree of unfair
division of labour inside the family. These campaigns might have achieved better results on the cultural level:
awareness raising rather than effecting dramatic behavioural changes. However, attention on the actual division
of labour within the family was raised to the degree that results of scholarly investigation into the matter be-
came relevant for public discussion and government concern. Whereas in previous periods, women were the
target group in terms of attention, in the period covered, men were identified as the problem group. At the
beginning of the new century a new word was coined, ‘the new man’ with a question mark. ‘Did or didnít he
exist?’ was the question. In contrast with previous terminology: ‘the new father’ and ‘new fatherhood’, popular
terms at the end of the last century (the 1980s and 1990s), in 2000–2001 the reference is not to children but
to the partner.The new man takes on his household duties. In 2001 a regional-governmental prize was awarded
to the ‘new man of the year 2001’, praising his performance in running the household and by doing so enabling
his wife to advance her career.
However, the main emphasis placed on ‘paid’ work, in terms of degree of activities as well as salaries. As far
as family-related issues are concerned, the main concern is focused on issues regarding the balance between
work and family.
Allocation of the surname
Some ten years ago, the law regulating surnames was changed in order to remove any discrimination between
children born in and out of wedlock. Yet, in 1997, a cohabiting couple made an appeal to the highest court
(Arbitragehof/Cour díArbitrage) on grounds of discrimination, claiming the right to attribute to their children a
double surname: both the fatherís and the motherís. The case is still pending. In Belgium children automatically
take the surname of the father.The Council of Europe has invited Belgium to adapt its system and make it non-
discriminatory. As a result, a senator proposed in parliament a bill reversing the situation and bestowing auto-
matically the motherís name on the child. No action, however, was taken. In June 2001, female members of
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parliament, a cross-party group, representing all the democratic parties in parliament, put forward a bill to the
effect that a surname should not be bestowed on the child automatically but that the parents should have the
choice. The proposal is to the effect that parents can give either one name or a double name. The surname
should be identical for all children born to the same parents. However, the parents have a wide choice: they can
opt for either the fatherís, the motherís, or both names in whichever order they wish. In the latter (double
name) case the next generation has even a wider option: either both names of the mother or the father, or a
mixture leading to sixteen options.This proposal received considerable media attention. As a result, the Minister
of Justice confirmed that the government would put forward a bill regulating the matter in 2002.
According to an opinion poll, conducted June 2002, 50% of the Belgian population expressed its support
for this change. However, new legislation to that effect did not materialize.Thus, in contrast to the former issue
(same-sex marriage) this item has not gained priority on the political agenda and no action is to be expected in
the near future. Meanwhile, in early November 2002, the highest council (Arbitragehof/Cour d’Arbitrage) ruled
on the matter. Although they recognize the existing provision to represent a patriarchal image of society that
tends to be out of step with current trends, they do not consider this provision as ‘unconstitutional’.
In mid-2003, this issue was dealt with in the negotiations leading up to the new coalition government of
June 2003. It was agreed that the new (federal) government would introduce a bill regulating the matter. The
intention of the current (federal) government, which took office in July 2003, is to change the patriarchal system
which consists of bestowing on the child the surname of father, into a system, labelled the Spanish system. For
example, the simple name would be replaced by a double name, father’s and mother’s and in that order. The
question remaining open is whether the newborn should get the double name automatically or whether the
parents could decide and have an open choice between the father’s (sur)name and/or the double name. As a
result, an issue which started as a gender-related issue has now turned into an issue of power-balance between
the private and the public sphere. One year later, in mid-2004, these issues had disappeared from the political
agenda.
Family life: new and emerging issues
In the period covered (1996–2004) several issues were raised concerning family life as well as family structure.
This report will only deal with family life since this aspect has featured as an important issue on the socio-politi-
cal agenda. With regard to family life in the period covered, three issues were at the centre of public attention
and the socio-political debate, parenting, balancing work and family, and care.
Parenting
In the period covered, parenting has emerged as a political issue and featured explicitly in socio-political debate.
The media reported on the issue by suggesting that parenting had become more complex on the one hand
and on the other hand that parents had developed a more anxious attitude and are becoming more insecure.
And, indeed, some studies have suggested that parents have had high and unrealistic expectations of their chil-
dren, while other studies have indicated that one out of four parents defined the task of parenting as a heavy
burden. Non-material family policy in Belgium is the competence of the three language community govern-
ments (Flemish/French/German), to the effect that the policies tend to be quite diverse.
Balancing family-work-citizenship
Time credit
On 1 January, 2002, a new system aimed at balancing family-work-citizenship was introduced, called ‘time credit’,
replacing the former system of career-interruption. The system of time credit is regulated by a Collective
Labour Agreement and therefore covers all persons working in the private market sector. It allows each
employee to take leave of absence for one year in the course of his/her career. According to the sector of
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activity the one year limit can be extended up to five years. By the end of November 2002, 30 out of 170 indu-
strial sectors had extended the period of one year to the full five years.
The beneficiary receives a flat sum each month with a ceiling of Euro 495.79 (if he/she has seniority of less
than 5 years, this amount is reduced to EUR 371.84). In addition to this provision, in one region, Flanders, three
different incentives were introducedd in order to stimulate the success of the programme.As far as family is con-
cerned, the ‘bonus care credit’ should be mentioned.This bonus is granted to anyone taking time credit in order
to care of a sick child (up to the age of 18) or of a parent in need of care (aged 70 and over).The credit is also
granted to those who care for a severely ill family member or a terminal patient.The additional bonus amounts
to EUR 50 a month for those in full-time employment, EUR 100 for part-time employees. In mid-2002, the
system of time credit, applied in the private market sector, was extended to the governmental business sectors
(such as postal services, etc.), employing approximately 100,000 persons.
The system of credit time, substituting the system of ‘career interruption’, can be described as successful on
two counts: already by April 2002 some 15,600 persons had entered the programme.As a result it was success-
ful in terms of participation, but it has also addressed the gender issue.The system of career interruption was
predominantly taken up by women, whereas the system of time credit became somewhat more male oriented.
The percentage of males has risen from 21% to 37%. However, the reasons for taking up time credit are remar-
kably diverse.Women tend to take up time credit at an age when they can spend more time with their children,
while. two-thirds of the men entering the programme are in their 50s and are likely to be doing so in order to
alleviate the workload.This discrepancy is confirmed by the results of a survey by the ULB (Université Libre de
Bruxelles); conducted in the French-speaking region of Belgium. Their findings suggest that in case of illness of
very young children who are in care (crèche, day care etc.), about 26% of mothers take leave-of-work versus
14% of the fathers.
In 2003, the system proved to be even more successful than in 2002. In the first semester of 2003, the 
number of persons who took time off under the time credit scheme had doubled compared with the reference
period 2002, 152,000 persons were expected to take advantage of this system in 2003.
Although the programme is still heavily female oriented, the percentage of men entering the system in-
creased by almost 40%, in the first semester about 16,000 men (15,892) took advantage of the system out of a
total of about 50,000 (49,796), i.e., 68% women and 32% men.
Parental leave
Parental leave, linked to the time credit system and consisting of a three months’ career interruption, showed a
dramatic increase from about 12,000 in the first semester of 2002 to over 18,000 in the corresponding period
in 2003, a 50% increase.
Simultaneously, 2003 marked a dramatic increase in parental leave taken up by fathers.The figure more than
doubled in the period June 2002–June 2003; its number rose from 1,026 to 2,480.This sharp increase of men
(fathers) did not occur to the detriment of the number of women (mothers) taking leave. Indeed, that number
also went up considerably. In one year there was an increase of about 70%.
The new government which took office in July 2003, announced in its governmental declaration an exten-
sion of parental leave from three months to six months. In March 2004, the government decided to extend the
leave by one month to four months.
Amounts will be raised by Euro 100. (e.g. from Euro 550 up to Euro 650 for a full-time employee).This decision
is still (summer 2004) subject to approval by the social partners, but the government has announced its firm
intention to apply these measures.
 Already in 1997 the issue of parental leave was not exclusively directed at mothers but fathers too were
included. Even special arrangements exclusively for fathers were introduced.To give one example, the regio-
nal government of Brussels introduced an additional ten days fatherhood leave for its staff, effective 1
January, 2002. Across the regions two general tendencies can be identified:the amounts received for paren-
tal leave tend to be substantial and some incentives are built in so that the measures would attract men as
well as women.
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Care
In the period under discussion the care issue has been at the centre of socio-political debate. Children are
involved but more and more attention is being paid to the aged.The rationale of care for children traditionally
has been put in terms of ‘balancing work and family’, but is increasingly put in terms of ‘investment for the future’.
Child centeredness is even reflected in political vocabulary. In one of the declarations by the regional govern-
ments, the goal is defined as ‘balancing the interest of parents and children’. Moreover, facilities for childcare
were, up to 1996–1997, almost exclusively put in terms of availability ‘quantity’, whereas the issue is increasingly
put in terms of ‘quality’. As far as care for the aged is concerned the longstanding debate and controversy over
dependent/independent assurance for non-medical care came to fruition in 2001, the new provisions coming
into effect on 1 January; 2002.
Childcare
Although childcare is a matter of the three (language) Communities (Dutch/French/ German-speaking), the
policies and preoccupations are more convergent than divergent. In the period covered three main issues were
at stake: day care for babies up to three years of age and out-of-school care for infants between two and six
years of age.
Provider concerns
The issues concerning the providers are availability and quality of crèches, this is also a concern of the con-
sumers, i.e., the parents.
Day care for babies 
In Belgiumóas in any other European societyó informal care (grandparents) is gradually taken over by formal
care. In the period covered the latter form (formal care) was an issue, in contrast to informal care. Informal care
was hardly at the centre of public attention, although some attention was paid to the declining care provided by
grandparents. As far as formal care is concerned: the first phase of the period covered was marked by great
concern over availability of services (quantity). In the last part of the period covered, quality became more
important.This does not mean that quantity is no longer a problem; on the contrary, it is the quantity problem
that poses claims for the quality standard to be high. Indeed immediately prior to the period covered new qua-
lity control standards were developed and had been applied since 1997. At the end of the period covered,
2004, there is still serious concern both in terms of quantity as well as quality. In terms of quality a special cha-
racteristic, the gender issue, has emerged in the course of the period under observation.
In Belgium, until 1983, statutory provisions stipulated that the staff in childcare had to be female. In early
2003 the Flemish government launched a campaign in order to attract more men into the sector of profes-
sional childcare. Based on data going back to 1995, it was documented that in childcare facilities less than 2% of
the staff was male. Officially the action was based on three considerations:
 Economical: in the sector there is some (over)demand and a certain undersupply;
 Gender issue: an attempt versus horizontal integrating,
 Pedagogical: the advantage of male role models for infants.
An assessment of the situation in the middle of 2004 showed that the situation has not changed dramatically,
yet in training centres for childcare the number of male participants has increased considerably.
As a more general observation, in the two language regions (French, Dutch) a striking convergence in
preoccupation and policy formulation regarding day-care centres can be identified. In both communities the
focus is on quality care both in terms of the material quality of the facilities and also in terms of qualified
employees. Since in Belgium, almost all children between the ages of 2.5 and 3 and over tend to go to school
on an all-day basis, the attention is being focused on out-of-school care. In late May, the government of the
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French Community introduced a bill which came into effect in September 2003. Its aim is to transform care
from ‘care-parking’ into a care system that could be qualified as more stimulating for the children. The main 
feature of this reform is its stimulation and activation of cooperation between the various participants.
Regarding childcare facilities, two types of providers are available. The first type are crèches (8 children or
more in private centres, 23 children or more in publicly controlled initiatives).The second type of facility is that
of the day-care mothers (minimum of 4 children up to a maximum of 8 children).
Crèches
Subsidized and governmental crèches are administrated by licensed NGOs. They outnumber by far private
crèches in the free market. In the period covered, the latter (private crèches) have made several attempts to
increase their share of the market arguing that they are cost efficient. In 2001 these efforts yielded some results.
In order to expand their facilities they will receive ± EUR 370 per child per year (index 2001 = 100).
The official crèches score high in terms of numbers of places available (babies), satisfaction of the custo-
mers (parents) and performance (they tend to score highly on quality-control tests). In addition the parents
also clearly appreciate the professionalism of the care takers. The main shortcoming reported was related to
the issue of flexibility. Already in 1996 an inspection team reported a growing discrepancy between the work
situation of parents (in terms of time schedules) and the opening hours of the crèches. In addition there is over
demand and undersupply of the official crèches. This short coming has not yet been fully dealt with. Some 
claimed that over demand and undersupply would be eased by the demographic trend: lower birth rates.Yet,
this tendency was counteracted by a steady decrease of the informal sector (grandparents) and by a decrease
in the number of day-care mothers, but in 2003 the latter situation has shown a reversed tendency.
In business-linked crèches, the childcare sector is characterized by a permanent squeeze: overdemand and
undersupply. In order to cope with this imbalance, an effort was made to expand the number of participants on
the supply side. Corporate family policy was never given high priority on the political agenda, yet the regions,
and more particularly the regional governments, became active in this area. In June 2002, the Flemish Minister
for Welfare started a campaign aimed at involving businesses in childcare. Somewhat later, in December 2003, a
similar campaign was launched in Wallonia. In both regions, different alternatives were suggested, ranging from
subsidizing parents to actually installing crèches at the workplace.The latter was severely criticized by the major
family organisations, fearing too close a link between family and work (‘boss and family’). However, even before
this campaign started, this type of day care was already in existence. In Flanders, the service was offered to
approximately 35 employers, i.e., a tiny minority. They almost all tended to be in the non-profit sector. In con-
trast, the campaign focused heavily on the market sector. In Wallonia, the campaign was endorsed by the
Organisation of Employers. Already in early 2003, regional governments and the federal government made a
deal to the effect that companies (market) as well as local authorities (e.g. communes/cities) could take initia-
tives in childcare, the cost of which was to be tax deductible up to a certain amount (tax benefit ceiling for
companies). The measure came retroactively into effect as of 1 January, 2003. The measure was not aimed so
much at the establishment of childcare facilities within the company premises, although this was not excluded,
but rather targeted financial support by corporations, either to existing facilities or to the establishment of new
ones (inter-corporative or mixed ones). The measure was advocated on two grounds, expanding childcare
opportunities for the employees as well as expanding the labour market. For Flanders, it was calculated that the
measure should yield: 1,100 new places for childcare, involving at least 100 new full-time jobs. In Wallonia, the
target was set at 1,130 new places. For Wallonia it is too early to asses the impact of this campaign. In Flanders,
in terms of numbers, the target seems to have been reached. Indeed, by the end of 2003, some 2,400 babies
had been registered, however in terms of companies involved, the overwhelming majority is still confined to the
non-profit sector.
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Day-care mothers
Day-care mothers are women (occasionally men) who look after children in their own home during the day.
This model represents the most popular, or at least the most frequent form of day care in Belgium. Together
with the crèches, two systems are simultaneously operational: private day-care mothers, operating as self-
employed persons, i.e., the ‘non-organized’ sector, and the ‘organized’ sector administrated by rather larger
NGOs, belonging to the social welfare sector They are monitored and controlled by specialized agencies which
in turn are part of the (regional) governmental authorities. The second type by far outnumbers the former in
terms of quantity as well as in terms of quality. Parents highly value the flexibility offered. Yet, in the period
covered by this report, their numbers have decreased steadily, although late 2003, a reverse trend was ob-
served. Great dissatisfaction was expressed by day-care mothers in terms of income as such and in terms of
social protection, both were qualified as inadequate.
Self-employed day-care mothers. In late 2003 the University of Limburg reported that the income of self-
employed day-care parents was low compared with the heavy workload they had to bear.The study highlights
long working hours, some days they have to work up to nine hours. In the lowest income bracket, involving
25% of the women, monthly income ranged from zero up to Euro 300,while in the highest bracket (some
10%), income was as high as Euro 1,500 with average income being Euro 541. Thus, in sum very few women
make a decent living out of their profession and some even have a negative income (i.e., they lose money).
What the day-care mothers value in their homes, is their freedom, so they do not want the government to
be involved too much or to exert greater control. During the period monitored their number has steadily dec-
lined. Moreover they are by far outnumbered by the organized day-care mothers.
Day-care mothers (under supervision of NGOs). In comparison with the previous group, day-care mothers
working under the supervision of NGOs (welfare sector), manifestly and even militantly demanded more ade-
quate social protection and even more so in the period covered. Prompted by decreasing numbers, in early
2000 the federal government promised increased social protection, yet the regional authorities (regional gover-
nment) had to pay a larger share of the bill.The social protection promised would ensure unemployment bene-
fit, pensions, health insurance and insurance for work-related accidents. However, day-care mothers were be-
coming more and more unionised to the extent that the trade unions would not accept these proposals and
claimed full social coverage, e.g. day-care mothers had to be recognized as employees.The conflict culminated in
a street demonstration in the capital, Brussels, in spring 2002 organized by the main trade unions. Meanwhile,
individual care mothers filed their cases in the labour courts. As is often the case in Belgium, a compromise was
reached, care mothers would be covered by a transitional system of social protection, coming into effect on 1
April, 2003. New provisions in social security systems were introduced to the effect that day-care mothers
were receiving some social security, but not full coverage as requested by the organisation representing them.
The system was mainly centred on income security. The new system was qualified as transitional, a first step
towards full coverage and the recognition of care mothers as employees. However, in autumn 2003, a labour
court ruled that care mothers could not be considered as employees and therefore did not qualify to be
covered by the social protection system of employees. A roller coaster of judicial rulings followed, some courts
ruling that care mothers were to be considered as employees, others rejecting it. The last rejection was in
September 2003 while the last ruling in abolishing the claim is rather recent, June 2004. At the time the Ghent
court of appeal made a clear ruling that care mothers should be considered as employees and thus are entitled
to full social protection like any other employee.Yet the NGOs either employing or monitoring the work of the
day-care mothers expressed clearly their position: ‘they were not able, on financial grounds to agree to this kind
of protection. Currently, the situation has reached a stalemate. .
New developments: vouchers for childcare
In order to combat illegal employment, as well as to create new jobs, one regional government introduced a
new system of ‘vouchers for household work’. Temping agencies as well as non-profit organisations were en-
titled to recruit staff. Although this initiative started at a regional level in Flanders, it should be mentioned be-
cause of it is breaking new ground.The vouchers entitle the customers to employ a worker in their household
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to perform household duties ranging from housekeeping to cooking to gardening. ‘House workers’ paid with
these vouchers, benefit from full social protection, employers (households) pay a fair amount but the expenses
are tax deductible, and finally, the regional government subsidises to a large extent the total costs. As a result,
the demand for vouchers considerably outnumbered the supply (governmental budget being fixed). Although
successful, the initiative was highly controversial on a political level. It provoked considerable conflict between
the federal and regional governments on matters of competence which ended in a compromise. Thus, the
system continued and expanded. Early in 2004 the vouchers could be used not only for household work but
now also for childcare.This provoked a new political controversy, this time within the regional government, the
ministers for labour and employment, versus the minister for social welfare (including family). Here too a com-
promise was reached. However, whether conflict, compromise or cooperation, the important point is that the
interaction of work and family leads to an overlap between family and employment policy.These new measures
can be qualified as innovative on three accounts: (a) In Belgium, it implies that the market is intruding into the
childcare domain. In spite of protests by the non-profit making sector, expressed in public demonstrations
backed by trade unions, the free market was able to acquire a share of the new opportunities and job creation,
to the benefit of families. (b) The introduction of this at home care by agency staff (i.e., persons temping) was
severely criticised by experts, e.g. an inter-university group of child education professors who strongly highligh-
ted the value of crèches over upbringing in the home. In doing so they were not referring just to the advan-
tages of the system for the parent (work/family balance) but mainly to the child as the target of policy.This was
more than one single action, the value of the crèche, the importance of the social as well as the educational
function of crèches, was highly valued, even over the family as a system. Family organisations as well as the
media expressed concern about this new concept. (c) The introduction of the vouchers can actually be
characterized as another element enhancing family power. Families (parents) have acquired more power in
hiring services, setting demands, and in expanding alternatives.
Out-of-school care (infants aged 21/2 to 6 years of age)
In Belgium the overwhelming majority of children around the age of 21/2-3 years do enter into the school
system. In 2004, it was estimated that at the age of five, almost all children attend school (only some 0.3% are
not registered). In the age bracket 2Ω to 6 years of age children attend kindergarten on full-time basis, five days
a week. As a result organized and formal care for children after school hours needs to be organized.
In all three regions initiatives for out-of-school care are organized by the local communities (town authori-
ties) subsidized by the regional authorities.The French community government included the issue explicitly in its
former governmental declaration (September 1999). It reads: out-of-school care should not be limited to the
school year but vacation time should be covered as well.
In the period 1996–1997, considerable debate took place on whether or not the school should be linked
to out-of-school care.This resulted in a typical and functioning Belgian compromise: the out-of-school initiatives
(IBOs). Most of this initiative came into effect in 1998. Since then the system has expanded and now covers the
whole territory. Yet, in contrast to younger children (0–3 years), informal care, in particular by grandparents
plays a far greater role. Moreover, in general, the role of the informal sector (grandparents) tends to decline to
the benefit of the role of the formal system. Recent evidence suggests that 35% of out-of-school care is covered
by the informal sector (but declining), 35% of out-of-school care by school-linked services (but increasing) and
IBOs account for about 10% (but increasing).
Customer concerns
Two main issues are at stake: availability (quantity) and quality, secondly: costs.
Availability 
As already stated above, the childcare sector, although expanding rapidly, can still be characterized by over-
demand and undersupply. Recently (mid-2004) it was estimated that in the largest region, Flanders, some 5,000
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places for infants (up to five years of age) and about 10,000 for out-of-school care (6–12 years of ago) would
be needed by 2010. In terms of quality, the study noted that there was some room for improvement more par-
ticularly in the non-subsidized, private crèches, sector.
Recently, the emphasis has not been so much on availability of facilities but on flexibility, more particularly in
terms of business hours. For more than one year now (2003-2004) there has been an experiment regarding
out-of-school care; a few out-of-school care facilities now offer their services from 5.30 a.m. until 11.00 p.m. If
these practices will continue depends on the evaluation and assessment by groups of experts (predominantly
education specialists) who are monitoring these experiments.
During 2003–2004, concern was not exclusively based on supply but also on demand. More particularly, it
was felt that children of dual-career/dual income parents were overepresented in childcare, while babies living
in deprived neighbourhoods, more particularly in larger cities were underrepresented. In order to encourage
the participation of disadvantaged groups, in late 2003, in larger cities such as Ghent, initiatives were taken to
stimulate neighbourhood- oriented childcare. These initiatives were characterized by their small size, their way
of operation (close collaboration between professional care takers and parents) and their informal nature
(great emphasis on accessibility).These new initiatives are not a Belgian innovation they were modelled on simi-
lar projects of large cities in France and Germany.
Costs/Fees
Up to mid-2004 costs for childcare were tax deductible for children up to the age of 3 years. From mid-2004
the age limit was raised to 12 years. Since the organization of childcare is under the competence of the regio-
nal governments, fees tend to differ according to the region. For example, in the largest region, the fees are
income related and range from Euro 1.50 a child a day, up to about Euro 15 a child a day, reflecting the prin-
ciple ‘fee according to financial capacity’.
Care for the elderly: money matters 
Research evidence, released mid-2003 suggests that half of the people in the over 55 age group do not con-
sider themselves to be old.These people tend to become more healthy and wealthy. However, this category is
characterized by great differences in terms of health as well as in terms of wealth, both variables being cut
across different age subcategories. As regards care, for this age group, the responsibility liesóto a great
extentówith the regions, although the federal government plays a vital role in financing the programme. For
example, in 2003 the federal government transferred an additional 23 million Euros to the language communi-
ties, (Flanders, 15 million Euros, Wallonia, 7 million Euros, Brussels, 0.5 million Euros and the German speaking
region approximately EUR 32,000) in order to enable them to carry out their care programmes. During the
same period some initiatives are being developed in Wallonia which can be said to be rather innovative in brid-
ging the market differential between home care and institutional care. One example is the development of day-
care centres for ailing older family members and of spouses who can be taken to these centres, while remaining
integrated in family life by coming home at night.
However, most matters in that domain cannot be covered under the label of ‘family’. Nevertheless, two par-
ticular issues can be identified as family-related, at-home care and residential or institutionalised care.
Home care
Since care is under the competence of the regional authorities, so also does home care.The last term of office of
the language community Flanders, was marked by great unrest, demonstrations and strikes by professional home
carers (both for the family and the elderly).They claimed that the Flemish regional government did not live up to its
promise of increasing their salaries, neither meeting their demands for better secondary labour conditions (vaca-
tions etc.). As a result, new provisions were made, although subject to budgetary constraints. This development 
serves as another example of the increased confusion between family policy and employment policy.
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Institutionalised care
In November 2003, the federal government issued an order entitling each resident in a home or residential
home to a minimum amount of pocket-money of EUR 900 a year.The amount is to be paid by the local (com-
munal) social welfare organisation (run by the local communal authority) in monthly instalments.
The same local social welfare agencies (run by the local authorities) take care of payment for the elderly
who are insolvent and who either cannot, or only partially pay the residential cost for their stay in residential or
nursing homes. Up to now these agencies, run by local authorities, could reclaim that money from the
child(ren) of the elderly. Starting in 2001, some communes decided to stop that practice on grounds of in-
efficiency.The last half of the period covered needed a great deal of investment (in terms of money and effort)
but the outcome was meagre. Ever since, this issue has been central in the socio-political debate and 2003 did
not bring it to an end. In 2003, new elements were brought up to add fuel to the argument. Old and new argu-
ments were heard. An old argument was abolition does not cost a great deal. A new argument concerned an
opinion poll organised by a regional government, which showed that an overwhelming majority of the elderly
population themselves agreed with abolition. Whatever the importance of opinion polls, the results had sym-
bolic value, since the argument ‘children should feel responsible for their parents, and parents are entitled to
count on it’, did not hold true.
In mid-2004, the Federal Minister for Social Integration decided that on the condition that local (communal)
authorities approved, the social welfare agencies had an option, either to maintain the system of reclaiming the
money or abandoning it, currently (mid-2004) some 100,000 are living in a retirement home, of which some
25% are financially supported by the local welfare agencies.
Current trends and developments
The current government that took office in July 2004, announced in a governmental declaration the intention of
organizing a ‘General Assembly on the Family’.This General Assembly, representing political authorities, experts
and NGOs was organized in April 2004.The results of this high powered Assembly may serve as a show case
of the current trends and developments of family issues in Belgium.
From an explicit family policy to implicit family friendly policies
In this cabinet there is a new under minister (Secretary of State) with the brief ‘Family and Disabled Persons’.
This might be seen as paradoxical since family policy is under the competence of the regional governments
(regions and language communities).Yet, crucial family related policies such as tax-benefits, child allowances and
so on remain a federal matter. However, the organisation and working groups preparing the high-level confe-
rence on Family illustrated and confirmed the tensions that exist between central federal and decentralized
regional governments regarding competence over the regulation of family matters. These tensions have mani-
fested themselves clearly during the period under observation (1996–2004). Moreover, this competition for
power does not tend to be limited to conflicts between federal and regional political authorities, being intra-
governmental as well.The tensions were particularly obvious between the political decision makers in the realm
of employment and labour versus those who were responsible for care and welfare. The emergence and 
growing visibility of these tensions may serve as an indicator of the growing overlap between family matters and
work-related issues. It also reinforces the old adage that the target group of family policy does not exclusively
consists of the deserving poor but is geared to the able, productive work force as well.
Traditional family policy: tax and child benefits (cash benefits)
There is a second paradox. At the final and public session of the Family Assembly, a great deal of attention was
paid to financial transfers to the family.This in sharp contrast with the trend and developments in family policy
in the course of the period under observation, which was characterized by family policies beyond the sphere of
taxation and child (family) allowances. To some extent this can be attributed to the differences of opinion
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expressed in the working sessions of the Assembly. However, as to contents, the debate and controversy tends
to focus on taxation systems under the label of splitting the so-called ‘family-quotient’ by referring to a system
of ‘splitting’ the taxable income. For example, some part of the income of one spouse can be taxed as if it was
the income of the other spouse. This is in contrast to the ‘individualization of the tax-system. Whatever the
value and merit of either system or its lack of value’, it brought the old (or original) type of family policy back
into the limelight of public debate. Therefore, cash was put back at the centre of socio-political debate, more
important even then the focus on services. Even more paradoxically, this is occurring simultaneously in Belgium
at a time of an overwhelming need for greater participation in the labour force, more particularly in terms of
gender and age, more female participation, longer participation of older workers, both male and female. Thus
the convergence between gender policy and family policy is currently being tested, at least verbally.
Marriage and divorce
The period covered (1996–2004) was marked by a decrease in the rate of marriage and an increase in the
divorce rate.The decrease in the marriage rate did not provoke much concern, since marriage-like cohabitation
is accepted and to some extent over institutionalised. However, divorce rates, which in the European context
can be regarded as relatively high, have caused some concern. This is yet another paradox: in Belgium the di-
vorce law is outdated since it represents one of the few examples in Western Europe where the non-fault
divorce has not yet been introduced.Therefore, the divorce issue ranked highly on the agenda of the Assembly
on the Family, in the spring of 2004.Two issues are at stake: divorce procedure (divorce law) including child
custody and alimony (ways of collecting amounts awarded by the courts).
Non-fault divorce 
In its governmental declaration, the current government (which took office in July 2003), announced its inten-
tion to introduce a bill introducing faultless divorce in Belgium. Early in 2004, the Federal Chamber of
Representatives put this item on the agenda. Current debate on this issue is not so much about whether or not
to introduce faultless divorce since the principle itself is not so much a matter of debate, rather the question
raised is whether or not this ‘faultlessness’ should become exclusively the new principle or if ‘fault’ divorce
should remain on the books, e.g. in case of divorce caused by domestic violence.Whatever the outcome of the
debate, the faultless divorce, ranking high on the political agenda, will probably be introduced in the course of
the next two to three years.
As far as custody of children is concerned, currently custody is usually given to the mother. For some de-
cades now, fathers have been organising themselves, and claimósometimes through militant actionótheir rights
to remain fathers. In parliament as well as in civil society agreement has been reached on the principle of joint
custody and in practice this is increasingly the case. However, this principle does not yet have any legal support.
Debate continues to attract great publicity.The Family Assembly is concerned not so much with the principle as
with the modalities and implementation of this principle. Currently two alternatives are being proposed. Some
advocate the ‘bi-location’ of children, with children spending an equal amount of time alternatively with each
parent. Others are strongly opposed to this principle and advocate joint custody or joint responsibility but
stress the importance and value of stable and familiar accommodation for children. It should be noted that both
positions are supported and strongly defended by the experts such as psychologists and educationalists.
Alimony/child support
On Womens’ day 2000, women’s organisations met in the Belgian parliament under the label of ‘Women’s
Parliament’.They made a formal request to the government to establish an ‘Alimony Fund’ which would guaran-
tee payment of alimony when ex-partners failed to do so. The need for such an institution had already been
voiced in the middle of the 1970s and had surfaced regularly ever since.The Minister of Finance stated it would
be feasible to made such a Fund operational by January 2003. In 2002 the number of ex-partners failing to pay
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alimony was estimated at 19%. In September 2002, the government unexpectedly announced its intention to
abandon the project. The current system will remain and will be modified; it will become more flexible and
accessible to many more women.Yet, the claimants will still have to contact the local social welfare agencies in
their local communities.This rejection of an explicit commitment by the government provoked severe criticism
from womenís organisations.They protested on grounds of technical difficulties (financing) as well as on grounds
of performance (according to their mission this meant giving priority to persons according to need). As a result,
the project to establish an Alimony Fund was revitalised. In early 2003, a bill to that effect was passed in parlia-
ment and the fund was to become operational in September 2003. However, in September 2003 the new
government (which took office in July 2003) decided to postpone its introduction by one year. As a result, some
10,000 claimants still have to contact local social agencies. The Alimony Fund will partly be financed by the
money obtained from an increase in the tax on tobacco products. Even this goal could not be fully realized. As
a result of protests from womenís organisations who had established a ‘Platform for Alimony’, a ‘light version’ of
the Alimony Agency became operational. In contrast with the original purpose, this agency was not empowered
to advance money to the claimants but was reduced to an office which would collect money from ex-partners
unwilling or unable to comply with the payments due. After being in operation for one month only, the agency
had at least 145 registration offices and had already started working on some 200 cases; 89% of these claims
were made by women.
Of course the Family Assembly did not intend to put all emerging issues concerning the family onto its
agenda. In the period covered, 1996–2004, at least three issues, that have emerged in this period, should be
mentioned:
 concern about a stable birthrate continuing to stay below replacement level,
 issues concerning bio-technological engineering and 
 the issue of migration (intra-European and international migration) influencing the role of the family in a
multicultural society.
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JENS BONKE
Denmark
Introduction
Changes in gender relations, generational relations and the socio-economic situation of families are important
issues in order to understand recent developments in modern welfare states. However, these are very broad
categories allowing plenty of scope for interpretation with respect to monitoring purposes. In this study, a more
concise use of gender and generational relationships and the family structure are applied, with focus on the
conditions of individuals as members of families in Denmark, i.e., the working life–family life dilemma, family
norms and developments and the welfare of children. Moreover, health conditions and immigration issues are
also addressed.
The description of the development of the above-mentioned welfare indicators follows questions raised in
the Danish debate as well as topics of national research in this field. Moreover, policies addressed have all attracted
marked public attention. Nonetheless, other perspectives and policies might have been chosen, so this paper
cannot be definitive with regard to changes in gender and generational relationships and family structures in
Denmark.The information used in this paper is from diverse reports, research articles, and from public debate.
However, there are no references (available on request) because the overall aim has been to give an overview
of the issue rather than a full documentation of the state of the art.
General family issues
The family issue can be approached in several ways, although some questions are found in the public debate
more frequently than others. In the Danish debate the questions are work-life balance, family norms and develop-
ments and the welfare of children.
Working life–family life
The welfare of the family is closely related to working life patterns.The increasing workload of both men and
women is considered to have a negative impact on the well being of modern families. However, recent research
indicates that this is not necessarily the case, because the well being of the family is found to rely more on the
quality rather than the quantity of work. If women and men spend the day in an inspiring and challenging 
working environment, it is found to have a positive influence on how they experience their time within the
family. A challenging working environment, therefore, in many ways mitigates the working life–family life dilemma
and the bad conscience that women and men often experience. On the other hand this implies that those
parents who do not experience job security do not feel as comfortable in general. For the unemployed, the
problem might be even worse, as they find themselves in a humiliating position and prone to potentially self-
destructive behaviour. There is an increased risk of violence, abuse, and divorce, and therefore the family will
experience not only financial but also social and mental negative consequences from unemployment. As in
other countries, unemployment is not evenly distributed throughout the Danish population, but most often
occurs in families with the lowest educational level.
Parental and educational leave arrangements were introduced both to ease the general problem of unem-
ployment and to meet some of the family’s needs.When employees leave the labour market in order to study
or to take care of their children for a given period of time, temporary jobs are open for the unemployed.
Parental leave was introduced with the aim of reducing waiting lists to public childcare institutions. Despite good
intentions, however, leave arrangements did not achieve these goals. In fact, parents did not always make use of
this leave and fathers in particular rarely use it.This can partly be explained by the fact that the father is still the
breadwinner in most families, and for double career families neither of the spouses wishes to risk good career
opportunities by losing their attachment to the labour market, not even for a short period of time.There are
variations, however, as public-sector employees take leave more often than private-sector employees, because
of more flexible working conditions and higher economic compensations.
Today, Danish men and women attain nearly the same educational level, and the proportion of households
where the woman is more highly educated than the man, has increased from 15% to 29% in the period
1985–1995.Therefore, it does not seem right that the housework should still be unevenly divided between the
spouses.The father is still more committed to his job than the mother, and the mother still manages the major
part of the housework. One reason is that most husbands earn a higher income than their wives and regard
themselves as the breadwinner. Another explanation is to be found in cultural and historical gender differentials
concerning expectations and the value attached to paid work versus unpaid work. Finally, many women still
have to get away from the idea that housework is an obligation, and get a position in the labour market. This
does not mean that changes have not occurred.The division of labour, where women are mainly responsible for
unpaid work, was much more pronounced within the traditional family, whereas modern households are based
on more equal rights for men and women.Today, men contribute more to the housework than previously and
a comparative European gender study shows that Denmark is leading in terms of equal opportunities and
allocation of time when compared to most other European countries.
However, there is still a childcare gap in Denmark insofar as Danish women reduce time spent in the labour
market after giving birth while men increase theirs. Moreover, women never work to the same degree as prior
to giving birth. This means that there is still a gender division with regard to time between parents with small
children.Whether this can be explained by different time preferences between women and men, or because of
structural phenomena, is still an open-ended question.
One implication of the gender division of labour is, on the one hand that women earn less than men, and
on the other hand dedicate themselves to a career less often than men.The gender wage gap is now calculated
to be 12% for public-sector employees and 17% for private-sector employees, with 9% and 5% respectively due
to different training and education and to positions in the labour market, while some of the residual 3% to 12%
are accounted for by earnings discrimination against women. Discrimination appears primarily in the private
sector, and the general level of discrimination is very low in Denmark.The same study has shown that the gen-
der wage gap is found to be highest in the upper end of the income-distribution scale. One explanation is, that
even for career people, a gender division of household work prevails. Another explanation is that the public
day-care institutions do not offer sufficient flexibility in terms of opening hours and therefore do not make it
possible to have long and late working hours at the workplace.
Family norms and development
An important question is whether the growing number of women working full time has a negative impact on
family life. Due to pressure of time, less time might be available for family issues such as socializing and taking
care of children. However, there is no evidence that this is the case in Denmark. Most families appear to be
satisfied and only a small number (10% to 15%) of families report that they have major problems. However,
satisfaction is difficult to measure as it depends on expectations and varies according to cultural and social life
styles. Marriage occurs later than previously, the spouses are more likely to be of the same age, and often have
the same educational background. Furthermore, because young people want to create a secure social and eco-
nomic environment for the family before they have children, the age of women giving birth to their first child
has been increasing.
Nowadays almost half of all Danish children are born into families where the parents are not married but
cohabiting instead, with only 4% born to single mothers. Moreover, there has been a substantial increase in the
number of parents who choose not to be married. Therefore, the well-known term the nuclear family now
refers to parenthood rather than to marriage/married couples.
One feature of today’s society is the process of individualization, which implies that the family is nowadays
constituted by non-marital cohabitation—a freer and more non-committed way of living than marriage. This
does not prevent a high number of divorces, however, and every third child experiences a family break-up
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during his/her childhood. One reason for this may be that women, who are now better educated, have become
economically independent of their husbands who were traditionally the breadwinners.This might be one reason
for the loosening of family ties making divorce a more obvious solution to marital problems.
When parents break up there is a tendency towards a change in the child’s relationship to his/her parents.
Most commonly, it is the father-child relationship that weakens with divorce, because the father more often than
the mother loses daily contact with the child.This implies that the mother gains a stronger position in the child’s
upbringing, which together with the high number of women in day-care institutions has led to the term ‘femini-
sation’ of childhood. For children of poor parents this is even more pronounced, because they have weaker
bonds to their father than children of more well-off parents. If the parents are not married these problems are
found to be greater, and therefore, there has been an attempt to equalise the rights of married and unmarried
couples in order to secure the child’s right to see both parents on a regular basis.
Child welfare
The increasing participation of women in the labour market has obviously had an immense impact on how
children grow up nowadays. Apart from a large increase in living standards, everyday life has changed radically.
Most children spend a considerable number of hours in day-care institutions or schools or, to be more specific,
94% of the 3-year-olds are in some kind of childcare institution on any ordinary day.That leaves only 6% to be
taken care of at home by their mother. Moreover, the relationship between the child and his/her parents has
changed, as children are treated more as individuals with their own rights, and they have become prestigious
”projects” for their parents.
Furthermore, the upbringing of children in Denmark has become much less authoritarian. Mothers report
that they find it very important for their children to be brought up to be independent and to feel responsibility
for their environment. In addition, there has been a perceptible fall in the use of physical punishment in the last
30 years, which is an important indicator of improvement in child welfare.
Most Danish children experience a safe childhood, with only a minority growing up with problems in their
homes.The proportion of Danish children experiencing poverty for two or more years during their childhood
and adolescence is calculated to be around 20% of a cohort of children born in 1984, whereas the proportion
of children experiencing ten or more years of poverty is only 1%. Another study shows that the number of
poor children—living in families with equivalent corrected disposable income below the 50% median—is
around 3% to 4% for a given year and another 4% to 5% are living in families at risk–families below the median
income with financial problems, but not classified as poor. However, there seem to be high transition rates—
calculated by using deprivation poverty criteria—as around 50%of children in poor families in one year are not
considered poor families the following year.
Social economic inheritance has also been studied, and findings show that it is still considerable in Denmark.
Measured as so-called mobility coefficients, we find that social economic inheritance in Denmark is somewhat
higher than in Sweden and Finland, but lower than in the USA.
Furthermore, there is strong evidence of negative social inheritance concerning factors such as unemploy-
ment, low education levels, crime, alcohol and drug abuse, mental illness, attempted suicide and violence in the
family.These problems already begin in early childhood, when children from deprived families more often than
other children enter the social system and experience a higher risk of being removed from home. It is difficult
to ascertain whether removing children from their home is a positive or negative measure and the latest legisla-
tion stresses the importance of keeping families intact. For that reason different support arrangements have
been introduced, and the removal of children from their home is considered as the last resort, and if there is no
alternative the period they live away from home should be as short as possible.
However, studies show that children who grow up under tough conditions generally do better than their
parents.The explanation is a wealthier society with better opportunities for all citizens. On the other hand, this
does not imply that the relative positions of children and parents in society have changed, only that there has
been an improvement in the absolute level of welfare.
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In the Danish welfare society, the effects of social inheritance should be reduced through an extensive social
safety network and a progressive tax system. Moreover, because the majority of Danish preschool children
spend most of their day in public day-care institutions, this should somehow compensate for a problematic
family background. However, studies have shown that this is not the case. The tendency is that children from
families with inadequate resources are also the ones to be found in the poorly functioning day-care centres and
their social skills with other children tend to be limited.This is despite the fact that Danish day-care centres are
on a high level when compared internationally. Schools are also incapable of smoothing out existing inequalities.
The introduction of free choice when choosing public day-care institutions and schools across community
lines is recognized as a threat to the fight against negative social inheritance. The argument for this initiative,
however, has been that more competition implies higher quality in childcare and education for all children.
Health
In Denmark, private and semi-private institutions mainly constitute the primary health-care system, whereas the
secondary health system is mostly a public affair. For this reason the role of the family is hard to determine.This
does not mean, however, that taking care of sick family members does not take place within Danish families.The
family does indeed play an important role for the health and welfare of Danish citizens.
Health-related caring in Denmark 
Despite the large health sector in Denmark, the family plays an important role in health-related caring. Every
third adult helps family members and/or friends in maintaining and/or improving their health. There are only
minor variations between age groups, but gender matters since women offer health services to relatives more
often than men.This places women in the traditional role of being more family-minded than men.
The proportion of people who have given help to family members and friends living outside the household
is fairly high, i.e. for the under 60 age group one in four has helped their parents within the past four weeks. For
obvious reasons, this proportion drops to one in twenty when focusing on the over sixties age group. Helping
children who live on their own is also common with one out of every three parents between the ages of 46
and 74 doing so on a regular basis. On the other hand, only one out of every eight grandparent has taken care
of their grandchildren, probably because most of the under sixties grandparents are active in the labour market,
and the over sixties are either active in the labour market, have active leisure time or live too far away from
their grandchildren to take care of them.
The conclusion is that even though the role of the Danish welfare state is considerable in issues such as
health, many Danes are active in helping and caring for other people living outside their own household.
The standard of health in Denmark 
Reporting on the health situation is not an easy task because different approaches can be applied. One is to
take objective measures into consideration; another one is to rely on subjective measures. Furthermore, the
health situation varies between different groups within the population, so overall figures might tell only some
part of the story. We will apply subjective and objective measures and look at average figures as well as figures
related to different population groups.
First of all, we find that the proportion of women and men reporting good health are virtually the same up
to the age of 60. After that relatively more women than men report good health. In absolute figures among 
60-year-olds, around 60% report good health, while 35% of men and 40% of women in their 70s do the same.
For the 80-year-olds, the corresponding figures are 15% and 20%, respectively.The same pattern is found when 
looking at the proportion of women and men within different age groups who have been without long sickness
periods during their lifetime. Again, among the oldest age groups men do worse than women.
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The proportion of people who report good health varies according to educational background. That is, the 
higher their education, the more healthy people feel, the exceptions being people with 10 years of schooling,
who fall between groups.
Another important welfare indicator is life expectancy, which has increased from 70 to 74 years for men
and from 74 to 79 years for women within the last four decades.The developments, however, have not been
the same for both sexes. While men experienced no progress for most of the 1960s, the life expectancy for
women increased sharply in the 1960s and the 1970s. From that time the life expectancy curve for women was
very flat, which was also the case for men in the 1980s as well as in the 1970s. Another surprising observation
is that men’s life expectancy increased considerably in the 1990s, when half of the total increase in life ex-
pectancy came about, whereas for women the same trend only relates to the last half of the 1990s.
Although life expectancy in Denmark has been increasing for women as well as for men within recent
years, Danes still fare relatively badly internationally. If we compare the Danes to other Scandinavians—Swedes,
Icelanders, Norwegians and Finns as well as with Germans and Britons, Danish men do not live as long as men
from those countries, and Danish women not as long as other women, the differentials being greater for
women than for men.
Immigration
In the years to come Denmark will be faced with the major task of integrating foreigners more thoroughly into
Danish society.This applies to foreigners already living in Denmark, as well as to those arriving in the future, i.e.,
either as refugees or via family reunification.
Experience so far has shown that many immigrants from the so-called developing countries, i.e., countries
outside the Nordic countries, the EUROPEAN UNION (EU) and North America, have not succeeded in 
finding employment.The main reason is because they have little schooling and weak cultural and social compe-
tences, which makes it hard to get an ordinary job in the Danish labour market.
An increased focus on language studies and education, and on discriminatory behaviour among employees
and employers are important integration initiatives already implemented in recent years. Immigration necess-
itates this, but in addition the need is growing and appropriated by the expanding group of foreigners with little
or no education. It is, therefore, a fact that the Danish welfare system is at risk because most benefits are based
on a universal principle allowing everybody in need to get tax-funded subsidies, independently of earlier associa-
tions with the labour market.
An intense public debate in the last couple of years on immigration and integration has been followed up
by a number of regulations and cutbacks aimed at reducing the number of immigrants coming to Denmark.
Below is a review of the situation based on recent research in the field.
Integration and language skills
According to studies on immigration, the primary factors to determine the success of integration are education,
employment and self support. Furthermore, improved language skills in Danish are important because they are
conditional on acquiring a job and on completing an education. Only four out of 10 immigrants speak fluent or
good Danish. The proportion speaking poor Danish is 38% among women and 29% among men.The second
generation is significantly better at Danish, as 80% speak the language well or fluently.
Moreover, immigrants and descendants from developing countries who have a Danish educational qualifica-
tion have a better employment status than immigrants and descendents from developing countries who com-
pleted their education in their country of origin. Immigrants from developing countries, who have completed a
Danish education, have typically been in Denmark for a minimum of eight to ten years prior to acquiring a
vocational qualification.
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The labour market and the immigrants
Permanent within the labour market is of great importance for the integration of foreigners in Denmark, be-
cause it increases the chance of self support and improves the standard of living. It is also at the workplace that
foreigners and Danes meet and have the opportunity of gaining a more distinctive impression of each other’s
background and cultural orientation.
Unfortunately, only every second foreigner from developing countries belongs to the labour market, com-
pared to four out of five Danes. However, even among those within the labour force, there are markedly more
unemployed foreigners from developing countries than there are Danes (19% versus 4%) and more foreigners
in government-supported employment, e.g. job training, job-pools, and rehabilitation (6% versus 1%).The pro-
portion of the immigrants aged between 25 and 66 from developing countries, who have lived in Denmark for
more than three years, and who still receive some kind of social benefit, is therefore high, around 76%, equal to
80,000 people.The equivalent figure for Danes is 42%.
Integration policy encouraging immigrants to become economically independent of the welfare state is
therefore still far from being a success.
Other aspects of integration 
An important precondition for the integration of immigrants is social relations between immigrants and Danes.
These contacts may arise out of either working together with Danes, within clubs or through mixed marriages.
It turns out that 55% of foreigners from developing countries regularly socialize with Danes, 40% are on spea-
king and greeting terms with Danes, whereas 8% have no contact with Danes whatsoever.The study also shows
that younger foreigners socialize more with Danes than older ones, men more than women, and employed 
foreigners more than unemployed.
Furthermore, 27% of foreigners with children say that their children’s friends are mainly Danes, 63% of the
children have Danish as well as foreign friends, whereas 10% state that their children primarily have non-Danish
friends. An obvious place for socializing is in day-care institutions.There is, however, a significant difference in the
proportion of children in day-care institutions, 68% of Danish children were in day care in 2000, but only 39%
of children from developing countries. Furthermore, the proportion of children with a foreign background is
very high in some day-care centres as well as in some schools, which minimizes the opportunity of socializing
with Danish children.
Finally, studies show that Danes relate to the principles on equal rights between sexes to a slightly higher
degree than the foreigners interviewed. For Danes 88% of those interviewed among the entire population dis-
agree with men having more right to paid work in case of unemployment, and 92% found it obvious that
housework chores are shared equally among spouses. For foreigners, the concurrent figures were 66% and
88%, respectively. However, in terms of equal rights in general, the majority of all Danes interviewed as well as
foreigners, express positive attitudes.
Family policy
There is now a specific Ministry of Family Affairs in Denmark. However, also other ministries—such as the
Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Employment—deal with issues concerning family policy. Moreover,
many political decisions fall within the jurisdiction of the municipalities and are based on individual collective
agreements between the social partners (trade unions and employers’ associations). The implication is that
there is no general agreement on what family policy is about in Denmark.
In the following study, family policy relates to initiatives, which somehow influence the everyday life of indivi-
duals living together with partners and/or children.The period studied principally covers the last five-six years.
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Day-care facilities, youth clubs, etc.
During recent years, one political aim has been to increase the number of day-care institutions and youth clubs
to meet modern, double-career families’ demand for daytime caring of children. In the period from 1996 to
2001, for example, the coverage rate for zero–two–year old children increased from 66.4% to 76.6%, and for
three-five–year olds and six-nine–year olds the rates increased from 85.0% and 66.6% to 92.4% and 79.3%, r
espectively.
Following the February 2001 amendment to the law governing social services, several municipalities have
more flexibility in assigning places in day-care facilities.This allows them to pay more attention to the situation
of siblings, who now have a better chance of entering the same day-care facility.
Another initiative concerns strengthening the role of day-care facilities as an integrating factor. It tries both
to include more bilingual children in day-care facilities and to focus more on integration of these children,
especially when it comes to language skills. Around 7 million Euros were allocated to improving youth club
work with non-integrated and vulnerable young people.
In 2001, the Ministry of Social Affairs placed more emphasis on the quality of day-care facilities.This process
is a collaborative project between the Ministry of Social Affairs, Local Government Denmark (LGDK), and the
National Union of Child and Youth Educators. Focus is on the following, education, network organization and
economy, cooperation and responsibility, management and human resources, and public family day care.
In Denmark, the procedure has been that a child is offered a day-care place in the municipality where the
family resides, and therefore it has not been possible for the child to enrol, for instance, at a day-care facility
near the parents’ workplaces. In 2003, the Parliament passed an amendment to the act on social service, which
makes it possible to choose day care across municipalities. The major advantage is that parents can now state
which kind of day care they think suitable for their child, and the municipality is obliged to take this into consi-
deration when placing the child. Furthermore, the family is also entitled to receive a grant if the costs in the
other municipality exceed those in their home municipality. The municipalities can for a short period of time
choose to close the waiting list for outsiders under certain conditions, for example if it is impossible to meet
the care-taking guarantee for the home citizens alone.
The current increase and raised standards in quality in day-care facilities have increased the price consider-
ably over the past few years.This has brought about an increased political will to give financial support to fami-
lies with children, and the Social Democrats have proposed putting a ceiling on expenses on childcare, if they
come into power.This proposal would, when in effect, limit the disbursement to DKK 1,000 (about  130) per
child per month, whereas the average disbursement at present is around DKK 2,000 a month.
Child benefits
The number of families receiving child allowance is now 667,000, one in every four families in Denmark. The
ordinary child allowance is a fixed amount received by all parents of children up to the age of 18.The allowance
varies with the age of the child, and the average amount per family is DKK 4,400. As a percentage of all kinds of
child allowances, including lone parents’ allowance, orphaned children’s allowances, etc., the ordinary pay check
amounts to 87% of the payments. However, there is now a proposal to introduce means-testing of the child
allowance in order to place more emphasis on poor parents, and certainly to reduce overall expenses, which
amount to 1-2% of GNP. Means-testing has already been introduced for students with children, who receive a
special child allowance to a maximum of DKK 5,000 per year.
Children at risk
The Ministry of Social Affairs has granted financial support to the Family Group Conferences project, a model
for working with children and families with special needs. It includes the entire extended family (siblings, parents,
grandparents, good friends, etc.) within a framework of developing a future action plan for the individual child.
The purpose of the project is to test, develop and finely-tune Family Group Conferences as a model in eight
Danish municipalities.
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In ten municipalities, a project concerning children in families with alcohol abuse has been implemented.
Cooperation is established between the county and the municipalities to ensure that the municipalities involved
will not ignore, or fail to take notice of, these children.The project is among others supported financially by the
Ministry of Social Affairs.
Moreover, in Copenhagen discussion groups for children of divorced parents have been established. The
experience so far has been fruitful, and the idea is apparently spreading to other counties that are starting 
similar groups.
After a number of cases of sexual abuse, Danish family policy has paid more attention to the need to
implement further measures to combat this problem. Several initiatives have already been implemented, such as
research groups and the so-called knowledge centres that are rooted in social and health fields. Precautionary
measures have also been proposed with regard to children’s use of the Internet.This is to be done through the
municipalities and their influence on schools, libraries, and other public institutions where children gain access to
the Internet. More knowledge on preventing and helping in a situation of abuse is being incorporated into rele-
vant education for educationists and schoolteachers. Similar guidelines for reporting and passing on information
of an assault and for better precautions when hiring personnel are other preventive measures proposed in
order to help prevent child sexual abuse. Efforts to reduce the extent of child abuse are also aimed at the
international community. This does not only include fighting organized trafficking of human beings and child
pornography, but also sex-tourism.
Finally, an educational project directed at all municipal caseworkers involved in placing children and young
people has been initiated.This project reflects an increased political will to make the casework smoother when
placing the child. Evaluation carried out by the participants is generally positive. Over 90% feel that the courses
within the project have been relevant to their work.
Social inheritance
Some few years ago a number of Danish research institutes carried out a research review on negative social
inheritance, which is still considerable in Denmark.This work led to a research programme, which stressed the
importance of improved knowledge on factors influencing individual resources and behaviour, and the demand
for analyses on how these factors affect an individual’s well-being, social integration, health, family formation,
education and maintenance of the family.
On the basis of this research the government made a proposal with regard to negative social inheritance
entitled ”A Good Start for All Children”.Three central strategies were proposed.They included more parental
responsibility to increase involvement in the lives of their children. For example, parents are invited to define a
code of conduct for what they expect from day-care facilities and vice versa. A clearer line of responsibilities
between parents and school is to be drawn in order to reduce absenteeism. A further strategy addresses the
development of qualifications obtained during time spent in childcare institutions. This strategy is assumed to
ease the transition period for the child when starting school. In addition, all day-care facilities should have clear-
ly defined goals in terms of the qualifications children should obtain prior to starting school.To prepare the staff
for higher demands, the education of teachers and educationalists is being improved in order to cope with the
changed standards. The point of departure was that there are considerable problems relating to information
about an individual child and what to pass on between the various institutions with which the child has been in
contact. These procedures will clarify and minimize a loss of information. The knowledge of child placement is
very limited, and through research the government hopes to be able to initiate an effective reform in this field.
Caring for relatives with disabilities
The purpose of the initiative is to improve conditions when taking care of relatives with a disability or with a
serious illness, for a limited period of time. Another dimension of the initiative is the maintenance of the bond
to the labour market throughout this period. In October 2002, this was put into effect. For a period of up to 6
months a close relative in good health is granted leave from his or her workplace and becomes employed by
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the municipality. In this way the right to receive unemployment benefits and earn holiday pay is maintained, as is
the contact with the labour market.
Leave arrangements
Maternity leave prior to giving birth is now four weeks for the mother, and leave after giving birth is 14 weeks
for the mother and two weeks for the father, without any substitution possible between the parents. Parental
leave, which was 10 weeks for the mother and two weeks for the father, and the childcare leave another 13
weeks, has now been extended to 46 weeks for the father and the mother, respectively. However, the parental
leave allowance is only available for 32 weeks in total for both spouses, whereas there are no limitations con-
cerning the maternity and paternity allowances, which cover the full period. The parental leave is to be taken
within the child’s first eight years, with eight weeks as a minimum and 13 weeks as a maximum. While public-
sector employees keep their salary, most private-sector employees receive public allowance, which is up to 90%
of their pay, i.e., equal to the level of unemployment allowance.
In view of prolonged maternity leave, the financing of it is being debated intensively. Most agreement areas
have a maternity fund that covers some of the expenses of maternity leave, but problems arise when some
industries hire more women than men.To overcome this bias across industries, many unions have stressed the
need for a maternity fund for all agreement areas.The maternity fund would imply that the economic pressure
in very female-dominated working areas would be reduced. Many feminist organizations are also heavily invol-
ved in this matter because of the gain in terms of equal opportunities for men and women. A maternity fund
would imply that employers facing the choice of hiring either a man or a woman would be less reluctant in
hiring a woman because he would get compensation if the woman became pregnant.
In recent years, the municipalities have had some trouble meeting the demands of day-care facilities. To
comply with this demand an initiative has been undertaken.The offer of a grant so that one parent can stay at
home to take care of his or her child took effect from 2002. The grant can be given to families with children
from the age of 24 weeks to the age where they normally start kindergarten and for a time period of at least
8 weeks but no more than a year. The parent receiving the grant should give priority to the family and spend
time with his or her children, so they should not receive other earnings during this period. If the family takes
advantage of this opportunity it is assumed that there will be a drop in the demand for places available to chil-
dren in day-care institutions.
Working life–family life
The government has appointed a committee to take a closer look at the terms that a family faces in relation to
work and work conditions. Here work-life balance plays a central role. Many families face barriers such as infle-
xible working hours, long waiting lists for day-care facilities and lack of transportation or other essentials to
make everyday life work. In order to make this transition, freedom of choice and flexibility are keywords. The
government has already, as mentioned above, passed a one-year flexible maternity leave and improved the pos-
sibilities of receiving financial support when taking care of the child at home.
Another suggestion is the termination of the Shops Act.The argument is, why should it not be possible to
do the shopping on a Sunday instead of on an already busy weekday? Can the hours not be more flexible? The
counterargument is the concern about people who will have to work on Sundays. Both sides, however, agree
on the need for liberalizing the Shops Act.
Health policies
The Danish Health Plan 2002–2010 proposes different goals in order to improve the standard of health in
Denmark within the next decade. As Denmark has the lowest life expectancy in Europe, the major goal in the
Health Plan is to make progress in improving life expectancy.This implies the identification of a number of risk
factors such as smoking, alcohol, unhealthy diet, too little physical activity, obesity, accidents, a poor working en-
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vironment and environmental factors. All these factors have a negative influence on health and life expectancy
the implication being that minimizing these factors might improve the life expectancy of Danish people.
Another major goal in the Health Plan is to increase the number of years of quality life. However, there are
several problems in defining what quality of life is about and for the same reason it is not easy to measure this
concept. Furthermore, there might be different opinions about the meaning of the quality of life.Thus, different
approaches are used; one is to apply a subjective measurement relying on people’s own perception of his or
her health. Other measures used are the probability of contracting a chronic disease, or the risk of losing ones´
physical ability for a prolonged period of time. If these measures were made operational and appropriate pre-
ventive initiatives taken, this would secure more years of quality of life in old age.
The last goal mentioned in the Health Plan is to decrease social inequality by focusing more explicitly on
the living conditions of people particularly at risk. These people include pregnant women, children, young 
people, poor adults, the elderly and those with a chronic illness.The diversity of this group, however, implies that
different initiatives must be taken and a variety of players need to become involved in order to target more
specifically the people in need of help.
A number of initiatives have been undertaken to combat problems within specific risk groups of the popu-
lation. Most of the initiatives are specific campaigns, and one of the most prominent examples is the so-called
”Six a Day”-campaign. People are among other things encouraged to eat at least six pieces of fruit or vegeta-
bles every day. Another initiative, organized by the National Board of Health, is the ”Week Number 40”, which
is a week-long campaign aimed at reducing the consumption of alcohol. At the regional level some counties
have begun cooperating on projects called ”Children, Food and Exercise”. Although the projects vary greatly
they are all about implementing food and exercise strategies by involving parents and other family members in
improving children’s health.
Other initiatives have also been taken recently at national level. These include financial support to parents
with handicapped children. The aim is to compensate financially for the loss of earnings caused by their extra
caring burden. In this way, it will become more attractive for such parents to keep their handicapped children
within a family setting.
In the public debate another issue has been addressed, namely that of expanding the present ”Child’s First
Day of Illness” system.This arrangement enables the parent to stay at home on their child’s first day of sickness.
The intention was to expand the system to more than just one day of leave for the parent, but the extension,
however, was found to be too expensive for the employers and was taken off the political agenda.
Another arrangement is about taking care of dying close family members. This system was introduced in
1994 and compensates family members for lost earnings during the care-taking period. The new figures show
that more and more families are taking advantage of this opportunity to spend the last moments together with
their close relatives.
Integration policies
Within recent years integration policy has been subject to intensive debate in Denmark. Even though the 
number of immigrants is relatively small compared to other countries, there has been a significant increase
during recent years, especially in terms of immigrants from relatively poor countries. To limit this increase the
present government has taken various initiatives, which have been passed through the Danish Parliament.
The initiatives include among other things:
 Permanent residence permission is only given on an individual basis.
 Family reunification is dealt with on an individual basis.
 Marriages with a national of another country requires among other things that both parties are over the
age of 24 and that the Danish partner is able to support the other person, which means that no public
benefits will be paid. In addition a stronger sense of belonging to Danish society than to the home country
is taken into consideration, when permission for reunification is given.
 An introduction programme for individuals obtaining asylum implies that reduced social benefit is given, i.e.,
significantly below the usual cash benefit.
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 Finally, an individual action plan including labour market training and compulsory participation in language
courses in Danish and some cultural programmes is essential.
There are further initiatives being launched in Denmark and directed towards immigration, health and family
issues, but the above mentioned are the most significant ones when dealing specifically with gender relation-
ships, generation relationships and the socio-economic situation of families in Denmark.
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FAMILIES IN EU-15. POLICIES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
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SIRPA TASKINEN
Finland
Family relationships
Family forms
The family scene has changed quite profoundly in Finland during recent decades.The tendencies are similar to
other countries in the European Union (EU), but in some respects, development has been more rapid in
Finland than in most other countries.
There are two distinct trends concerning the formation of families. Never before have there been so many
single persons living alone, but at the same time, more people than ever have some kind of pair relationship
during the course of their life.
The marriage rate (the percentage of married people aged 15 or over) went down from 27.9 in 1990 to
23.9 in 2001 for men and from 23.7 to 20.6 for women over the same period. Only in the last two years has it
slightly increased. In 2002, it was 25.6 for men and 22.2 for women. The mean age for the first marriage has
risen from 28.6 years (in 1991) to 31.4 (in 2002) for men and, at the same time, from 26.6 years to 29.1 years
for women.
After the reform of the Marriage Act in 1988, the number of divorces increased from about 10,000 to
13,000–14,000 per year, and has remained at about the same level ever since. However, as the number of 
marriages has decreased, the proportion of divorced people in the population has actually grown.
The younger the marriage age, the greater is the risk of divorce. For young couples, one out of two marria-
ges is anticipated to end in divorce. An increasing number of people have decided to cohabit even after they
have had children.The risk of separation for cohabiting couples is even higher than for married couples.
In spite of the growing divorce rates, the mean length of marriages has not changed to any great extent
over the past century, since the mean age of people has increased. Marriages end more often through divorce
and not so often through the death of the spouse as happened before. However, this might also be changing. In
the early 1990s, most divorces occurred in marriages, which had lasted from four to six years, but from 1997,
the largest incidence of divorces has been concentrated on those marriages that only lasted from two to four
years. However, there are no big changes in the average duration of marriage ended by divorce, since it has
remained between 11.6–12.5 years during the last decade (Statistics Finland 2003).
As a consequence of divorces and separations, the number of single parent families has been rising. In 1985,
the proportion of children living in families with married parents stood at 85%, but by the year 2002 the figure
had dropped to 64%.
Table 1: Children Aged Under 17 by Family Type (1985–2002)
Sources: Kartovaara & Sauli 2001, Statistics Finland 2003
Around one in five children is living with a single parent. This figure includes those who have lived all their life
with just one parent, as well as children of couples who have divorced or separated from a consensual union
Year Children Married Cohabiting Single Single Total (%)
(total) Parents (%) Parents (%) Mother (%) Father (%)
1985 1,136,000 84.5 5.4 9.0 1.1 100
1990 1,136,000 80.7 7.9 10.0 1.3 100
1995 1,151,000 74.6 10.9 12.9 1.6 100
2002 1,105,988 63.7 16.6 17.2 2.4 100
and those who have been widowed. In 2002, there were 32 registered same-gender male or female couples
with children (Statistics Finland 2003).
Most of the families are nuclear, and in only 3% of families are three generations living together.
Demographic situation
The population of Finland was 5,206,295 in 2002.There were 595,725 families with children under the age of
17 years. Cross section statistics imply that the prevailing number of children in the family is two (40.4%), and in
37.1% of the families, there is only one child. There are four or more children in 5.9% of the families. The 
average number of children under 18 living at home in a family was 1.83. However, some of these children have
older siblings already of adult age who do not appear in the statistics, and some of these are first-born children
who will, in time, have siblings.
The number of children has decreased markedly since 1992. Until then, about 65,000 new babies a year
were born, but in the 2000s, births have decreased to 55,000. At the beginning of the new millennium, fewer
children were born than ever before in the past 70 years. Half of the decrease can be explained by the fact that
the small age groups of the 1970s now are at a fertile age. A small increase occurred, however, in 2003 and in
the first half of 2004.The reproduction rate has declined over the last10 years from 1.84 to 1.71, which is one
of the highest in EU but nevertheless a growing cause of concern (Statistics Finland 2003).
According to a family barometer set up by the Population League (Väestöliitto 2002), people would be 
willing to have an average of 2.4 children in their family, if they had finished with their studies and had a steady
job.Those questioned gave credit to the day-care systems and the housing facilities arranged by society.
About 15% of married women remain childless. A steadily increasing number of couples have to use some
artificial fertilisation method. In 1992, 479 babies (0.7% of all newborns) and in 2002, 1,438 children (2.4%)
were born with the aid of artificial insemination (Stakes 2003).
The rate of abortions has remained relatively low, under 11,000 per year. Among teenagers aged 15–19,
the number of induced abortions remained steady at around 20 per 1,000 in the 1970s and the 1980s, but
dropped to 10.7 per 1,000 in 1994.The rate increased to 16.2 per 1,000 teenage girls in 2002, and only decli-
ned in 2003. Even these numbers are still low in comparison to other countries (Gissler 2004).
Since most pregnancies under age 20 are unplanned, the occurrence of adolescent pregnancies reflects
adolescent sexual activity and contraceptive practices. Girls from a lower socio-economic background have a
higher risk of pregnancy. This risk increases among teenagers not living in an intact nuclear family, especially if
they live away from their parents. Girls who live in a stepfamily have a higher pregnancy risk than girls who live
in a one-parent family. Swedish-speaking girls in Finland have a lower risk than Finnish-speaking girls, even when
the socio-economic background was similar (Vikat 2004).
Among the immigrated ethnic groups, the use of contraception is less usual than among the native Finnish
population. A study has revealed that the large majority of the Somali women living in Finland did not use
contraception and the men did not use condoms either. Social status, religion, the traditional gender system and
the utility of children are the four pillars of Somali culture considered as obstacles to the use of contraception
(Filio 2004).
Gender relationships
The relationship between the genders has rapidly changed, due to the high educational level of Finnish women.
Finland has one of the highest rates of women’s employment, and most people in the labour market work full
time.
Finland has been rated one of the most egalitarian countries in the world. Gender equality and the availabi-
lity of alternatives for childcare have been emphasised as indicators of the woman-friendliness of the Nordic
welfare-state model. Universal services and benefits form a safety net for all citizens and decrease the indivi-
dual’s dependence on family or marital status.
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In 1906, Finland was the first State in Europe to grant women the right to vote and be eligible for Parliamentary
office. In 1919, municipal reform gave women full rights in local politics. The Marriage Law reform of 1929
enhanced women’s position as autonomous subjects and citizens and made them economically independent of
conjugal relationships.The Act of Equality between Women and Men came into force in 1987; it was aimed par-
ticularly at promoting the status of women in working life.
In spite of the legislation, however, there still exist some basic problems, both in working life and at home.
Regardless of women’s high participation in the labour market, their mean annual earnings still remain only
about 80% of those of men. This is partly due to the fact that women and men work in their own separate
labour markets, in that there still exist jobs considered to be more suitable for women (such as nursing) or for
men (e.g. technical trades). Men are also more often promoted to management-level positions, even in such
areas where the majority of the workers are women (e.g. libraries).
The share of work in families is another concern. Mothers spend considerably more time on domestic tasks
than fathers do, and this is also true for women who work full time. Latest statistics show that in the past 20
years, little change has occurred in the share of domestic chores (Statistics Finland 2003).Young mothers and
fathers often have atypical working hours (shift work, evening or night work, weekend work), and young fathers
in particular put in a great deal of overtime.
On average, parents with children tend more often to be gainfully employed than other people of working
age.The employment rate for mothers is 70% and less than 60% for childless women. Also, single parents show
a high employment rate (almost 50%), though not as high as parents in two-parent households.
Every second child has two working parents.The male breadwinner model is most common in large fami-
lies, and in half of these families the mother is not in the labour force. Mothers tend to regulate their working
time according to their children’s age. Where the youngest child is under three years of age, only 45% of the
mothers work. This has been made possible by maternity and parental leave as well as childcare leave. More
mothers go back to work when the child reaches three years of age, and again when the child reaches school
age (seven). Compared to other men, fathers who have small children work more overtime. Young mothers
and fathers often have atypical working hours (shift work, evening or night work, weekend work).
Mothers spend considerably more time on domestic tasks than do fathers, and this is also true for women
who work full-time. Women bear greater responsibility for children and have been the main users of various
forms of statutory childcare leave. Because benefits do not totally compensate for earnings, it is more profitable
for the parent with the lower income to stay at home. Most often, this is the mother.The use of gender-specific
paternal leave has increased from 8% (in 1980) to 70% (in 2001), but only 1% of fathers have used their 
option for a parental leave (Lammi-Taskula 2003).
At the beginning of 2003, an extension of the fathers’ leave at the time of the birth of a baby was intro-
duced.The father is entitled to a bonus of 12 days if he uses the last two weeks of the parental leave instead of
the mother. However, this innovation was not favoured by families mainly for economic reasons. During the first
year, only 2,100 fathers took advantage of this possibility. Almost two thirds of all fathers have used their right to
stay at home to care for a sick child, but temporary childcare leave is mainly used by women.
Generational relationships
Life expectancy has risen considerably in two decades. For males, it was 69.2 years of age in 1980, and at the
turn of the millennium, 74.2 years of age. For females, the respective ages were 77.6 years and 81.0 years
(European Union 2004).
Population aging has raised the issue of financing pensions. Several working groups have made suggestions
on this issue, and there are proposals for a flexible pensioning age that would make staying at work more
attractive by increasing the pension rate according to age. In addition, there has been much discussion of the
need to improve working conditions in order to encourage people to work longer.
Almost half of the children under two years of age have four grandparents still alive; most often the
mother’s mother (91%) and the father’s mother (89%).The mother’s father is more often alive (76%) than the
father’s father (72%). Thus the first to die is usually the father of the father, which might be explained by the
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 FINLAND
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 87
somewhat older age of the male parents. In the same age group of children, father’s mothers were on average
2.5 years older than mother’s mothers and almost the same age as mother’s fathers were. The oldest of all
were father’s fathers. For teenagers, only half of the grandfathers identified were alive any more; the proportion
for grandmothers was three-quarters (Kartovaara & Sauli 2001).
Of the Finnish grandparents still alive, four out of five live together. The parents of the father have stayed
together more often than the parents of the mother. Here age might explain the difference since in the older
age groups divorce rates are the smallest.
Table 2: Children by Age and Number of Grandparents (in 1997, percent of all children)
Source: Kartovaara & Sauli (2001)
Compared with other countries, Finnish children are in good health and both prenatal health and infant morta-
lity are among the lowest in the world.
However, there is a growing concern about the psychological well being of children. Until the mid-1990s,
surveys showed that the physical and psychological health of children was improving year by year. Since then—
following an economic recession—the children themselves as well as their preschool and school teachers have
reported that children are showing more distress and different behavioural problems and health symptoms
than before. The incidences of asthma and allergies have risen consistently, and even among young children
depression occurs. A small but increasing group of children are faced with cumulative problems. Alcohol abuse
by youngsters is the main problem in Finland, followed by drug abuse, which for many years remained at a re-
latively low level. Only in 2003 have the numbers of health and behavioural symptoms shown a decrease
(Kouluterveyskysely 2003).
There is now an ongoing public debate on the psychological state of children. Many factors are cited as
causes for their problems: parental ineptitude or indifference, increasing demands at work, the difficult socio-
economic situation of families as well as the egocentric and competitive atmosphere in society at large.
It has been pointed out that, during the recession, family benefits were cut (see below), and poverty is
increasing among families with children. Although the national economy has rapidly recovered, earlier cuts have
not been fully compensated for. Even services for children have deteriorated, e.g. net spending per child in day-
care facilities has dropped. In schools and in day-care centres, class size has grown, with a negative effect on the
overall group dynamic. Children’s primary health care and preventive services have declined in many municipali-
ties, and the queues for guidance and therapy are long.
The Government issued a Report on Child Policy to Parliament in spring 2002. In a preliminary report to
the Government Bardy et al. 2001 conclude:
“The fact that distress among children has increased and exacerbated is not surprising; it is a logical consequence
of the combined effects of several factors. We should take a comprehensive view of the conditions under which
children are growing up and of the underlying factors.
Children face inequalities in financial opportunities available to their families, but also in the extent they have
access to people they can rely upon, people who concern themselves with children. Serious attention should be
paid to lone and lonely children. It seems that the ‘adult resources’ available to children have diminished.This has
happened in some families as well as in day care and in school, where adults are fatigued by children’s increasing
needs, understaffed units and demands for efficiency.“
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Age of Number of Grandparents
the child None One Two Three Four
0–2 2.5 4.5 15.1 30.3 47.5
3–6 3.2 6.7 19.0 32.7 38.4
7–12 7.0 12.7 24.7 31.1 24.5
13–17 15.6 20.3 27.6 23.9 12.5
Socio-economic situation of families
There has been a tendency to blame social expenditure and labour costs for the past depression although eco-
nomists do not support this view. However, this discussion has created an atmosphere where reductions have
seemed inevitable.Thus, almost all benefits were reduced in 1995.The greatest pressure has been on the bene-
fits of the unemployed, since the costs had risen above all expectations. Family benefits have also been targeted,
although several political parties had earlier made promises not to tackle these. For the first time even child
benefits were lowered in 1995. Since the child allowances are progressive, the reduction was 6% for the first
child, and rose to 16% for the fifth child onwards. It was not until 2004 that there was again an increase in child
allowances, but only for the allowance of the first child, which rose from EUR 90 to EUR 100 per month.The
amount of the child allowance increases with the number of children, so that for the fifth child onwards the
maximum amount is EUR 172 per month per a child.
During the past decade, income inequality has grown in Finland, and a new phenomenon of wealthy 
yuppies has appeared with the increase in information technology. Compared to other households, incomes in
families with children have declined in general, and the proportion of poor and low-income families has in-
creased. At the same time, housing costs have gone up. The number of children below the poverty line is 
growing. Over half of those who lived below the poverty line in the late 1990s belonged to families with chil-
dren. Low-income families are increasingly dependent on welfare.
Table 3: Percentage of Families with Children by Income Quintile (1990–1999)
Source: Sauli 2001
The purchasing parity of income transfers for families with children has decreased by almost 84 million Euros
from 1992 (the most generous year) to 2000, i.e., by about one quarter (taking into account inflation). At the
beginning of the 1990s, tax reductions for children were eliminated. With the above mentioned cuts in child
allowances, the ensuing purchasing parity of child benefits dropped by 11% between 1995 and 2001. With the
declining number of children, the total amount of the child benefits has decreased from 1,397 million Euros in
1999 to 1,358 million Euros in 2003.
Maternity, paternity and parental allowances are calculated proportionally according to the beneficiary’s
taxable income; or, if she/he is not working, there is a minimum allowance.The percentage decreases as income
increases. Percentage rates were lowered in both 1992 and 1993, and they have not changed since. Before
1992, the highest percentage for wage compensation was 80% and the lowest was 30%. After 1993, the per-
centages have been 70% and 25% respectively. Due to the high unemployment rate in the 1990s the amount of
mothers receiving only the minimum allowance rose from 6% to 28% (in 1999). Even the minimum allowance
was lowered.
In 2003, maternity, paternity and parental allowances were finally raised. In addition, with recovering employ-
ment, total payments have again increased in the new millennium. From 2003 on, there is a new bonus to the
father (see below), and thus the payments to the fathers increased by 16.3% from the previous year (Kela
2004).
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Year Lowest Second Lowest Middle Second Highest Highest Total
Quintile % Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
1990 16.0 25.0 24.7 20.8 13.4 100
1995 20.4 22.2 23.9 20.3 13.2 100
1999 22.7 21.5 22.9 20.6 12.4 100
Table 4:The maternity, paternity and parental allowance from 1999 to 2003 (million Euros) 
Source: Kela 2004
After the maternity/paternity/parental period, the family can choose between municipal day care, or home care
allowance for children under three, or private care allowance for families with a child under school age looked
after by a private day-care provider. During 1995–1996, allowances were cut twice, the total reduction amoun-
ting to almost 25%.Thus, the level of these allowances has remained at that of 1990, without any compensation
for inflation. The basic allowance for one child is EUR 252.28 per month. Different families choose different
allowances. The children’s home care allowance is mostly used by families where the educational level and
socio-economic position of the mother is low, and family income is small and the private care allowance is used
by wealthy and better-educated families.
Single parent families face a much greater risk of falling below the poverty line than do other groups.
Unemployment and the cuts in some benefits have most probably been the main reasons for their economic
difficulties. Single carer families form half of those families who receive a living allowance. Because women are
more often single parents than men (17.2% as opposed to 2.4% of all families, respectively), this is also a gender
issue.This also concerns the housing allowance.Two thirds of all families receiving housing allowance are single
carer families. Changes in qualifications for the allowance eliminated the eligibility of a great number of families
but since the result was a disaster, the policy had to be modified. Given that housing costs are one of the main
expenditures for families, housing policy has a major impact on their life.
In the new millennium, mostly due to the improved employment situation, the economic situation of fami-
lies with children seems to be improving. In 2002, about one in ten families with children received income 
related social security benefit while the proportion was one in eight in 1998.The amount of single parent fami-
lies applying for income security, however, is still increasing.
Family policies
Measures in family policy
There are three main measures in family policy by which the families may be supported and empowered.
 Laws and generally accepted unofficial norms;
 Benefits and subsidies;
 Services.
The laws and norms make explicit the accepted norms and their limits; e.g. in which situations must the privacy
of the family be tackled in order to protect the child.The objective for benefits and subsidies is to ensure the
maintenance and the well being of the family members. In Finland, as in the other Nordic countries, society aims
to support children and their families with a variety of services. Many of the services are organised by the local
municipalities, and they are free for the customers or their costs are subsidised so that everyone can afford to
use them.This is considered to be one of the basic features in the so-called Nordic welfare society.
In Finland, all legislation is decided by Parliament, and there are no local or area authorities which can 
decide on their own laws, although the municipalities in Finland have considerable independence in organising
local services as they see fit.
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Year Paid to the Mother Paid to the Father Total
1999 262.1 4.6 466.9
2000 266.2 4.5 478.5
2001 276.5 5.3 500.1
2002 283.9 5.8 519.5
2003 308.5 7.8 569.7
Both the State and the local municipalities have the right to levy taxes. Welfare is financed in almost equal 
shares by the State and the municipalities. Fees are charged for some of the social services, but these cover only
about 10% of the costs of all social services. Charges can be waived for low-income families or for social 
reasons. Basic security benefits are funded through social security payments collected from employers and 
insured persons and in part by the State and, to some degree, also by the municipalities. Basic national unem-
ployment security is financed entirely by the State.
Social insurance contributions are paid by employees, the self-employed and other persons with taxable
income, as well as employers. The pension insurance of persons employed by the private sector is financed
through insurance contributions based on salary and paid by employers. The pension insurance of farmers as
well as other self-employed persons is financed in part through insurance payments made by the self-employed
persons and in part with State funds.
The municipalities have the responsibility of arranging social, health and educational services, as laid down in
the respective laws. For this purpose, the State gives subsidies to the local authorities.
Voluntary welfare has a long tradition in Finland, and private organizations have started many programmes
that have later been established as public social services, especially for children and families. Organizations still
play a major role in supplementing official welfare for minors, old people and persons with disabilities. Most of
the services of the private societies are organized by salaried employees. Organizations get a reasonable part of
their funding from public resources.
The parishes of the Lutheran Church of Finland run children’s day clubs, supply home help and auxiliary
services for the old as well as cooperate in home nursing and in welfare for the disabled, addicts and other
troubled persons.
Supporting the functions of families
The functions of the family can be listed in different ways. Listed below are the functions that are considered
vital:
 strengthening the bond between spouses;
 giving birth to children;
 giving identity and legitimacy to children;
 basic care of children ;
 socialisation of children;
 protection of family members;
 emotional care for family members;
 work and family conciliation.
In the following table, the functions of families and the means of family policies are cross-referenced.Thus, one
can quickly check the ways in which families are supported in their different tasks, and what remains to be
developed.
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Table 5: Examples of Different Ways to Support Families in Finland
Strengthening the bond between spouses
In Finland, there is a firm belief that choice of spouse is such an intimate and private affair that counselling for
young people regarding their relationship concerns does not exist.
Since the reform of the Marriage Act in 1988 free optional counselling in marriage matters does exist. It is
organised mainly by the municipal family guidance centres and Lutheran Church family counselling bureaus.
However, this service has mostly been limited to counselling in divorce situations. Around 9,100 persons per
year have used these services, i.e., about one third of divorcing couples.There has been much discussion about
the constant increase of divorce and separation among cohabiting couples. Several NGOs, together with the
Lutheran Church, have arranged programmes to strengthen the bonds between spouses.
A lengthy debate preceded the law on the registration of homosexual and lesbian couples.The argumenta-
tion line was that there is more reason to be worried about marriages than about homosexual and lesbian
people who want to make their relationship permanent and visible. In autumn 2001—after a six-year debate—
Parliament finally passed a bill allowing for this type of registration. It came into force in 2002. It was stressed
that mere registration does not mean a family-like status for such couples. Adoption in particular was discussed
during the debate, but no regulations for this were included in the legislation. The couples were only granted
rights of mutual inheritance and other property rights. A new working party was established in 2003 to con-
sider the possibility of adoption.
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Family Functions Measures of Family Policy
Laws and Norms Subsidies Services
Spousal Bonds Marriage Act; unofficial role (All former tax refunds for Marriage and divorce counsel
models marriage and first home ling
loans have been eliminated)
Child birth Adoption Act;
Abortion Act Maternity allowance; Maternity clinics, well-baby
Maternal, paternal and clinics, family planning 
paternity benefit clinics
Identity and Legitimatisation Paternity Act; Name Act; Child maintenance allowance if Legal advice,
Child Custody and Right the custodian is not able to child welfare supervisor :
to Access Act; Adoption Act pay (repayable) adoption counselling
Basic Care of Children Child Welfare Act; Universal child benefits; home Well-baby clinics;
Child Custody and Right and private care allowances; free municipal day-care services
to Access Act lunch in schools for all pupils
Socialisation School Laws; Free preschool (optional); Municipal day-care services and 
Traditions Free basic education; preschool; municipal primary 
study loans for higher education and secondary schools
Protection Child Welfare Act; Benefits on individual basis to Open care facilities and instituti-
Criminal Code support children's maintenance ons for child welfare; shelters 
and activities; housing allowance for the victims of family violence
Emotional Support Social Welfare Act Free child and family guidance Municipal family guidance cent
res; mental health clinics
Work and Family Conciliation Work legislation; unofficial Childcare leave and shorter Home help services;
norms of living and working hours; social leaves programmes
household labour subsidised leaves 
distribution for poor families
Giving birth to children
A-natal maternal clinics (from 1944 on) have successfully contributed to the low incidence of baby and 
maternal deaths, low birth weight and premature births. Finland has for years been among the top three coun-
tries in the world in these respects. Almost all pregnant women (94%) attend clinics before the end of the
fourth month of pregnancy.
With declining birth rates and a growing number of abortions among teenagers, family planning was one of
the arguments in the discussion of a proposed new subject (Health Information) to be taught in schools. It was
included in the high-school curriculum in 2001.
A maternity allowance (a package or EUR 140 in cash) is granted to each newborn baby. Over three of
four families choose the package, which consists of a large variety of baby equipment. The package box is big
enough for the baby to sleep in for the first months. From 2003, in the case of twins, the maternity allowance is
doubled; triplets get it tripled and so on. There is a maternity leave (of 105 weekdays), paternity leave (of 18
weekdays + a bonus), and parental leave (of 158 weekdays which the parents can agree to split between them-
selves). In 2003, a special bonus of 12 weekdays was granted for the father if he uses the last two weeks of the
parental leave instead of the mother.
Giving identity and legitimacy to children
Under the Paternity Act paternity shall be established and confirmed to all children, even if the parents are not
married. It is a duty of the municipal child welfare supervisor to pursue this, though the mother has the right to
refuse permission to the establishment of paternity. All children received the right to inherit from their biological
parents; however, adopted children only inherit from their adoptive parents.The Child Maintenance Security Act
was revised in 1977, guaranteeing maintenance paid out of municipal funds if the parent ordered to pay main-
tenance is not able to do so, if the paternity is not established, or if a single person adopts a child.
The child has the right to receive maintenance from his or her parents. If this for some reason does not
happen, the child can receive maintenance support, which has then in due course to be repaid by the liable
parent.The number of children receiving maintenance support has constantly increased. In the 1980s, about 6%
of children received support, in the 1990s the amount rose to over 9%, and in 2002 already almost one in ten
children (9.6%) received maintenance support with a total of 144 million Euros. From 1999 there has been a
limit for the repayment of debts by the liable parents (61,000 parents in 2002). If the debt has not been repaid
within five years, it will not be reimbursed. This was aimed to facilitate the work of social welfare supervisors
who earlier had to try to collect payment for support that had been paid even decades earlier. Single mothers
feared that this would lead to fewer payments by the fathers, but this does not seem to be the case.
The growing number of children receiving maintenance support as well as the increase of agreements
(concerning children in divorce, separation or other situations where the parents do not live together) reveals
that the families of more and more children are broken, and that even their maintenance is jeopardised.
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Table 6:Agreements Confirmed by the Social Welfare Boards (by number of children)
Sources: Stakes 2001, 2002 and 2003
Since the Adoption Act of 1985, international adoptions have increased in Finland by about 200 children
annually. The parents of an adopted child under the age of seven are entitled to a parental allowance if the
adopted mother or father takes leave from work.The parents of an adopted child under the age of 12 months
are also entitled to maternity benefit (either the maternity package or a lump sum). Since 2002, they also can
receive support for the costs of international adoption.The amount depends on the child’s country of origin: for
adoption from Estonia the support is EUR 1,900, for China and Colombia EUR 4,500 and from any other coun-
try, EUR 3,000.
Basic childcare
For basic care and primary health care (including vaccination) families can attend well-baby clinics until the start
of school age. Practically all families do attend these clinics and in 2000, there were 1,343,243 visits to such 
clinics. Later, school health nurses and doctors take care of the health care of pupils in primary and secondary
schools. New guidelines for programmes in well-baby clinics and in school health were laid down by the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in 2004.
With regard to the statutory day-care system, the question is sometimes raised whether the children be-
come institutionalised. However, about half of all children are cared for in their own home. Due to parental 
leaves, practically all babies are in home care, and only 2% are in outside day care. From the third year on, the
rate of home care drops to 36%. At home, the parents are the care takers; only 1% of children have a paid
nanny at home. Municipal day-care facilities look after 46% of all children under preschool age, while the share
of private day care remains at 4–5% of children (Takala 2000).
Because of the irregular working hours of the parents, 7% of children under school age use shift care 
offered as part of municipal day care. However, one third (32%) of the municipalities have not been able to
provide this to all families who need it. (Sosiaali—ja terveysministeriö 2001). In some home day-care sites, the
child-teacher ratio has grown larger than the Day Care Act originally permitted. Consequently, the League of
Day-Care Teachers is concerned about the situation of children and working conditions in some of the centres.
Day-care fees to be paid by the parents have constantly been a target of political debate.The present fee varies
according to the income and size of the family. Low-income families may be totally exempt from paying any fee.
Some political parties would prefer a flat-rate fee, while others prefer the current system.
Over the past decade, municipal day care has become more and more concentrated in day-care institu-
tions, whereas earlier almost half of the children were cared for in other families by child minders. In 2002, no
more than 33% of children were in such day-care homes.
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Year Agreement on Custody and Right of access Agreement on Maintenance for Children
1985 6,473 7,278
1990 17,047 11,673
1995 30,911 26,808
2000 36,727 34,316
2002 38,313 35,646
Table 7: Children Under School Age in Day Care
Sources: Stakes 2001, 2002 and 2003
Full-time day care has also decreased from a high of 83% so that, in the 2000s, one in four children uses day-
care facilities only part time.
From August 2004, the municipalities will receive State support amounting to an average of EUR 235 per
child if they arrange optional morning and afternoon day-care activities for young pupils. According to prelimi-
nary information, most municipalities will start to organise these services, and 50,000 pupils will attend. Of
these, 58% are first-graders, and 38% second-graders (Opetusministeriö 2004).
Socialisation of children
In 2001, all children received the right to free optional preschool education at the age of six. Preschool classes
are arranged either in a municipal day-care centre or a public school, according to the decision of the munici-
pality in which the child is living. In the first year, already 91% attended preschool, and in 2003, almost all children
(99%) were included. A majority of preschool education is arranged within the municipal day-care institutes.
Basic education is free of charge, and almost all schools are public. School legislation was reformed in 2003.
Stronger than the old laws, there is an emphasis on the promotion of a healthy and safe school environment
and on the psychological development of the pupils.
Protection of family members
The number of children in need of protection doubled during the 1990s. The percentage of children placed
outside their own home, which earlier was 0.7% of all children, has grown to 1.0%.The reasons for this develop-
ment have been discussed above. In child welfare as in child day care, the volume of institutions has risen more
rapidly than the volume of family-type care. Already 57% of children in child welfare are placed in institutions.
This also indicates that the problems of the children are severe enough to require professional care.
Table 8: Child welfare 
Sources: Stakes 2001, 2002 and 2003
Children in need of child welfare are also vulnerable to mental health problems, and about half of them have
psychic disorders. Their primary health status is weak and their mortality risk is manifold compared to other
children (Kalland et al. 2001).
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Year Children in Day-care Children in Family Care Total Percent of Children Under
Institutions Outside the Home 6 years
1989 106,876 91,830 198,706 45
1993 112,580 61,757 174,337 39
1997 140,991 78,389 219,380 49
1999 142,538 72,429 214,967 50
2000 131,857 68,630 200,487 48
2001 132,058 65,113 197,171 48
2002 130,272 62,817 193,089 48
Year Children in Open Care Children Placed Outside the Home Children Taken into Custody
1992 23,456 9,414 6,382
1997 35,809 11,764 6,803
2002 54,458 14,187 7,829
Eliminating violence against women has been one of the principal objects of promoting equality in Finland.
Funded by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, a five-year (1997–2002) project for eliminating violence
against women was carried out by the National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health
(STAKES). Among other things, the project has encouraged municipalities to create services for battered
women and children, build shelters, and institute programmes for abusive men to enable them to take respon-
sibility for their behaviour.The number of clients in shelters has remained at the level of 3,500 persons a year,
but the need is probably greater than these figures suggest. Not all municipalities are willing to cover these
expenses.
For the recognition and treatment of physical and sexual abuse of children, the STAKES laid down new
guidelines in 2003 for personnel in social and health services (Taskinen 2003).These guidelines were prepared
in collaboration with the police and the prosecutor to ensure the best ways to proceed.
Emotional care for family members
As stated above, there is a growing concern for the psychic state of the children. The number of children in
mental health institutions has markedly increased in the past five years. For 10–14 year-old children, the increase
was as high as 46% (Niemi et al. 2003). Parliament granted an extra 70 million FIM (11.8 million Euros) for the
development of child psychiatry in 2000. With the help of this money, new personnel were employed and a
number of preventive and curative projects were carried out (Taskinen 2001a).
The number of clients in family and child guidance centres has also increased, especially in the latter part on
the 1990s after the economic recession. As Leinonen (2004) puts it:
“The results support […] theories in showing that parenting is not simply a technique which can be mastered or
not, but it is deeply dependent on parental and family resources and circumstances, such as national recession,
economic and work realities, mental health and social support.The results further show that child mental health is
vulnerable to changes in society when they affect parental mental health and family relationships, especially the
quality of parenting.“
Table 9: Family and Child Guidance
Sources: Stakes 2001, 2002 and 2003
In the 2000s, over 33,000 children and their 42,000 parents have visited family and child guidance centres
annually. This is 52% more than 10 years before with 40% more visits. The percentage of children under 18
years visiting these centres has grown from 4.6% to 7.0%. At the same time, the number of personnel was cut,
and only increased in the last few years (Kauppinen et al. 2003).
The majority of families visit the centres on their own initiative, and the children are not checked without
the consent of the parents. The services are free of charge. Most often the reason for the visits is some 
problem of the child (60%), but also partner and family relationships are common. Among the clients, the pro-
portion of single and remarried clients is statistically significantly larger than in the whole population.
Helping people who face a divorce sometimes requires expert advice. In many divorces, there are 
problems regarding custody and access rights that are severe enough for the authorities to intervene, and these
cases are quite difficult and time-consuming. In 2001 Development Centre for Welfare and STAKES published a
guidebook for social welfare and health personnel dealing with divorces (Taskinen 2001b).
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Year Clients Visits
Total Children Check-up Therapy Total
1985 49,197 5,363 71,914 77,949 22,303
1991 22,003 28,610 33,518 86,000 135,775
1997 248,033 253,264 79,000 103,080 171,238
2002 148,848 238,855 286,218 419,271 402,112
Work and family conciliation
One of the key areas of Finnish equality and family policies has long been the reconciliation of work and family
life. Society supports this by means of various family-leave arrangements, income transfers and day-care services.
There is widespread agreement that the opportunity for both women and men to take part in working life
should be ensured and, at the same time, a more equal division of labour between women and men in both
childcare and housework should be facilitated.This has been the main target of two EU-funded projects run by
the STAKES. However, there is no general model yet agreed upon for reaching these goals.
With reference to the above-mentioned increase in problems that children must now face, there is a strong
public sentiment that mothers should stay at home while their children are small. Needless to say, this has given
rise to heated debates, since opponents consider this kind of argumentation to be old-fashioned and against the
principle of equality. Several enterprises have worked on their own models for combining work and family life.
Once the parental allowance period has ended, the parents of a child under the age of three are entitled to
childcare leave without endangering their employment. The parents cannot both take childcare leave at the
same time, but from 2004 on, they both can be on partial childcare leave. For instance, the parents can share
the care of the child so that one parent cares for the child in the morning and the other in the afternoon, or
they can care for the child on alternate days or weeks.
In the 1980s, the municipal home help service was greatly appreciated by families with children. However,
this service has been more and more directed towards aging people still living at home.Ten years ago, 60,000
families with children received services from the home-help services while the number had dropped to 20,000
by the end of the millennium (Bardy et al. 2001).
In recent years, a new and promising measure has been tested, as families gained the right to detract from
their taxes the cost of helping hands and paid services at home. Further analysis has still to be carried out in
order to ascertain the results.
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CLAUDE MARTIN
France
Economic background
Although France enjoyed economic recovery between 1997 and 2001 it is now facing a downswing in the eco-
nomy (2001–2004) and the forecasts for 2005 do not contradict this negative trend. As matter of fact, the
employment rate of 15–64 year olds increased from 59.2% in 1997 to 62.3% in 2001 (59.7% in 1998, 60.1% in
1999, 61% in 2000). But during 2002 and 2003, more than 300,000 people became unemployed. In other
words, more than half of the positive impact on employment of the economic recovery disappeared in these
two years. For 2004, the unemployment rate reached the symbolic threshold of 10%, i.e., 2,7 million people.
Furthermore, the paradoxical effect of the economic recovery must be emphasised: a decrease in unemploym-
ent, a decrease in the number of beneficiaries of minimum income support (Revenu minimum d’insertion) and, at
the same time, an increase in inequality and in the number of the working poor. Inequalities of wages remained
relatively stable from the mid-1970s (Atkinson et al. 2001). Contrary to a commonly held idea, these inequali-
ties in terms of wage per hour were lower in the 1990s than at the beginning of the 1970s. But, on the other
hand, inequalities in terms of access to a job increased greatly during the 1980s and 1990s.The percentage of
working people receiving very low wages (i.e., less than the guaranteed minimum wage) increased from 13% at
the beginning of the 1980s to 18.4%, in the mid-1990s.This is mainly due to the development of enforced part-
time work, atypical jobs and also atypical times of work. In 2003, about 12% of salaried people had atypical sta-
tus (fixed term contract, temporary work, subsidized contract, paid experience, etc.), i.e., 3 millions people.
The number of bi-active couples and couples where both members are unemployed is increasing, which means
a polarization of the structure of employment of couples. At the same time, the number of working people
living alone, and working lone parents, is increasing, they represent today more than a third of active house-
holds, compared to a quarter at the beginning of the 1980s.These isolated people are particularly vulnerable in
terms of employment (atypical and precarious jobs, but also unemployment). This polarization also increases
inequalities.
To tackle this tendency during the first period (1998-2001), more re-distributive employment and fiscal public
policies were adopted: the creation of a subsidy for employment (‘prime pour l’emploi’) in 1998 and tax relief
are recent examples of government decisions at the time.The efficiency of this re-distributive effect combined
with an improvement of the global economic situation was visible in many indicators: between 1997 and 2002,
more than 1.6 million jobs were created and the unemployment rate decreased more than 3.5 points. In 2000
and 2001, and for the first time since its adoption, the number of beneficiaries of the minimum income (RMI)
decreased (80,000 fewer in 2000–2001).
Unfortunately, this effect was short lived. With 2,285,000 unemployed (International Labour Office), the
year 2001 has the best indicator for the last decade. In 2003, 2,685,000 people were unemployed (+400,000).
In January 2005, 2,716,000 unemployed people were registered. It is the same for the minimum income benefi-
ciaries. In 2003, their number increased again: +152,000 in 2002. Currently, more than a million people are
receiving RMI.
Thus, the results are contrasting: during the first phase, an improvement of the global economic situation,
better conditions for the poor, but at the same time, polarization of the labour market and an increase in pre-
carious situations, which affect the families directly (Commaille and Martin 1999). For the past two years, we
have been facing a new and marked downturn in the economic situation in France.
Main demographic trends 1998–2004
Fertility and marriage rate recovery
As for all other European Union (EU) countries, France was affected during the period 1970–1995 by a sharp
decrease in fertility rates: from almost three at the beginning of the 1960s to 1.65 in 1994. Nevertheless, the
end of the 1990s may have been a turning point.The number of births increased from 1998 up to 2001 (Table
1). Some newspapers even speak about a new ‘small baby boom’ in France at the end of the millennium.
Subsequently, the number of births slightly decreased in 2002 and 2003  (-– 10,400 in 2002 and –1,000 in
2003). Nevertheless, the fertility rate remains at a high level (1.9). Between 2000 and 2001, the rise in the birth
rate was mainly due to young women (under 25 years of age). Between 2002 and 2003, it was mainly due to
women between 30 and 34 years of age.Therefore, the mean age of the mother is rising again (29.6 in 2004)
(Table 1).
Table 1: Number of births and fertility rate 
Source: INSEE, 2005.
The final fertility rate of 40-year old women is still high: 2.09 children for the generation of women born in
1953, and 2.03 for the generation of women born in 1963. At 35 years old, the women born in 1968 already
had 1.74 children, which means that they will probably have a final fertility rate of around two children. So, in
sum, France has quite a high fertility rate compared to other European countries.This level of fertility, which had
not been reached since the beginning of the 1980s, put France at the top of the EU, together with Ireland.Two
main arguments may explain this recovery: first, economic recovery itself which plays a major role in terms of
household morale1; second, the importance of childcare policies, which facilitate conciliation between work and
family life, even if these policies are not developed enough to cover all needs.
The issue of caring arrangements for contemporary families
The high employment rate of mothers and the high level of fertility in France are closely related to public ser-
vices devoted to young children. Children have access to pre-elementary school almost free of charge, even for
two- year old children. In 1998, 100% of three- to five-year old children were in a pre-elementary school, and
even 35% of the two-year olds. In the west of France, around 60% of the two-year olds were in a pre-elemen-
tary school in 2003.The French situation is particularly good compared to other European countries, even if all
needs are not covered.
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Number of births (in thousands) Fertility rate Mean age of the mothers
1994 741.5 1.68 28.8
1997 758.1 1.74 29.1
1998 768.6 1.78 29.3
1999 776.5 1.81 29.3
2000 808.2 1.9 29.3
2001 804.1 1.9 29.3
2002 793.6 1.89 29.4
2003 792.6 1.91 29.5
2004 797,0 1,9 29,6
1 This first argument is nevertheless relatively weak: French households reached a record of pessimism in March 2003,
which is still the case at the beginning of 2005, but the fertility rate remain still relatively high.
Pre-elementary schools, day-care centres (crèches collectives) and childminder’s homes (crèches familiales) 
offered almost 500,000 places in 1999 for the 2.2 million children under three years of age, which is almost
20% of the potential needs. One may add the ‘crèches parentales’ (8,500 places) and the ‘Halte-garderies’ (70,000
places) to these services (DREES 2000).
Nevertheless, it is important to underline the local variations of these services within the country. The 
difference may be very significant for a family living in a big city, compared to a family living in the countryside.
Accessibility and availability of the different types of services are quite different.
Table 2: Situation of children under 3 and under 6 years of age in France and types of 
structures
Source: DREES 2000
The fertility rate of immigrant women is one point higher (2.80) than that of French women (1.72).
Nevertheless, this mean is hiding a convergence, whose effect is still greater when the length of stay is longer.
This trend progressively reduces the gap between these two populations in terms of level of fertility. For exam-
ple, between 1989–1990 and 1998–1999, the fertility rate of women from Africa decreased from 4.72 to 4.07.
The same trend can be seen for women from Tunisia – 3.93 to 3.29;Turkey – 3.73 to 3.35; Morocco – 3.51 to
3.32. Portuguese, Spanish and Italian women have more stable fertility rates, 1.86 in 1989 and 2.04 in 1999 for
Portuguese women; 1.48 in 1989 and 1.41 in 1999 for Spanish women and 1.43 in 1989 and 1.47 in 1999 for
Italian women.The women from these countries who live in France have a higher level of fertility than their fel-
low citizens still living in their home countries, which may be linked to the offer of services in France compared
to the situation in the country of origin.
As far as marriage is concerned, the trend is comparable. The number of marriages decreased drastically
from the end of the 1960s to the mid-1990s: from 380,000 in 1969 to 253,000 in 1994, which means a decrea-
se in the marriage rate from almost eight marriages in a thousand people to 4.4. A slight increase was observed
in 1996 (280,000 marriages), mainly due to fiscal reform. This recovery was subsequently confirmed, with
293,700 in 1999, 305,400 in 2000, 295,900 in 2001, which means a marriage rate of five in 2000 and the rate
was still 4.9 in 2001. In 2002, there were 286,300 marriages (4.7) (9,600 fewer marriages compared to 2001)
and there was a further decrease in 2003, with 280,300 marriages (4.6) (6,000 fewer marriages compared to
2002), which means 25,100 marriages less in three years compared to the situation in 2000. In 2004, the
decrease was confirmed with 266,000 marriages and a marriage rate of 4,3. Currently, the mean age of marria-
ge is becoming older: 30.4 for men and 28.3 for women.
The introduction of a Civil agreement: ‘pacte civil de solidarité’ (PACS) in 1999 offers an alternative to mar-
riage for cohabitant homosexual or heterosexual couples. By the end of 2000, around 30,000 PACS had been
registered, and more than 15,000 in 2001. In 2002, 25,000 had signed up and by the end of 2003, a total of
100,000 PACS had been registered. At the end of the first trimester of 2004, 130,000 PACS had been registe-
red. However, this public recognition does not seem to threaten marriage.
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Age of child Care institution Number of places 
(1 January 1999)
Under 3 years Pre-elementary school (children under 3 in 255,000
1998–1999) (56%)
Crèches collectives 138,400
(30.5%)
Crèches familiales 61,000
(13.5%)
Total number of places in all institutions for children under 3 years of age 454,500
(100%)
Under 6 years Haltes-garderies 68,100
Couples and divorces
The decrease in the number of marriages in the 1970s and 1980s did not mean a reduction of couples, be-
cause during these years, the decrease in the number of marriages was compensated for by an increase in
cohabitation. Almost 70% of people over 15 years of age are living as a couple. So cohabitation is growing
constantly and is compensating for the decrease in the number of marriages: there were 2.4 millions cohabiting
couples in 1998, compared to 1.5 million in 1990, which means almost one couple in six in 1998, compared to
one in ten in 1990 (Beaumel et al. 1999) (see Table 3).
Table 3: Number of couples married and cohabiting depending of the number of children
Source: INSEE, Employment inquiry in 1990 and 1998
The cohabitants are young people: almost 30% of people aged between 25 and 30 are living in cohabitation.
Cohabitants are more numerous than married people particularly for women under 26 years of age and for
men under 28 years of age. Nevertheless, cohabitation is no longer a specific behaviour of the younger genera-
tions. As Toulemon (1996) argued, „cohabitation became established.“
The birth of a child is no longer a sufficient reason to get married. So we are witnessing a significant increa-
se in the number of children born out of wedlock: around 6% between 1945 and 1965; 6.8% in 1970; 11.4% in
1980; 30% in 1990; 39% in 1996; 40% at the end of the 1990s and 47,5% in 2004. More than 50% of first child-
ren are born nowadays out of wedlock.This increase means that France was in third position after Sweden and
Denmark in terms of live births outside marriage in 1998 (followed by the UK, Finland and Germany). Very
often, cohabitation has occurred between adults who already had children from a previous relationship. Out of
the total number of unions that occurred between 1989 and 1993, with or without marriage, 16% of men or
women already had one child (Beaumel et al. 1999).
This trend partly explains the increase in the birth rate, because in contrast to the southern European
countries, births out of wedlock represent a significant part of the number of births in a year. In 2000, 40% of
births were out of wedlock and even 45% in 2001, which means 360,000 children. In 2003, 45.2% of the births
were out of wedlock (57% of the first born children were born outside marriage).
These developments show that cohabitation is integrated in French society as an accepted situation for mil-
lions of children (Martin & Théry 2001).Their situation is very different nowadays, as almost 75% are recognised
by their father at birth, compared to 6% of illegitimate children at the end of the 1960s, which was associated
with strong stigmatisation and disapproval.2 This normalization process has led to their total legal recognition, as
is suggested in the last report to the minister of Justice by Dekeuwer-Desfossez (1999). In that sense, cohabita-
tion is not a major issue in French public debate, not even in the field of family policy reforms, except as an
aspect of couples concerned about the PACs project (Commaille & Martin 2000). But it is mainly a means to
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1990 1998
(thousands) % (Thousand) %
Cohabitants 1,516 10.7 2,429 16.4
Without child 973 6.8 1,353 9.1
One child 332 2.4 587 4.0
Two or more children 210 1.5 490 3.3
Married 12,714 89.3 12.386 83.6
Without child 6,850 48.2 7,211 48.7
One child 2,439 17.4 2,126 14.4
Two or more children 3,425 24.0 3,049 20.5
All together 14,229 100.0 14,815 100.0
2 At the beginning of the 1970s, only one in five children was legitimised by their father at birth.
avoid speaking exclusively about homosexual couples, or a means to also involve the interests of the modern
homosexual and heterosexual couples.
The number of divorces, which increased regularly from the mid-1960s, from 9% of marriages in 1965 to
22% in 1980, 30% in 1985, 32% in 1990 and 40% in 2000, is becoming stable around 110,000 divorces per year
in 2000 and 2001. In 2002, the number of divorces increased once more to 127,000. If we take into account
the breakdowns among cohabiting couples, which seem more unstable than married couples, the instability of
family life seems even more important. These breakdowns of fertile couples lead to new phases in family life:
lone parent households and reconstituted families.The number of lone parent households with children under
the age of 25 (definition of INSEE) increased from 720,000 in 1968 to 1,100,000 in 1990 (Chambaz & Martin
2001). In 2000, there were 1,423,000, which represent 16% of households with a child under 25 years old and
in 2002, 1,6 million (18% of the households with a child under 25).
The percentage of minor children living in a lone parent family also increased significantly, from 8.4% in
1986, to 11.5% in 1994 and 14% in 1999. At present, 15% of the under 18 year olds are living in a lone parent
family and around 9% in a reconstituted family. A lone parent means more and more lone mothers, who repre-
sent almost 86% of the lone parents (Table 4).
Table 4: Number of lone parent families in France in 1990 and 2000
Note: Dependent children are single and under 25 years of age.
Source: INSEE, 1990–2000
But the major change here concerns the distribution of single parents by marital status. The share of widows
among lone parents dropped from 54% in 1968 to 12.7% in 2000, compared to the percentage of divorced
parents which rose from 17% in 1968 to 47% in 2000, or single parents, which represented 8% in 1968 and
30% in 2000 (Table 5).
Table 5: Number of lone parent families in 1990 and 2000 by marital status and age.
Source: INSEE 1990–2000
For the last decade, the most important increase has concerned single parents, whose number has more than
doubled, from 217,000 to 449,000.3 The increase of cohabitation and the fragility of non-married couples
explain these changes. As a matter of fact, the growing number of single parents refers mainly to the progres-
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1990 2000
Thousands % Thousands %
All families with dependent
children 8,901 100.0 8,888 100.0
Lone parent families 1,088 12.2 1,423 16.0
Lone mother 925 10.4 1,222 13.8
Lone father 162 1.8 201 2.3
1990 2000
Thousands % Thousands %
Marital status
Single 217 20.0 449 31.5
Divorced 555 51.2 673 47.3
Separated 78 7.2 121 8.5
Widowed 234 21.6 181 12.7
3 The progression is also important for lone parents who have separated, this figure dropped from 78,000 to 121,000.
Couples seem to separate more often before divorce has been pronounced.
sion of cohabitation in new generations and the fragility of these cohabiting couples. The category of single
parents has also changed significantly in terms of age. In 1990, almost one single parent in three was under 30
years old and only 8% were more than 45 years old. In 2000, only one in five was under 30 and almost 18%
were more than 45 years old. So, contrary to the situation in most Anglo-Saxon countries, lone parents in
France are rarely young single mothers with babies. Most of them are divorced or separated mothers with pre-
adolescents or teenagers. After separation and divorce, many parents may meet a new partner and commit
themselves to a new family.The likelihood of this happening depends very much on the sex of the parent (men
are more concerned than women), on the age (the younger you are, the more probable it is), and on the level
of schooling (the higher it is, the more probable it is) (Martin 1997, Cassan et al. 2001).
Academic controversies regarding family transformations
Public opinion and public debate are more and more affected by the arguments and ideas of experts, whose
advice is frequently sought by politicians through the issuing of official reports. How do these experts interpret
this profound change? 
French debate has mainly been organized through the opposition between the family and the individual
(Commaille & Martin 1998; Martin & Théry 2001). The reason for this is probably historical and goes back to
the beginning with the French Revolution.The creation of civil marriage in 1792 was the symbol of a secularised
society and equality of citizens before the law. Civil marriage was at the same time the symbol of the link be-
tween republican political ideals and the private sphere. From 1789 to 1793 (a short but historically very
important period), all problems regarding the family were analysed in terms of individual liberty and equality.
The family was seen as a private sphere and revolutionary laws were introduced (the divorce law introduced in
1792 was more liberal than the French divorce law today).
Immediately after the ‘terror’, another interpretation of ‘family’ emerged.The family was considered as a pre-
condition for assuring social order and as the natural bedrock of society.The Napoleonic code of 1804 promo-
ted one unique model of family as ‘the’ family for more than a century and a half. Marital and paternal power
organized the family as a very hierarchical unit. Only the married family was considered to be a family. Liberal
revolutionary divorce was limited, and finally suspended in 1816 for almost one century (when divorce was
reintroduced in 1884 it was fault-divorce only, until the reform of 1975). This history explains the long lasting
opposition between conservative parties, strongly influenced by Catholicism, and progressive or socialist parties,
attacking this family model on the basis of individual liberty, secularism, and equality.This opposition is so strong
in French culture and public debate, that the word ‘family’ seemed, until very recently, to belong to the right
wing. Until the 1980s, it was most unusual for the left wing to refer to the family as something of value
(Commaille & Martin, 1998).
Until the beginning of the 1980s, it was not unusual to present the transformation of the family as a crisis
and a threat. This position consisted of a simplistic opposition between the Golden Age of the family (‘20
Glorieuses’ from 1945–1965) and the 30 pitiful years of the family (‘30 piteuses’ from1965–1995). Indeed, if we
want to understand the current transformation by a comparison with the traditional family of a hypothetical
golden age corresponding to the 1945–1965 period, the diagnosis seems simple: it compares the stable nuclear
family (founded on marriage, very fecund, with strong ties and obligations, etc.) to a fragile family, with weak
links and solidarities. That nostalgic position underestimates that the strength of the traditional family was 
founded on a strict and unequal division of the gender roles and on the dependence of the female within the
marriage contract.
This dichotomy led to the consideration of the ‘family’ as ‘traditional family’. So it is not surprising that the
recent change in family behaviour and values was interpreted among academics as ‘the passage from family to
individual’ and as a movement towards ‘privatization’ of norms. Demography and family sociology has expanded
a great deal since the 1970s, but most of the research was devoted to specific aspects, dealing very little with
family change in general. The reason is that a kind of generalized explanation was largely accepted: we faced
‘new behaviours’, ‘new values’, and ‘pluralization’ of the family forms. Depending on each political choice, this was
seen as a symptom of decline, decadence, individualism, egotism (among jurists and some demographers), or, on
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the contrary, a cultural emancipation, more freedom and social tolerance (among sociologists). But the main
expression was ‘from family to families’.
The 1990s changed the issues and the hypothesis of a ‘passage from family to individual’ was challenged.
This aspect became more important after 1995, when social problems and specifically teenage delinquency
were attributed to a lack of family education, generating a strong political debate. So, beyond the ideological
position which interprets the transformation of the family as destruction, a threat, a peril, and which considers
that the best solution is to go backwards, ‘back to basics’, we can identify different, more theoretical positions,
which demonstrate the difficulty in understanding the present and the future.The meaning of these transforma-
tions of the family may be synthesized in three main positions, often interconnected (see Déchaux 1995,
Commaille & Martin 1998,Théry 1999):First, some researchers consider that the main transformation of family
life corresponds to a process of emancipation from tradition, a ‘detraditionalization’ of family life (Beck 1992), a
progressive recognition of the individual within the family, and mainly a process of emancipation of women in
relation to their role in terms of gender.The interpretation considers that this ‘positive individualization’ mainly
has virtues and gives the family a new structure, more horizontal and more equal, more contractual (famille
élective), more centred on the production of identities than around transmission of goods (de Singly 1993 &
1996). By analogy, it could also correspond to a new public order, not the vertical conception of social order
founded on a structure of delegation of power from the top (God) to the bottom (the father), but a demo-
cratic order founded on mutual recognition (Giddens 1992).
However, this initial position is immediately counterbalanced by those who insist on the limits of the indivi-
dualization process or the threat of ‘de-institutionalization’ (Roussel 1989). How can we preserve the ‘common
good’, the collective foundations of a society, without symbolic signs and collective norms? How may we even
form a society if the only links we recognize are defined on the basis of interaction between individuals? Such a
position insists on the role of law, as a symbolic link which gives meaning and consistency to the social relati-
onships inside the family: horizontal (couple) or vertical (filiation). It leads also to a demand for more institutions
(for example, PACS or the access to marriage for same-sex couples).These limits to the ‘de-institutionalisation’
of the family are very close to those identified by Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) in the 19th century or Durkheim
(1892) at the beginning of the 20th century, in terms of risk of individualism.
This hypothesis argues that growing equality between men and women is the most important factor of
change, and has been largely underestimated in France for years. The general thesis is that the ‘matrimonial
model’ of the family, presuming a gender share of public and private, in fact, implodes in the 1970s. It is an
anthropological revolution, still incomplete, that we are just beginning to be conscious of. Fertility, marriage, and
divorce must be reconsidered according to this perspective. The other major issue concerns changes in inter-
generational relationships within a context of increasing life expectancy. The entire life cycle is reconstructed.
From this perspective, family change is a structural mutation, generating new forms of social inequalities and
requiring the elaboration of new institutions, and a complete change in family policy defining a ‘new gender con-
tract’ and a new ‘generational pact’.
A third position in these debates considers that a second risk and brake on this positive progress of indivi-
dualization is constituted by inequalities: inequalities between social groups and classes and between genders
(Chopart & Martin, 2004).The process of emancipation is not equally accessible and the main evidence of this
inequality is, for example, the unequal consequences of separation and divorce, depending on the social and
economic conditions of the families (Martin 1997 & 1999, Commaille 1999). On the other hand, traditional
norms still represent a reference point for many social groups. Individuals in these configurations do not re-
cognize themselves in the new gender or intergenerational roles. In these cases, separations, divorces, births
outside marriage, etc, are still considered as pathologies and sources of social problems. From this perspective,
the process of individualization may accompany a regulation of social inequalities and problems linked to these
transformations of family.
These different positions represent a very simplified scheme in which it is possible to collect the arguments
about family change and family reforms. We can easily understand that arguments, ideas, and social references
swing in the political debate between these different interpretations of changes, according to circumstances and
mobilization.
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 FRANCE
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 105
Main family policy reforms
A major political change marked the period under discussion and the framing of family issues: the shift between
the Jospin socialist government (1996–2002) and from April 2002, the Raffarin government (reconstructed in
2004).This political turning point had a great impact on family issues.While the former government was mainly
centred on the question of modernization of civil family law (reform of divorce and parental authority, PACS),
and aimed at promoting more equality between men and women, the right wing government immediately
introduced a very prominent issue: insecurity, with all the consequence in terms of family responsibility.
Political background: Public debate about family and insecurity
In order to be understood, family issues must be related to the profound shock of 21 April 2002: the re-elec-
tion of Jacques Chirac with about 80% of the vote to make a ‘Republican front’ against the extreme-right candi-
date.The link between private life and public policies or the role of the State and the family are closely connec-
ted to this ideological confrontation.
The strong comeback of right-wing parties in political life may nevertheless be much more complicated to
understand than it might appear at a first glance. On the one hand, it is quite clear that public opinion is much
more sensitive than 10 years ago to the issue of authority and respect for Institutions.The percentage of those
who consider, for example, that ‘it’s a good thing to respect more authority’ in a recent public opinion inquiry
rose from 51% in 1981 to 65% in 1999. But on the other hand, the traditional gap between 
left- and right-wing positions on private and public issues is more difficult to ascertain than it was a few years
ago: when the left was quite liberal on private issues and interventionist in the economic field, and the right was
quite liberal on economic issues and conservative on private ones. Nowadays, the principal left-wing party, the
socialist party has been more tolerant towards the market while at the same time the right-wing party became
more open to changes in private life.The frontiers seem more and more hazy.
Another element plays a central role in this ideological confrontation, i.e., the emergence of the issue of in-
security. By gaining the spotlight in the media, the subject of insecurity, the increase in juvenile delinquency and
parental irresponsibility (Martin 2003), became one of the primary issues for all candidates in the last presiden-
tial and legislative elections.The effect that family transformation and particularly divorce has on children led to
this feeling of insecurity.The proposed suppression of family allowances in the case of families that were incap-
able of functioning in society under ‘normal’ or satisfactory conditions was launched towards the end of the
1990s. This was introduced by the mayors of several middle-sized French towns, principally those of a rightist
political tendency, but also by one or two leftist Mayors anxious to contain ‘the explosion of delinquency’ and
what they saw as a flagrant degradation of the social conditions of minors. From their point of view, several dif-
ferent events seemed to justify this solution: attacks on teachers and school bus drivers, urban degradation and
antisocial behaviour. The application of sanctions appeared, to these leading political figures, to be the only 
possible course of action, notwithstanding the fact that criminal law already envisaged disciplinary measures for
negligent parents, and in particular, the withholding of family allowances in the event of school truancy.
Although initially the left was mainly reticent as regards this discussion on security and repression, certain
leftist exponents contributed to the modification of political attitudes in the matter. Jean-Pierre Chevènement,
who was Minister of the Interior in the socialist government, played a crucial role by qualifying these antisocial
minors as ‘sauvageons’ (little savages) and by giving a republican and traditionalist address of a kind designed to
support initiatives likely to reinforce authority, whether that of parents or of the administration.4 The debate in
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4 A few academics had recourse to the same argument, such as Charles Hadji, professor of education at the University
of Grenoble who writes: ”When will the parents cease being afraid to discipline their children? Because ‘only discipline
transforms animality into humanity’ (Kant).Without discipline, which is the simple negative dimension of education, the
child is condemned to ‘brutality ‘, which makes instruction impossible, ‘the positive dimension of education ‘. Let us not
be afraid to call a spade a spade and ‘sauvageon’ (it is the only correct word) the one who was not likely to meet the
structuring interdict which will make it pass from the wild state to the human state” Letter published in Le Monde on
February, 16, 2002.
favour of the wide-scale return of the concept of incompetence, parental irresponsibility or lack of authority
again became a major issue.
Since then, the subject has remained latent and recurrent. Although no action was taken on the suspension
of family allowances in the case of antisocial behaviour by children, the idea was occasionally invoked as a form
of threat particularly from the political right but also at the level of a certain number of local communities. For
its part, the socialist government preferred, on the occasion of the 1998 ‘family conference’,5 to propose mea-
sures designed to help parents in their educational mission: ‘counselling, support and parental assistance net-
works’.The aim was to create a budget, managed at local level, for the support of associations and local initia-
tives seeking to create discussion groups or support facilities for parents under the supervision of the
Délégation interministérielle à la Famille (DIF)6.Three million Euros were set aside between 1999 and 2001, half
of which came from the family branch of the social security system.These operations were carried out by local
associations, including departmental groups of family associations. Four influential types of action were im-
plemented: those which relate to parent-school relations; exchange of knowledge and experience between
parents; meetings between parents and professionals; the organization of parent–child activities.
However, it appeared more and more difficult for the socialist party and the ‘rainbow left’ government
(socialists, communists and the greens) to ignore this issue that was becoming increasingly hot to handle, at the
risk of allowing itself to become involved in a moral debate on the subject of the family. The approach of the
highly important political elections of March 2001 (municipal) and of May 2002 (presidential and legislative)
took care of the rest.
Among government initiatives, mention should be made of a measure introduced by Ségolène Royal, the
Minister for the Family, Childhood and Handicapped Persons, concerning the reform of parental authority. But,
notwithstanding her cautious attitude towards the issue of insecurity, this ministry did not wholly escape unsca-
thed concerning its responsibility in respect of the spread of delinquency.
In February 2001, the minister announced measures intended to urge parents to exercise full responsibility
for their children and, in particular, for fathers following separation: ”Parents must regain a form of authority in res-
ponse to the antisocial and risk-provoking conduct on the part of young people. There must be an end to the ‘do as
you please’ attitude, the desire to be friends with one’s offspring induced in many cases by a guilty conscience on the
part of divorcing parents. In the absence of barriers and constraints, young people become immature adults. All fathers
and mothers, irrespective of their lifestyle, must be given additional help in putting authority of this kind into practice.”7
The aim of the government was ”to redefine parental authority by insisting on the responsibility of parents in
the education of their children; the reaffirmation of the joint character of the exercise of parental authority through
definition of the rules applicable to all parents; promotion of the alternating residence procedure following divorce and
the provision of a legal basis to facilitate the development of family mediation” (action proposed by Ségolène Royal,
Minister for the Family, Childhood and Handicapped Persons, on Thursday, 26 April, 2001)8. Notwithstanding the
scope of the proposed aims, it is remarkable that Ségolène Royal has herself chosen to present these measures
as an effort to restore parental authority in a context of excessive laxity and a dangerous ‘do as you please’ atti-
tude.
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5 Since 1994, a family conference is organised each year (except in 2002 because of the elections) which brings together
ministers in charge, trade unions, family associations and high-level civil servants. It provides the opportunity for the
government to announce a new family plan.
6 Inter-ministerial Delegation on Family.
7 Ségolène Royal’s press conference on the occasion of the presentation of the reform project on parental authority
published in Le Monde on 28 February, 2001.
8 Among the concrete measures announced, one can mention the reading, during the ceremony of marriage, not only of
the obligations of the husbands but also of the main articles of the Civil code concerning parental authority; the crea-
tion of a solemn meeting of recognition of cohabitant parents in front of a registrar ; the inscription of the rules con-
cerning parental authority in the family record book; and following divorce, the possibility of alternating custody of the
children; the creation of a booklet of paternity; the delivery of a copy of the administrative documents to the non
custodial parent; the linking of the child to the social security of each parent; the maintenance of train reductions for
the separated families.
These different elements in the reform of legislative provisions for the family were introduced in a general 
climate of denunciation of parents’ failure to take responsibility for their children when confronted with a pre-
sumed ‘explosion of insecurity’. At the same time, however, a number of experts challenged this approach on
the grounds that the institutions (justice, law, education), at which an accusing finger is pointed whenever men-
tion is made of the spread of delinquency, appeared to blame the private sphere.
During the summer of 2001, one witnessed a marked resurgence of this subject on the media’s agenda 
following the decision of the right-wing Mayor of Orléans to forbid young persons under the age of 13 to be
on their own on the streets of three ‘sensitive’ districts between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m., a measure that was termed
a ‘couvre-feu pour les mineurs’ (a curfew for minors). This provision was moreover adopted by other mayors in
the metropolitan centres of Cannes, Nice and Étampes, but more importantly it was ratified by the Conseil
d’État in July when analogous municipal decisions, adopted in 1997 had been annulled by the administrative tri-
bunals. This decision to ratify these repressive municipal decrees led to lively debate and some measure of
denunciation, notably from the League of Human Rights, because of its concern for the restriction of public and
individual rights. But this decision on the part of the Conseil d’État resulted principally in the consolidation of
support for greater severity in the struggle against juvenile delinquency and parental abandonment.
In August 2001, the publication of the disappointing statistics on delinquency by the Ministry of the Interior
showing an increase of nearly 10% had, according to a headline in Le Monde, definitively placed „delinquency at
the core of public debate”.These statistics on delinquency, which reflect offences reported by the police and gen-
darmerie, were no better on the eve of the presidential and legislative campaigns of 2002.There was a further
increase in offences of 5.7%, thereby accounting for more than 4 million ascertained infringements involving
177,000 minors, with an increase in the number of juvenile delinquents under the age of 13.
The fact that these statistics effectively show an increase in delinquency remains highly problematic. For the
Centre de recherche sociologique sur le droit et les institutions pénales (CESDIP) — (Sociological Research Centre
on Criminal Law and Institutions) and experts in criminology such as Laurent Mucchielli, Philippe Robert or
Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay, it implies an upgrading of surveillance services on the part of the gendarmerie
and the police or a more systematic recording of their activities: ”It is probable that over the past few years, poli-
ce and gendarmerie services have been encouraged to record complaints of delinquency victims more systematically,
owing to the fact that they received recommendations in this sense… One enters into a vicious circle when one con-
siders an indicator of means—what the police is doing—for the reading of the insecurity barometer” (B. Aubusson
de Cavarlay interviewed by Le Monde on 29 January, 2002, see also Aubusson de Cavarlay 2002).
By gaining the spotlight of the media,9 the subject of insecurity, the increase in juvenile delinquency and
parental abandonment, raised a serious problem for the leading left-wing candidate in the presidential election.
Lionel Jospin, who had to define a position on the subject of delinquency and the family before the media, was
frequently compelled to answer questions on the difference between his propositions and those of Jacques
Chirac. In effect, his platform, and also Mr Chirac’s platform, included the projected reopening of detainment
centres for juvenile delinquents (which however had been abolished by Mr Peyrefitte, the right-wing minister in
the 1970s owing to ineffectiveness and extreme violence)— and the immediate pressing of charges (‘comparu-
tion immediate’) against juveniles, a measure until then applied exclusively in the case of adults, and thereby
questioning traditional legislation concerning justice for minors (Ordonnance de 1945)10.
Numerous experts once again protested against these measures and denounced security campaigns and
catchphrases such as ‘zero tolerance’. A petition brought together a number of renowned specialists in this field,
such as the sociologists Eric Debardieux, Rémi Lenoir, François Dubet, Laurent Mucchielli and magistrates such
as Alain Bruel or psychiatrists such as Stanislas Tomkiewicz.11 (next side) But this led to nothing. The election
results showed that the issue of insecurity had borne its fruits: the elimination of Lionel Jospin in the first presi-
dential round, the appearance on the scene of the extreme right candidate Le Pen in second place and finally,
the election of Jacques Chirac by an overwhelming majority in a ‘republican reflex’.
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9 According to an investigation which measures the quantitative importance of various issues on television, radio or in
the press, during the first quarter of 2002, three times more French people were confronted with questions of insecu-
rity in the media than with the problem of unemployment.
10 This legislation was a way to distinguish clearly the criminal treatment of minors compared to adults.
The first Raffarin government then set itself the task of implementing the electoral promises of the majority
party.The new Minister for the Interior and the Justice Minister decided to promote recruitment in the police
and gendarmerie and to increase their budgets significantly, to publish monthly statistics on delinquency, to 
stiffen control in ‘no-go’ areas, to reform the ‘1945 Ordonnance’, to reopen detainment centres for minors and
authorise imprisonment of juveniles from the age of 13, notwithstanding the fact that French prisons are over-
crowded owing to a dramatic increase in numbers (+15.5% inmates and +25% in custody) in the course of a
year12. As of 3 August, 2002, a special provision (the Estrosi amendment) even permits the withholding of fami-
ly allowances in the case where a minor is placed in one of the new detainment centres for the re-education of
13–16-year old juveniles.This measure emphasizes the fact that delinquency is not a societal problem and trans-
fers the blame to the family.
It is difficult to understand how any such financial penalty levied on an already impoverished household
whose resources are often heavily dependant on allowances can serve to restore parental authority. The pur-
pose of any such measure is clearly different. It is a question of satisfying public opinion through the adoption of
ideologically exemplary measures for the symbolic restoration of public order. It constitutes a return to ‘La 
police des familles’ (Donzelot 1977) or to ‘blaming the victim’ (Ryan 1971).
Main reforms
After the adoption of the PACS in 1999, following a very lively debate in the media (Commaille & Martin 1999
& 2000), Jospin’s Government, and more specifically the Minister of Family, Childhood and Handicapped Persons
proposed and implemented in 2001 and 2002 important reforms in the field of family law, on the following
issues:
 Compensatory allowance (‘prestation compensatoire’ ) in the case of divorce (Law n°2000–596 30 June
2000), with the aim of putting a time limit (eight years) on the money that should be paid by an ex-spouse
to compensate for the decrease in the resources of the other partner due to divorce and giving priority to
payment as capital.
 The rights of the surviving spouse (possibility to stay in his/her house for one year, for example) and equa-
lity between all the children in terms of inheritance for children born illegitimately (Law n°2000–1135 3
December 2001).
 Anonymous childbirth (‘Accouchement sous X’) and access to parental information (Law n°2002–93, 22
January 2002).
 Parental authority, (Law adopted the 21 February 2002).
 The name of the child and the choice of the father’s versus mother’s name or both (Law adopted the 21
February 2002).
 Divorce, as a proposition of reform presented to the national Assembly, on 10 October 2001 and to the
Senate on 22 February 2002.
This last reform dealing with divorce had two main objectives: to simplify the mutual agreement proceedings,
with only one hearing and not two as before and to reduce the length of the proceedings which on average is
nine months but also to abolish the ‘fault proceedings’.This last proposition has been rejected by the senators.
Nevertheless, this reform has not been adopted and was again put forward in Parliament in July 2003 and
adopted in 2004, with a similar proposition by the present government.
The most important reform of the last socialist government was certainly parental authority reform. The
objective was clearly to equalize the position of the father and the mother in terms of parental responsibility, in
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11 „The campaign without precedent on insecurity, political escalation and the excessive coverage in the media which
accompany it worry us seriously….These measures come close to manipulation and suggest young people facing diffi-
culties are responsible for insecurity.This comes close to irresponsibility and distracts from true solutions which should
be implemented.” (Le Monde).
12 In August 2002, French prisons accommodated nearly 56,000 people, while having only 47,500 places. More than half
of the prisoners suffer from psychiatric disorders.
marriage, as well as outside marriage or after divorce.This reform entered into civil law, entails the possibility of
shared custody and has instituted paternal leave (implemented in January 2002) and even a paternal record
book.
Paternal leave (11 days paid leave covered by the social insurance system, or 18 days for multiple births,
than can be taken during the four months after the birth of a child) has been a success. In 2002, 250,000 fathers
took parental leave, irrespective of whether he was a wage-earner, self-employed or unemployed. Another mea-
sure, adopted in 2001, concerns parental leave and a specific allowance for those parents who have to cope
with a serious illness of a child, to care for him or her at home (1,800 families benefited from this measure in
2001). Last but not least, a special fund has been used to finance 20,000 new places in childcare institutions
(municipal and parental crèches).
In 2003 two reforms were introduced: the return of the reform of the divorce proceedings in civil law and
the reform of the childcare allowance in social law.The project of reform of divorce proceedings is a continua-
tion of previous ones. First, the mutual agreement formula (60% of the cases), aims at reducing the number of
hearings from two to only one, in order to simplify and ease the proceedings for those parents who have rea-
ched an agreement. A divorce in the situation where there is an irreversible breakdown in marital relations
(1.4% of the cases), will be pronounced after two years compared to six years in the previous system. The
divorce by fault (38% of the cases) is maintained in the case of ‘serious violation of the duties and obligations of
marriage’.The role of mediation is also emphasized in order to help couples to reach an agreement.
For five years, between 1994 and 1998, the family branch of the social security system was in deficit.
However, as of 1999there was a surplus of 0.254 billions Euros in 1999, 1.44 billion Euros in 2000, 1.7 billion
Euros in 2001, 1.1 billion Euros in 2002 and 1.7 billion Euros in 2003. Only a small part of this surplus (2%) was
used to help French families in their daily life in 2003: around 32 million Euros only.The rest of this surplus was
transferred to the pension fund.
In April 2003, the last Family Conference was the occasion for the Raffarin government to present the pro-
ject for family policy, completely focused on the reform of the French childcare policy (for the under three year
olds), in the realm of the famous ‘simplification and free choice’ ideology. Even if these measures were effective
only in 2004, it seems interesting to us to note that they express a very strong commitment on family issues in
a very difficult economic background (increase in unemployment, bad economic indicators, reduction of the
budget, etc.), as if, as a few commentators suggest, the government were trying to compensate for the bad
news and prospects on the pension reform, health and unemployment.
So, the Government only presented the reform which proposes to replace all previous allowances (only for
children born after the 1 January 2004):
 APJE (Allocation pour jeune enfant – allowance for young children), a mean’s tested allowance from the fifth
month of pregnancy up to the child’s third year, approximately  159 per month;
 AFEAMA (Aide à la famille pour l’emploi d’une assistante maternelle agréée-family allowance for the employ-
ment of a registred childminder ), which helped parents who employed a professional childminder to look
after their child(ren) in her own home to pay the welfare costs;
 AGED (Allocation de garde d’enfant à domicile- allowance for home childcare), which helped parents to com-
pensate for up to 75% of the cost of a childminder who cares for their child(ren) in their own home;
 APE (Allocation parentale d’éducation - paid parental leave), a flat rate non means-tested parental leave (
495 for the full allowance) for parents with two or more children who want to stay home and stop their
professional activity completely or partially,
There is an unique, almost universal, allowance called PAJE: prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant and there are four
main elements, for this reform:
 A birth bonus:  800 before the birth of a child;
 A flat rate means-tested allowance with a ceiling of  4,120, distributed until the child is three years of age;
 A subsidy for those who want their child to be cared for by a registered childminder or in a ‘crèche’, and to
stay in the labour market; this depends on the revenue of the household and on the type of carer 
(registered childminders, non professional carers, crèche).
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 A subsidy for those parents who decide to stop their professional activity to care for their child, a paid
parental leave, which is  340 per month.This allowance may be paid to a family with two children until the
youngest child is three years of age, with a condition of activity (the parent has to be on the labour market
for at least two years out of the last four years). It could be paid also for the first child, but only during the
first six months after maternity leave and only if the mother has worked during the past two years.
The government proposes also a fiscal incentive to encourage enterprises to develop private childcare soluti-
ons. In addition, the government has announced that 200 million Euros will be made available to create 20,000
new places in childcare institutions, and a tax credit to help develop childcare services in enterprises. Lastly the
government announced an improvement in the prestige and salary of childminders.
The Government’s estimate for the financing of the plan was about 1 billion Euros, which will be quite
problematic in the future. The surplus of the family branch of the social security system in 2003 about equals
that amount, but for 2004, it is only 800 to 900 million Euros. What about the future? Uncertainty does not
only affect the finance side, but also the costs: nobody knows exactly how many women with a first child will
prolong their maternity leave by six months parental leave.
But the other important aspect of the reform is that it completely ignores other major issues, that are
receiving much attention in other European countries: the development of public childcare solutions through-
out the entire country; the payment of parental leave on the basis of the previous salary (80% as in Sweden or
Iceland), and more importantly, the question of equal opportunity for women and men, which could lead to a
distinction between maternal, paternal and parental leave (three months for each as in Iceland, for example).
Some doubts, criticisms and controversies still exist about the financing of these measures, but also about
the impact of paid parental leave for women. As a matter of fact, almost half of the beneficiaries of the APE
system did not return to the labour market after the end of the allowance, contrary to the aim of the law,
which is supposed to give them the right to an equivalent job at the end of parental leave.
Challenges for the future of family life and family policies
Double-income families and the new ‘gender contract’
Because of the very high participation rate of women in the labour market, (eight women in ten between 25
and 50 years old are active and 70% are employed full time), 60% of couples living with children are both
active.This percentage depends, of course, on the number of dependent children living in the household: 64%
of the parents with two children are both working, but only 44% of the couples with three children.This trend
means that the traditional ‘gender contract’, or the ‘male breadwinner model’ is called into question.
Nevertheless, the gender division of domestic and caring tasks is still very unequal, and inertia of behaviour
means that the road to equality in that field is still very long (if it continues at the same speed of change that we
observed with the last two inquiries in 1986 and 1999, we will need about a century to share these tasks
equally between men and women). On average, a man living in a couple devotes two hours and a half each day
to domestic tasks compared to five hours for women. Another challenge concerns the work timetables and the
development of atypical times of work.This phenomenon is increasing and has posed new problems for house-
holds, the more so in a country where the childcare services are only accessible during normal working hours,
i.e., from 8 am to 6 pm (Le Bihan & Martin 2003).Therefore, it is also a big challenge for the policy maker. How
can this situation be regulated? Introduce new 24 hour and 7 days a week services as in Scandinavian countries;
regulate the labour market in such a way that these types of atypical and, mostly unpredictable timetables do
not flourish; encourage the enterprises concerned to develop a specific answer to this problem, etc.
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From youth to young adults
France is also being challenged by a new organization of the life cycle. Between 1945 and 1975, it was general-
ly considered that life was divided into three main phases: childhood, time of education, ending with ado-
lescence; adulthood, time of work with a slow but regular progression; and old age, time for retirement, a 
period now called the third age.This organization of the life cycle is changing.The prolongation of schooling up
to 18 years of age and the access to high school for a majority of young people means a lengthening of the first
phase. On average, young women are mainly living with their parents up to 21 years old and young men up to
24 years old. Around 10% of young adults are living in their parents’ home, even if they spend more than half of
their time outside their home. Others are living in an independent flat during the week, but come back to their
parents’ home at the weekends.This ‘lengthening of youth’ is challenging public policy (Cicchelli & Martin, 2004).
The debate revolves around the creation of a new social status for young adults and even a new allowance to
permit them to be more economically independent of their parents. The alternative is to discuss the limit to
which family allowances may be distributed to the parents in charge of dependent young adults (up to 25 or
older?).
The caring needs of children and the frail elderly: a new contract 
between generations
The aging of French society, i.e., the increase in the number of older people (over 60 or 65 years old) com-
pared to the youngest (under 20 years old), is obvious. People aged more than 60 increased drastically between
the two last censuses in 1990 and 1999, from 11.3 to 12.5 million (an increase of 1.2 million).This increase is
going to speed up with the ‘baby-boom’ generation, i.e., the approach of the numerous generations of the baby
boom to retirement age.The population which is increasing even faster corresponds to the more aged people.
The number of people over 75 years old was about 4.5 million in 1999 (an increase of 500,000 between 1990
and 1999).
A quite significant proportion of this ‘fourth age’ generation is concerned with caring needs (receiving help
for bathing, dressing, lunches, walking, etc.), or what we call in France, dependency.Taking into account that inter-
generational cohabitation is much rarer nowadays, 40% of the people aged more than 80, are living alone. In
other words, more than half of the people living alone in their household are over 60 years old. The national
statistic institute (INSEE) estimates that there are about 1.2 million frail elderly people of which 800,000 could
apply for a new allowance, ‘allocation personnalisée d’autonomie’ (APA, personal allowance for autonomy) to
help them to pay for services. But in fact, the family is still the main provider of daily help and, within the family,
mainly women: wives, daughters, daughters-in-law. So there is a double trend: lengthening of youth and old age
means that the ‘middle generation’ or the ‘buffer generation’ (45–60 year olds) is under pressure from work,
young dependent children and frail elderly parents (Le Bihan & Martin 2003).
In summer 2003, France experienced a major tragedy when a heat wave hit the country.This tragedy made
the government adopt new measures. In April 2003, the government decided to reduce the conditions of
access to the APA, criticizing the previous government and its finance plan. In September, however, after the
heat wave, the government had to announce a new plan to guarantee the financing of APA and also to increase
responses: a major plan for the frail elderly.
Between 4 and 10 August 2003, 6,500 people died in France because of the heat wave. But between the
10 and 13 August the temperature was extremely high, minimum 25.5° during the night and up to 10,000 peo-
ple died because of it. On 25 September, the Institute of medical research INSERM and more recently INSEE
confirmed that more than 15,000 people died that summer because of this heat wave: 42% of these deaths
occurred in hospitals, 35% at home, 19% in retirement homes and 3% in private hospitals. In September, some
newspaper and politicians were criticizing the lack of responsibility of the families, who had left their aged
parents alone, without any support, to take their normal summer holidays. This argument was ongoing at the
beginning of September, even if some experts were arguing that, on the contrary, the family was the main 
source of help and careThe various official reports and inquiries published afterwards show clearly that the lack
of responsibility and response was due to the government and administration and that the gap between social
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and health services was very detrimental. Right-wing politicians had to face the political impact of this event,
which shows clearly the importance of the combination of formal and informal sources of solidarity, an inter-
connection of the health and social services, the huge importance of local response to such a phenomenon, the
responsibility of the administration to deal with such an event, and so on.The share between public and private
regarding care needs, may become the major issue on the political agenda.
A last challenge may be to define a real policy towards children, in a perspective of social investment in the
future of society (Esping-Andersen 2002; Martin 2004), which means an improvement in the social and econo-
mic conditions of the child, by facilitating conciliation between work and family life for active parents, promoting
dual earner families and improving the level of education of children. Adopting such a preventive perspective
may be much more efficient than to adopt repairing measures towards adults confronted by social exclusion. It
is also a way to consider social policy in a longitudinal perspective, taking into account that tomorrow’s social
problems are made today.
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WALTER BIEN
Germany
Introduction
”Family means Future—Joint Family Policy Thrust 
in the European Union“
”The Member States of the European Union have been confronted with strong social, economic, demographic and
societal challenges. If we do not manage to cope with these challenges and do not make use of the opportunities that
are rooted in these trends, it will have serious impacts on man’s social existence.
Particularly the population trend constitutes a process the consequences of which are currently discussed on a
large scale but cannot yet be assessed comprehensively by far. On the one hand, the increasing life expectancy of the
population includes a large potential for the government, society and the families, which has not yet been used to a
sufficient extent. On the other hand, fewer children mean less wealth, less dynamism, less innovation and a lower stan-
dard of living.
In politics we therefore have to deal intensively with the forms of living together that people wish to realize in 
different shapes as a prerequisite for the education of their children. This particularly applies to families. Families con-
stitute a source of stability for societies by giving the individual person support and orientation in times of major 
change. For the great majority of people, family is the most important part of their lives.
The European Union does not have any competence for family policy. The member states are right to consider
family policy as a national task. Nevertheless they have granted considerable scope for action to the European Union
in the past. The support of the family has not been stipulated as an objective and task in the EC Treaty. However, it
has been laid down in permanent form that the Community pursues the goal to achieve a high level of social protec-
tion in all member states and to promote gender equality. The particular regulations in these areas are of the same
importance to family policy as the objectives agreed upon in Lisbon which serve as a central guideline in policy.
In the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union the protection of families has been stipulated as an
integral part of the Constitution for Europe: ‘The family shall enjoy legal, social and economic protection.’ (Article 33
paragraph 1) The 25 member states of the European Union have different economic and socio-political traditions. In
view of the major challenges for society it is important to share our views about the issues that are currently dealt
with in family policy.“1
Good, reliable data are an indispensable basis for political action and objective debate, both in the national and
international context. Responsible advocates and actors in the public sphere depend on the support of sound figures,
accurately reflecting reality.This is particularly relevant in those socio-political areas at the heart of current debate and
which call for far-reaching decisions.
Developments such as changing family structures, the growing number of families of different ethnic origins and
current demographic processes all have a fundamental impact on social security systems. Developments in this area
are not limited to the national context; they are global phenomena.
We are living in an era of internationalisation and globalisation and the mobility this entails leads to different forms of
living together. Yet there is a constant factor in the midst of all upheaval and innovation and that is the family. The
family today has many more facets than in previous times; in addition to the married couple family with children, there
are a large number of non-married families, lone parents and families made up of several households. But the changes in
external form do not alter the fact that the family is still the core element of society. The family is and remains the
basic model for community spirit in action, meaning that only a nation which is family friendly is a nation with a 
future. For this reason, acceptance of the family is an essential political credo—in Germany and throughout the world.
1 Text from an invitation to a European family policy conference hosted by Renate Schmidt, Federal Minister for Family
Affairs, Senior Citizens,Women and Youth, in Berlin on 2 December 2004.
The need to foster the family links us all. But to achieve this, we also need good arguments. And these rely on quality
data. That is why this report is based solely on data from official statistics or from data sets financed from public
funds. The independent and representative nature of these data is guaranteed by law and is the result of sound and
reliable research.”2
Both these citations of Renate Schmidt indicate how discussions have changed with regard to issues on
family and family policy in Germany.
Policies, challenges and opportunities
The main discussions in recent years have been related to the question: what will German society be like in
2010? In an attempt to answer this question, the Federal government introduced a programme called ‘Agenda
2010’.The purpose of the Agenda 2010 reform programme is to reform the welfare state while preserving its
principles.The key objectives are more growth, stable pensions, lower health care costs, better education, lower
taxes and thus more disposable income, as well as more money for investment in research.
The German parliament passed key legislation relating to Agenda 2010 in December 2003. Some parts of
these laws have been in effect since the beginning of this year and are showing initial results.This includes health
reform, labour market reforms, and the creation of new all-day schools.
Agenda 2010 reforms will continue.This year and next the government will initiate reforms in the areas of
education as well as in research and development. The coming years are to be years of innovation, requiring
renewal and the willingness of society as a whole to explore new paths (Deutsche Bundesregierung 2004).
The main purpose of the discussion is the reconstruction of the social system in accordance with current
financial and economic constrains.Therefore the need to reduce costs determines the discussion. Independently
of this discussion, both society and the political system have recognized that the society of the future will be a
society of human beings, so the power and strength of this future society will be related to the power and
strength of the people living in such a society. Future society will not be exclusively tied to the economic system
or capital but also to human capital. Thus the increasing importance of human and social capital and also of
family matters is one of the main themes discussed nowadays in Germany. Solutions preferably discussed under
the given economic constraints are solutions without additional cost. In recent years they were very often
addressed to the work-life (labour-family) balance.
Family Alliance 
The ‘alliance for the family’ will initiate a long-term lasting economy and family policy.The alliance is based on the
consensus that:
 In the long and mid term Germany needs higher birth rates as a protection against negative economic and
social side effects of population decline (BMFSFJ 2003b);
 Human capital is one source of economic success in Germany, so the economic sector needs highly qua-
lified workers and a higher employment rate of women (BMFSFJ 2003a);
 In order to increase the level of human capital, children need support and education particularly in the
early years (BMFSFJ 2003c, 2004a, 2004b).
The partners of the alliance agreed to make an effort to create a family friendly labour force, employment and
occupational culture within the areas of:
 business culture
 labour force organisation
 working hours
 human resources development
 family related services.
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2 Renate Schmidt Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens,Women and Youth in a foreword to a CD with data
on families in Germany (Families in Germany—Facts and Figures).
A realization of these topics is being attempted between local unions, local businesses, local politicians and local
family organisations. Another activity is a contest based on an audit on family friendly companies with the title
‘Success Factor Family’.The audit is based on an instrument which allows examinations on family friendly activi-
ties.
Childcare
Childcare is discussed not only with the intention of achieving a family-labour balance, but also with respect to
the needs of children in strengthening early childhood needs and the responsibility of the parents for education.
Providing opportunities within the first six years of life will strongly influence the future, therefore childcare is
not only a question of quantity but also of quality, and of affordable good quality. Childcare is the area in which
key qualifications could be learned. The development of children should be optimised in relation to their age,
their possibilities and their individual time needs (BMFSFJ 2003c).
Family competence
Parents have the main responsibility for the education of their children.To fulfil this responsibility parents some-
times need help. One area for giving support is media competence, especially sensitivity to the problem of
‘children and violence in electronic media’. A new law for the protection of youth and operational from 1 April
2003 decrees that computer games have to be labelled as being suitable for children of a certain age.This will
make it easier for parents to find appropriate games for their children’s age. Another initiative is ‘Look on’.
Together with media journals, television stations and the media-related industry help will be given for everyday
situations, e.g. by a Parent-Child-Media-Workshop or a media passport (BMFSFJ 2003d).
Reconstructing the social system under economic constraints and the promotion of human and social capital
are interventions into complex interwoven systems.The main difficulties have arisen because most solutions are
discussed separately for the pension system, health system, labour force, education system, fertility and the issue
of migration. But they are complex and interwoven, especially when family is involved, so these discussions are
accompanied by a considerable feeling of uncertainty, dissatisfaction and fear.
Family report
Every second legislature period, the federal government has to prepare a family report to be presented to par-
liament. One part of the report will be drawn up by an independent group of experts, while the other part is
a political interpretation of the results of the first part by the federal government.The Fifth Family Report was a
general report describing the future of human capital in Germany (BMFSFJ 1995, 2003e).
The Sixth Family Report was related to migration (BMFSFJ 2000).The Seventh Family Report will deal with
the Future of Family and the Future through the Family. Central topics are balance of family and labour in the
life cycle, change and stability of family, change in labour, education and economy, financial and time economy of
families, generation relationships between children, parents and grandparents and changes in gender roles.
The report should show that the basic changes in the life cycles of the family members, the changed time
structures in economy and labour, the differentiation of family environments, different cultures and the new
definition of generational relationships require a new balance between the family members, the structure of
families, neighbourhoods, labour force and society. This balance cannot be restricted to isolated core families
with a clearly defined role, if the outcome of families is based on family-orientated and emotionally stable re-
lationships.The family as an economic factor should be seen also as the family as a personal social solidarity net-
work of its members.
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Family relationships 
General discussion topics
In recent years, discussion on family policy in the Federal Republic of Germany has been greatly influenced by
fears rooted in the current low fertility rate of around 1.4, coupled with the dramatic estimates of the Ninth
population forecast for the next 25–50 years. The media sensationalised the figures as being a drastic popula-
tion decline entailing considerable disadvantages for Germany as an industrial nation.The discussion on popula-
tion forecasts gave rise to a number of different proposals to remedy the anticipated situation in relation to the
labour market. On the whole, the changes discussed and partially implemented, can be classified as positive.
Interestingly enough, however, the triggering factor— the birth rate— did not provide any incentive for change,
because it has remained stable at a low level over the past 20 years—at least in the western part of Germany.
A different pattern emerged in the eastern part of Germany.The birth rate sharply decreased after reunifi-
cation and it is now slowly increasing, with the aim of achieving the same rate as in the western part of
Germany.
A new population forecast from the Federal Statistical Agency in April 2003 (Statistiches Bundesamt 2003)
provides a different view of the problem.The low birth rate is still seen as a problem. Furthermore, the number
of possible mothers is decreasing, because of the decrease in the birth rate over the past 30 years. As a result
the absolute number of births will go down. On the other hand, life expectancy is increasing and migration is
expected to be positive. So the population forecast for the next 20 years shows absolute overall numbers of
the population which are not very different from today, but with a higher average age. This Tenth population
forecast of the Federal Statistical Office with its moderate estimates for the future has not yet been recognized
by the public media and the politicians.
It would appear that public opinion and political discussion are only tenuously connected with the results of
these scientific forecasts and it is sometimes hard to say if this is good or bad for the family situation.
One highly discussed topic is migration, which is sometimes expected to compensate for the lack of births.
However, the Federal Agency does not believe that there will be a significant effect on population distribution.
Because of fear of the lack of highly qualified people for the labour market, the Federal Republic of Germany
was keen to improve the conditions for immigration, especially for highly-qualified labour immigrants. Initial
changes to facilitate immigration of skilled labour had already been implemented but was stopped by the
Supreme Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) because of the incorrect way the proposed laws were implemen-
ted. Hence, discussion on the problems of migration started again, without any idea of how the process will
end. In addition, in the initial concern about the decline of the German population, young people—particularly
young women—were accused of endangering the survival of the German population because of their lack of
motivation to have children. However, these allegations quickly subsided and gave way to more realistic ideas on
how to solve the problems.
Besides migration, the discussion soon focused on the enormous potential of qualified women. If future
provisions enable them to reconcile work and family life better, they could close the anticipated gap between
the supply of and demand for skilled labour. Meanwhile, the governments at the federal and ‘Länder’ (state)
levels, as well as communities and industries, have all taken a number of initiatives to enable childcare services to
operate more flexibly during working hours. This is a prerequisite to increase the number of employed young
mothers. Although these measures were mainly introduced to ensure competitive advantage, their implementa-
tion also substantially contributes to securing the livelihood of women as well as their vocational choice. In this
way, these measures also enhance equal opportunities for both genders. Helping to reconcile work and family
could even have the side effect of raising the birth rate.
Equalising the burden on families also plays an important role in the discussion on low birth rates and the
reconciliation of work and family life. As in other European Union (EU) countries, the developments in
Germany over the past few decades have shifted poverty and the lack of financial and material resources from
the older to the younger generation. Most especially, the share of children below 10 years of age who are
dependent on public subsidies has increased by four to five times in the Federal Republic of Germany, while the
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share of the elderly population receiving such subsidies has slightly decreased. Public debate also became aware
of the fact that this development has had a negative effect on the birth rate, which needs to be counteracted
by improving the situation of young families. This then gave rise to the first serious analysis of what measure
would be more appropriate: to increase personal allowances (e.g. child benefits) to young families, or to improve
the social infrastructure to help young mothers improve their situation on their own by taking on paid work.
To sum up, it can be said that in Germany, the public debate is centred on a well-known fact, i.e., the low
birth rate.The expected shortage of labour and the resulting deterioration of Germany as an industrial nation
in the medium term has created a favourable climate for a more sensible and judicious family policy. Low birth
rates and the lack of labour in the near future make the situation of the family of paramount importance in the
political agenda. Most players in the field recognize that population related policy, which implies a policy which is
strongly related to the decision to have a child and ends with the child’s birth, is not enough. Only family policy
which concentrates on the whole life cycle and relates to all different kinds of problems of family life can chan-
ge the situation.
On the one hand, the anticipated problems form a good basis on which to discuss and develop a better
family policy. On the other hand, the shortage of money and budgetary problems decrease the possibility of
introducing a real change in the situation of families. Because of economic changes in Germany and the positive
influences of economic fear with regard to family policy, more and more of the discussion within the govern-
ment and between government and industry related to family policy is centred on the economy.
In 2002 a new calculation of the costs of raising children based on an economic household survey (EVS)
was made public.The cost of raising children for single mothers was below the cost of raising children for fami-
lies with both parents.The cost of raising children for single mothers varied from Euro 400 to Euro 500 for per
child per month, irrespective of whether the single mother had one or two children or lived in eastern or
western Germany.The cost in families with two parents varied from about Euro 500 in three children families
to about Euro 570 in one child families. Calculated over 18 years the average cost of raising a child in Germany
is around Euro 120,000(Münnich & Krebs 2002).
Also in discussion with different groups of society the economic value of families has shown to be more
and more important, so reconciliation of work and family is easier to achieve if benefits can be reaped by all
sectors involved. A model calculation, carried out here for a company with 1,500 employees 44.6% of which are
women, shows that family related activities could reduce the legal-based family related costs of a company by
55% to 78%. Such family friendly activities include flexibility of work time, information, computer related work at
home, company organised childcare and so on. So an investment in family friendly activities is not only related
to higher motivation of the staff, but is also a cost reducing factor (BMFSFJ 2003a).
The basic idea behind such calculations and such arguments is the only family policy which has not yet been
realized, a cost reducing and/or economic related family policy. Improvements in family policy could provide the
basis for increasing birth rates. An increase in birth rates without improvements in family policy seems un-
thinkable.
Fewer children and the decreasing rate of women’s employment escalate the economic problems of aging
societies.Young people in Germany want children. Society, at least in Germany, needs children.The problem is to
bring both together.Therefore, a good family policy should be based on equal opportunities for both sexes and
should be orientated towards the wishes and needs of the population. The expectancies of the majority of 
people include the reconciliation of family and employment. Therefore, a better childcare infrastructure and a
decrease in the opportunity costs of children should be developed with the aim of higher employment for
women as well as higher birth rates. This will be a win-win situation for families, companies, government and
society (Rürup & Gruescu 2003). However, the prospects for improving the situation of women and young
families, and in particular for better reconciling work and family, have not been very favourable for many de-
cades when compared to the importance of the issue. It remains to be seen whether this climate will continue
long enough for the constructive approaches discussed to be implemented.
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Family relationships
In Germany, the last century was the century of women.The traditional role and opportunities for women has
changed dramatically.There has been a trend towards more fairness between both sexes in public discussion, in
politics and in private life.Young women, just as young men, see realistic fairness more and more not as unrealistic
equality between the partners, but as the basis of a long lasting relationship. Both try to start a relationship
based on the idea of fairness, and as long as no children are born most of the couples are successful in having a
fairer relationship than their parents had. With pregnancy and after the birth of the first child, the situation 
changes. While the decision for the first child is a decision of both partners, the decision for a second child
tends to be the decision of the woman. When the second child is born the woman very often realizes that
something is changing, her involvement in regular family work is much higher then the involvement of the father.
The major reason for this change is the situation in the labour market and the importance of the labour force
for living conditions in combination with an inadequate childcare system.The risk after a possible divorce of not
finding a suitable entry into the labour market is much higher for a woman than for a man. So fairness often
ends with the first and certainly with the second child. The difference between the wish for fairness within a
couple and the problem of realising it when having children is still an unsolvable problem for many couples. If
both of the partners see that the essential problem lies in the structure of society they have a chance for a long
lasting relationship. If one or both partners perceive the behaviour of the other partner as being the main cause
of problems, the risk of divorce is very high (Fthenakis et al. 2002).
Why is it so hard to achieve a fair partnership after the birth of the first or second child? There are many
subjective, acceptable reasons for a gender specific division of labour and family related work. In Germany, most
women marry men who have a higher status in the labour market than themselves, and generally there is still
gender income inequality. So the decision to effect adequate distribution of family related work and labour
becomes an economic decision.The father takes a full-time job and the mother reduces her hours of work to
take over family work.Young couples very seldom have a real chance to resist the traditional role division, even
if there is the wish for fair distribution. Problems in the childcare system, especially the low flexibility of this
system, makes it very hard for young mothers to combine family and a satisfactory career. Men have career
opportunities while women lose them after each year involved in family work. So the real income differences at
the beginning of parental leave have a worsening influence on future income differences between both partners
after one parent leaves work; the differences increase year after year until women start a full-time job again.
There is also the significant risk that women are the losers if the relationship ends.Young women, who have a
clear idea of their situation and can foresee the consequences, see themselves losing their independence more
and more.
Some couples accept this situation and they try to do their best under difficult circumstances. For an increa-
sing number of couples this problem leads to real conflicts. Men and women often personalise this structural
problem and each sees the other as the main cause of the problem. Because they have no chance to change
the structural inequality by themselves, their relationship will probably end with dramatic consequences for the
family, especially for the economic situation of single mothers, the contact of fathers with their children and the
economic and mental state of the children.
Discussion of the role of fathers has become more and more important in Germany.While it is understood
that women have the same rights in the labour market as men, it is also understood that fathers have rights and
duties concerning the education of the child. The legal rights of fathers after divorce have changed, and the
commitment of fathers is increasing, but it is still far below the commitment of mothers.
Therefore, programmes should be initiated to remedy the situation, for example, programmes against struc-
tural inequality and programmes to improve fairness between husband and wife in a young family and help
them solve conflicts. Since the social security system is used by single mothers because of the lack of other
opportunities, it is also economically relevant to start programmes to help couples to solve their problems, stay
together and not end their relationships without important reasons. Gender mainstreaming is also important
for everyday family life and help for young couples should be available, otherwise problems will arise and the
difference between the wish for gender fairness and reality will result in broken families. Higher education, equal
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opportunities in the labour market, equal pay for equal work are other relevant issues which help to establish
stable relationships.
Fairness between generations is also an important issue in Germany. One aspect of increasing life expec-
tancy is the larger number of living generations within a family. One aspect of an aging society is the need for a
fair and maybe new distribution of resources between the generations. Both aspects are being discussed within
families and within society.
Within a family the relationship between generations is not free from problems, but for most of the family
members there are more positive than negative aspects, especially regarding the relationship between grand-
children and grandparents. Within most families one can find a high degree of solidarity, active family relation-
ships, and most importantly the feeling that there are people who will help provide within the same generation,
from the younger generation and from the older generation, if such help is needed.The older generation give
more money to the younger generation than the other way around. Instrumental help is more often given by
the younger generation to the older generation. Communication is the base of real family life and goes from
older to younger and from younger to older generations.The stability of the family is established by the feeling
of fairness through these different relationships between all generations, balanced over the whole life cycle.
Again, the feeling of fairness is more important then a balanced household budget. Where there is a feeling of
fairness the family can be said to be stable.
In society and especially within the public domain there are intense discussions regarding the abstract fair-
ness between generations in relation to the labour market, the social security system and resources. As a result
there is a great deal of discussion about how the effects of an aging society will interfere with generational rela-
tionships. Most often the older generation is apprehensive; they are more afraid of the future than the younger
generation. Some of these problems will be addressed in the description of the socio-economic situation of
families. Solving the problems of fairness between the sexes and between the generations will be a major prob-
lem for German society and particularly families. Not solving these problems will generate more difficulties and
could pose a real danger for the future development of German society.
Socio-economic situation of families 
In Germany, about one in three adult persons lives in a nuclear family (the parents are married and have at least
one child). The age at marriage and the percentage of unmarried persons are increasing most dramatically in
the eastern part of Germany. More than 70% of all Germans believe that there is no happiness without family.
Most childless couples want children (73% in the west, 79% in the east). If a couple has one child usually a
second and sometimes a third child is born. Growing up without siblings is rare in Germany, only about 17–20%
of all children have no siblings.There is an ongoing discussion to make the decision to have the first child easier.
This decision is related to expectations regarding stability in work and in a partnership. If the objective and sub-
jective feelings of stability in both areas remain constant, the number of childless women and men will rise.
There is a significant variation in socio-economic situations in the different German states (Bundesländer)
which is closely connected to the degree of unemployment: in 2000 the unemployment rates were 8.7% in the
west (7.4% in Bavaria and up to 15.8% in Bremen) and 18.8% in the east (16.5% in Thuringia and up to 21.4%
in Anhalt-Saxony). Also the situation differs between the big cities (Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Cologne, Munich)
and the countryside. Family life in Germany, as in most other EU countries, is related to the economic and cul-
tural background of the region of residence.
The percentage of non-German citizens in the population is 8.9%.The comparison of the living conditions
of citizens and non-citizens and differentiation within the population of non-citizens shows a high variation,
depending on the reason for migration and labour status. Also, the percentage of non-citizens varies dramatical-
ly between states from 19.4% in Hamburg to 1.3% in Thuringia.
Any investigation into inequalities shows the importance of being employed. A good indicator of wealth and
poverty is the ratio of household members employed divided by all household members.This indicator is high-
ly sensitive to family constellations and family cycles.Young children in Germany have a high risk of poverty.The
percentage of poor young persons under 10 years of age is about five times higher than the percentage of
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poor elderly people.When a relationship ends, for a married or non-married couple this reduces the possibility
of having a large number of employed persons in a household.Therefore young women with children under six
and non-married women are particularly at risk of becoming poor. On the other hand, empty nest families of
(married) partners who are both employed and have adult children who are not living in their household do
very well economically.The economic situation of families in Germany is strongly related to the specific phase of
a family cycle, the region of residence, and being a German citizen. All of these factors contribute greatly
towards success in the labour market.
However, there is a discussion about the problems of the pension system given demographic changes. As in
other European countries, in Germany there is a call to raise the retirement age. This discussion (as in all
European countries) is not related to the impact of such a decision on the labour market.The consequences of
dealing with the pension system will generate serious problems for families. In Germany in the last ten years, the
absolute number of employed persons has been stable. If in the next four years this continues and the retire-
ment age goes up, by three years for example, in the election year 2006 there will be about six million people
out of work instead of four million. A high percentage of these six million unemployed people will be young
people. Fairness between generations also includes fairness regarding opportunities in the labour market. For
the future of any society it seems more important to have labour prospects for young people in the early 
phases of the family cycle than for the elderly. Raising the retirement age in a stable labour market would only
make sense if, for example, working parents had more opportunities for parental leave as compensation for
later retirement. Otherwise young people are the losers in every sense.
Family policies 
Increased Expenditures for Family Policies
Over a two year period, child benefit (Kindergeld) was adjusted twice: after an increase of Euro 15 for the first
and second child in January 1999, it amounted to Euro 128. In January 2000, there was a further increase of
Euro 10, bringing it to Euro 138.The next upward adjustment to Euro 154 was envisaged for the beginning of
2002. The basic tax-free amount was increased in two annual steps: in total, it rose from Euro 6,322 to Euro
6,900 in 2000. Moreover, the basic tax rate was lowered from 25.9% to 22.9%. From 2005 onwards, there are
plans to gradually increase the basic tax-free amount and to lower the basic tax rate (BMFSFJ 2004c).
In the last year, these costs rose by 3.84 billion Euros, bringing them to around 165.65 billion Euros in 2001.
Even if we consider that families finance a considerable part of these amounts themselves (they also pay taxes
and other fees flowing into the transfers), the result obtained in this study shows that society finances around
one third of the cost of raising children.The largest item consists of kindergartens, schools and youth services
offered by regional and/or local authorities (63.25 billion Euros), the second largest item consists of family-policy
measures granted under tax legislation, particularly child benefits (31.09 billion Euros) and income-splitting be-
tween spouses (23 billion Euros). Monetary transfers by federal, state and local authorities for childcare services,
child rearing allowances, family supplements paid by the public service as well as public assistance, accommoda-
tion allowance and publicly-assisted housing (29.19 billion Euros) are third on the list. Measures by the statutory
health insurance including free insurance for family members and/or dependants, and non-cash benefits for
pregnant women and mothers (13.9 billion Euros) are in fourth place.
Recent Changes in Family Policies
 The regulations regarding the child rearing allowance (Erziehungsgeld) were changed to enable fathers and
mothers to distribute their leave from gainful employment better.To make clear that raising children is also
work, the term ‘parental leave’ (Erziehungsurlaub)—which tends to connote ‘vacation’ in German—was sub-
stituted by ‘parental time’ (Elternzeit). Since the beginning of 2001, mothers and fathers have also been en-
titled to take parental leave at the same time. During the three years of parental leave, both parents have
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the right to work part time, provided the firm has more than 15 employees.The weekly working time allo-
wed was extended from 19 to 30 hours.With the employer’s consent, parents may postpone the third year
of their parental leave until their child’s eighth birthday. Given that the income ceiling for receiving full child
rearing allowance had remained unchanged since 1986, the recent 9.5% increase was long overdue: it is cur-
rently Euro 16,464 per year for parents with one child older than seven months. For single parents, the
income ceiling was raised to Euro 13,498 per year, which corresponds to an 11.4% increase. After a 14%
raise in 2001, the supplement for each additional child increased to Euro 2,454 and will be increased by
another Euro 343 in each of the following two years. Parents may receive the monthly child rearing allo-
wance amounting to a maximum of Euro 307 for the child’s first 24 months of life. If they opt for the shor-
tened period of 12 months, the allowance may be as high as Euro 460. Another new feature is that a
parent may receive both a child rearing allowance and unemployment benefits if the latter are granted as
income compensation for a weekly working time of up to 30 hours. (BMFSFJ 2004b)
 A reform introduced on 1 January 2001 tailored the accommodation allowance to the needs of families.
Many low-income households that did not receive an accommodation allowance before the reform have
now become eligible. Large families benefit most: on average, their housing allowance is around Euro 61
higher than before. Those who receive an accommodation allowance in the old Federal States receive an
average of around Euro 42 more.
 Subsidising home ownership now focuses more on families with children.Within the past two years the inco-
me ceiling for the allowance granted to people living in their own homes was raised to Euro 163,613 for
spouses. In the year the family moves into its new home, this limit increases by Euro 30,678 for each child.
 Protection against domestic violence: Besides more public support to improve the material situation of fami-
lies, legal protection against domestic violence was also improved, thereby strengthening the position of
women and children (e.g. by ordering violent men to stay away from the family home). The right to non-
violent education was enacted into the Civil Code.
Future plans
An aging society, economic problems and influences on social security systems have influenced government
programmes for the next decade. Agenda 2010 is one such programme initiated by the Social Democratic
government with regard to the situation of families.Within this programme fighting against child poverty is one
aim, e.g. by giving more subsidies to low- income families and to raising the threshold of tax-free income for
single parents. In order to reconcile family and work better, the childcare system should be broadened and with
regard to the economic sector there is the idea of an alliance of families for a better balance of family and
labour.These alliances should be realized as local coalitions for families within a community or small region.The
main aim of these activities is increasing fairness between sexes and lowering the risks for women of having
children.
Summary
The importance of the family has never been questioned in Germany. However, appreciation of the work involved
in raising a family and the importance of families as an investment into the future only became focal issues in
the course of the discussion on the potential labour shortage. Family associations and those representing fami-
lies feel some uneasiness over the fact that the family only received the recognition it deserves by virtue of its
role in the production process—thus a back-door entry at best, without any recognition in its own right.
However, current acknowledgement of the family’s importance is indeed noteworthy. It constitutes a favourable
prerequisite for creating a solid and lasting basis for children, women and families—and for not blocking the way
into a future that must offer children and adolescents stable conditions for growing up.
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CHRISTOS BAGAVOS
Greece
Introduction
Over the last few years, the Greek economy has shown positive macroeconomic results, in particular GDP 
growth and an increase in labour productivity. Efforts to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have
been recompensed by the introduction of the Euro at the beginning of 2002.This extremely important deve-
lopment for Greece has led to further political and scientific discussion about the content and the character of
the economic and social policy, in order to create conditions for improving the level of competitiveness in the
context of the common currency. At the same time, Greece continues to be characterised by high—though
declining—levels of unemployment affecting specific population groups and by a poor trade balance and low
competitiveness. Moreover, Greece faces a relatively high inflation rate and public deficit, in particular for the
year 2003, when compared to the European Union (EU)-15 average, as well as relatively severe income in-
equalities.
Growth in GDP was around 3.8% on average for the period 1997–2003, which is one of the highest levels
in the EU (Bank of Greece 2004). Over the same period, productivity rose by 2.6% per year and employment
increased by 1.2%. Unemployment rates, which reached a peak level in the late 1990s and then started to de-
cline at a moderate pace, are still some of the highest in the EU-15 as a whole. Moreover, for certain groups,
namely women and young people, unemployment rates continue to be significantly higher than the national
average (around 50% higher for women while youth unemployment is nearly three times higher than the natio-
nal average).
As far as families are concerned, family and household structure have been modified, partly because of the
increasing participation of women in the labour market and in education, changes in gender roles and relations-
hips and also because of the high level of youth unemployment. Furthermore, as Greece clearly became a
migration destination, the question of foreign families, but also more generally, the financial situation of all fami-
lies, has been debated in the context of present and future social cohesion. The family’s standard of living has
been clearly affected, among other factors, by the relatively high, and somewhat increasing, inflation rate, which
occurred in particular after the introduction of the common currency.This financial constraint is reflected in the
increase of the rate of borrowing among families, although these rates remain lower in Greece than they do
EU-wide.
Last but not least, the way decisions are taken at the level of policy making in the social field has been affec-
ted by the predominance of an economic policy based on the Stability and Growth Pact. In this context, mea-
sures, which could be considered as family policy initiatives have been further, integrated into policies regarding
employment, social protection, social inclusion and equal opportunities.
Issues affecting Greek family and household structures
Changes in family forms and household structures
Both family and household structure have changed over the last few years. According to the final results of the
latest General Census (2001), the number of households increased between 1991 and 2001 by nearly 15%, at
least double the total population growth over the same decade (6.6%).This trend has resulted in a net decrease
in the average size of household (from three persons per household on average in 1991 to 2.8 in 2001).
The increase in the total number of private households is mainly due to developments regarding the one-
person household, the households with two members and to a lesser extent to households with three mem-
bers. All the previous household types increased in numbers between 1991 and 2001, but their contribution to
the rise in the total number of households differs quite markedly. In fact, changes in the one-person household
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is likely to account for 44% of the increase in the number of households as a whole, while the two and three-
person households have contributed to that by 38% and 25% respectively. In addition, the contribution of hou-
seholds with four members to the increase in the number of households was very low (2%) while households
with five members and over could decrease the total figures (by –7%), since its number has fallen by –16%. For
the largest households (five persons and over), in particular, the strong negative correlation between their size
and their increase in numbers continues to persist, although at a lower pace as compared to previous decades.
In fact, their share in the total number of households decreased between 1991 and 2001 from 14% to less than
11%.Trends in one-person and four-person households have also to be mentioned, since they tend to diverge
significantly.This diversity is reflected by the fact that the share of one-person households in the total number of
households has increased from 16% to around 20%, while for households with four members, the correspon-
ding figure has fallen from 23% to nearly 20%. As for the remaining household types, their ranking has not chan-
ged a great deal, since their share moved from 27% to 28% (two-persons household) or remained stable at
21% (three-persons household).
Changes seem to be somewhat more pronounced when household size is compared with the population
living in private households. In particular, the population living in the largest household has decreased by around
–15% while the population living in four-person households has remained somewhat unchanged (an increase of
1%). In contrast to that trend, the population living in the other household types, namely the one, two or three-
person households, grew significantly by 40%, 21% and 18% respectively. Greece, however, presents quite a 
different household pattern when compared to the EU-wide pattern, since nearly 50% of the population lives in
households with four persons and over, 43% in households with two or three members and only 7% in one-
person households.
The fall in the percentage of family households out of the total number of households, resulting from a
lower increase in family households than in non-family households, is one of the more relevant developments of
the last decade. Family households, however, currently amount to a rather high share of the total number of
households (roughly 75%). An additional important feature is that trends in family households show significant
divergences, depending on whether or not children or both parents are among the household members.Thus,
while the number of family households without children rose by 30% between 1991 and 2001, family house-
holds with children fell by around –6%. At the same time, trends in one-parent families resulted in an increase in
its share in the number of family households as a whole by 1.5. It is worth noting that this kind of family conti-
nues to be matriarchal, since in four out of five cases the mother is the head of the family.
As regards the relationship between age, household type and population living in specific types of house-
holds, it has to be mentioned that, in Greece, the proportion of persons living with their parents remains rather
high (around one in three). For the most part (nearly 80%), they are of course young people aged below 24
but also to some extent people in the age group 25–34. In general, young people continue to live for quite a
long time in the family household. In fact, over the last 10 years, the youngest age at which 50% of the young
people are not living in the parental home has increased for both males and females (from 29 to 31 and from
24 to 27 respectively). As far as the older population is concerned, it is worth mentioning that, among people
living with a partner and without children, more than 50% are people aged 65 and over. This percentage is
almost at the same level when one-person households are considered. In other words, the elderly are clearly
over represented in the two-household forms mentioned above, since they amount to roughly 17% of the total
population and to around 50% of the population living in those household forms.
There can be no doubt that all the above changes are closely related, among other factors, to develop-
ments regarding family formation and family breakdown as well as birth rates, especially birth order.They also
have to do with the longstanding trend in population aging, which favours the increase in the number of one or
two person households, the increasing participation of youth in education and the persistence of their extreme-
ly high unemployment rates as well.
Marriage, fertility, family breakdown and ‘modernisation’ 
of family structure
In recent years, a certain number of indicators appear to suggest a further ‘modernisation’ of family structure in
Greece, which is reflected, among other things, in the delay in family formation, childbearing postponement,
shorter marriage duration and the growing number of family breakdowns. In particular, the crude marriage rate
has remained at relatively low levels (around six per 1,000 population), whereas the average age at first marriage
has continued to grow. The rising delay in marital partnership is also reflected by the increase in the annual
average or median age on marriage for different cohorts. Recent research shows that for women born in the
late 1960s, the median age at first marriage was 23.1 while for those born in the late 1950s it was 22.5
(Symeonidou 2002). A similar increasing trend seems to occur within successive generations as regards to the
proportion of women who have never been married.While 5% of women born at the beginning of the 1960s,
have never had a husband, this figure is likely to reach even 20% for women born in 1970 and afterwards.
Generally, evidence points to a closer and closer relationship between the delay in marriage and the post-
ponement of the first childbearing.This is likely to suggest that, even in Greece, marriage rates should no longer
be considered as fertility determinants. The fact that both marriage and childbearing are simultaneously post-
poned could be seen as a signal of people’s will to seek the most ‘convenient timing’ to have children rather
than to get married. In other words, in contrast with what had happened in the recent past, it appears that the
delay in childbearing is more likely to ‘draw on’ marriage patterns than the opposite.
At the same time, marital breakdowns have become a more frequent phenomenon.Thus, the crude divorce
rate, over the period 1999 to 2003, was clearly higher (by nearly 50%) when compared to figures at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. The mean number of years of marriage duration at divorce is also decreasing over time. It
was 14.3 years for the 1970 marriage cohort and fell to roughly 12 years for that of 1985. In addition, marital
breakdown developments are also reflected in the growing proportion of marriage dissolved by divorce for the
various marriage cohorts. In fact, this proportion was around 8% for the 1970 marriage cohort, while it tends
towards rather high levels for the marriage cohorts of the early 1980s (between 12–13%). In other words, this
is an increase of around 50% for the marriage cohorts, which had taken place 10 years later. Nevertheless,
those levels remain quite low when compared with EU-wide ones (between 28–29% for the marriage cohorts
of the early 1980s).
In addition to the above developments, the proportion of couples living in a consensual union and where
partners are aged between 16 and 29 years has doubled from the mid-1990s onwards (from 4% to 8%).
Nevertheless, the current level is nearly four times lower than the EU-15 average (33%). Moreover, while one
out of 100 persons within the total population live in a consensual union in Greece, the corresponding figure
for the EU-15 is nine out of 100. Lastly, the number of out-of-wedlock births has experienced a rather sharp
increase (from more than 2% in the mid-1990s to 4% in the early 2000s). In comparison with the EU-15 as a
whole (27%), this is, however, an extremely low level. In other words, all divorce, marriage and new family forms
indicators show that the average speed of the process towards a further ‘modernisation’ in family formation is
clearly higher in Greece than in the EU-15 as a whole. However, Greece still remains in a cluster of countries
where family structure presents a certain number of ‘traditional’ features.
Fertility patterns show that very low fertility has become a rather structural characteristic of the demogra-
phic regime in Greece.The combination of a later timing with less intensity has led to very low level in the total
fertility rate (around 1.3 in recent years). In fact, the lower number of children when compared to the past and
the increasing fertility rates at higher ages are the main features of the recent trends in reproduction patterns
(Bagavos 2004, Bagavos and Martin 2004).The age pattern of fertility development in Greece indicates that in
the 1990s as well as in the early 2000s, low fertility is mainly a result of the combination of three elements.
Firstly, fertility rates for the age group 30 to 39 years stopped decreasing and then started to go up. Secondly,
fertility for women aged between 25 and 29 experienced a rather limited increase and thirdly, fertility in younger
ages (below 25) continued to fall. There can be no doubt that the above developments reflect, to a great
extent, the different age pattern of successive generations as regards childbearing. In a context where the total
number of children born to various female cohorts is, on average, around two, either the births occur at the
younger ages and then fertility rates decline at the higher ages or childbearing is postponed for women below
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25 and then births occur mainly at higher ages.When, in addition to that, changes in the age pattern of fertility
are combined with those in the average number of births from one cohort to the next, trends in the Total
Fertility Rate (TFR) become quite pronounced over time. In reality, there are two elements likely to explain why
TFR continues to remain at a very low level.The first, which seems to prevail in Greece for the cohorts born in
the late 1950s and afterwards, is related to ‘tempo’ of fertility (i.e.,, a postponement of fertility at younger ages
followed by a resumption at the higher ages).The second is a result of the ‘quantum’ of fertility as cohort ferti-
lity declines over time (from two children per woman born in the early 1950s to roughly 1.7 for women born
in the late 1950s and afterwards).
In general, given the relatively low (below replacement level), and even declining, level of completed cohort
fertility for the post-war cohorts, for whom in addition, the incidence of divorce was rather insignificant, low fer-
tility is not necessarily a recent development for Greece.The new element is that recent trends in childbearing
tend to confirm that low fertility not only results from the delay in the timing (tempo effect) but from a net
decrease in fertility as well, since the resumption of fertility at higher ages does not compensate for the post-
ponement at ages below 25. Besides, taking into account the fact that the tempo effect in Greece is currently
estimated at 25–30% (Bongaarts 2002), the TFR could amount to nearly 1.7 rather than the current 1.3, which
in any case is clearly below the level that had been observed before 1980.
Gender and generational relationships
Gender relationships and roles are constantly changing in Greece in favour of more gender equality. Women’s
participation in economic, political and social life is increasing, although in some cases, some backlashes can be
observed. In the economic sphere, the increasing participation of women in the labour market has clearly con-
tributed to further ‘modernisation’ of the traditional family and created several situations requiring policy 
responses, particularly in the area of childcare. On the other hand, despite the increase in female participation
in the labour market, gender differences still exist regarding unemployment rates, atypical employment, pay dif-
ferentials and occupational segregation, as well as occupational and career choices. At the same time, the educa-
tion gap between men and women has almost disappeared as the number of years people devote to their
education has increased much more for women than for men. However, this gender education gap, even
though it is decreasing, still persists for the relatively older generations, as a result of the lower female participa-
tion in education over the past decades.
In recent years, particular attention has been paid to the question of childcare in relation to the reconcilia-
tion of family and working life for women. In fact, as grandmothers became less available to provide unpaid
childcare (more of them are in paid work or most of the time they live quite far away), childcare remains a core
problem for working mothers.The number of public kindergartens is still not enough and the scheduled opera-
tion of primary schools does not correspond to parents’ working hours.The recent results of the Fertility and
Family Survey (FFS) for Greece indicate that only 3% of children under three years of age are catered for by
nursery school, while for children aged 3–6 this percentage is 70%. In fact, grandparents remain the main sour-
ce of childcare provision, in particular for working parents (46.4% of the childcare for children under three
years old with two working parents is the responsibility of grandparents (Symeonidou 2002)). Generally, the
burden-sharing of men and women becomes a major aspect of gender roles, not only in terms of policy (i.e., an
increase in the use of parental leave for men) but also in terms of more ‘cultural’ changes (i.e.,, the acceptance
of the idea that childcare is not exclusively a mother’s affair).
As far as society in general is concerned, contraception, women’s health and domestic violence are the
main issues of gender equality. Abortion practices have become an extremely important issue for Greek
women and Greek society. Although the data on abortions should be treated cautiously, it is quite evident that
the frequency of abortion is very high in Greece. One out of four women in Greece has experienced an abor-
tion while 150,000 couples (in fact women) cannot have a child because of a previous abortion (Bagavos
2002a). As older cohorts tend to use more traditional contraceptive methods, abortion rates are higher among
them than the younger cohorts. This clearly arises from the lower cumulative percentage of women having a
first induced abortion in the younger birth cohorts. For instance, at the same age (29 years), this percentage
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was around 18% for women born between 1965 and 1969 while for older generations (1960–1964,
1955–1959 and 1950–1954) it was 24.5%, 24% and 25.5% respectively (Symeonidou 2002). Despite the lower
frequency in younger generations, abortion continues, to a great extent, to be considered as a method of
‘contraception’ than of termination of an undesired pregnancy.
Recent research into the intra-family domestic violence against women shows that for 9% of women, the
behaviour of their partner/husband is considered to be violent (KETHI 2003). Around half of the women admit
that they experience abusive behaviour (verbal and psychological violence such as slights, insults, restrictions, iso-
lation from their friends and family environment and threats), 3.6% of them recognize that their partner/hus-
band acts with physical violence against them and 3.5% that they are forced into sexual contact. However, only
30% and 37% of them respectively consider this behaviour as violent behaviour or sexual maltreatment. In
general, it seems that there is a persisting gap between violent acts and women’s perception of violence. This
has to do with attitudes and perceptions regarding family and gender roles, as well as with inadequate know-
ledge of women’s rights. It is also related to the fact that the legal framework with regard to women’s protec-
tion against intra-family violence fails and therefore the issue is most of the time considered by the authorities
as a ‘private’ affair.
The generational aspects of recent socio-economic developments in Greece indicate that, in spite of the
delay in family formation and the idea that recent changes lead towards a ‘broken family’, the family remains a
pivotal element of social and economic life.The strong generational relations are reflected, among others, in the
importance of family and family networks for the education, the financial support and the employment per-
spectives of young people. In particular, the cost of children’s education borne by families is very high and 
closely related to the existence of a ‘parallel’ education system in Greece. In fact, this is expressed at least in two
different ways:
 private institutions (for primary and secondary education), and 
 private education functioning as a complement to secondary public education enabling students to improve
their knowledge in particular subjects.
According to recent estimates, the percentage of children and adults enrolled in private education (both pri-
mary and secondary) has risen to almost 7% of the total school population and the cost of the whole ‘parallel’
education has risen to nearly 30% of the overall public budget for education (Bagavos 2001). As far as the rela-
tionship between unemployment patterns, financial status and family ties is concerned it seems that there are at
least two different directions. On the one hand, the existence of family and informal networks is one of the fac-
tors explaining why in Greece, poverty increases less than unemployment rates (Bagavos 2001). On the other
hand, in a context of high unemployment, a high proportion of unemployed youth (in 2002, it was estimated at
73%) appeals to the family network in order to obtain a job (Bagavos 2002a).
Family and kin networks are also important elements for the care of the elderly whilst as discussed above
the elderly play an important role as a childcare provider. In fact, Greece is characterised by a high proportion
of the elderly living in a son or daughter’s home (more than double compared to the EU-15). Moreover, the
family remains the principal care provider for the elderly. According to a recent study (KEDKE 2002), in two out
of three cases it is the family, which provides care for the elderly.
All the above elements, which reflect strong generational ties, seem however to be in contraction, to some
extent, with recent socio-economic trends. Firstly, an increasing educational gap between children and parents
has become apparent over time, as a result of the increase in the children’s education level. In the early 2000s,
this educational gap was nearly 30% higher in Greece than in the EU-15 for both upper-secondary and tertiary
education (Bagavos 2002a). Secondly, the proportion of the elderly living in a household where the head of
household is a younger person seems to have decreased over time (Bagavos 2001), indicating that family
solidarity as expressed exclusively through the simple cohabitation of different generations is likely to be weaker
than in the past.Thirdly, income distribution in Greece is clearly against the elderly, which means that their finan-
cial resources must be rather limited and therefore there is not much scope for financial assistance towards
their children and their grandchildren.
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In reality, on the one hand different indicators regarding the generational aspects of recent socio-economic
trends could imply that generational ties become weaker over time. But, on the other hand, there can be no
doubt that these ties remain very strong, even if they are expressed in a different way from in the past.
Family concerns and the socio-economic situation of families 
Migrant population and migrant families
Although the mid-1970s can be considered as the turning point of Greek migration history, since Greece be-
came for the first time a net immigration county, particular attention has to be paid to the most recent trends.
In fact, the unprecedented increase in immigration flows over the last 10 to 15 years has undoubtedly made it
clear that the immigration movement has to be treated from now on as one of the most relevant socio-eco-
nomic developments for Greece. The main peculiarity of the latest trends in immigration flows and stocks is
related to the fact that immigrants are mostly foreigners and ethnic Greeks and to a lesser extent returning
Greek emigrants.
According to the results of the latest General Census (2001), international geographical mobility was the
main demographic component of the total population growth in Greece during the 1990s. In fact, between
1991 and 2001, the number of foreigners multiplied by five (from 167,000 to 797,000). Given that the natural
increase has only been 21,600 persons (3% of the whole increase), the 90% increase in the total population
during the 1990s has been due to the net migration movements of non-nationals (the other 7% is due to the
net migration of nationals). Taking into account the fact that these figures could be underestimated, as coming
up with the total number of illegal immigrants from studies based on official statistics is an extremely difficult
task, it is quite evident that at the beginning of the 2000s the proportion of the foreign population exceeded
7% of the total population (Bagavos, in press). In addition, as 92% of total net migration over the 1990s is 
foreign immigrants and internal EU mobility was rather stable during the 1990s, it is obvious that the large
majority of immigrants are third-country nationals.
The impact of immigration on total population growth is even more significant when the natural increase of
the foreign population is taken into account. Although this impact can not be measured precisely, since data
regarding birth numbers by nationality of parents are not available, natural increase of foreigners appears rather
high, since they present a younger age structure than nationals, and therefore birth rates are higher than mor-
tality rates. Moreover, administration data, provided by public hospitals in the Athens area as well as by the
Athens municipality, show that a large proportion (varying from 30% to 60%) of births are due to the foreign
population (Bagavos 2002b). Nevertheless, because of the high concentration of the foreign population in the
Athens area as well as of the high concentration of the foreign population who visit particular public hospitals,
we must be very careful about generalising these results. But, in any case, whatever the percentage of births due
to the foreign population, it is evident that over recent years the immigrant birth rate has had a clear, positive
contribution to the natural increase of the population of Greece.
The composition of immigrants by nationality clearly indicates the preponderance of Albanians in the for-
eign population. While in 1991, they were around 20,000, 10 years later this figure amounted to 440,000. A
sharp increase has also been recorded for immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, among others,
Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine. In 2001 however, the share of Albanians was around 56% of the total
foreign population, whereas that of Bulgarians, the second most important nationality, was slightly above 5%. In
general, the vast majority of immigrants are from the ex-communist countries since, when immigrants from the
new EU member states are excluded, their share amounts to 73% of the total number of immigrants. In con-
trast to that, the corresponding figure for immigrants from Asia and Africa is low, their share being around 7%
and 2% respectively.
Foreign citizens present some quite typical characteristics, the likes of which can be observed in any new
immigration country. They have a younger age composition than nationals and they live mainly in urban areas,
especially in the Athens region. Although some significant differences in the sex ratio within nationalities are
observed, there is a clear overrepresentation of males in the total foreign population. In addition, males have a
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higher participation in the labour market than females and both males and females present a concentration
regarding the employment sectors and occupational status as compared to the nationals. In fact, given that in
public administration the posts are generally open only to nationals, the immigrant population is mainly employ-
ed in construction, in personal services, in petty trade and in hotels and restaurants and also to a smaller extent
in the food and beverage sector. It is also widely acknowledged that immigrants are employed to a large extent
in the agricultural sector, but as these activities represent a high degree of temporality and since most of the
time immigrants working in this sector are illegal, the corresponding figures are not always represented in the
statistics. The occupational structure of immigrants shows an overrepresentation of unskilled or semiskilled
manual workers in the sectors already mentioned. Construction workers, petty traders and helpers, personal
service providers and textile workers are the most common occupations of immigrants. In the labour market,
they are complementary to rather than substitutes for Greek nationals, except perhaps in construction.There
can be no doubt that they occupy temporary and badly paid work positions.
Moreover, there are some particular family-related characteristics in the foreign population, which have to
be mentioned.The first, which concerns the reason for settlement in Greece, indicates that 13% of immigrants
entered the country for family reunification purposes, which is the second reason after employment-linked
migration (54%).The second feature concerns marital status, where there are no significant differences between
foreigners and nationals. In particular, nearly 48% of foreigners are married (50% for nationals), 44% are not
married (39% for nationals) and 8% are either widows or divorced (11% for nationals). It is also worth noting
that the size of an average household for married people is around 2.7 in the foreign population, which is very
close to the corresponding figure for nationals.
Apart from trends in the immigrant population as a whole, particular attention has been paid over recent
years to children of immigrant and ‘repatriate’ parents (Greeks returning, usually from the ex-USSR, during the
1990s). In fact, a growing number of immigrants and ‘repatriate’ pupils have been added to the school popula-
tion in recent years. Figures have more than doubled from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s (from around
48,000 to more than 100,000). At the same time, the native school population in primary, secondary and upper
secondary education has tended to decrease as a result of the decline in birth rates from 1980 onwards.Thus,
the proportion of children of non-nationals in the total school population has increased to around 11% in 
primary, 6% in secondary and 2% in upper secondary education. Moreover, figures are much higher in certain
schools (i.e. in the Athens area) where this proportion even reaches 75%.
Income and poverty
In recent years, questions of income inequalities and poverty have become particularly important subjects in
the media and in political debate in Greece. The availability of statistical data from different sources, regarding
the economic situation of households, has allowed a deeper analysis of trends in poverty over time. From a
family point of view, the prominence attributed to poverty was associated with the established idea that family
poverty is closely related to family structure. Moreover, as social cohesion constitutes one of the main objectives of
the welfare state, the fight against poverty has become one of the main goals of socio-economic policy. At a
national level, the latest available (1999) Household Expenditure Survey has permitted an analysis of the 
phenomena of income inequalities and poverty over the period 1994–1998, a period characterised by substan-
tial efforts to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). Two particular methodological considerations, how-
ever, have to be mentioned (Mitrakos & Tsakloglou 2004). On the one hand, because of the sample charac-
teristics, a certain number of population groups running high risks of poverty (for instance the homeless, people
living in institutions or asylums and more generally people who do not live in private households) are excluded,
while on the other hand, some other groups (for instance immigrants) are clearly under-represented. For these
reasons, results regarding inequality and poverty could probably be underestimated. However, on the other
hand, the fact that public non-financial benefits applying to families are not included in the analysis could lead to
a greater degree of welfare among the population than that suggested by the above results.
Statistical analysis of the above data has shown that changes in relative poverty, based on total income or
total expenditure per adult equivalent, were very moderate, leading to a level of nearly 18% in the late 1990s
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(Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2001 | Mitrakos & Tsakloglou 2004). However, poverty, in absolute
terms, has experienced a further decline between 1994 and 1999. On the whole, taking into consideration the
fact that the population’s material well being is positively related to average consumption expenditure and
negatively to the inequality level, the population’s welfare has improved over time (Mitrakos & Tsakloglou 2004).
Poverty levels are related to the different family and household forms but not necessarily in the expected
way. Even if the presence of a child increases the probability of living in poverty, the poverty level is decreasing
over time for couples with one child and is rising for families with three children and over. On the other hand,
in the late 1990s, poverty for families with one child or two children was lower than for families without chil-
dren.This result is probably related to the existence of informal networks, but also to the fact that the decision
for family formation and childbirth, at least of the first order, do not precede the efforts of the families to 
stabilise their financial situation. Lastly, single parent families appear to be burdened in terms of income but not
in terms of consumption, probably because of the existence of an informal support network.
Another particularly important point has to do with the factors that tend to affect inequalities and poverty.
Analysis shows that only educational inequalities are closely related to economic inequalities. As regards pover-
ty, it is related to the elderly as well as to people living in farming households or in households having a head
who is working in the primary sector, or who has a low-educational level or who is unemployed or retired.
Taking into account the interactions between the above factors, it seems that three of them are the most
important for poverty patterns: the low educational level, the unemployment of the head of household head
and residence in an agricultural area.
In addition, it is quite clear that poverty in Greece affects in particular the elderly and pensioners, although
their relative and absolute financial situation has clearly improved over the period 1994–1999, to a certain
extent because of the implementation of the EKAS (Pensioners’ Social Solidarity Supplement) in 1996.
Moreover, differences in income level can be observed among the population of higher ages. Here again, the
main factors affecting unequal income distribution for the elderly population are related to their previous
employment experience and employment sector, which determines the pension level of retired people. In addi-
tion, income and poverty differentials are particularly strong between the elderly living in urban or rural areas,
but also within rural areas. In this age group, farmers as well as very old persons seem to be more vulnerable to
poverty situations.
Family and family-related policies 
In recent years family policy measures have been more and more connected to new initiatives regarding
employment, social protection, social inclusion and equal opportunities (Moussourou and Stratigaki 2004).This
connection between new initiatives and policies regarding families is clearly reflected in the different National
Action Plans, which have been presented in the last few years. Moreover, reforms undertaken in recent years or
announced for the very near future in the fields of health, social protection, welfare services, education and the
tax system are likely to have an impact on the socio-economic situation of families, and for this reason they
should be considered to some extent as elements and measures of family policy. Some of the most relevant
policy measures regarding families, in a context of more general reforms, are presented here.
Family allowances and tax policy regarding families
Over recent years, a number of changes have occurred regarding family income tax. Up to 2003, a tax reduc-
tion was granted in line with the number of children: Euro 88.04 for one child, Euro 205.43 for two children
(which means Euro 102.71 per child), Euro 616.29 for three children (which means Euro 205.43 per child),
Euro 939.10 for four children (which means Euro 234.78 per child). For families with more than four children,
every additional child increases the tax break by Euro 29.35 for each child (this means a family with six children
has a tax reduction of Euro 1,760.82 or Euro 293.47 per child). A quite different tax system was applied for
incomes earned in 2003. In fact, the number of children is no longer related to tax amounts but to tax exemp-
tion scales, since family structure could lead to an increase in the level of the tax exemption scale. Notably, for
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taxpayers with one child, the tax exemption scale increases by Euro 1,000 when compared to the first tax
exemption scale, while with two children the tax exemption scale increases by Euro 2,000, and with three child-
ren the tax exemption scale increases by Euro 1,000. For taxpayers with more than three children, the tax
exemption scale increases by Euro 1,000 for each child.
An important development has taken place over recent years regarding family allowances and in particular
for those allowances which accrued as a salary augmentation of the father or of the mother (civil family allow-
ance). In fact, in 2001, the Supreme Court decreed that this kind of family allowance has to be paid both to the
mother and the father.This decision concerns parents working in the public and the broad public sector as well
as various other professional categories, among them judges, magistrates and persons belonging to the diplo-
matic corps. It also concerns people working in the public sector whose partners work in the private sector
and have already received the allowance in the past.This development has led to a discussion about the retros-
pective validity of the decision. In fact, it has been decided that the retrospective payment only concerns the
period after 1999 and it can come into force after those concerned take their case against the State to court.
In 2002, a preliminary court decision ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. This was, in fact, the starting point, which
led public authorities to agree that these allowances have to be paid to both parents. However, recognition of
this right still remains an open question for people working in the private sector.
This differential between private and public sector is also clearly reflected in the application of measures
regarding maternity leave as well as parental leave. In Greece, the ‘typical’ maternity leave is a paid leave of 17
weeks (eight before and nine after the birth) in the private sector and for five months in the public sector.
Moreover, in the private sector, a reduction of working time is offered, over the 30 months following the birth,
to either the mother or the father.This can take the form of starting work one hour later, or leaving from work
one hour earlier, or working fewer hours per day (two hours per day for the first year and one hour per day
over the following six months).
This kind of measure is applied in the public sector but with some differences. In fact, the reduction in wor-
king hours only applies to the mother and it concerns a reduction by two hours per day when children are
under the age of two, and one hour per day when children are aged between two and four. However, mothers
could opt for another possibility, namely, a paid ‘maternity leave’ for nine months. Again, this possibility is not
offered to the fathers.
Parental leave is an unpaid leave, offered, in the private sector, for a period of 3.5 months when the child is
aged less than 3.5. In the public sector, parental leave could be extended at two years. Nevertheless, it seems
that in both the private and the public sector, parental leave is not attractive for parents. Although statistics
regarding the use of parental leave are few, the fact that parents are not paid during the leave-period and in
addition they have to pay their own social security appear to be the most dissuasive factors. In any case, in both
the private and the public sector, parental leave is much more a woman’s than a man’s affair. On the whole,
apart from the pronounced differences between the private and the public sector, the gender issue is also very
relevant as regards to the use of maternity-parental leave.
Childcare, ‘all-day’ schools and kindergartens 
In recent years, the question of childcare services was closely related to policies regarding the reconciliation of
work and family life. At present, there are almost 180 day-care centres operated by local government. On the
other hand, nearly 2,100 are operated under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and Welfare in different
municipalities. In recent years, the Ministry of Education has created 1,000 ‘day-long’ kindergartens, attended by
17,000 infants. In 1997, day-long infant and elementary schools with an extended timetable (children of working
parents remain until 4p.m., and are occupied with creative activities) were created. Their number is constantly
increasing. 2,000 such schools existed in the 2000–2001 school year, with the participation of 60,000 pupils.This
number was extended to around 3,000 in the school year 2002–2003, covering nearly 210,000 pupils, and it is
expected to increase further in the years to come.This measure is very popular among parents who are also
very positive about this type of school (INE 2003).
Although the objective of the ‘all-day’ schools is rather different between infant and elementary schools, since in
the former they tend to facilitate the work of mothers and in the latter to attenuate social inequalities, it seems
that in both cases they are used as ‘care centres’. In fact, a recent study (INE 2003) indicates that the majority of
pupils are in the first three classes of the elementary school (nearly 68%), which accords with the parents’ view
(by 94%) that the day-long school permits the mother to have a job. This positive view of parents as regards
those schools contrasts, to some extent, with that of educators.The latter are rather reluctant, because of the
insufficient infrastructure as compared to the activities that the day-long schools are supposed to offer to the
pupils, and of the long timetable which in relation with physical inactivity, could on the one hand transform
those schools into ‘kindergartens’ and on the other hand lead children to manifest violent behaviour. It is worth
noting that parents are of the same view as regards some of the above concerns and in addition they consider
that the timetable is rather tiring for their children.
Migration policy and children of immigrants at school
Given the growing importance of immigration issues, in particular illegal immigration, it is not surprising that the
main policy aspects were closely related to the legalisation of illegal immigrants through the regularisation pro-
cesses. Up to now there were two regularisation processes in Greece.The first, started in 1998, has been based
on the 1997 Presidential Decrees 357 and 358 and to the first law (1975/1991) aimed at regulating the migra-
tion question. In 2001, Greece instituted a second regularisation programme for illegal immigrants, based on a
new law on migration (2910/2001). In this law particular attention was paid to the process of family reunifica-
tion of foreign citizens. According to the new ruling (article 28), family members can enter the country after the
head of the family has spent two years in legal residence. Moreover there are some changes regarding the
definition of the meaning of family member. Foreign citizens have the possibility not only of inviting their own
child but also the child of their partner for whom they have legal care. Lastly, family members who have reached
the country through the family reunification process could legally participate in the labour market.
There can be no doubt that law 2910/2001 aimed at setting up a new legal framework regarding residence
and work of illegal immigrants is going in the right direction. Nevertheless, several problems have been met
during its application, mainly because administration services were unprepared to accomplish this new and 
rather difficult task. Most of the time immigrants are provided with a resident and work permit of a limited
duration—one year—and so the renewal of these cards remains one of the main elements of the process.
Moreover, the residence of family members depends on the work permit of the head of family. In fact, all the
above elements seem to indicate that immigration is still treated as a temporary and not as a structural pheno-
menon. Immigrants are seen more as ‘visitor workers’ than as ‘resident workers’.
However, the importance attributed by Greek authorities to immigration issues is reflected in the their
efforts and initiatives undertaken during the Greek Presidency (first half of 2003), which led to the adoption of
the Directive on Family Unification. The Directive, which was adopted after three years of negotiations and
three amended Commission proposals, provides the first legal instrument for entry to the EU. Its added value is
in defining the concept of family and the right to be reunited in member states.
The rapid change in the composition of the school population has led to policy measures aimed at integrating
immigrant children in education, and has augmented at the same time worries about the education prospects
of native children (it is worth mentioning that these worries are by no means expressed by native children and
not necessarily by all parents). Different measures have been taken, aimed at creating a bilingual and bicultural
environment for immigrant children. A number of new educational institutions such as reception classes, after-
class tutorial sessions and intercultural schools have been created in order to facilitate the educational, linguistic
and social integration of the children. Moreover, a number of initiatives have been implemented, such as the
compilation of bilingual educational material (in Albanian and Russian) and material for teaching Greek as a
second language. At present, admission classes operate in primary and secondary education.
However, the existence of a common system for integration in school of both repatriate and foreign chil-
dren, is likely to have quite a negative impact on the effectiveness of the above policies (Moussourou 2002). It is
rather obvious that the question of integration of immigrant children in school presents a certain number of
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contradictions, where the most apparent is related to the fact that the temporality of the immigrant population
does not aid efforts for the integration of immigrant pupils, which requires their presence in school for quite a
long period of time. Moreover, as both pupils’ and their parents’ inadequate knowledge of the Greek language is
one of the main obstacles to their integration, foreign and repatriate children do not face the same difficulties.
On the whole, the extremely positive results attained in school by some of them disguise the difficulties, which
the majority of them have to face (in fact, only 10% of foreign children continue into secondary education).
There can be no doubt that, taking into account the specific nature of the integration problems that each immi-
grant pupil faces, increasing efforts to combine the heterogeneity of pupils with the homogeneity of the educa-
tional system could further contribute to their integration.
Initiatives regarding new practices for human reproduction 
During 2002 a newly proposed law was presented to the National Assembly, which aims to regulate practices
regarding in vitro fertilisation and the possibility of having a child through a surrogate mother. Despite prelimi-
nary reactions from various quarters, the proposed law was adopted towards the end of 2002 after a certain
number of modifications (Bagavos 2002b). Under this proposed law, particular attention is paid to the role of
biological parents and in particular to the role of surrogate mothers. In order to avoid ‘tourism reproduction’, it
was decided that the biological parents, as well as the parents with whom the child will grow up, have to reside
in Greece. As for the surrogate mother no compensation is expected. Moreover, she will not be considered as
the legal mother. With regard to in vitro fertilisation, the mother has to be at the ‘natural’ age of reproduction
and not at the period of menopause. Artificial insemination is also permitted for non-married women. In this
case, the biological father’s agreement is required, something which has to be attested by a notary.This agree-
ment is equivalent to the recognition of paternity.
Health care and assistance for the elderly 
In the context of growing demographic aging, several policy initiatives have been undertaken in order to meet
the growing needs of the elderly as well as of their families, which very often are the care providers. Over
recent years, care for the elderly has become a broader policy issue than the simple income measures aimed at
reducing income inequalities, which clearly work against the aged. New policy initiatives were implemented
which aim at influencing and improving the way of life of the elderly, by augmenting the support and solidarity
provided by the family or the local community and by supporting independent and dignified living conditions
(Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2001).
Among others initiatives, the ‘Home Help’ programme deserves particular mention.This programme, which
was implemented by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1997 in collaboration with municipalities, was based
on the idea that people do not have to be removed from their familiar (in a broader sense) and social environ-
ment.The objective is to provide primary home medical care as well as consultation and psychological support,
in order to improve the quality of life of people, and to guarantee services leading to decent standard of living
and independence. It addresses people living alone with insufficient means who are unable to help themselves,
which means mainly the elderly. Particular attention is given to efforts to reduce the need for institutional hos-
pital care. The programme is being extended to persons with disabilities. The provision of help and care is 
guaranteed by a staff composed of a social worker, a nurse and a home helper, and in some cases a volunteer
worker of a collaborating NGO, who pay visits regularly to old persons.The programme offers a sense of secu-
rity to the elderly and to disabled people, since it guarantees the supply of units with cars and the provision of
paging services, which enables interconnection with emergency and other services (Ministry of Labour and
Social Security 2001). According to estimations (KEDKE 2002), this programme covers only one out of three
elderly people who need care and for whom the family is not the care provider. There can be no doubt that
this initiative has to be extended to all the elderly, whether they are living alone or with their children.
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Changes in social security 
Issues regarding reforms of the Social Security System have been widely discussed in Greece in recent years. In
reality, 2002 has to be considered as the starting point for these reforms, which were finally classified into two
main categories.The first one contains several changes in relation to different parameter’ of the system, among
them retirement age, replacement rate and early retirement.The second category refers to five statutory and
structural changes:
 A precise timing for the gradual unification of pension funds for paid workers.
 A new framework for the functioning of auxiliary insurance funds.
 A set of changes regarding the financing of the main pension fund (IKA) in order to provide pension
sustainability up to 2032.
 The introduction of professional pension funds.
 The establishment of a National Actuarial Office.
Particular attention has to be paid, among other changes, to the fact that the new law gives the possibility to
parents to recognise a ‘fictive’ period of social insurance. Women becoming mothers after 1.1.2003 might re-
cognise that fictive time in order to complete the number of years required to receive an old-age pension.
According to the number of children, the fictive time corresponds to one year for the first child, 1.5 years for
the second child and two years for the third child. Although the objective is to counterbalance the difficulties
that a woman might have to cope with over her life cycle (higher unemployment, lower participation in the
labour market, specific role as a care provider…), this possibility is granted to men as well.
Conclusion
Family welfare is closely related to the welfare of its members. In recent years, a certain gap between expecta-
tions and reality seems to have occurred in Greece for particular population groups and for different family
forms, increasing the risks of declining welfare of family members. In particular, the discrepancy between the
high expectations of women and young people, to a great extent due to the increasing education level, and
their unfavourable position in the labour market call for more adequate measures in socio-economic policy
making.
Reducing the imbalance between the increasing education level and the rather vague employment pros-
pects for younger generations will constitute a core issue for both families and its members over the coming
years. As for gender issues, they will continue mainly to be related to gender differential in the labour market as
well as to uneven gender distribution of household labour and leisure. For those issues, the aim as well as the
effectiveness of policy responses are not so clear at the moment. For instance, as measures regarding the con-
ciliation between family and working life are almost exclusively addressed to ‘normal families’, they risk repro-
ducing gender stereotypes where women will continue to be the principal care provider for both children and
the elderly.
In spite of the recent trends towards a further ‘modernisation’ of the Greek family, the family as well as
strong family ties continue to be core elements of Greek society. However, families have to cope with increasing
difficulties, as the crisis of the Welfare State results in inadequate public services and in further responsibilities
for families in order to cover the needs of its members, which are not met by public services. Moreover,
although targeting measures seem to be an adequate way to improve family welfare, current policies tend to
neglect specific family forms, among others, one-parent families, families with unemployed or handicapped or
elderly members, as well as migrant families, which have been of a growing importance over recent years.
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Ireland
Introduction
In the past six years Ireland has undergone rapid economic and social change that has impacted on the struc-
ture and nature of family life.While this report concentrates primarily on developments in the past six years, it
is important to place more recent changes within the context of the development of family policy in Ireland.
At the beginning of the 1990s there was no explicit family policy, although a range of social policies did exist
which impacted on families. Family policy was not identified as a separate entity within social and public policy. It
existed in an implicit rather than explicit sense. At that time it was necessary to look to other policy areas such
as social welfare, housing and childcare to evaluate family policy.There were no unifying elements in these poli-
cies regarding the promotion or protection of family life, so that policies developed in a pragmatic and piece-
meal fashion around specific issues as they arose. In the absence of any structured family policy, government
strategies were linked by a number of beliefs and philosophies about the nature of the ideal family and how life
should be organised. Policy measures at that time relating to the family were either distributive measures pro-
viding financial support or regulatory measures in the form of legislation which were centred around how fami-
ly members should behave socially and morally. Both the Church and the State engaged in considerable 
rhetoric about the family and its protection but neither institution had an overall policy strategy related to it.
The Programme for Government (1993) was the first indication that family policy was gaining a place on
the political agenda. It proposed a major programme of family law reform as a response to increasing recogni-
tion of the numbers and variety of family forms in Irish society and the need for a more pluralistic approach to
family policy. It promised to introduce a Constitutional referendum to remove the ban on divorce and re-
marriage, to implement the 1991 Childcare Act, to provide for the payment of the legally determined entitle-
ments of married women to social welfare equality payments, to proivdeprovide in housing for all, to intrude a
basic income system for children and to introduce policies to deal with long-term unemployment.
The International Year of the Family in 1994 provided a major impetus for the development of family policy
in Ireland. During that year a wide range of events were coordinated by a National Steering Committee made
up of representatives of organisations with an interest in family affairs. At a national level the Oireachtas set up
the Joint Committee on the Family. Consequently, ‘the family’ became central to many debates during the year.
As a result of the increased interest in the family as an institution and awareness of the many changes taking
place in relation to the family, the Government established the Commission on the Family in 1995, whose terms
of reference were:
“To examine the effects of legislation and policies on families and make recommendations to the government on
proposals which would strengthen the capacity of families to carry out their functions in a changing economic and
social environment.“
In 1995 the Government established the Constitution Review Group, which reported in 1996. Part of that
review included examination of the definition of the family within the Constitution. It recommended that a 
revised Article 41 should retain recognition by the State of the family as the primary and fundamental unit of
society and a pledge to protect the family based on marriage, but should also guarantee respect for all family
life, whether based on marriage or not.The Review Group argued that the change would maintain the special
place of marriage as the ideal family form while also giving recognition to the increasing numbers of other fami-
ly forms, without taking the final step in changing the definition of the family within the Constitution. The
Government did not introduce any constitutional change and the definition of the family as based on marriage
remains. However, debate on the definition of the family continues to be raised, particularly among groups
representing families defined as ‘non-constitutional’ who take the position that they are disadvantaged because
they do not conform to the Constitutional definition.
While not going so far as Constitutional change, the Government moved towards addressing the issues of
exclusion of families not based on marriage from the protection of much of the family legislation. Consequently,
there were significant changes in the legislation and public policy introduced. For example, in 1996 divorce legis-
lation was passed (Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996) and in 1997 a One-Parent Family Payment was introduced
to consolidate all the social welfare payments that existed for lone parent families. This change opened the
scheme to male and female applicants and removed the term ‘unmarried mother’ from   social welfare termino-
logy.The growing awareness of the needs of all families laid the basis for a more explicit family policy in Ireland
for the following six years.
Demographic changes 1998–2004
During the past six years there have been major demographic changes.These are documented in the Census of
the Populations 2002. The Census gives a picture of increasing diversification of family forms and evidence of
Ireland moving towards a multicultural society. Over the inter-census period, Irish society has become more
urban and ethnically diverse than ever before, the population is getting older, producing fewer children and 
speaking less Irish. The Census quantified the huge social change of the past decade, including the growth in
immigration, the effects of the introduction of divorce legislation and the increase in the number of lone parent
families and those with no children.
There was a population increase of 8% over the previous six year period, resulting from a combination of
net inward migration and a natural increase of births over deaths. The arrival of large numbers of asylum-
seekers and other migrants is reflected in these figures, although it is probable that the count of some non-
national populations is an underestimate.Ten percent of the population was born outside Ireland, compared to
7% in the last census, and the non-national population is recorded as 5.8%.The combined forces of returning
emigrants, foreign workers and asylum seekers have created a situation where one in every six people in
Ireland had lived abroad for at least one year prior to the Census.The Census also shows that the population in
their twenties and thirties are also the most ethnically diverse generation in the country with one person in 10
in the 25–34 age range described as non-Irish nationals.
The figures show that 644,400 long-term migrants are now living in Ireland and of these 366,800 are returned
Irish emigrants while 252,000 have come to live in Ireland since 1996. Many of the returned migrants would be
Irish citizens who have reached retirement age, having emigrated during earlier periods of high unemployment,
together with younger people attracted back to Ireland because of the unprecedented economic growth
during the Celtic Tiger period when there was a demand for highly-skilled workers. During the latter part of the
inter-census period migration into Ireland has been driven by foreign nationals rather than by returning 
emigrants.
The statistical data for 2003 (CSO 2004) showed a slight rise in the number of births at a rate of
15.5/1,000, an increase of 0.3 on the previous year. Births outside marriage now make up 31.4% of all births
registered, 10% higher than the average for the rest of the European Union (EU). A recent phenomenon of
Irish demography has been the high average age of women at childbearing. In the 1990s the increasing employ-
ment participation rate of young Irish women had the effect of raising to 28 the average age at which Irish
women have their first child. After 1980 there was a rapid drop in the birth rate by over one third but this has
been reversed in the last eight years with the number of births increasing by over 25% since 1994.The majori-
ty of this increase is, therefore, attributable to the increase in birth to Irish women in their thirties who had
postponed childbearing during the previous decade. In addition, for the total period the fertility rate rose to
2.01 in 2002 but fell again in 2003 to 1.98.This compares to an all time low of 1.85 in 1994.The Census also
shows that the dependency ratio is now less than the EU average.
Abortion remains illegal in Ireland forcing Irish women wishing to have a termination of pregnancy to travel
to England or to other European destinations. In 2002, a total of 6,490 women providing Irish addresses had
abortions in England, a drop of 135 over the previous year.The annual figure had risen steadily each year since
1980.The highest number were aged between 20 and 24 years (34.5%) with 24.9% being between 25 and 29
years of age. Fifty-four girls under the age of 16 were recorded as having abortions in 2002.The decrease in the
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numbers may well be accounted for by unrecorded numbers of women travelling to European countries within
the Euro zone which would be a cheaper alternative than going to England.
Demography of the family
One of the striking features of the past six years has been the changing structure and formation of families in
Ireland together with increasing diversification of family forms.
The number of families in Ireland has increased since 1996 with households comprising childless couples,
whether married or not, representing the fastest growing category.The average size of private households has
fallen from 3.14 to 2.94, which confirms the continuing decline in family size. Multi-family, three-generational
households have continued to decline in number with the number of households consisting solely of couples
with children increasing by 11.1%.The number of families with four or more children has halved over the period.
Moreover  75% of families in 2002 contained two children or fewer and the average number of children per
family fell from 1.8 to 1.6 in the inter-census period.The statistics also show a rise in the number of married and
cohabiting women aged between 25 and 34 with no children, equivalent to 38% of the total number in this age
bracket. Birth rate trends are likely to fall further since women are increasingly delaying childbearing and are
having just one child or none at all.
Young adults are increasingly staying in the family home until their mid-30s. Since 1996 the number of people
aged over 20 remaining in the family home rose by 13.7% with 47,500 men aged over 30 remaining with their
parents.This development is largely explained by rising house prices, particularly in urban areas, the high cost of
private rental accommodation, the later age of marriage and the increasing age of completed education or 
professional qualifications.
Family formation through adoption has changed rapidly over the past six years.The numbers of traditional
non-family adoptions in Ireland has declined significantly with just 68 Adoption Orders being granted in 2003.
This reduction is almost entirely accounted for by the fact that women giving birth outside marriage are deci-
ding to parent their children either alone or within a cohabiting relationship. The majority of adoption orders
made in 2003 (n=171) were family adoptions, in the main a mother and her husband who was not the father
of the child adopting the mother’s child.While these numbers have been declining the number of foreign adop-
tions has increased.The Adoption Board granted 648 declarations of eligibility and suitability to adopt abroad or
to extend the declaration in 2003 compared to 399 in the previous year. Between 1991 and 2003 a total of
2,124 children adopted from abroad were registered by the Adoption Board. (Report of An Bord Uchtala (The
Adoption Board) 2003 (2005))  The Government is currently introducing legislation in order to comply with
the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-Country Adoption. In
addition, new legislation will be introduced in relation to search and reunion between adopted persons and
their birth parents.
Marital breakdown and lone parenthood
Since the previous census divorce legislation has been introduced in Ireland (Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996),
which came into effect in 1997.The number of separated persons, including divorced, increased by over a half
between 1996 and 2002 giving an average annual increase of 7.3%. Within a separate category, the number of
persons recorded as divorced more than trebled, reaching a figure of 35,100, which is a reflection of the divorce
legislation. The relative extent of marital breakdown in 2002 was 7.5% compared to 5.4%   six years earlier.
Much of this increase may be attributable to an increase in accurate reporting at the census. However, it is clear
that there has been a rapid increase in the number of couples seeking divorce. In 2003 almost 3,000 divorce
applications were granted in the High Court and Circuit Court, which represented a 15% increase on 2002
(Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform 2004).
Data from the 2002 Census showed that the number of cohabiting couples is increasing rapidly. Over the
previous twenty years the number of cohabiting couples has increased more than two hundredfold. In 2002,
75,000 couples were recorded as cohabiting accounting for 8.4% of all family units compared with 3.9% in 1996
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of which those with children represented 5.5% of all couples with children. A more in-depth analysis of the data
relating to cohabiting couples reveals that over three quarters of these couples without children were unions
where both partners were single and over 50% of the females and 40% of the males in cohabiting relationships
were in their 20s.These figures would seem to indicate that marriage is of less importance in family formation.
However, marriage rates have increased by 22% since 1994 reaching an annual rate of 5.1 per 1,000 population.
However, divorce and marriage breakdown have increased sharply adding to the increase in cohabitation.
The number of same-sex cohabiting couples increased from 150 to 1,300 during the inter-census period.
This probably reflects the increasing social acceptance of same-sex relationships and the willingness to put this
information into the public domain.
While the largest family type in Ireland still comprises two-parent married families the number of lone
parent family units in Ireland has risen to just under 179,000 which represents 9.5% of total family units of
which 87.5% were headed by women (Central Statistics Office 2004). Different family types have been found
to have a strong social class dimension in Ireland in that one-parent families, both single and separated are more
likely to be concentrated in lower socio-economic positions involving unskilled occupations (McKeown et al.
2003).They are also the families at greatest risk of reaching the poverty level (Nolan et al 2002). Almost 32% of
lone parents are separated or divorced and never married parents accounted for 23.9%. The widowed lone
parent group was almost 40% of the total. However, there has always been a difficulty in enumerating lone
parents, with an underestimate of the group of unmarried parents with a child who live within another house-
hold, and an overestimate of the widowed group who live with children where the ages of the children are not
given and who therefore, may not be dependent children.
Development of family policy 1998–2004
The report of the Commission on the Family (1998) was the first coordinated statement of family policy in
Ireland. Its publication marks the beginning of a period of development towards a more explicit family policy.
The Government was quick to respond to many of the recommendations of the Commission on the Family,
amongst them the setting up of a Family Affairs Unit, within a reconstituted Department of Social Welfare as the
Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs, headed by a Minister who for the first time was officially
designated as the Minister responsible for the family. Emphasis in the report stressed the need to support and
strengthen families by providing both financial support and services.The overall focus of policies affecting families
began to change from one of control and regulation of behaviour to one of support and recognition of the
multiplicity of family forms. The emphasis has gradually moved away from focusing on the traditional married
family to address the needs of all families irrespective of the basis on which they are formed. Developments
have included an expansion of the Family Mediation Service, together with increased funding for marriage coun-
selling services and the extension of a clear policy framework for the development of family support services.
In 2003 the Family Support Agency, a statutory body, was set up. Its main functions are:
 To directly provide a family mediation service which is a free, professional and confidential service;
 To support, promote and develop the provision of marriage and relationship counselling and family support
services;
 To promote and disseminate information on issues relating to marriage and relationships, education, family
mediation, parenting and family responsibilities and related matters;
 To support, promote and develop the Family and Community Services Resource Centre Programme and
provide financial help to voluntary bodies in respect of matters related to the Agency’s functions.
Over 80 Family Resource Centres, which receive financial support from the Family Support Agency, have been
set up with the aim of combating disadvantage and improving the functioning of families.They provide counsel-
ling and information and aim to enhance the self-esteem and potential of people by working closely with them
within their communities.
The Department of Social and Family Affairs also set up a research programme designed to fund research,
which will stimulate and inform the development of future family policy.
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Socio-economic context
In the last six years Ireland has experienced unprecedented economic growth. For example, during the period
1996–2001 the general government balance went from a deficit of 0.3% of the GDP to a surplus of 4.6% in
2000. In 2001 this fell to 1.1%. During the same period unemployment fell from 11.5% in 1996 to 3.7% by
September 2000, with average earnings for men rising by 26% and for women by 30.8% (Economic and Social
Research Institute (ESRI): Economic Series 2001: 24,55).The year 2002 saw a substantial slowdown in economic
growth, largely related to the general slowdown internationally. However, the Medium Term Review 2003–2010
(ESRI 2003) reported that the Irish economy remains fundamentally healthy despite the uncertain short-term
outlook with a projected return to full employment. The Quarterly Economic Commentary Summer 2004
(ESRI 2004) shows that economic conditions have improved significantly in the first half of 2004 with output
growth expected to average 4.6% in 2004 rising to 5.2% in 2005. Irish incomes in real GNP terms are anticipa-
ted to grow by 4.3% in 2004 and 4.5% in 2005. Price inflation fell by nearly 3 percentage points during 2003 to
an average of 3.5% and is expected to average 2% for the next two years. The EU-SILC survey (Central
Statistics Office 2005) found that the gross annual household income averaged over all households was estima-
ted to be just over EUR 46,000 in 2003, the equivalent to an average of EUR 883 per week. Total disposable
household income, which is net of income tax and social contributions was almost EUR 38,000 per annum. The
average weekly gross income of households in the lowest income group was EUR 121.58 with 94% receiving
social benefits. This was in sharp contrast to the top income group where almost 97% of the total weekly in-
come of EUR 2,398.70 was from direct income. After adjusting the income figures for household size the total
disposable household income averaged across all persons was EUR 17,800 per annum. (Central Statistics Office
2005)
During the first half of 2004 the labour market has begun to improve with the unemployment rate expec-
ted to average 4.5% in 2004 and drop to an average of 4.3% of the labour force during 2005.
Amongst the countries of the OECD Ireland is ranked 12th out of 173 countries in the Human
Development Index (HDI) and in terms of GDP per capita Ireland comes third with a purchasing power parity
in US Dollars of 32,600.
Socio-economic situation of families
Despite   economic growth over the past six years Ireland remains a divided society where not all sections have
benefited equally from the years of the Celtic Tiger. Using the Human Poverty Index the OECD has calculated
that Ireland comes second worst out of 17 selected high income countries with 12.3% of its population living
below the poverty line. Overall, Ireland is rated as second only to the US as being the most unequal society in
the Developed World.The EU-SILC survey (Central Statistics Office 2005) found that over 9% of the populati-
on is classed as consistently poor with 23% at risk of poverty.The survey, covering the last six months of 2003
showed that people living alone are most at risk with almost 45% below the 60% threshold. Adults and children
living in lone parent households were also a high risk group at just over 42% below the 60% threshold. Children
living in lone parent households showed the highest consistent poverty rate at 32% followed by those living in
other households with children at 16.6%. Households with one adult had a consistent poverty rate of 12%.The
data provided by this survey will be used to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving the targets set
out in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy.
The Combat Poverty Agency has highlighted the continuing needs of families at greatest risk of poverty:
families with four or more children, lone parent families, single adult families, especially women and vulnerable
families such as ethnic minority families and those of the travelling community. Vulnerable families also include
the homeless, particularly women and children. People in workless households make up 70% of the consistent-
ly poor population, comprising people working in the home, unemployed people, retired and disabled people.
In addition, low paid employees account for a quarter of the consistently poor (Daly 2001).
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) (Stationery Office 1997) is the main national policy document
to address poverty. The revised strategy Building an Inclusive Society is based on targets to eliminate poverty
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generally by 2007 and particularly aimed at eliminating child poverty (Stationery Office 2003). The main plat-
form to address this is to raise the basic social welfare rate and to raise child benefit. However, the levels of
increase in child benefit and other social welfare benefits announced in the 2004 Budget were below the 
targets set by the NAPS. The National agreement Sustaining Progress which was negotiated after the revised
NAPS contains eight specific targets: ending child poverty, measures to deal with migration and intercultural
issues, housing and accommodation, long-term unemployment, vulnerable workers who have been made
redundant, tackling educational disadvantage, care of children and the elderly, alcohol/drug abuse, and the inclu-
sion of all the population in the information society. (National Agreement Sustaining Progress 2003). Unlike
NAPS, no time schedules or tasks are set for accomplishing these targets. In addition, the agreement commits
no new resources to addressing poverty, social inclusion or inequality and makes few specific commitments in
relation to these issues. However, it does contain a commitment to raising the lowest rates of social welfare
payments to 150 in 2002 terms by 2007 as set out in the revised NAPS (Daly 2003).
One significant development was the setting up of the National Office for Social Inclusion and the Social
Inclusion Forum. The National Office for Social Inclusion represents an administrative re-organisation for and
specialisation on social inclusion, whereas the Social Inclusion Forum is a move towards regularising consultation
with those who are active in the field of poverty and social inclusion, including people directly affected by
poverty and social exclusion.
Families and the social welfare and tax systems
The rise in the number of new family structures led to the Report of the Working Group on the Treatment of
Married, Cohabiting and One-Parent Families under the Tax and Social Welfare codes (Stationery Office 1999).
For many years the underlying assumption of social welfare and taxation in Ireland was that of a breadwinner
father with a dependent spouse and children in a lifelong marriage. Many of the issues examined in the report
remain contentious. The social welfare system treats cohabiting couples in the same way as married couples,
whereas the income tax system treats cohabiting couples as single people and anomalies concerning Earnings
Disregards continue within the social welfare system.
As a consequence of the Report individualisation of the tax system began in 2000 giving dual-earner fami-
lies a lower tax liability than single breadwinner families in order to encourage more married women to enter
the workforce.There was intense public debate on this issue particularly involving the parent groups represen-
ting women working in the home.Women in the home constitute a sizeable number of Irish parents.This is evi-
denced from the Quarterly National Household Survey (CSO 2004), which shows 557,8000 people whose
principal economic status is ‘home duties’ of which 99.2% were women. As a result there was a parallel intro-
duction of a tax-free allowance for carers of children, the disabled or the elderly.The allowance was welcomed
as a partial recognition of both the value of unpaid labour carried out in the home by stay-at-home parents and
of social protection from the labour market for mothers. However, the result has been that dual-earner families
with high incomes have been the major beneficiaries of the system and concerns have been expressed that the
anomalies and various rules may act as a disincentive for lone parents to marry.
Employment is regarded as a major factor in the elimination of poverty among lone parent families.
However, the low level of employment among lone parents remains an issue.The Minister for Social and Family
Affairs has indicated that she intends to review the income support arrangements for lone parents, the main
purpose of the review being to establish the extent to which the One-Parent Family Payment may be acting as
a disincentive to recipients taking up employment.
National statistics show that lone parents are at a high risk of poverty and a significant number live in con-
sistent poverty (Nolan et al. 2002). A recent study, which reviewed the One-Parent Family Payment, concluded
that the original aims and objectives of the One-Parent Family Payment are not being achieved.1 (OPEN 2004)
The report recommended:
 That there should be an independent review of the One-Parent Family Payment in view of the continuing
risk of poverty for lone parents;
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 IRELAND
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 147
 There should be a significant increase in the Earnings Disregard to reflect childcare costs, the Earnings
Disregard should be treated as untaxed income in the same way as the Back to Work Allowance and no
future cutbacks to the Community Employment scheme should be made and its flexibility and support
should be applied to all mainstream training programmes (OPEN 2004: 54).
The rapid growth of good quality employment has contributed to a widening gap between top and bottom
income barriers. Economic growth has put huge pressure on housing and other forms of economic and social
infrastructure.The cost of housing has contributed to the economic difficulties of low-income families with the
narrowing of housing choice for low income households. This has gone hand in hand with a decline in the 
relative size of the social housing sector and   a sharp rise in the level of private rents, both of which have
emerged in the last decade.
Work/life balance
Since 1996 the participation of women in the paid labour force has continued to rise and in the first quarter of
2004 was 49.5%, a slight drop from just over 50% in 2003. Over this period, the most significant change in
female participation in the labour force has been the increase in the number of married women. In the first
quarter of 2004, the participation rate for married females was 48.8%. For married women with children and
women living with a partner and children, the rate was 52.4% (CSO 2004). The participation rate for lone
mothers with children of any age was 42.3% and lone mothers with children under the age of 15 years accoun-
ted for 52.8%, in the first quarter of 2004.
The increase in female participation rates over the period has been the result of policies aimed at encoura-
ging women to remain in or return to the labour force. However, emphasis on policies has been largely 
motivated by an economic agenda rather than an agenda to achieve gender equality.
Family policy over the past six years has been greatly concerned with families as workers. Part of the strategy
to combat poverty has been based on increasing the levels of employment and in particular encouraging the
participation of women in the workforce. Consequently family policy measures aimed at the reconciliation of
work and family life have been central to addressing poverty. Policies relating to maternity leave, parental leave,
organisation of work time and the protection of part-time workers have been introduced largely in response to
EU Directives. Maternity leave has been gradually increased and now allows for 18 weeks paid leave and eight
weeks unpaid leave. Parental leave allows for 14 weeks unpaid over five years for each child until the child 
reaches five years of age.The government has published its intention to strengthen the Parental Leave Scheme
in line with the recommendations of the Working Group on Parental Leave. Amendments will provide for leave
to be taken in separate blocks of a minimum of six continuous weeks and the raising of the maximum age of
the eligible child from five to eight years. There are no plans to introduce paid parental leave. There is no 
statutory paternity leave in Ireland. The fact that parental leave is unpaid has led to a low uptake, particularly
among fathers.
The Programme for Prosperity and Fairness set up the National Framework Committee for Family Friendly
Policies, which included representatives of Irish Business and Employers Confederation, the public sector employers
and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. It is charged with the task of monitoring and developing policies such as
flexi-time, part-time working, job-sharing, term-time work and teleworking. Despite the increasing number of
work/life balance opportunities within the workplace it is clear that the uptake of such schemes is largely by
women. One research study has shown that while public policies have influenced the gender division of paid
work through increased female participation they have made little significant impact on the gender division of
unpaid work (Richardson 2003).The findings from the International Social Survey Panel survey data show that,
despite the overall emphasis on gender equality and making men into fathers within social policy discourses,
1 Objectives: the relief of hardship where a lone parent has not secured adequate, or any maintenance from the spouse
or the other parent of their children; to support and encourage lone parents to consider employment as an alternative
to long-term welfare dependency, while at the same time supporting them to remain in the home if that is their wish.
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female respondents reported an increase   rather than a decrease in their share of unpaid work, thus confirming
the ‘second shift’ phenomenon for women combining work outside and inside the home (Rush et al. 2005).
Generational relationships
Existing demands and future demographic change present significant challenges to the traditional patterns by
which Irish society supported those in need of care and there is a clear need for a strategic approach in order
to provide an infrastructure of care services which should achieve a balance between the respective roles of
families, the State, the private sector and voluntary organisations.
Ireland is generally characterised by its liberal welfare regime (Hantrais 2004:129) insofar as the state does
not impose a legal responsibility for caring and family relationships are not regulated. Families can expect to be
supported by the state but in a situation where the duties are not clearly defined. Greater reliance is placed on
the private and voluntary sectors.The behaviour of families towards their older members and children involves
a moral sense of responsibility rather than legal obligations. Families in Ireland have always cared for their mem-
bers and there is no indication from available research that there is a reduction of this desire.The family conti-
nues to play a key role in the care of its members. However, with the increase in employment, particularly that
of women, the ability of the family to meet the demands of providing care of both children and the elderly or
disabled has diminished. In addition, the gender division is obviously seen in that the greatest majority of care for
dependent family members falls to women.
Care of the elderly
Policies are still underwritten with the assumption that it is one of the roles of women in society to assume
caring responsibilities for others. The policy of community care outlined in Shaping a Healthier Future
(Department of Health 1994) with its emphasis on care for dependent groups being provided in the home by
family members, has obvious implications for women and their health status. Older people, their families and
the Government prefer care at home rather than in institutional settings and there is strong support for exten-
ding family care with little enthusiasm for nursing homes. However, in a study carried out by the European
Foundation for Living and Working   in 2004 it was found that 25% of female carers and 15% of male carers felt
that care limited their employment opportunities in terms of career development and promotion, disadvantaged
them in terms of finances and pensions and limited access to training and skills development and increased the
risk of stress, sickness and absenteeism.
Despite these difficulties, according to the 2002 Census it is estimated that there are at least 148,800 fami-
ly carers in Ireland who provide constant unpaid care to elderly, infirm, chronically ill and disabled family mem-
bers. 27.3% provided 43 hours or more of such care every week, 15.7% provided between 15 and 42 hours
per week of care and 57% provided between one and four hours care each week.
Since 1990 when the means-tested Carer’s Allowance was introduced there have been a number of deve-
lopments in policies regarding care of the elderly. Cash benefits have been continuously expanded and revised
and eligibility has been widened to include ill children and adults, and some of the conditions such as co-
residency and non-employment have been relaxed. However, the means-tested element of the allowance has
been strongly criticised with calls from pressure groups for its modification.
An important development was the introduction of the social insurance-based Carer’s Benefit in 2000 designed
to facilitate short-term exit from the work force for the purpose of caring. In 2001 a carer’s leave scheme was
introduced to dovetail with the Carer’s Benefit.The scheme entitles employees to take advantage of temporary
leave from employment to provide full-time care and attention for a maximum period of 65 weeks.There are
about 22,000 people receiving either Carer’s Allowance or Carer’s Benefit.
There is a range of tax credits and allowances available to carers.2 However, there is no overall policy
behind these credits and allowances.Tax credits and allowances are only relevant to people who have a taxable
2 Home Carers Tax Credit; Incapacitated Child Credit; Prescribed Relatives Credit; Allowance for employing a carer
income, thus excluding a significant number of carers who are family members who are classified as being ‘on
home duties’.These allowances and credits need to be examined and consideration given to direct payment for
family carers.
The report of the 2003 Joint Oireachtas Committee on Social and Family Affairs highlighted that the majo-
rity (78%) of carers were caring for the frail elderly and 46% of them were themselves aged over 60 years.The
greatest need identified by carers was for respite care in the home and day-care services. Despite the unprece-
dented levels of economic growth and resources there are still significant waiting lists for residential care, day
care and respite as well as for a range of medical services/procedures.
The public sector used to be the main provider of institutional care services for the elderly. However, by
1996 provision by private and voluntary sectors had exceeded 50%. (Department of Health and Children
2004:195). The growth of such provision derived from a system of subventions introduced by the Health
(Nursing Homes) Act 1990. However, the new system of subsidies introduced by the Act has been controver-
sial insofar as entitlement is subject to a means test by which the income of the elderly person, their spouse
and the income of sons and daughters living in Ireland are assessed. Close family are, therefore, expected to
contribute towards the cost of care. However, the legality of this measure is in question since there is no legal
or constitutional obligation on family members to support their elderly parents (Fahey 1997: 97–98).
The system for care is a dichotomised system. At the present time, state intervention is used to substitute
for the carer or used when care supports break down, rather than offering practical support in order to ensure
continuation of care in a complementary sense.There is a real need for increased provision of respite care. As
Comhairle has pointed out, “Given that increased support for carers would make financial sense the question arises
as to whether the lack of greater support for informal care and intermediary forms of care is due to deep-rooted
reluctance to increase the role of the State in financing and providing services.“ (Comhairle 2002). Although it still
remains low in comparison with the expenditure on institutional care, health board expenditure on community
care has expanded tenfold during the latter half of the 1990s. However, more support services are needed if
State policy is to be one of continuing reliance on informal care provision. It is essential to promote the mental
and physical health of carers if they are to continue to provide the bulk of caring services without undue 
damage to their health and well being (O’Neill & Evans 2000). Policies in Ireland are primarily designed to 
support an assumed capacity and willingness on the part of informal carers and the needs and wishes of those
who need more intensive support to cope with the task of informal care are not adequately catered for under
current provisions.
Childcare
The childcare sector has developed in an ad hoc manner with responsibility being fragmented. State provision
of day care for children has traditionally been available only for children at risk and those in targeted areas of
deprivation. Government policy related to provision of childcare for the children of working parents has been
to leave parents to make their own private arrangements. However, the lack of affordable, good quality child-
care has been a major issue for working parents of young children. Only in the mid to late 1990s did childcare
become an issue on the policy agenda and then in response to the need to encourage women’s increased par-
ticipation in the labour market.The debates concerning the provision of childcare have been centred on labour
market issues rather than those of early childhood education and its association with equity.
Under the Childcare Act 1991 regulations covering the registration, inspection and standards of certain child-
care facilities were introduced.This measure, while having the positive effect of monitoring quality also reduced
the overall stock of childcare facilities and increased the cost of childcare.
The beginning of a pro-active approach on the part of the State to childcare emerged from Social
Partnership negotiations when trade unionists and other social partners, including women’s organisations, high-
lighted the necessity for developing concrete measures to bring about greater provision of childcare facilities. An
Expert Working Group on Childcare was set up in 1997 under Partnership 2000 and reported in 1999.
(National Childcare Strategy 1999). The Strategy has provided the basis on which the State has embarked in
developing a national childcare infrastructure by establishing city and county childcare committees throughout
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 IRELAND
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 149
the country for the coordination of childcare delivery. Since that time Government policy has targeted the supply
side of childcare provision with increased state funding through capital grants for community and private child-
care facilities under the Equal Opportunities Childcare Programme. Except for lone parents where the costs of
childcare can be factored into the means test, there are no subsidies or tax benefits for childcare costs for wor-
king parents. The Government has been very sensitive to the “question of equity between parents who stay at
home to care for children and those who have to meet additional childcare expenses when they go out to work“
(Minister of Finance, Budget speech, 1999).
The Quarterly National Household Survey on Childcare (CSO 2003) showed that 42.5% of all families
with preschool children regularly rely on non-parental childcare arrangements for minding their children during
normal working hours and the greatest uptake was among couples where both partners were working. Usage
of non-parental childcare facilities is less common for minding primary school-going children with 25.3% of all
families availing themselves of it on a regular basis.The reverse is the case for lone parents with primary school-
going children where over 28% have regular arrangements compared to the average of 25.3%.
While it is clear that over half of the families with preschool children are cared for by their non-working
parents, for those children who are cared for by others their families provide a substantial amount of that care,
most commonly the grandparents. Almost 23,000 (31%) families with childcare arrangements relied on unpaid
relatives for minding preschool children on a regular basis and over 19,000 (82%) of these indicated that it was
their main source of childcare. Reliance on unpaid relatives was somewhat greater for minding school-going
children with over 31,000 (46%) of families reporting their use on a regular basis and 25,100 (80%) of these
indicating that it was their main source of childcare outside school hours. In proportionate terms, lone parents
were more reliant on unpaid relatives (Central Statistics Office 2003 Tables 2 and 5)
In terms of paid childcare around 8,000 families paid a relative to mind their preschool children and a simi-
lar number paid relatives in the case of school-going children. Almost 20,000 families employ a paid carer and a
further 15,800 used a crèche or Montessori school. However, less than 4,000 families used a crèche for their
school-going children with the majority (19,700) using a paid carer. Average childcare expenditure exceeded
EUR 97.47   per week in the last quarter of 2002.
In terms of satisfaction with the arrangements just under 20% of families with preschool children would
welcome alternative arrangements with almost half preferring a crèche and preferably work-based. Just over
one in ten of parents would prefer to mind the children themselves instead of their existing arrangements.
Over 45% said that they were not availing themselves of their preferred alternative due to cost or financial 
reasons. In relative terms there was less dissatisfaction in relation to arrangements for school-going children.
Ireland participated in an OECD review of family friendly policies the report of which was published in
November 2003. The report analysed the existing mix of policies, including tax and benefit policies, childcare
policy and employment and workplace practices and how they contribute to parental labour market outcomes
and other societal outcomes.The report made specific policy recommendations for Ireland which include intro-
duction of an entitlement to part-time work for parents with very young children, measures to facilitate lone
parents to take up full-time employment, encouragement for employers and unions to make the workplace
more family friendly and good quality childcare services. It also recommended additional public investment in
childcare, particularly for low-income families.
The social partnership agreement Sustaining Progress 2003-2005 contains a commitment to setting up a
Partnership Sub-Committee with representatives of Government, Irish Congress of Trade Unions and Irish
Business and Employers Confederation under the Equal Opportunities Childcare Programme which will con-
sider recommendations on how to improve the availability of quality childcare for working parents and how the
supply of both preschool and after-school care can be accelerated (National Agreement Sustaining Progress
2003). In particular the committee will examine and make recommendations on the feasibility of establishing
workplace childcare arrangements such as provision of specific supports to facilitate employers and unions to
work together to design and implement a range of childcare support at the level of the enterprise together
with targeting resources towards promoting the active participation of employers in developing and providing
childcare initiatives in consultation with the unions.
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Child protection, children’s rights and children as citizens
The latest available national statistics from the Department of Health and Children show that health boards
received 8,269 reports of child abuse during 2000 of which 37.3% (3,085) were confirmed. Of the total num-
ber, the majority were cases of neglect (1,453), 548 of physical abuse, 517 sexual abuse and 567 emotional
abuse.This is an increase of almost 30% over the previous five years. However, it is difficult to assess whether
the increase in cases notified is due to a higher incidence of abuse or whether increased public awareness has
led to increased reporting (Department of Health and Children, Health Statistics 2000 (2003))
Awareness of the extent of child abuse has heightened over the past six years, particularly in relation to the
abuse of children in state institutions over the past forty years. In order to respond to this situation the
Government issued a public apology to the victims and also set up a Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse
as part of a range of measures to address the effects of abuse in childhood on the victims.The primary func-
tions of the Commission are to listen to victims of childhood abuse who want to recount their experiences and
to fully investigate all allegations of abuse made to it. In addition the Residential Institutions Redress Board was
established under the Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002 to make awards to persons who, as children,
were abused while resident in industrial reformatories and other institutions subject to state regulation or ins-
pection.
The two decades from 1970 laid the foundations for policy developments in the 1990s and the enactment
of the Childcare Act 1991. A developing awareness of the extent of child physical and sexual abuse, the increa-
sing body of research on child abuse, the official reports of child neglect and abuse, the increasing role of volun-
tary bodies in the support of families, strong pressure group activity, the development of health board struc-
tures and the professionalism of social work services all came together to affect policy during this period
(Ferguson 1996: 23–5).The period was characterized by attempts to move towards policies of prevention and
support for families in providing for the care and welfare of their children.The overriding responsibility for child
welfare became firmly rooted in the health board structures with central government guidelines allowing for
regional variations of interpretation (Kenny 1995: 56). However, Ferguson (1996: 26) has argued that initially
government policy was more concerned with influencing what practitioners actually do in relation to suspected
cases, and putting less emphasis on the prevention and family support aspects. It is this legacy, which has led to
the present child protection policies.
The passing of the Childcare Act 1991 brought together many of the strands of childcare policy and mar-
ked the beginning of the present era.The Act is based on the principle that it is generally in the best interests of
a child to be brought up in his or her own family (Section3.2c) and that it is the function of the health board to
promote the welfare of children in its area who are not receiving adequate care and protection (Section3.1).
The Childcare Act 1991, despite being signed into law that year, was not fully implemented until December
1996.Thus, the mid to late 1990s was characterized by the implementation of new legislation and dominated
by increasing public awareness of physical and sexual abuse as a major factor in Irish society. A growing awaren-
ess of children’s rights has been significant in the development of a philosophy surrounding children and their
needs, together with an increasing understanding of the need to institute measures to educate children and the
public about child abuse, with concentration on prevention.
In June 1998 the government launched Springboard an initiative of 15 family support projects and in 1999
the Government also committed itself to establishing 100 Family and Community Centres throughout the
country in line with the recommendations of the Commission on the Family (1998:17), which had highlighted
the need for health boards to prioritise family support work at the preventive level and to make resources
available to do so.The centres were planned as a social partnership between the statutory and voluntary agen-
cies driven by the communities involved. In particular the Commission on the Family (1998) recommended the
extension of the Family Support Scheme run by the Eastern Health Board and the Community Mothers
Programmes (Johnson et al. 1993). In addition, the government proposed developing parenting programmes
and ‘other supports for vulnerable families’ (Department of Health Press Release June 1998
www.dohc.ie/press/releases/). An evaluation of the Springboard family support projects found that parents and
children showed considerable improvement in well being and it was estimated that the projects had halved the
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number of children at moderate to high risk of being abused or going into care. (McKeown et al. 2001). By the
end of the century family support services were at an expansionary phase. The National Development Plan
2000–2006 contained a commitment to the allocation of funds to childcare, community and family support and
youth services. The importance of family support was also underlined in the National Guidelines for the
Protection and Welfare of Children, Children First (1999:59-63) These initiatives indicated a very important
policy change in relation to the prevention of family breakdown and the support of families.
This period of development also saw the beginning of a children’s rights perspective within childcare policy
and practice. In January 1998, the UN Committee published its concerns about Ireland’s performance in rela-
tion to its obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Despite the fact that every report
on childcare policy and practice since 1970 has emphasized the need for rationalization of the administrative
systems affecting children, statutory responsibility for their welfare   remains divided.The competent authorities
are the Departments of Health and Children, Education and Science, and Justice, Equality and Law Reform.
Responsibility for the welfare of children in need of care and protection and children with disabilities lies with
the Department of Health and Children, within which a Minister of State for Children has been appointed as
the designated minister with overall responsibility for coordinating the three Departments. It does, however,
leave a serious anomaly, with child policy being separated from family policy development within the
Department of Social and Family Affairs.There is a real need for rationalisation of these administrative structures
and to place children’s welfare within the context of the family.
In 2000 the Government published its National Children’s Strategy, Our Children—Their Lives (2000).
Three national goals were identified:
 Children will have a voice;
 Children’s lives will be better understood;
 Children will receive quality supports and services.
In order to ensure that the goals and objectives of the National Children’s Strategy are met a plan was set out
which involves cooperation between government departments, statutory and voluntary agencies and the
research community. As part of the implementation a National Children’s Advisory Council was set up together
with the National Children’s Office in 2002. This office has the leading role in the implementation of the
Strategy. Its functions are to advise the Minister on all aspects of children’s lives, including the development of
child well being indicators, to advise the Minister on better coordination and delivery of services, to undertake
and advise on research and to advise on the development of mechanisms to consult with children. In respect of
the latter the National Children’s Office has promoted the setting up of Comhairle na nOg at local level and
the national Dail na nOg3 (National Children’s Office 2003). In 2003 the National Children’s Office prepared a
National Play Policy, which was published in 2004 and continued monitoring the Youth Homelessness Strategy.
In June 2002 legislation was passed to enable the setting up of the office of an Ombudsman for Children.
This was established and the Ombudsman took up office in March 2004.
The Irish Constitution and the reluctance of the state to interfere in family life have circumscribed policy
developments. Policies have resulted from attempts to balance the rights of parents, the rights of children and
the rights of the state. However, until the early 1990s, the focus was firmly on the rights of parents. The full
implementation of the Childcare Act 1991 has laid the foundation for policy to focus far more clearly on the
rights and needs of children. Constitutional change is needed now to underpin the legislation. Its emphasis on
prevention, on partnership between parents, the state and other social service agencies, and cooperation and
coordination between all agencies involved with children, provides a framework for policy development.
However, it is only a framework. Despite the proactive orientation of the Childcare Act, much childcare and
protection work remains reactive and partnership with families operates at a low level (Buckley 1997: 120).
3 Dail na nOg is the children’s parliament which meets annually with children’s representatives elected through local
Comhairle na nOg which are established and organised by City/County Development Boards (see Department of
Health and Children 2004).
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Since the beginning of the 21st century there has been considerable movement in the commitment by workers
and government to listen to children, involve them and their families in the decision-making process and strive
towards a children’s rights perspective.The challenge now is for adequate resources to be made available on a
continuous basis in order that the full potential of the frameworks and policies developed can be realised. Policy
must now be proactive rather than reactive and driven by a real political commitment to enhancing the posi-
tion of children in Ireland.The government has given a commitment to undertake a longitudinal study of chil-
dren in Ireland. However, it is imperative that such a study should be instituted as soon as possible in order that
the true impact of the childcare policies that exist can be measured against the real, lived lives of Irish children.
Current issues in family policy
Definition of the family
The definition of the family within the Constitution remains a contentious issue within family policy because of
the increasing variety of family forms and also because of the different and inconsistent treatment of cohabiting
and married families within the tax and welfare codes. The family has already been defined in broader terms
within the Irish legal framework where unmarried families and families based on marriage have been equalised.4
In order to begin to broaden and inform the debate on the issue of cohabitation the Law Reform Commission
recently published a consultation paper on the rights and duties of cohabitees (LRC 2004). The Consultation
Paper deals with the rights and duties of cohabitees in relation to property rights, succession, maintenance, so-
cial welfare, pensions, taxation, health care and domestic violence (LRC 2004). It proposed that measures dea-
ling with these issues in the case of married partners should equally apply to cohabitees.
The reforms proposed would apply to ‘qualified cohabitees’ defined as persons who live together in a ‘mar-
riage-like’ relationship for a continuous period of three years or, where there is a child from the relationship, for
two years. This definition includes relationships between same-sex or opposite sex couples, neither of whom
are married to each other or to any other person. The Commission argues that the exclusion of any person
who is not married is necessitated by Article 41 of the Constitution, which deals with the provisions in respect
of the family.The Commission proposes that ‘qualified cohabitees’ should be given the right to apply to Court
for certain rights and financial reliefs following the termination of the cohabiting relationship. The Commission
made some specific provisional recommendations in relations to property, succession, maintenance, extensions
of the definition of cohabitation in social welfare, to include those in same-sex relationships and recognition of
cohabitation within the tax code. It also considered that cohabitees should be given greater recognition in the
context of health care situations and decision making and changes in relation to the Domestic Violence Act
1996 which would give greater protection to cohabitees.
The proposals made by the Law Reform Commission met with strong criticism from the Irish Bishops.
While they recognised that cohabiting families in difficulty were legitimate welfare subjects, it argued strongly
against any recognition of de facto unions and in particular same-sex couples. The Catholic Archbishop of
Armagh speaking at a conference organised by the Catholic Bishops to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the
UN Year of the Family, on ‘Supporting Marriage and Family Life’ (3rd May 2004) stated:
‘some recent initiatives propose the institutional recognition of ‘de facto’ unions and even their equivalence to
families which have their origin in a marriage commitment. It is important to draw attention to the damage that
such recognition and equivalence would represent for the identify of marriage as traditionally understood.’
The recommendations of the Law Reform Commission are likely to stimulate ongoing discussion before any
changes in the legislation are introduced because of the challenge they make to traditional views on the defini-
tion of the family in their attempt to equalise the rights of married and non-married families. For example the
4 The definition of the family has been expanded in pieces of legislation such as the Non-Fatal Offences against the
Person Act 1997; Domestic Violence Act 1996, Parental Leave Act 1998, Employment Equality Act 1998, Mental Health
Act 2001 and the Residential Tenancies Act 2004
submission of Treoir (Federation of Services for Unmarried Parents and their Children) to the All-Party
Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution (2005) argues that the broad protection afforded to family life in
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights should be incorporated within the Irish Constitution.
Family support—government’s ‘Families First’ approach to family policy
Since the publication of a report of the Family Commission (1998) the focus of much   family policy has been
on the provision of services aimed at supporting families at a material, emotional and relationship level. The
Family Support Agency is a statutory body set up in 2003, its main functions being to provide a family media-
tion service, to support, promote and develop the provision of marriage and relationship counselling and family
support services, promote and disseminate information on issues concerning marriage, relationship education,
parenting and family responsibilities and develop the Family and Community Services Resource Centre
Programme.
There are over 80 Family Resource Centres, which receive financial support from the Family Support
Agency. This programme aims to combat disadvantage and improve the functioning of the family unit. The 
centres provide such services as counselling and information for lone parents, young mothers and socially ex-
cluded families. They aim to enhance the self-esteem and potential of people by working closely with them 
within their communities, with particular emphasis on creating successful partnerships between voluntary and
statutory agencies.
The Family Support Agency Strategic Plan for the next three years was published in May 2004.The strategy
is based on delivering direct and indirect support services for families and contributing to the effectiveness of
family policy and services through research. In 2004 the Minister made 7.62 million Euros available for the sup-
port of family organisations, which is seven times the allocation in 1997.
Supporting fathers
The absence of men from family support services and the need to make services more accessible and accept-
able to fathers has become an area of growing concern within family policy. The Irish Constitution makes no
specific mention of fathers. Since the family is defined as based on marriage, unmarried fathers therefore have
no Constitutional rights to children born outside marriage. They have no automatic right to guardianship of
their children although they have the right to apply to the Court to be made a guardian and can apply for
custody. However, in this case it would be unusual for an unmarried father to have custody of his child. In cases
of divorce and separation the courts must be satisfied that appropriate arrangements are made for the welfare
of the children before granting a separation or divorce order. Data is not available to indicate how many chil-
dren are the subjects of joint custody orders and how many fathers merely have access arrangements.
However, a number of vocal groups representing non-resident fathers are active in trying to raise issues con-
cerning the rights of fathers to be involved in the active parenting of their children.
The predominant focus of services for families is on mothers rather than fathers. Fathers tend to be avoi-
ded by professionals and possibly vice versa and there is uncertainty among professionals on how to approach
fathers (McKeown 2001:45). There is growing recognition that services need to be developed to support 
fathers as part of a broader strategy of promoting the well being of children and families, including the well
being of men and women. Groups on parenting skills are being developed and aimed particularly at fathers.
A recent study (McKeown et al. 2003) on family well being in Irish families showed that the family type was
much less important in relation to happiness and well being than the way in which family members related to
each other and coped with each other’s personalities.The study showed that the diversity of families in Ireland
is not undermining the well being of parents or children, thus suggesting that there is a need for a more in-
clusive concept of the family which would focus on the set of relationships that link parents to each other and
to their children, even where the parents are not living in the same household. Non-resident fathers continue
to have a significant influence on the well being of their children, as do their grandparents.These findings have
implications for family policy by highlighting the need for measures that develop and support relationship skills.
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Furthermore, interventions to support families also need to acknowledge the influence of parents’ psycho-
logical traits and how these influence the happiness of all family members.
Future development of family policy
Over the past six years, family policy has become a far more explicit area of public policy as demonstrated by a
number of important structural changes. In May 2003, in preparation for the 10th Anniversary of the Interna-
tional Year of the Family, the Minister for Social and Family Affairs initiated a series of consultations or ‘Family
Fora’ to hear the views of family members together with family organisations, those working with families and
public representatives about their needs and concerns. In setting up the Fora the Minister stated:
”this process is about taking the ‘pulse of the nation’ on family matters. My task will then be to get the diagnosis
right and come up with the remedies in terms of Government policies, programmes and structures that will
strengthen family and family life on an ongoing basis“
(Department of Social and Family Affairs: Government Press Release September 2003
www.welfare.ie/press/pro3/index03.html)
Discussions focused on the impact of current social and economic developments affecting families, the effec-
tiveness of government policies and programmes in responding to these developments and what forum partici-
pants saw as priorities for strengthening family well being. Other areas of concern were centred on the nature
of   structural change of the family, family processes and relationships together with the circumstances in which
families in Ireland now live. The policy area discussion focused on the values and models that should inform
policy, how family policy should be organised and what its priorities should be, together with the role of the
State and how far public policies should facilitate Government intervention in the family.
The report of the Fora was published in March 2004 (Daly 2004). The values considered to be important
in order to form the basis of family policy were:
 Respect: respect for   unpaid work carried out within the home by family members. Participants expressed
the view that such work was no longer valued by society and that current policies give little support or
encouragement for people who choose to work full time in the home.
 Choice: families should have real choice in the area of family and employment. Increased support for
work/life balance policies.
 Balance: people want to reclaim an independent place for the family and that family has the right to be the
central concern of policy rather than being considered merely as an economic unit.
 Equality: measures to address gaps between men and women in relation to family roles, equal opportunities
for all families irrespective of ethnic, religious, cultural and economic background with equal access to 
services.
 Diversity: the need to embrace on equal terms family in its diverse forms.There is a need for an inclusive
definition of family which recognises and gives value to all types and forms of family.
 Prevention and support for families in difficulties.
The Report also addressed possible approaches to the development and implementation of family policy. It
emphasised that:
”Family policy is transversal in nature.That is, family crosses policy domains and is not sectoral. Hence rather than
being confined to one department of domain or policy a concern about the family should inform the work of all
government departments“ 
(Daly 2004:59)
One of the main conclusions of the Fora was that support and assistance from the State should be made avail-
able to all families at critical points, such as the birth of the first child, but that there should also be specialist 
services for families with additional needs. Furthermore, families should be consulted and be actively involved in
policy formation.
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The recommendations arising from the Fora covered a number of areas:
 Support services for parents in their parenting role;
 Increased support for fathers in undertaking their caring role within the family;
 Increased support for lone parent families;
 Help for children affected by family breakdown;
 The need for a strong political will to support and promote work/life balance for working parents;
 The need to value the work undertaken by women working full time in the home;
 Policies supporting families with relationship difficulties;
 Policies on the family as carer.
Many of the developments in family policy to date have been the result of an economic agenda; the need for
increased participation of women in the work force to alleviate the labour shortages in a period of strong eco-
nomic growth and to encourage lone mothers into the workforce to alleviate costs to the exchequer, in com-
pliance with EU policies relating to equality. However, it is clear that families speaking at the Fora wished to re-
direct the focus towards families as units providing stable caring environments. As one participant put it 
”when was the last time we heard the government refer to Ireland as a society and not an economy?”
(Daly 2004:56)
The public Fora and the subsequent publication are to form the basis of a Family Policy Strategy, which the
Minister intends to publish during 2004. In a recent press release the Minister stated 
”this Government’s commitment to families will come later this year the 10th Anniversary of the UN International
Year of the Family when I intend to publish an integrated strategy for the support of families and family life“
(Department of Social and Family Affairs, Press Release 31st May 2004)
The publication of such a strategy should mark a significant development for family policy in Ireland by
placing it high on the political agenda.
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 IRELAND
156 | ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23
References:
Buckley, H. (1997) Child protection in Ireland. In: Harder, M. & Pringle, K. (eds): Protecting children in Europe:
towards a new millennium. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press.
Comhairle   (ed.) (2002): Supporting carers: a social policy report Dublin: Comhairle.
Commission on the Family (1998): Strengthening families for life. Dublin: Government Publications.
Central Statistics Office (2003): Quarterly National Household Survey Childcare Module. Dublin: Central
Statistics Office.
Central Statistics Office (2004): Quarterly National Household Survey. Dublin: Central Statistics Office.
Central Statistics Office (2005) EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) First Results 2003.
Dublin: Government Publications
Daly, M. (2001): Against all odds—family life on a low income. Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency.
Daly, M. (2003): NAP/INCIL 2003 First background report on Ireland.
Daly, M. (2004): Families and family life in Ireland: challenges for the future.
Department of Health (1994): Shaping a healthier future: a strategy for effective healthcare in the 1990’s. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Department of Health and Children (2004): Delegate Report Dail na nOg 2003 Dublin: Government
Publications
Department of Health and Children(2003) Health Statistics 2000 Dublin, Government Publications
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (1999) National Childcare Strategy
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (2004): Annual Report of the Courts Service 2003. Dublin:
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.
Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs (1998) Strengthening Families for Life: Report of the
Commission on the Family Dublin, Government Publications
Economic and Social Research Institute (2001) Dublin: ESRI Economic Series, 24: 55
Economic and Social Research Institute (2003): Medium term review 2003–2010. Dublin: Economic and Social
Research Institute.
Economic and Social Research Institute (2004): Quarterly Economic Commentary Summer 2004. Dublin:
Economic and Social Research Institute.
Fahey,T. (1997):The elderly, the family and the state in Ireland. Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute.
Ferguson, H. (1996): Protecting Irish children in time: child abuse as a social problem and the development of
the child protections system in Ireland. In: Ferguson, H. & McNamara,T. (eds.): Protecting Irish children:
investigation, protection and welfare. In: Administration, 44 (2 Summer). Pp. 5–36.
Hantrais, L. (2004): Family policy matters. Bristol:The Policy Press.
Johnson, Z., Howell, F. and Molloy, F. (1993) ‘Community Mothers Programme: Randomised controlled trial of
Non-professional intervention in Parenting’ British Medical Journal Vol. 306 pp 1449-1452 
Kenny, P. (1995):The Childcare Act 1991 and the social context of child protection. In: Ferguson, H & Kenny, P.
(eds): On behalf of the child: child welfare, child protection and the Childcare Act 1991. Dublin: Farmar.
Law Reform Commission (2004): Consultation paper on the rights and duties of cohabitees. Dublin: Law
Reform Commission.
McKeown, K. Haase,T. and Pratschke, J. (2001): Springboard: promoting family well being through Family Support
Services. Dublin: Department of Health and Children
McKeown, K. (2001): Fathers and families: research and reflection on key questions. Dublin: Department of
Health and Children.
McKeown, K., Pratschke, J., and Haase,T. (2003): Family well-being.What makes a difference? Shannon: Ceifin
Centre & Dublin: Department of Social and Family Affairs.
National Agreement Sustaining Progress Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005 (2003) Dublin: Government
Publications
National Children’s Office Annual Report 2003 (2004) Department of Health and Children, Dublin
National Childcare Strategy (1999) Report for the Partnership 2000 Expert Working Group on Childcare
Dublin, Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Government Publications
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 IRELAND
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 157
National Children’s Strategy (2000) Our Children—Their Lives. Government Publications, Department of
Health and Children, Dublin
National Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of Children, Children First (1999) Dublin, Department of
Health and Children, Government Publications
Nolan, B., Gannon, B., Layte, R.,Watson, D.,Whelan, C.T., and Williams, J. (2002)  Monitoring poverty trends in
Ireland: results from the 2000 Living in Ireland Survey. Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute ESRI.
O’Neill, S. & Evans, D. (2000): Informal care throughout the Western Health Board Region. A study of carers,
people receiving care and non-carers: key findings and recommendations.Western Health Board,
Department of Public Health.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2003) Babies and Bosses: Reconciling Work and
Family Life Vol. 2  Paris, OECD
OPEN (2004): Living on the book. Dublin: One Parent Exchange & Network.
Programme for a Partnership Government 1993-1997 (1993) Dublin: Government Publications
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness 2000-2003 (2000) Dublin: Government Publications
Report of An Bord Uchtala 2003 (The Adoption Board) (2005) Dublin: Government Publications
Report of the Constitution Review Group (1996) Dublin, Government Publications
Richardson,V. (2003): Evaluation of policies in relation to the division of unpaid and paid work between men
and women in Ireland. Dublin: Department of Social Policy,Trinity College.
Rush, M., Richardson,V. and Kiely, G. (2005 in press) Family policy and unpaid reproductive work. Dublin: Social
Science Research Centre.
Stationery Office (ed.) (1997): National Anti-Poverty Strategy. Sharing in progress. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Stationery Office (ed.) (1999): Report of the Working Group Examining the Treatment of Married, Cohabiting
and One-Parent Families under the Tax and Social Welfare Codes. Dublin: Stationery Office
Stationery Office (ed.) (2003): Revised National Anti-Poverty Strategy. Building an inclusive society. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Treior (2005) Submission to the Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution Dublin:Treoir : Federation of
Services for Unmarried Parents and their Children
Vital Statistics 4th Quarter and Yearly Summary 2003 (2004): Central Statistics Office, Dublin.
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 IRELAND
158 | ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 ITALY
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 159
GIOVANNI B. SGRITTA
Italy
Introduction
In Italy, the period between the mid-1990s and the first years of the new millennium was one of both stability
and change. Stability and continuity marked the dynamics of family and generational relationships; at the same
time, there were far-reaching and interesting legislative innovations in the field of family policies, a sector that
had remained static and widely neglected for a long time.
Over the last five years, in fact, there has been a continuation of those demographic trends that, in Italy as
well as in other Western countries, had already emerged in embryonic form from the second half of the 1960s
onwards: that is, a continuous drop in fertility levels, a natural rate of increase of the population that has been
negative for some years now, longer life expectancy, and—more recently—increasing immigration flows from
abroad, both legal and illegal. These changes in the demographic picture have been accompanied by the 
following:
 an equally profound revolution in the age structure of the population, with an increase in the number of
the elderly and a decrease in the number of young people;
 a significant increase in the number of families, as well as a decrease in their average size;
 a significant shift in the timing of couple formation;
 a decline in marriages;
 a slight but gradual increase in family instability (separations and divorces).
Partly in response to these changes, and partly for reasons related to the political scenario and specific choices
made by the government, the period between 1996 and 2000/2001 was also characterised by a new and, in
many ways, both original and surprising attention paid to the family, at least as far as social policies were con-
cerned. During these years, the sheer number of laws passed in this area constitutes an important reversal of
the trend of the preceding half century, one marked by general inattention and historic delay with regard to
family policies.The new laws also acknowledge the role of families in the care and maintenance of their mem-
bers, both young and old, and of the responsibilities that women have to bear on their shoulders. As evidence
of this substantial change, we can draw attention to the measures of economic assistance for (traditionally less
well-off) families with children, the law on parental leave, the children’s law and the comprehensive reorganisa-
tion of the system of services and social assistance.
A structural view: the 2001 census
Turning to structural changes, the recent publication of the results of the latest population and housing census
offers us the opportunity to draw a detailed picture of the demographic and family situation of the country in
the past decade.1 From 1991 to 2001 the resident population remained almost unchanged: 56.7 million versus
56.9. If we consider the contribution of immigration, this means demographic growth was practically zero.
During this time, however, the family panorama changed a great deal. In 2001 there were over 21.8 million
households in Italy, with an average number of members equal to 2.59. In a single decade the number of house-
holds has increased by about two million units while their size has progressively decreased (2.8 in 1991).
At the date of the last census almost the whole population lived in families; only a minimal part (0.7%)
lived, for various reasons, in different types of institutions (schools, residential care homes, nursing homes, pri-
1 The results of the 2001 census can be consulted on the website of the National Institute of Statistics:
http://dawinci.istat.it/daWinci/jsp/MD/dawinciMD.jsp
sons, religious institutions, etc.). In the course of the decade other important changes marked the structure of
Italian families; on the whole, the picture shown by the census is that of a family whose size is getting smaller
and smaller but also weaker, more unstable and more fragmented. In particular, there has been a great increase
in one-person households.These were little more than 20% in 1991 and have now grown by 5% (24.89%) but
with marked differences between different areas of the country: over 28% in the North and under 20% in the
southern regions.Worthy of note are also the reduction in the proportion of couples with children, the increa-
se of those without children, the increase of recomposed families (which today are over 5% of the total) with
peaks of 7% in the North) and the progressive restriction of the quota of large and extended families. At the
end of 2001, couples with children made up 57.5% of the total of family units, those without children 29.4% and
single parent families 13% (the great majority of these are made up of mothers and children). Needless to say,
all these parameters show variations, marked in some cases, between the different areas of the country. The
North being quite similar to the countries of Central Europe and the South, (the Mezzogiorno), in spite of the
changes that have taken place in recent years, still retains more traditional characteristics.
Family instability has also grown considerably in the course of the past decade, due to an increase in
separations and divorces. In 2001 there were over 2.5 million people in Italy who had been through a marriage
–break up that was either definitive (if divorced) or at risk of being so (if separated legally or not).With respect
to the total number of separated and divorced people, the proportion of under45s in the same condition 
amounts to 42%, a clear sign that the phenomenon of matrimonial instability has particularly involved the 
younger demographic cohorts.
An interesting aspect, which we will return to more fully in the following pages, regards the phenomenon of
the ‘long’ family that is the prolonged stay of young adults in their families of origin. Information from the 2001
census confirms that in the past decade this phenomenon, far from decreasing, has increased even more. In the
20–24 age group, young people who continue to live with their parents are the great majority, no less than
85%. In the next age group (25–29) the proportion decreases but still remains quite high at 70.3%. More than a
quarter (26.2%) of young adults aged 30–34 still live at home with their parents and almost 10% remain until
the age of 45 even though they have long since finished studying and have (presumably) found a job. Interesting
in many ways is also the fact that, differently from other aspects of family life and structure, the prolonged resi-
dence of young adults in their families of origin does not show great differences between the various areas of
the country.The phenomenon is more widespread in the South than in North and Central Italy, especially in the
central age groups (25–34) but the differences are actually quite small, in the order of 3–5%.This shows, with-
out a shadow of a doubt, that we are faced with a complex and generalized phenomenon that escapes the 
characteristics that widely distinguish the demographic, economic and cultural structure of the Italian regions.
Thus, the causes of the phenomenon cannot be blamed either on the autonomous choices of the families
or on the specific structural characteristics of the territorial context in which they live.The reasons are rather of
a general, institutional order that have a profound impact on the nature of relationships between the family, the
State and the market; namely, the policies of income maintenance, social services, housing policies, the education
system, organization of the job market and the economic support of families with children. In other words,
young people’s long stay in their parents’ home, with all that entails (the function of education as a parking
place, later entry to the job market, delay in the formation of families, the decline in births, demographic aging,
the extension of the network of family relationships, social exclusion and poverty) is in fact just an adaptive 
response of the families to the circumstances in which they are forced to operate.
Family relationships: gender and generations
From the point of view of family relationships, Italy is still halfway between tradition and modernisation. Some of
the elements that characterise the formation of new families, structure of households, stability of marital rela-
tions, women’s role and the situation of new generations are definitely of a traditional type. However, in other
aspects, Italian families show behaviour patterns and attitudes that hint at a gradual process of convergence and
similarity to the typical family patterns of other European and Western countries. Moreover, there are still mar-
ked territorial differences between the regions of the North and the great urban centres, that are more deve-
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loped economically and more orientated towards consumption and modernisation, and the South and rural
areas that show more traditional characteristics.
As a rule, in Italy the family is firmly at centre stage. The use of private services to assist with housework
and care does not show any particular signs of change as compared to the past. Care of the house, children and
the elderly continue to be almost exclusively women’s responsibility. In any case, it is a fact that the Italian welfa-
re régime has as a rule privileged services ‘in cash’ (transfers), while services aimed at the family have always
played a residual role. Differences with respect to other European countries emerge clearly, although indirectly,
from a recent Eurobarometer survey.To the question of ”Who has to bear the burden of looking after dependent
old people?” more than 60% of those interviewed in Greece, Spain and Portugal, and over 48% of Italians
replied that this responsibility was the children’s duty, as compared with the European average of 37%. Only 2%
of all Italians think that elderly parents should be looked after in an old people’s home (as opposed to the
European average of 12.6%). No less interesting are the replies to another survey question, aimed at discove-
ring in which areas public policies should bear the burden of citizens’ needs. Only 61.7% and 59.8% of the Italian
sample replied that the responsibilities of the government and local authorities should be extended, respecti
vely, to the care and assistance of old people and to looking after children.The corresponding percentages are
far higher in other European countries (Malpas 1999).
In 2000, only 8.8% of Italian families availed themselves of at least one of the following paid private services:
home help, a babysitter, and care for the elderly and infirm.The most widespread service contracted was con-
cerned housework, which 6.9% of all families used, while only a very limited proportion of families employed a
babysitter (around 5% of those with a child up to age 15) or a person to assist an older adult (4.2% of the
families in which at least one family member was over 64). In all cases, the use of paid domestic help is more
frequent in the North than in the South, as well as in the large urban centres and among the wealthier families.2
As is well known, family obligations in Italy have traditionally played an important role in the satisfaction of
basic needs. Making up for the lack of an adequate structure offering assistance and services paid for by the
public purse was, and still is, the duty of the extended family and the kinship network.Thanks to this widespread
network of informal support, millions of people have been able to take advantage of unpaid help that is often
essential to maintain a minimum level of well-being. This help is provided in the form of care (looking after
elderly people and children, doing housework, mediating with welfare institutions, settling bureaucratic matters
and providing companionship), simple nursing, financial help, and help with work and studies.The research data
we have at our disposal on this subject span a period of 15 years, from 1983 to 1998. During this period, the
percentage of caregivers increased from 20.8% to 22.5% of the population, even though the share of benefici-
ary families decreased (from 23.3% to 14.8%). As was to be expected, it is mainly women who take on the 
leading role in the informal help network (24.5% as opposed to 20.3% of men)—independently of age, social
status and location. Not only are higher proportions of women involved, but they also devote more of their
time to this activity.
The highest quota of caregivers is concentrated in the age group between 55 and 64 years; this is also the
group in which, between 1983 and 1998, there was the greatest increase in people engaged in giving help. It
goes without saying that this age group is basically made up of those generations who are engaged simulta-
neously on two different fronts: caring for their children, who in Italy tend to stay at home even beyond the age
of 30, and caring for their parents, who once past the age of 80 enter a phase of the lifecycle in which the need
for care and assistance increases. An interesting fact emerges from the surveys: During the period under consi-
deration, help given to the oldest members of the population showed a marked decrease, while in 1983, 30.7%
of families with at least one elderly member and without children received help at least once, in 1998 this per-
centage fell to 16%.3
On the whole, these data show that the network of solidarity surrounding Italian families is still relatively
strong and widespread. However, one does notice incipient signs of change: indications that appear mainly in the
2 This data comes from the Multiscope Family Survey Aspetti della vita quotidiana, anno 2000. See Istat 2001: 251.
3 This data is taken from the following surveys: Indagine sulle strutture ed i comportamenti familiari (1983) and the
Multiscope Family Survey Soggetti sociali e condizione dell’infanzia (1998). See Istat, 2000: 457–469.
reduction of the quota of families who receive help, in the increase of the average age of caregivers and in a
strong selection of the flow of assistance that tends to be directed towards families with children in which the
woman works. It may be premature to draw conclusions from these embryonic trends. However, one may
hypothesise that the proverbial solidarity strength of Italian families is showing signs of distress and is having 
difficulty in adapting to the challenges caused by demographic changes and the socio-economic scenario.
The growing needs generated by an aging population and the inclusion of women in the job market, as well
as the prolonging of the time that young people remain at home with their parents, are certainly strong factors
of change: on the one hand, imposing an increase in policies and public services aimed at families, and on the
other, stimulating families to find new solutions and new forms of adaptation in organising their relationships and
their time.
A significant aspect of the changes that have taken place recently in the structure of family networks is 
related to the extent of help from relatives. If one considers help as a whole—informal and formal, provided by
the kinship network and by outside services—between 1983 and 1998, the number of families having an elder-
ly member over 65 who received help at least once grew by nearly 10%; and that of families with an elderly
member over 80 by almost 14%. Most of this growth is due to a process of substitution of the informal net-
work by utilising help provided by private individuals and the public sector.The case is different with regard to
families with children, for whom the importance of services outside the informal network is negligible. This
shows that, in the meantime, family support networks have reduced their range of intervention. To a certain
extent, they still survive within the restricted context of the nuclear family. Families depend almost solely on the
informal help network but tend to contract care and assistance for elderly people, for whom it is apparent that
the use of external help and services provided by the public authorities and/or paid personnel has increased
enormously.
Families with special needs
When the family has to tackle problems of assistance and personal care of one of the members of the house-
hold, this scenario becomes particularly complex and more articulated.What is peculiar to these families is the
intensity and the frequency with which their needs must be met. According to a recent survey (Istat 1998), in
1998 in Italy the families in this situation; that is, with a member in need of personal care such as eating, getting
up, dressing, bathing or using toilets, were about 3,100,000 (amounting to 15% of the total number of families).
In 79.8% of the cases this member was an elderly person or a person who was entering the third age (over 64
years). The informal network activated around these families provided more than 36% of the total amount of
informal help.
Both the intensity and frequency of informal help, however, change in relation to the gravity of the situation
and the structure of the living arrangement. For one thing, the more serious the need, the greater the propor-
tion of families that received help (36.6% when at least one member of the family is in serious difficulties versus
24.4% when at least one component has no grave problems); furthermore, the ‘socially weak’ families, i.e.,, those
composed of a single aged person and the one-parent families, receive the higher percentage of informal help
from the family network: respectively, 51% of the elderly who live alone and 26% of the single parent families.
Considering the type of help received, it is interesting to note that in the case of one-person families they con-
sist mainly of help with domestic chores (51.9%, but 71% if there are serious problems), companionship, accom-
panying and hospitality (35.6% and 45%, respectively), help in dealing with the practical business of life (31.9%
and 43.2%), and in assistance concerning the accomplishment of personal daily necessities (27.5 and. 74.3%).
Another interesting result of the survey is that the closer the relationship between the helper and the
receiver, the more frequent and intense is the intervention of the informal network. Children and their families
of course play a pivotal role in all the activities of assistance (of the parents) except the monetary aspect; for
instance, in care and assistance they are involved in 51% of cases whereas the kinship network is involved in
41.6% of cases. Considerable however is also the role of other informal carers, not belonging to the kinship net-
work like friends, neighbours and last but not least family associations and the voluntary solidarity is also consid-
erable, and, absorb altogether around 33% of the total informal family help. Both in the inside-the-family system
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of informal help and in the outside-the-family, the common characteristic is that the demand for assistance is not
‘externalised’; i.e.,, the solutions are asked for in the private sphere and not addressed to the public sector;
moreover, even when the request goes beyond the immediate entourage of the family, it is frequently directed
to the private market. In conclusion, these results confirm that the family in Italy is still largely an autonomous
system of social solidarity.4
Changes in family formation: parents and their (young adult)
children
Changes in the demographic picture and the structure of family relationships are, at the same time, both a
cause and an effect of the changes that have taken place in the relationship between the generations. In fact, in
the course of the last few decades, together with the decline in births and the aging of the population, there
have also been important changes involving the process of both family formation and structure.The postpone-
ment of the age at which people marry and have their first child is followed—in quick succession—by the
reduction of the average size of the family, the decrease in the number of families with children, increased fami-
ly instability, the fragmentation of family typologies and the appearance of the ‘long family’, i.e.,, genus italicum in
which the adult children tend to stay with their parents until a pathologically late age.
In this scenario relationships between the older and younger generations have undergone radical changes.
For one thing, there is the prospect of the increased economic and care responsibilities that today’s meagre
demographic generations will have to bear when they become adult and elderly tomorrow. Furthermore, the
traditional rules that once governed generational relationships within the family have become uncertain, i.e.,, less
clear and more difficult to put into practice. In many cases, these rules produce tensions that give rise to down-
right perverse effects. In any case, a certain form of adaptation takes place spontaneously in the family sphere
with the appearance of criteria and formulae of secondary redistribution that partially oppose and compensate
for the arrangements made and decisions taken in other spheres (e.g. the State or the market).
In this case, too, the Italian situation is very different from that of other countries. A recent secondary 
analysis of data from the 1994 European Community Household Panel Survey revealed that, compared to 75%
of young Danes who had left their families of origin between the ages of 21 and 25, only 7% of their Italian con-
temporaries had taken this step. Furthermore, 28% of women between 21 and 25 were already mothers in
Sweden and the United Kingdom, as opposed to only 12% in Italy. Finally, in the United Kingdom, half of the
young people had joined the job market by age 19, while in Italy and Spain, entry to the job market tended to
happen five years later, so that in these countries half of all young people were still without a job after age 24
(Iacovou & Berthoud 2001: 2).
Separation from the family of origin, the birth of the first child and entry into the job market are three
canonical moments that mark the end of young people’s dependence and the assumption of the responsibilities
and autonomy connected with adulthood. Each of these moments can either help or hinder the accomplish-
ment of that transition. As many studies and a great deal of research have widely confirmed, each of these pas-
sages has undergone a gradual prolongation in Italy, so that reaching adulthood has been put off to a more and
more advanced age and young people continue to live increasingly longer and in greater numbers in their
parents’ home.
A survey by the National Institute of Statistics in 1998 makes an important contribution to clarifying the
causes that bring about these results.The impression one gets from the survey is that, besides objective scarci-
ties and material obstacles (continuation of studies, lack of a job, difficulty in finding suitable housing, etc.), there
are also factors and elements of a different nature that encourage young people to remain with their parents.
These can be summarised in terms of an ‘adjustment’ considered convenient by both parents and children to
conditions imposed on them from the outside.The main reason given by young people (whether they are male
or female makes no difference) who continue to live at home, is simply that it suits them: ”It suits me, I have my
freedom”, reply 48.1% of the interviewees.The ‘objective’ obstacles that young people give to justify their status
4 Data and comments considered in this paragraph are largely taken from Buratta & Crialesi 2002 and Sabbadini 2002.
(continuing their studies, lack of work and of a place to live) occupy a very important place, but this is not what
matters. In the 18–19 year-old age group, the answers that indicated objective obstacles to leaving home have a
frequency of 79.9%; in the 20–24-year-old age group a rate of 69%; while those who mentioned ‘discretionary’
and subjective reasons make up 57% and 65.4%, respectively. The exact opposite happens in the age groups
25–29 and 30–34, where the reasons that would hinder or not encourage leaving home are above all subjec-
tive: 69.8% in the 25–29 year-old age group and as high as 75.3% in the 30–34 year-old age group.Thus, where
the first are higher, the second are lower—and vice-versa (Istat 1998).
With regard to parents, the scant data available seems to indicate that they do not put a lot of pressure on
their children to go their own way and face the choices and responsibilities of independent living. Often the
question does not even arise. Asked whether having their children stay on at home was a problem, only 8%
answered in the affirmative: for 38%, it is ”a normal phenomenon”; and for 54%, even ”a pleasure”. Furthermore,
to the question of what were the main reasons for why their son/daughter did not want to go and live on
his/her own, a good 43% of the parents declared, without mincing words, that ”they would have to give up their
home comforts”. In addition, apart from the list of the usual objective ills (lack of work, cost of housing, etc.),
there were also those who candidly admitted that their son/daughter ”did not want to be independent” (17%), ”is
not used to making sacrifices or giving things up” (7%) or ”taking on responsibilities” (7%), or ”doesn’t want to upset
us” (3%). More than half of the parents interviewed are likewise convinced that their children will miss life in the
family when they leave.
Another curious fact comes from the answers to two specific items on the relative advantages and disad-
vantages, both for parents and for their children, of the latter leaving home. The range of replies offers a real
sentimental cahier de doléances: 55% reply that there would be no advantage, apart from fewer expenses (21%)
and less work (17%). Only 12% of the replies indicated that the parents would somehow benefit in terms of
greater freedom and privacy (5%). At any rate, this is nothing compared to the disadvantages that the ‘loss’ of
the son/daughter would involve in affective terms (50%), worries (24%), loneliness and sadness (34%). Only
20% of the replies indicate that no disadvantage (for the parents) would result. Is this just objectivity or is it
excessive paternalism? It is difficult to say. In any case, according to the parents, their son/daughter would not
gain much either if he/she chose to leave home and become independent: 26% of the replies admitted that
he/she would gain in freedom of choice and decision, 27% in freedom of movement, 20% in a greater sense of
responsibility. However, there are also those who place these ‘gains’ in the column of disadvantages, and only
12% of the replies indicate that leaving the parental home would not result in any disadvantage at all for their
son/daughter (Bonifazi et al. 1999).
It seems, after all, that parents and children—in the circumstances dictated by the rules of the economic,
political and social game that they have to play—find personal reasons that, from time to time and depending
on circumstances and opportunities, can facilitate and render more advantageous the range of choices consist-
ent with the given situation. The fact is that, in this way, a perverse mechanism is set into motion. Each of the
institutional actors who take part in the mise en scène of the transition to adulthood contribute, though unin-
tentionally, to producing an unwanted result:
 Young people postpone the formation of a family and procreation sine die bringing about demographic out-
comes that, in the long run, cannot be sustained by society as a whole.
 The family, like it or not, offers a safe and—according to the means available—comfortable shelter for chil-
dren who decide to stay on at home.
 The education system permits an excessive waste of resources, does not manage to contain the actual
duration of education within limits and does not promote effective links with the labour market—the latter,
because it does not create enough and/or suitable opportunities of employment for young people.
 Finally, politics and the welfare system do not do enough to resolve these problems and, by not offering
adequate support to families with children and to young people, end up aggravating the solidarity function
of the family system abnormally, overburdening the parents and clipping young people’s wings in their
transition to adulthood (Livi Bacci 1997).
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The economic situation of families
The Report on the State of the Nation prepared for 1999 by the National Institute of Statistics dedicates a
whole chapter to the poverty trend over the past 20 years.The percentage of poor families increased progres-
sively in the 1980s, reaching the highest level between 1987 and 1988 (over 14%). In the following decade, the
incidence of poverty went down slightly: in 1998, 2,558,000 families—amounting to 11.8% of the total number
of families and to 7,418,000 individuals—were poor (Istat 2000: 427). In 2000, according to the results of the
survey on the consumption and income of Italian families, the poverty rate rose again, reaching 12.3%:
2,707,000 families or 7,948,000 individuals (13.9% of the entire population) (Istat 2001b). A more recent sur-
vey, relative to the situation in 2002, seems to show a slight decrease in the poverty levels. The percentage of
families below the poverty threshold is equal to 11%, corresponding to around 2 million 456 thousand families
and to a total of 7 million 140 thousand poor people (12.4% of the entire population) (Coccia & Masi 2003). In
both cases, it is a question of how relative poverty is measured—which, as is well known, takes any inequality in
the distribution of income (or consumer costs) more into consideration than the actual paucity of resources. In
fact, if we pass from relative measurements to the absolute ones calculated on the basis of a basket of goods
and services considered essential for the standard of living of an Italian family, the poverty rate is much lower. In
1998, 4.4% of families fell below the level of absolute poverty; in 2000, the percentage of families in conditions
of absolute poverty went down slightly (4.3%), while in 2002 the percentage of families with an income equal
to or below 80% ( EUR 658.76 per month) of the standard poverty line was 5.1%.5
However, in spite of the see-sawing poverty levels in the past two decades, some constants are obvious,
however. First, the gap between the incidence of poverty in the developed regions of the North and the more
backward ones of the South grew steadily, with the exception of the last year. In 1998, more than 65% of poor
families lived in the Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy), as compared to 32.9% of the total number of families resident
in this area of the country. In 2002, however, the percent composition of poor families by geographic division
was the following: 21.9% in the North, 11.8% in the Centre and 66.3% in the South of Italy, where more than
one family in five (22.4%) lives in conditions of relative poverty (as against 5.0% in the North and 6.7% in the
Centre) (Coccia & Masi 2003).
In the whole period under review, the families with the highest levels of poverty are the large ones made
up of five or more members. In particular, family units with three or more minor children are those most ex-
posed to the risk of poverty: in 1999, 27% on a national level and 37.2% in the Mezzogiorno. In 2000, the situa-
tion improved slightly, although the gap between the various regions is still wide. Families with three or more
minor children in conditions of poverty are 25.5% on a national level and 33.7% in the Southern regions. The
phenomenon of the growth of poverty in families with a greater number of children is not only Italian as has
been recently signalled by many comparative studies and research. However, there are at least two specific cha-
racteristics in the Italian situation.The first is that, ”neither the employment of at least one of the parents, nor the
higher stability of the family and the fact that the proportion of children born out of wedlock is very low– all conditi-
ons that would apparently make up a propitious circumstance with respect to other countries—protect effectively
children and minors against the risk of poverty” (Saraceno 2002: 261).
The second characteristic is that, together with the U.K., Italy is the country with the highest rate of (minor)
child poverty. In its last report, the Commissione d’indagine sull’esclusione sociale points out that the poverty level
of the child population and of families with minor children is not only higher than the national average but has
also increased in years. Among families with minors, in fact, the extension of poverty grew from 14% in 1997 to
15.1% in 2000.The Commission estimates that in this last year ”the number of minors in poverty was 1,704,000,
that is, 16.9% of the total number of Italian minors: a proportion that is higher than the poverty rate for the adult
population and slightly more than that of the over-64s (16.7%).To be poor are especially families with two and, above
all, three minor children: 16.4% and 25.5%, respectively in 2000. These poor families are mostly concentrated in the
5 Information on absolute poverty is not available for 2002 and has therefore been substituted by a poverty line equal
to 80% of the standard one.
Southern regions, where 27.4% of all minors are in poverty with respect to 7.4% in the North and 11.3% in the
Centre” (Saraceno 2002: 261–262).
Although the official stand of the Commission lends special relevance to these conclusions, the point has
been widely debated and documented in the last years (Saporiti & Sgritta 1990, Saraceno 1990, Sgritta 1993).
According to a study by the Bank of Italy, in the course of time child poverty has increased while that of the
elderly over 65 has dropped by over 9%, falling from over 20% in 1980 to 11.1% in 1993. Between 1980 and
1993, poverty among children increased by 7% (from 24.5% to 31.5%) (Cannari & Franco 1997). In 1998,
25.8% of all children under 18 residing in the Southern regions were poor, compared to 8.8% of children living
in the Centre, and 7.5% in the North. The respective percentages for the over-65 age group were as follows:
22.5% in the South, 7.6% in the Centre, and 6.4% in the North (Istat 1999).Thus, in the whole country, the inci-
dence of poverty among minors is higher than among all the other age groups. The poverty of children is in
direct proportion to their family’s standard of living, and the latter depends, to a great extent, on the overall dis-
tribution of wealth in the population.The more unequal the distribution of income, the greater is the difference
of income among families. As children represent a cost to families, consequently families with more children
have a lower standard of living than families with fewer children or without children, unless these differences are
counterbalanced or more than compensated for by an effective redistribution policy.
As many studies and analyses have documented, this is unfortunately not the case. In Italy, the composition
of social expenditure by function denotes a specific generosity towards the elderly that inevitably takes away
resources from other population groups. In fact, high levels of pension expenditure are matched by extremely
low levels (among the lowest in Europe) both in funds earmarked for families and children and for unemploy-
ment, housing and socially excluded persons.This is not all. Children are not only discriminated against with res-
pect to other groups of the population in Italy, public policies have also been largely ineffective in reducing
poverty and inequality by means of social and economic relief aimed at families with children.Thus, in the great
majority of countries, the effectiveness of social transfers and the redistribute force of the system of direct taxa-
tion is generally high, but in Italy, these measures leave families with children worse off, because income tax
exceeds overall social and economic benefits (Ditch et al. 1996: 54).
Family policies: a new course of action?
It is precisely within this scenario that the new course of action in family policy mentioned at the beginning of
this report must be interpreted. During the period 1996–1999, revived interest in family matters on the part of
political and social forces is a sign that old and delicate balances have been shattered. If no effective measures
are undertaken to support families and the more fragile social categories, there will be a real risk of endange-
ring some of the most significant social achievements of the post-war period in the sphere of civil rights,
women’s liberation, and the condition of children and the elderly. In order to overcome the innumerable diffi-
culties faced by families, women and the younger generation, action has had to be taken on many fronts. What
has been especially needed is an improvement in measures related to the following:
 enabling women to reconcile work at home with work in the market place;
 providing childcare;
 equalising the economic circumstances of couples with children and those without children;
 increased flexibility of working hours and different types of family leave;
 expanding care facilities for the elderly;
 expanding tax-exemption levels;
 income maintenance programmes for young people.
In all these areas, the seriousness of the problems was such that politicians and the government finally under-
stood that these measures were both urgent and indispensable.
In a document published by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers at the end of the past legislature, the
then-Minister for Social Affairs summed up the work done in this field as follows: ”In the period between
1996–1999, family policies were planned as a great battle of culture and values arising from our awareness of the
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need … of an inversion of trend with respect to the sterile familialism that has distinguished the last 50 years, during
which the Italian family has been left alone to bear the burden of all the social and economic changes” (Turco 2000:
5). Moreover, ”the family should be placed at the centre of public policies, from those regarding employment to those
for housing and the services precisely because it produces functions of great social value, bringing society fundamental
collective advantages, beginning from the new generations and their education, which should be of concern to the
whole community” (Turco 2000: 5).
It would be impossible to review exhaustively and in detail all the bills introduced by the government that
were submitted for approval by Parliament or became law. Just the mere list of the main laws and government
bills is enough, however, to get an idea of the innovations introduced in this period. The first area in which
government policies were put into action concerned monetary transfers to families. Although the context was
one characterised by the need to resolve the problem of balancing public accounts, the government increased
both tax deductions and allowances for the family unit. As of 1 January 1999, a family allowance equal to EUR
103.29 per month plus one extra month’s bonus per year was granted to family units with three or more
minor children and an annual income below a certain level ( EUR 18,592 ). Starting from the same date, a
maternity allowance equal to EUR 103.29 for a period of five months commencing from the date of birth was
established for women without other social-security benefits. From 1 July 2000, the allowance was raised to
EUR 154.94 (Act No. 448/1998); from 1 January 2001, it was raised again ( EUR 258.23) and extended to 
foreign citizens and to foster and adoptive mothers (Act No. 388/2000). With legislative decree No. 446 of 15
December 1997, tax deductions for employees and self-employed workers with dependents also increased; the
amount of deductions decreases as the total income of the worker goes up.
As to the effectiveness of these measures, a recent analysis shows that 84.3% of family allowances and
70.5% of maternity allowances were granted to the southern regions. In 2000, 64.2% of the family with at least
three children living in these regions benefited from the family allowance; in the Central region, the proportion
was 23.7% and 16.2% in the North. In the same year, 56.5% of children born in the Southern, as against 24.1%
and 12.3% in the Centre and in the North, respectively, obtained maternity allowance (Lelleri & Marzano 2002).
The Report of the Commission on Social Exclusion bears witness to the re-distributive effectiveness of the
reformed family allowance. In fact, between 1998 and 2000 the incidence of poverty among families with three
or more children, i.e.,, the beneficiaries of the allowance, decreased by around 1%, that is in counter tendency
with respect to the overall increase of poverty among the families with minor children; nevertheless, as the for-
mer president of the Commission has recently noted, the family allowance, to the extent that families with
fewer than three children are not entitled to this benefit, should still be considered a very partial measure
(Saraceno 2002: 266).
Another new feature introduced in family policy is related to parental leave; the importance of this matter
is connected with the need to guarantee a better quality of life for those families in which both parents work
and face difficulties in reconciling time at work with time dedicated to the care of the family and children.The
recognition of the right to take leave from work for family reasons has been extended to both male and female
workers. According to the government bill, leave can be taken until the child reaches the age of eight; but it also
covers cases of illness of the child or serious events affecting the family unit that require the constant presence
of one of the parents. This regulation applies exclusively to companies with more than 250 employees, which
also receive incentives to introduce particular forms of flexibility regarding work time and organisation.
Housing policy has always been a very weak element of policies aimed at families, a weakness that has 
produced a great number of negative effects with regard to both the formation of new families and the mobili-
ty of citizens. A government bill approved by one of the two Chambers of Parliament provides for the payment
of economic benefits to young couples who intend to form a family, to unmarried, separated, divorced or 
widowed parents with dependent children and to married couples at the birth of a child or in cases of adopti-
on.To receive these benefits, the applicants must not be over 32 years of age, not be owners of a second home
and not exceed a certain income threshold (Bill No. 3142/1998).
Finally, in this brief review of the measures approved during the past legislature, we must mention Act No.
328/2000. It profoundly reforms the order of the welfare state as far as the system of assistance and social 
services entrusted to the regions, provinces and councils is concerned, and also comprises ‘third-sector’ organi-
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sations. Besides, the law provides for the establishment of a National Fund for social-policy measures, and 
establishes management models for social services aimed at individuals and families.
In October 2001, however, while many regions and municipalities were preparing for an application of law
328/2000, the Parliament approved a modification of the Constitution that partly arrested the implementation
of the law.The modifications introduced in the Constitution, in fact, attribute to the regions full legislative auto-
nomy in matter of social policy, reserving to the State only the power to settle ”the basic levels of performances
concerning civic and social rights, that should be guaranteed throughout the entire country” (art. 117, Titolo V, Le 
regioni, le province, i comuni). In short, the regions have acquired the power to legislate in this matter beyond a
general normative framework, except for the basic levels of performances and delivery services.
Another important event which intervened in the last two years was the change of the parliamentary
majority that almost without interruption had ruled the country in the previous decades. In its electoral pro-
gramme the right-centre government that took power after the political election of June 2001 promised to pay
new attention to the family. Until now, however, the reforms realised in this field are rather marginal and limit
themselves mostly to re-proposing the measures introduced by the preceding governments. Eventually, in
February 2003 the Minister of Labour and Social Policies published a blueprint on welfare (Libro bianco sul
Welfare) (www.welfare.gov.it).The White Paper emphasises the aim of ”a social policy that recognises the family
as an active subject and a primary actor in the organisation of the welfare system” and advances proposals of
reform on which, however, it would be premature to express an opinion regarding their possible impact on the
quality of life of families in the years to come.
By the end of 2003, the Government had approved three of the multiple and often indeterminate mea-
sures mentioned in the White Paper. A Government decree with the force of law, dated 16th May, 2003, set up
a financing Fund for employers who organize day nurseries and micro day nurseries in the work place for
infants and small children (aged between 3 months and 3 years), the children of their employees and, where
possible, for the children of the residents of the neighbourhood.The funding granted—to a maximum of EUR
125 000for the day nurseries and 75 thousand for the micro day nurseries—is subject to repayment, for 50%
of the sum advanced, at a rate of interest which is not less than 0.5% per annum. Another government decree
(no. 269 of 30.9.2003) which was subsequently passed by Parliament on 24th November 2003 (Law No. 326)
introduced an allowance equal to EUR 1,000 for each second or subsequent child by order of birth born in the
period 1 December 2003–31 December 2004.The same allowance is also granted to children who are adop-
ted during the same period. The right to this allowance is granted to mothers who are Italian or EU citizens
resident in Italy at the time of the child’s birth or adoption. This measure, which the Government hopes will
encourage the birth rate to increase, has been allocated a total funding of EUR 308 million.
In fact, in Italy the gap between the (ideal) number of children desired and the (actual) number of children
born is quite large at all fertile ages. However, we may express some doubts at this point about the effectiven-
ess of this measure. According to a recent sample survey carried out by the National Institute of Statistics, what
is after all only a negligible quota (14%) of the mothers who do not want to have other children declare that
the reason for this choice is essentially an economic one. More often other reasons are put forward, in particu-
lar the advanced age of the mother, which is mainly due to the late formation of families. Between 1989–90 and
2000–2001 the proportion of young people under the age of 25 who are already parents dropped from 4.7%
to 1.8% while that of young people aged between 25–34 fell from 51.6% to 30.3%.
In recent decades, moreover, important changes have taken place in the mother’s role. At the beginning of
the 1980s only 18.9% of mothers had a high-school diploma; ten years later it was 30.8% and in 2002, 53.3%.
During the same period mothers with a job outside the home increased: they were just 45% in 1980 and they
rose to 53% in 2002; but if one considers the women who had their first child in the period July 2000–June
2001, a good 67.3% had a job. Career demands, the uncertainty of being able to count on the help of relations
and friends, the need to keep some of their time for themselves are often mentioned by mothers as being
much more pressing reasons than economic ones for not wanting to have another child (Istat 2003: 286–293),
not to mention the lack of services designed for young children. In any case, we are inevitably in the field of
conjecture: to evaluate the impact of the measures introduced by the government it will be necessary to wait
at least until the end of 2004.
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Another measure has been added to these with the financial law of 2003.This is the transfer to the Regions of
a Fund of EUR 161 million, to help young couples to buy their first home.This measure has been the object of
severe criticism from opposition parties since only married couples are eligible to receive the contribution,
according to Art. 29 of the Constitution, thus excluding de facto families.
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MONIQUE BORSENBERGER
Luxembourg
Demographic evolution
Over the course of the last ten years, Luxembourg has seen its population grow from 384,400 inhabitants in
1991 to 438,300 inhabitants in 2003. This demographic growth is largely explained by Luxembourg’s familiar
pattern of continual and sustained immigration.Throughout the decade 1990-2000, the number of immigrants
was on average more than 10% per year (compared to the European average of 2.3%).
The proportion of foreigners in the population has also increased as a result, from 29.4% in 1991 to 38.1%
in 20031. This group of foreigners is mainly composed of nationals from the European Union, principally
Portuguese. However, the proportion of non-European nationals has also increased significantly, rising from 9.2%
of the foreign population in 1991, to 24.6% in 2003. In addition, the foreign population in Luxembourg is rela-
tively young, and the birth to death ratio has been largely positive (in favour of births) and in 2001, it overtook
the native replacement rate for the first time.
The fertility rate indicator has not stopped increasing, going from 1.5 in 1980 to 1.62 in 1990 and 1.78 in
2000, decreasing finally to 1.63 in 2002. In 1980, in Luxembourg, women of Luxembourg nationality and women
of foreign nationality shared a fertility-rate indicator of around 1.6. This indicator grew much more quickly for
the foreign nationals, reaching 1.90 in 2000, compared to only 1.70 for Luxembourg women. Since then there
has been a drop in both of these populations, with the 2002 indicator standing at 1.61 for Luxembourg women
and 1.68 for women of foreign nationality.
Like other European countries, Luxembourg is faced with an ageing population, due to a drop in the birth
rate and an increase in life expectancy.There is an increase in the actual number of old people, although their
relative weight in the population as a whole is only slowly increasing.Thus, the number of people over the age
of 65 has increased from 42,800 in 1970 to 61,100 in 2000, which is a growth of 42.8% (but this only re-
presents 12.6% of the total population in 1970 and 14% in 2000.) Regarding the number of people over the
age of 80, their proportion of the population has increased from 1.7% in 1970 to 3% in 2000 (although their
actual number has increased from 5,900 to 13,000, an increase of 120%).
Family relationship
Family relationships have been in a state of flux for the past fifteen years. This has resulted in changed family 
patterns. Living arrangements have become more individualised, and there is now a greater tendency among
families to break up.
Marriage, divorce, birth outside marriage: changing patterns of behaviour 
The number of marriages has decreased over the course of the last ten years, particularly amongst single 
people.The indicator of male first marriages2 fell from 0.653 in 1980 to 0.595 in 1990 and 0.466 in 2002.The
indicator of female first marriages followed the same pattern, going from 0.661 in 1980 to 0.653 in 1990 and
1 This proportion of foreigners (38.1% of the resident population) places Luxembourg first in Europe, followed by
Liechtenstein (34% in 2002) and Switzerland (20% in 2002) (source: http://www.statec.lu/html_fr/statistiques—20 Dec
2004)
2 Indicator of male first marriages: the probability of first marriage for a person who conforms to the rate of marriage
for a given year throughout his/her life.The indicator refers to a fictitious cohort. It is obtained by adding the rates of
first marriage by sex and age observed in a year.
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0.504 in 2002. On the other hand, the number of divorces continues to grow.The divorce rate indicator3, which
was 0.27 in 1980, reached 0.36 in 1990 and 0.51 in 2003. As a corollary to the drop in the number of marriages,
the number of births outside marriage has continued to increase. From 12.9% in 1990, it reached 23.2% in
2002 (it was 6% in 1980).
Family dynamics in household composition
The share of family households4 dropped from 77.4% to 69% between 1986 and 1999, whereas that of non-
family households rose from 22.6% to 31% over the same period. Married couples without children, married
couples with children and extended inter-generational households have all lost shares in household distribution,
while single person households have been on the rise.
Basically, there has been a decline in the proportion of married couples with child(ren) among the under-
30s and the 30–39-year-old age group.The proportion of married couples without children is also decreasing in
the above two age groups.This development is more pronounced among those under 30, 28% in 1986 versus
a mere 10.4% in 1999.
These falls mirror a tendency among the under-30s and the 30–39-year-olds to marry later and have their
first child later, i.e., the number of singles has exploded in these two age groups. In 1985, only 19.6% of those
under 30 were unmarried singles, as opposed to 51.4% in 1999.This trend feeds through to those aged 30–39,
just under 5% belonged to the category of singles in 1986, compared with almost 25% in 1999.
In the same timeframe, the proportion of cohabiting couples without children has leapt from 6.8% to
13.5% among the younger generation and has slightly risen among those aged 30–39 (from 2.9% to 4.6%).
However, in general terms, cohabitation remains a marginal living arrangement and concerned only 5% of
households in 1999 versus 3.5% in 1986.
The proportion of single parent families has gone up slightly, i.e., from 5.9% to 7.2%.This is mainly due to
rising numbers of lone parents in the 40–49 age group, where their proportion rose from 7.1% in 1986 to
13.5% in 1999.This expansion has to be seen within the context of rising divorce figures.The divorce indicator
has been close to 50% since 1997. Moreover, divorcées with children were the top contenders for the status of
single parent family in 1999, whereas in 1985 these had been widow(er)s.The share of unmarried single parent
families remains below 1%.
The number of extended inter-generational families was cut in half, with their proportion dropping from 7%
to 3.6% within the period under review.The most conspicuous changes took place in households of the 40+
generation. Fewer of them now live with one or more elderly parents. In 1986, 10% of these households 
belonged to the category of extended inter-generational households, as opposed to only 3.5% in 1999. In the
50-64 age group, this proportion also dropped from 11.3% to 7.7%.
These figures illustrate the individualisation of living arrangements and in particular the growing autonomy
of older persons. In 1999, people aged 65+ mostly lived as couples, the majority of them without a child (32.7%
to 38.2%) and some with a child (3.7% to 5.7%).The category of extended inter-generational households went
down from 4.3% to 2.4% among family households. The category of ‘other non-family households’ has almost
disappeared within this generation, i.e., 0.2% in 1999 as opposed to 3.2% in 1986.
3 Divorce rate indicator: the probability of divorce for a married person who throughout his/her marriage conforms to
the rate of divorce for a given year.The indicator refers to a fictitious marriage cohort. It is obtained by adding together
the rates of divorce for different marriage durations.
4 For definitions, see box on household typology.
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Types of households
Households have been subdivided into two main categories:
family households, i.e., households comprising couples or at least one parent plus child, and 
non-family households, i.e., all other households.
Both household types have been further subdivided according to generations, i.e., the age of the head
of the household.
Households with children include all such households no matter whether these children are dependent
or not.
The ‘extended intergenerational’ household sub-category favours lineage and includes households
where the person of reference lives with a father and/or mother (father-in-law/mother-in-law) and/or
an uncle and/or aunt and where children may be part of such a living arrangement.
The ‘other extended’ household sub-category includes households where the person of reference lives
with collateral relatives.
Source: Kuepie (2002)
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Sources: PSELL I, PSELL II
Intergenerational solidarity
While family nuclearisation implies the absence of solidarity, we have observed, on the contrary, that family soli-
darity appears to be relatively dense. Thus, the results of a study (Borsenberger 2003) on solidarity between
adults aged 45–64 and their old parents show that residential autonomy between adults and parents is the
most common way of life. However, if we do not observe the oldest form of solidarity, i.e., co-residence, other
forms of solidarity can be explored. Structural solidarity (residential proximity indicator) is extremely high. 70%
of individuals reside no further than 15km away from their parents when they live in Luxembourg. Associative
solidarity (frequent contact) is also very high and includes the majority of individuals as 95% of them have
contact with their parents and 70% have weekly contact with the parent who is living in Luxemburg. Finally, fun-
ctional solidarity (giving help) is common for a large majority of people. 60% of them helped their parents at
least once a year during the last year. These forms of solidarity, which appear relatively strong, could be inter-
preted as a sign of the survival of an enlarged family which is multi-located.
A second study (Borsenberger & Kupie 2003) on solidarity practices between parents and adult children,
without age distinction, leads to the same conclusions: 60% of the individuals have weekly contact with their
parents and more than 50% help them. In spite of an observed household atomisation, solidarity practices are
Table 1: Household distribution by type of household and age of the person of reference 
(1986 and 1999)
1986 Under 30 years 30–39 years 40–49 years 50–64 years Over 65 years Total
Family households
Married couple without child 28.4 13.4 7.4 26.3 32.7 21.3
Unmarried couple without child 6.8 2.9 1.9 0.9 0.7 2.1
Married with child(ren) 31.2 63.9 60.5 33.5 3.7 38.7
Unmarried couple with child(ren) 3.5 2.4 2.3 0.1 0.2 1.4
Lone parent with child(ren) 4.4 4.9 7.1 7.5 4.5 5.9
Extended intergenerational 1.9 4.1 10.0 11.3 4.3 7.0
Other extended household 1.9 0.6 0.6 1.5 0.7 1.0
Non-family households
Unmarried single 19.6 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.9 7.3
Widowed, divorced, other single 1.7 3.1 4.5 11.7 43.2 14.0
Other non-family household 0.7 0.2 0.5 1.2 3.2 1.2
Total households 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1999 Under 30 years 30–39 years 40–49 years 50–64 years Over 65 years Total
Family households
Married couple without child 10.4 9.7 5.1 26.9 38.2 19.4
Unmarried couple without child 13.5 4.6 1.4 2.4 1.1 3.5
Married couple with child(ren) 13.1 46.3 59.0 33.2 5.7 33.0
Unmarried couple with child(ren) 5.7 1.8 1.8 1.0 0.1 1.6
Lone parent with child(ren) 4.2 5.3 13.5 8.2 3.9 7.2
Extended intergenerational 0.4 2.0 3.5 7.7 2.4 3.6
Other extended household 0.2 1.5 0 .3 0.7 0.2 0.6
Non-family households
Unmarried single 51.4 24.8 8.0 6.0 5.3 15.1
Widowed, divorced, other single 0.0 3.4 6.6 13.4 42.0 15.1
Other non-family household 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.8
Total households 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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very high. In addition, we have observed that people who are living without a partner are more established in
these practices. 70% have at least one weekly contact with their parents and 65% help them.To live alone in a
one-person household, not yet being married or being divorced is not negatively correlated with one or the
other form of solidarity. Finally, if more and more individuals are living alone, they seem to compensate this 
residential loneliness with close ties to their parents.
Legislative changes affecting family relationships
Recognition of cohabitation
In his annual state-of-the-nation address, the Prime Minister recalled, on 3 May 2001, the main lines of govern-
ment policy action, and started with a reflection on social life, pleading „for more humanity in inter-personal
relations“. It will become necessary to introduce a number of changes and legislative adjustments to respond to
the development in people’s living arrangements.
The recognition of domestic unions by same-sex and heterosexual couples, which was announced by the
new Christian/Liberal coalition government after the parliamentary elections of 1999, has been under discus-
sion since then and produced a fair amount of paperwork in 2000 and 2001. Originally scheduled to take place
in autumn 2001, the policy-orientation debate in the Chamber of Deputies was postponed until 2002.
Currently, unemployment benefits or the minimum guaranteed income are means-tested based on house-
hold income.This will result in reduced benefit levels being granted to an individual if this individual is cohabiting
with people who do have an income. In terms of tax law, social law, or rights of succession, however, domestic
unions are not recognised. Unmarried couples are thus excluded from aggregated taxation, co-insurance (en-
titlements), and direct line of succession. Those who advocate the recognition of domestic unions want to
remove this inconsistency and see recognition as a means of enabling cohabiting couples to enjoy the afore-
mentioned rights and entitlements.
The Minister of Justice (PCS5), who is responsible for drafting the respective bill, reaffirmed that it was not a
question of creating a second kind of civil marriage. The debate is between the proponents of a minimalist
approach – i.e., legal recognition of domestic unions with special rights and privileges different from those of
married couples – and the proponents of a maximalist approach – i.e., according the same rights and privileges
to married and unmarried couples.
The Greens, the PSOL6 and the gay rights movements are calling for the creation of a legal framework that
goes beyond civil and social law and includes other rights and privileges.These include the right to visit a hospi-
talised partner, the right of adoption, the right of residence for a partner coming from a non-EU country and
protection in matters of tenancy agreements.
Domestic violence and abuse
A law on domestic violence was passed on 8 September 20037. This fairly wide-ranging measure dealt with
domestic violence between those who were married or living together and also covered those older and 
younger8 members of the family living under the same roof. Thus domestic violence does not only take into
account violence against women and children, but also covers violence against the elderly or the disabled.The
effect of this law is to treat domestic violence as a public concern, and no longer as a private matter within the
5 PCS = Christian Social Party
6 PSOL = Socialist Party 
7 Government bill n°4801 of May 2001 on domestic violence modified (1) the law of 31 May 1999 on the police and
the police complaints authority, (2) the penal code, (3) the criminal code teaching, (4) the new code of civil procedure
and (5) the civil code.
8 Regarding the offspring of the spouse or partner, the law only covered children under the age of 18 or those who
were disabled.
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family. The law requires the perpetrator of domestic violence to be expelled from the home for a ten-day 
period, a measure ordered by the prosecution on the basis of information put forward by the police. During
this period, an order can be passed banning the person from the home. On the other hand, the person could
be given back the keys to their home after the ten-day period.
There is still no specific legislation concerning domestic violence. Up until now, acts of violence could come
under the general framework of the penal code or specific laws that do not take aggravated circumstances
(those which make the crime worse) into account for cases of domestic violence.Women who were victims of
domestic violence found themselves confronted with a certain number of problems, the most important being
the need to leave their home and find a place of refuge, which proved difficult if they were not financially in-
dependent. Furthermore, the person who left their home must prove she was the victim of violence. Without
proof, she could be accused of having violated the obligations inherent in the marriage contract, given that the
law requires spouses to cohabit. We also have to bear in mind that Luxembourg’s Civil Code makes a clear
distinction between married and cohabiting couples. Marriage affords additional protection to a spouse who
may have recourse to urgent or special measures (such as asking for measures of protection).
Debate on the reform of the divorce system
In May 2003, a law proposal aimed at the reform of the divorce system and, in particular, suppression of divorce
for reasons of misconduct was introduced. Until now, divorce can be granted for one of three reasons: divorce
for a specific reason (also called divorce for reasons of misconduct), divorce because of actual separation and
divorce by mutual consent.The increase in the number of divorces over the last few years has been matched by
the proportional increase of divorces by mutual consent. In 1998, this proportion was 65% of all divorces, but
divorce for reasons of misconduct was still around 30%.
The reform of the divorce laws, announced in 20019, aims at calming down relationships between divorcing
couples, and, in particular, of reducing the psychological damage within families with children, who will no longer
be faced with legal battles between their parents.The length of the divorce proceedings will, therefore, also be
reduced.This reform will modify the alimony system, making it more equal, as it is more often the women who
suffer financially as a result of divorce. Financial aid has, until now, been seen as helping to feed the family. The
reform’s new objective would be to compensate, to a certain extent, for the divorcing couple’s disparity in in-
come.This could be done by taking into account the length of the marriage, and the amount of time already
dedicated to bringing up children, or the time that the children would need in the future.This last aspect is still
under discussion.
Family policy and social policy
Yearly average equivalent disposable income
In 2003, the yearly average disposable income for individuals was EUR 28,458. Individuals who belong to a
household composed of one man under 65 years or a couple without children and aged less than 65 years
have the highest equivalent disposable income. In the next level we find individuals who belong to other house-
holds without children, households with a couple without children but with one adult aged at least 65 years and
couples with one child. On the other hand, individuals belonging to a household composed of a lone woman
aged 65 years or more, a single parent family, a couple with three children or more or other types of house-
holds without children have an equivalent disposable income which is clearly below the average. Those who
belong to a household composed of a lone man aged 65 years or more, a lone woman aged less than 65 years
or a couple with two children are just below the average.
9 The annual declaration by the government on the social, economic and financial state of the country; known as Annual
Declaration by the Government on the State of the Nation, 3 May 2001.
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Table 2 clearly shows that as soon as a child belongs to the household, the equivalent disposable income of 
individuals sinks below the average with the exception of a couple with one child.
Table 2: Yearly average equivalent disposable income per type of household 
Source PSELL-3/2003, CEPS/INSTEAD
Note: OECD equivalent modified scale
Tax reform
The most important reform in 2001 was the tax reform. Its first stage, concerning the taxation of individuals,
took effect on 1 January 2001.The second stage took effect on 1 January 2002.
The Prime Minister announced this tax reform and its objectives in his government policy statement10 of
August 1999: “The active welfare state has to be effective also in areas where, a priori, we would not expect it,
namely in tax policies. Low-income earners do not pay taxes, or pay hardly any taxes, in Luxembourg. Nothing
will change in this respect.The bottom tax rate of 6% will remain the lowest in Europe. Social justice and higher
taxes for low-income earners are not compatible.This is why a combination of reduced taxes and higher family
benefits will result in improving the situation of families with children.“
The major aspects of the 2001 reform are as follows:
 Tax-exempt earnings are raised from EUR 6,693 to EUR 9,667. This move will be tantamount to a tax
exemption of the social minimum11.
 The second (6%) and the top (46%) taxation brackets are abolished.
 A uniform 2-point reduction in marginal income-tax rates is adopted over the 2000 rates.
 The maximum marginal income-tax rates are reduced from 46% to 42%.
 There is now a uniform design governing the size of all tax brackets.
Scheduled for 2002, the second stage of the reform includes a uniform additional 4-point reduction per taxation
bracket.Thus the bottom marginal income-tax rate will drop from 14% to 10%.The government introduced yet
another reduction by 2 points of the bottom marginal income-tax rate (from 10% to 8%), thus creating a new
income bracket as compared to the 2000 brackets.The maximum marginal income-tax rate has been reduced
from 42% to 38%.
Type of household Disposable income, in EUR
Lone man less than 65 years 34,827
Lone man 65 years or more 27,003
Lone woman less than 65 years 27,316
Lone woman 65 years or more 24,865
Couple without children less than 65 years 33,392
Couple without children, at least one person 65 years or more 29,114
Other households without children 30,375
Single parent family 24,545
Couple with one child 30,759
Couple with two children 26,790
Couple with three children or more 25,194
Other households with children 24,607
Total 28,458
10 Following parliamentary elections in June 1999, a new coalition government was formed. It comprises the Christian
Social Party (PCS) and the Democratic Party (PD). It is the first of its kind after years of coalition governments be-
tween the Christian Social Party and the Socialist Party (PSOL).
11 Minimum guaranteed income.
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 LUXEMBOURG
178 | ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23
This tax reform will place Luxembourg at the head of the European Union in terms of the lowest rate of taxa-
tion on modest incomes, as well as in terms of the lowest rate of taxation on highest incomes.
This reduction in the tax rates coincides with proposals to raise family benefits by EUR 24.7 per month, begin-
ning in January 2002. This increase will help improve the situation of families with children, who usually pay
fewer taxes than those without children and who, because of this, have so far not enjoyed any increase in their
disposable income in the wake of tax cuts.
Table 3: Summary of the Luxembourg tax reform (2001–2002), in Euros
Source: Ministry of Finance (2002)
An income for severely disabled people 
The year 2003 was the European Year of the Disabled, and also saw the passing of a law on income for sever-
ely disabled people.The introduction of this income aimed at making disabled people financially independent by
assuring them of an individual income, irrespective of whether or not they were working, and of giving them
financial status and integrating them into society.
Previously, income awarded to the disabled was paid via social security benefits (supplementary allowance,
family allowances not subject to age restrictions, orphan’s benefit not subject to age restrictions), or via social
insurance benefits such as the RMG (Minimum Guaranteed Income). However, a certain number of people did
not fulfil any of the conditions under which they could claim benefits (age restrictions, level of family income)
and found themselves financially dependent on their families.
The income of disabled people working in business can be reduced, whilst people who work in a training
centre for the disabled are limited to a career development allowance of EUR 250 a month (in 2002). For 
disabled people who do not fulfil any of the conditions for receiving state benefits, this allowance represents
their only income.
The law12 regarding the income of disabled people provides financial compensation for every disabled 
person of working age (aged over 18) who has a job, whether or not they work for an ordinary company or in
a special training centre.This remuneration is calculated according to the hourly minimum wage.
Disabled people who are unfit or unable to work receive an income which is equivalent to the RMG
(Guaranteed Minimum Income), regardless of the level of family income or of the legal maintenance obligation
to care for their children. The State also makes provision for increasing its financial contribution towards the 
training centres set up for the disabled, as well as creating extra jobs in the years to come. In addition, the
government is also making it a priority to increase the number of places available through the housing organiza-
tion for disabled adults, and to expand day-care services for disabled adults and children.
Finally, the Advisory Board for the Disabled (Conseil Supérieur des Personnes Handicapées) has been put
on a legal footing, so that it can become an official government consultative body.
Tax-exempted income 2000 2001 2002 2002
version version
2000 2001
One person 6,693 9,667 9,667 9,750
Two persons or one person and one child 13,386 19,335 19,335 19,400
Income brackets Variable 1,710 1,710 1,650
Top bracket over over over over 
65,443 33,614 33,614 34,500
Minimum rate of taxation 6% 14% 10% 8%
Maximum rate of taxation 46% 42% 38% 38%
12 Government bill n° 4827 concerning the income situation of disabled people, introduced in July 2001.
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Government initiative for taking extended parental leave 
The law of 12 February 1999, concerning the setting up of a national work action plan, introduced parental
leave.13 This measure was to be evaluated in 2003, so that the government could decide whether they would
extend it or, if change was necessary, how to modify it.
By the end of 1993, the evaluation of parental leave had still not been carried out. However, a government
bill had been introduced to extend this measure by increasing the time period for requesting parental leave (by
the salaried person to the employer) by two months, so that the employer could more easily replace the
absent person.Thus, the legislative body responded to the difficulties faced by the employers, but did not redu-
ce the period of leave as the employers had wished.
Presented initially at its launch as an employment measure, it seems as if parental leave has not had a great
effect on the employment market (in terms of creating jobs by the replacement of absent earners.) In addition,
it seems to have affected equal opportunities even less, an intermediate report at the end of 2002 showing that
only 12% of those taking parental leave between 1999 and 2001 were men.
The creation of a Mammerent 
A wide-ranging debate was held around the Rentendësch, the ‘roundtable’ for pensions. Bringing together politi-
cal parties, trade unions, bosses and government, this roundtable took place from mid-March to mid-July 2001.
It followed on from the actuarial and financial evaluation of the general pension insurance scheme carried out
by the International Labour Organisation and which was presented to the government and their social partners
in February 2001.The conclusions of the roundtable were incorporated into the law of the 28 June 2002.
Amongst the short-term measures brought in, we note the introduction of an education package14 that
aims to recognise the work done by parents in educating their children, and to take this into account when 
looking at pensions. Firstly, the benefit of two years’ worth of ‘baby years’15, which are taken into account when
calculating the pension, is extended to children born before 1987.The minimum taken into account for calcula-
ting the baby years was taken as being an amount corresponding to 1.5 times the minimum wage, i.e., EUR
2,049.15. The minimum amount is determined by the child, so that if an individual is bringing up several very
young children, the amount is multiplied by their number. If the previous income was greater than the minimum
amount, then the baby years are calculated according to this earlier income.
13 The law on parental leave allowed a degree of balance between family and professional life, with a guarantee of re-
employment. It came into force on 1 March 1999 and applied to all children born after 31 December 1998, (or to
those children whose adoption proceedings had started after that date). The law entitled each parent to a period of
leave (6 months full time, or 12 months part time). The right to parental leave is an individual right for each earning
parent, be he/she salaried, a civil servant, an apprentice or self-employed. It must, however, be claimed from the
employer (in the case of a salaried person), or the National Benefit Office (in the case of self-employment).The right
to parental leave (for salaried persons) also comprises a guarantee of re-employment. One of the two parents must
take parental leave directly after the period of maternity leave or adoption.The other parent can take the second peri-
od of parental leave (full or part time) before the child reaches the age of 5. If the first parental leave is not taken 
within this period, it is forfeited. Single mothers and fathers can take their parental leave any time until the child is 5.
The two parents can take their part-time parental leave at the same time, (but not full-time leave). Each parent on
parental leave is entitled to a monthly allowance of EUR 1,692.66 during a full-time six-month leave, or EUR 846.33
during a part-time 12-month leave.The allowance is paid regardless of resources and for the full period of leave. It is
non-taxable. Social security contributions are limited to payments for health-care insurance and for national insurance
(compulsory state-administered insurance). Pension contributions are paid for by the State.
14 These measures were adopted on government advice on the 7 December 2001 and will take effect from l July 2002.
15 The State takes responsibility for a 24-month period for the one of the two parents who looks after the child under
the age of 4 (born after the 31 December 1987), as long as the parent has worked for 12 months out of the 36
months preceding the birth or adoption of the child.
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Secondly, the education package of EUR 80.76 per month per child16 is awarded at the age of 60, (or when an
individual first receives a pension), to those people who have dedicated themselves to the raising their children,
on the condition that this person and their partner did not receive the benefit for the baby years.
The individualisation of pension rights was not discussed during the round table discussions, but has been
the subject of discussion by working parties since 2003.
Debate on young people in distress
The care and protection system for young people is currently under discussion.There is a significant number of
requests to place children and adolescents into care institutions. ”More and more families appear to be over-
whelmed by their responsibilities in bringing up their children, and, more and more frequently, the children and
young people placed into care show very serious psychological difficulties more and more frequently.”17 The
Ministry claimed that children and young people ended up in boarding schools because of two main factors,
namely for psychological reasons and for keeping them under control.The Ministry therefore suggested setting
up specific additional care organizations and refuges, and developing a support structure within the wider
framework of the young people and their families.
In addition, the Special Committee on Youth in Distress, (set up in 2000), handed in its report to the
Chamber of Deputies in October 2003 after three years’ work. This report should also be equally useful as a
basis for the work of the Ministry of Justice, which is preparing a reform of the Youth Protection law.
Two working groups have been created to analyse the problems of young people in distress. On the one
hand, a special Parliamentary Commission, created in 2000, presented its report to the Parliament in October
2003. This report constituted the basis of a parliamentary debate in November 2003. On the other hand, an
interministerial group (Justice and Family Ministries) was created in 2000 and presented its report in 2002.
Following the conclusions of these reports, the actual structure of the system ought to be kept and at the same
time adapted with the help of appropriate measures. A criminal law – one of the most important questions in
this debate – should not be introduced. A law project18, based on these reports was laid before Parliament in
June 2004.
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The Netherlands
Introduction
The period that is of central interest here, 2001 to 2003, must be seen within the context of a decision taken
in 1990s. In 1996 the Dutch Cabinet summarised its family-related activities in a booklet entitled ‘Notitie gezin’
[A note on family]. Moreover, it was decided that the Netherlands’ Family Council should present a report on
the family every two years; the first appeared in 2001, the second in 2003.1 In this monitoring report themes
and results from these two family reports will be discussed, along with some additional aspects specific to The
Netherlands.
The definition of the ‘family’
An official definition of ‘family’ was included in the document ‘Notitie Gezin’ of the Dutch Cabinet. According to
this definition, family is defined as a social unit where one or more children are being cared for and/or brought
up.This definition of family is extraordinary in several respects.The relationship between the respective careta-
ker and the child is not specified (filiation, adoption, foster care) and caring is what binds one child or more
children and any adult together as a family. As a consequence, a child that is brought up in an institution makes
those who take care of him or her a family. From this perspective, the difference between a particular parent-
child-bond and an organised way of child rearing (e.g. if there are no longer parents and a child is not adopted
or if the respective parents are defined as incapable of adequate child rearing) is blurred if care over a longer
period can be observed (bringing up). Besides the fact that the definition omits the specificity of the focal
parent-child relationship, one can assume that, given the cultural closeness of motherhood and childhood, the
definition has an implicit gender bias that makes it difficult to bring together men and child rearing.
The French sociologist Durkheim defines family as a combination of partnership and parenthood (Tyrell &
Schulze 2000). The official definition does not refer to partnership at all, although most families in The
Netherlands consist of a combination of partnership (marriage or cohabitation) and parenthood. Where we
see mothers or fathers taking care of their child alone, we know that in the majority of cases this is due to the
fact that the partnership has been terminated by divorce or separation, but partnership of both parents is con-
tinued.2 Moreover, the intention to focus on child rearing as the main domain of family functioning makes it
necessary to integrate partnership into a concept of family. Empirical research in The Netherlands has shown
that conflicts between partners lead to a high probability of child maltreatment (see Keuning et al. 2002).
The restrictive official family definition of the Dutch Cabinet indicates a considerable change, as the 
constitutive element of the family is not marriage but parenthood. In official statistics marriage is still the main
criterion for defining the existence of a family. But of course the situation of two married partners without
children clearly differs in several respects ( e.g. income, labour market participation) from two adult partners
who have children. If these two groups are clustered in statistical tables, a distorted picture will result.
The omission of a reference to relatives in the cited definition on the one hand and to the life course of a
given parent or a child on the other, offers no perspectives to imbed family in a broader context and to define
1 The first Dutch family report based on the decision of the Cabinet was published in 2001 under the title „Gezin: beeld
en werkelijkheid“ [Family: Image and reality]. Nederlandse Gezinsraad: Den Haag.The second report appeared in 2003
under the title „Tussen partners. Gezamenlijke keuzen tijdens de levensloop“ [Between partners. Shared choices
during the life course], Erna Hooghiemstra and Marina Pool (Editors), Nederlandse Gezinsraad: Den Haag.
2 The continuity of parenthood is underlined by the new law on divorce which was introduced on 1 January 1998. From
that time on both ex-partners as a rule continue to be parents to their children. Exceptions must be based on judge-
ment.This law obviously is not inspired by the ‘note on family’ (notitie gezin) issued by the Dutch Government in 1996
(see above).
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family policy in a more comprehensive way, e.g. based on three generations. This is a problem when we 
consider the fact that in The Netherlands, as in many other European Union (EU) countries, the fertility level
dropped a long time ago under the replacement level (1980: 1.62; 1990: 1.62; 2000: 1.72; see Directorate
General for Employment and Social Affairs 2003: 180) with consequences for the welfare state in general and in
particular for intergenerational relationships (Dykstra 2004). In addition, it is clear that the reconciliation of fami-
ly life and paid work needs to be planned paying close attention to the different phases in the life of adults.
To sum up, the chosen family definition offers only few perspectives for family policy. Still the fact that fami-
ly reports are to be carried out is a way that may keep family on the political agenda3 and make it possible to
inform the public about a central societal issue.
Preferred forms of private life in the 1990s
During the past decades we can observe that after the ‘golden age of marriage and the family’ private life no
longer was almost monopolistically organised as family life with a husband as the breadwinner and a wife as the
homemaker (Kuijsten 2002).
This trend which holds true for many Western countries is also to be found in The Netherlands. The
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Institute for Demography (NIDI) has repeatedly carried out research on the 
preferred form of private life in representative samples of the Dutch population. Based on the MOAB-enquête
(‘Meningen en Opvattingen van de bevolking over Aspecten van het Bevolkingsvraagstuk’4) in 2000 and earlier
the following results can be reported (Liefbroer 2002; see Figure 1):
Figure 1: Preferences for Different Forms of Private Life 1990-2000 (%).
Legend: From top to bottom 1) other 2) marriage after leaving the family of orientation
3) living together first, then marriage 4) cohabitation 5) living apart together 6) no permanent relationship.
Source: Liefbroer (2002).
3 The highest political representation of family matters consists of a secretary of state who, apart from other tasks, has
family as her/his major objective.
4 ‘Opinions en orientations of the population over aspects concerning the theme of population’.
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Within the last 10 years, and especially between 1994 and 1997 there has been a significant change. Before this
demarcation line we observe that about 50% of the population wanted to marry directly after leaving the fami-
ly of birth. From 1997 on a majority wanted to start with unmarried cohabitation before eventually deciding to
marry. Moreover, in the given period of time, the percentage of people who preferred to have a relationship
but no co-residence (‘living apart together’) has risen considerably.These remarkable changes should not make
us overlook the fact those who do not want to live together for a longer period of time at all or who want a
private form of life that is different from a pair relationship, is a minority.This means that more than three out of
four people want to marry but many of them want to cohabitate before they exchange rings. If we look at
divorce, we have to take into account that there was a rise in the number of divorces from 12% in the 1970s
to an anticipated 25% or 30% that are assumed to take place today. With respect to preferences, there is no
parallel to the rising divorce rate that took place. During the 1990s, the negative opinion regarding divorce has
increased. In 1990 33% of the population evaluated divorce negatively and in 2000 the corresponding per-
centage was 39%. What we observe here is a discrepancy between the number of divorces and the attitude
people have towards divorce.
Family formation 
Forty percent of all interviewees of a representative sample were of the opinion that you can “only feel happy
in the modern world if you have children of your own“. There is almost no difference between women and men,
the actual family status does not really matter and the same holds for income. Of relevance are the age and the
partnership status of the respondents (Beets 2002). Only 20% of all women with a high level of education 
agreed with this; for women with a low educational level this figure is 60% who agree.These preferences corre-
late with fertility data. Childlessness is to be found more often among women who have reached a high level of
education. The community orientation of children (“In my opinion it is a duty with respect to the community to
have children“) is only to be found among 10% of all respondents.
The question arises of when people want to fulfil their aim to have one child or more. Most women agree
that the age bracket between 25 and 29 is the best to have a first child.Women who have had their first child
after the age of 30 are of the opinion that the preferred age is 30 years of age or over (see Table 1).
Table 1: Opinion of Mothers Regarding the Best Age for Giving Birth to the First Child 
(Total Table = 100%)
Source: Beets 2002
If the ideal age and the real age are compared in more detail (by using one year periods), it may be observed
that 17% of the women show a discrepancy between ideal and real age.The factors that correlate strongly with
the ideal age for giving birth to the first child are the level of education and the age of the mother when she
gave birth to her first child. Evaluation of the timing of the first birth leads to the result that more than four out
of five women and men are satisfied with the timing of the first birth (see Table 2).
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Age of mother when The ‘best’ age for a woman to give birth to N = 225 (=100%)
giving birth to her her first child
first child
<25 years 25–29 years 30+ years Total
<25 years 12 20 1 33
25–29 years 3 44 4 51
30+ years 1 8 7 16
Total 16 73 12 100
Table 2: Evaluation of the Point in Time when the First Child was Born (%)
Source: Beets 2002 
Seen from another perspective, one can say that 20% of all women who have given birth to one or more chil-
dren are not satisfied with the timing of the first child. Apart from personal reasons, it seems clear that here lies
a task for family policy, i.e., to facilitate the birth of a first child at an earlier phase in the life of women. The 
reason is not ‘only’ the convenience of women but clearly the fact that a late birth is associated with high costs
for the budget of the state and growing health risks—as was recently stated in a letter by the Dutch Minister
for Social Affairs which he wrote to Parliament (Spits 2004).The initiative of the minister can be summed up by
the term ‘defensive family policy’.
Dutch policy now seems aware of the high age of mothers giving birth to the first or subsequent children.
What about the average age of first fathers? As partnership age differences are constant over time (Klein & Kop
2002) higher average age at first motherhood should be correlated with that of first fatherhood. Historical 
research reveals that between 1812 and 1922, the average age of men who became a father for the first time
oscillated between 34 and 36 years of age. Observations were taken up again in 1940 and continued to the
middle of the 1990s.This period has the form of a V if the father’s average age is presented in the vertical and
the chronological time in the horizontal axis (Poppel & Mandemakers 2002). Around 1940 first fathers on 
average were about 34 years old. Until the beginning of the 1970s the average age decreases and reaches a low
at the age of 30 and from that time on the average male who becomes a father for the first time is 34 again. At
the beginning of the period less than 0.5% of the first fathers were 50 years or older; this percentage has risen
to just under 1% in the mid-1990s.
Child rearing and parental childcare
The central theme in this section is the division of childcare in two parent families.
An overall assessment of child rearing 
There is no definitive answer to the question concerning the quality of child rearing by one or two parents.This
has to do with the preconditions necessary to give a well-founded answer. Unlike any observation of the eco-
nomic situation, there is no permanent observation of the quality of family functioning which would make it pos-
sible to develop reliable and valid indicators which serve for intertemporal comparison.The first representative
research in The Netherlands in the field of child rearing in the family was published in 1996 (Rispens et al.) and
has not been repeated since.The report came to the conclusion that in the majority of families, the quality of
child rearing is acceptable to good. Depending on the chosen criteria, there was a minority of families, 10-15%,
where support for parents and children was seen as necessary. As this research was not repeated, it is impos-
sible to present a comprehensive picture of the present quality of child rearing in the family in The Netherlands.
Within the public debate we are repeatedly confronted with groups of people who are regarded as risk
groups. We shall present the risk groups and point to the effects of these groups on the development of the
children that grow up in them. Two main themes emerged. The first refers to types of families which are 
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Age of mother when "Evaluated from the perspective The time of the birth N (=100%)
giving birth to her after the birth it would have been of the first child 
first child better if the first child was (almost) correct
... was born before." ... was born later."
< 25 years 3 22 75 119
25–29 years 10 3 88 217
30+ years 29 0 71 86
Total 12 8 81 422
Women in this group 10 9 81 226
structurally different from the two-parent family with a woman and a man living together as (married) partners
and their children.The second refers to family types that differ from the reference type by nationality, income or
process bound risks such as psychological, physical and social problems or strong tensions in partnership and
parenthood.
First of all we shall give an overview of different risk groups. From a total of about 2,400,000 families in The
Netherlands, there are about 5,000 parents of the same sex and about 20,000 are non-biological parents. In
80,000 families parental (neglect, physical, sexual and/or psychological) abuse is being reported and it is estima-
ted that about 50 children per year die as a consequence of maltreatment. About 100,000 parents are addicts,
there are about 100,000 step-parents, about 150,000 families who do not have Dutch nationality, about
120,000 families with a long-standing low income and about 250,000 one-parent families (Nederlandse
Gezinsraad 2001: chapter 3.2).
The presentation of risk groups can be divided into two clusters. One cluster refers to family types that
diverge structurally from the two parent family with a (married) wife and husband and their own child or chil-
dren. Another cluster refers to personal deficiencies of the parents (addiction, depression) or culture and
poverty. In those cases where risks are linked to process variables of the family, one may assume that the risks
probably will damage children in their emotional, cognitive and social development.
The process characteristics that are seen as a risk for the quality of child development can be summarised
under the heading of all different forms of child maltreatment (neglect, harsh treatment, degradation, sexual
abuse and conflict within the partnership).The above-mentioned process characteristics in particular have to be
seen as a negative condition for child development and as a possible cause for long lasting and severe problems
for children and adolescents.This means that structurally intact families are no guarantee for high child rearing
quality.The finding that structural characteristics of families are less important for the development of children
than process characteristics is supported by international research results (Golombok 2000).
The central position of processes within the family for the well-being of the single member of the family
can be explained by the buffer function of the family.With a positive stream of internal processes the family can
protect its members against adversities which are common to all members (e.g. poverty) and (re-)establish
trust and readiness to take action in case of problems which pertain to a single member (e.g. problems in
school or at work). Where the required ‘proximal processes’ (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci 1994; Schulze 2000), i.e.
concrete interactions of a given child with other persons, materials or symbols, do not occur or occur too
rarely, members of the family are deprived of positive experiences within the family and there is a great chance
that problematic experiences both outside and inside the family will be reinforced within the family.
The prevailing observation that families which belong to risk groups in the field of child rearing are charac-
terised by risks defined by process oriented characteristics, is supported by the following estimates.The highest
risks for children to become deviant or incapable of acting in an accepted way, is in the cluster of families where
abuse is observed: 30–50% of all children from these families show intolerable or unfavourable behaviour. In the
second place are children with parents who are addicts, 25–33% of them show deviant (in a broad sense)
behaviour.The negative effects of long-standing poverty can be observed in 5–15% of the respective offspring.
In non-Dutch families the respective percentages are 4–8% and for one-parent families 1–2% (Nederlandse
Gezinsraad 2001).
Another way of estimating the quality of parental child rearing is very often by looking at deviant adoles-
cents. One of the dominant themes in the mass media is criminal behaviour of adolescents and especially those
with a non-Dutch background. For example, we can select a virtual inner city district in one of the big Dutch
cities where 10,000 adolescents live; 6,000 would have Dutch nationality and 4,000 would have non-Dutch
nationality. It would not be uncommon to observe that 240 non-Dutch adolescents and 60 Dutch adolescents
in this inner city district would have contact with the police. If we relate that to the two populations of the
district, we see that the risk percentage for non-Dutch adolescents is 6% and the respective percentage for
Dutch adolescents is 1%. In general, this shows that, by far, most Dutch and non-Dutch parents have well-ad-
justed children. Moreover, the proportions of police contacts (80% for non-Dutch adolescents and 20% for
Dutch adolescents) are misleading. This does not mean that there are no risk groups which need more and 
earlier attention according to the Convention on the Rights of Children.
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Parental division of care for children
Although women have enhanced their contribution to paid work outside the home, the analysis of time series
concludes that parents on average have spent more time caring for their children in recent years (Van den
Broek et al. 2001, Gauthier et al. 2002). In 1985 women spent about seven hours and men about 2.5 hours
caring for their children. In 2000 the amount of time had risen to eight hours for mothers and four hours for
fathers.We have to take into account that the given data from time budget research relate to primary activities.
As we know from this kind of research, care for children is often a secondary activity and other jobs have prio-
rity (Hooghiemstra et al. 2002).
In the vast majority of families mothers fulfil most care tasks. But there are families in which these jobs are
more evenly distributed. In two-parent families where women have a higher education and/or a higher income,
men have a higher share in childcare (Van Dijk 1994). The higher share cannot only be attributed to the fact
that men spend more time in this area of activities, but also to the fact that higher educated women and/or
women with a high income spend less time taking care of their children (Breedveld 2000). Moreover, women
and men distribute their care work more evenly the more they have friends and acquaintances with more
modern values (Van Dijk 1994).
The authorities not only want to stimulate young mothers to continue paid work, but they also want to
give fathers more opportunity of taking care of their children. Parental care in The Netherlands concerns the
right of mothers and fathers to take unpaid parental leave. In 2001 only 25% of the employees really made use
of this opportunity (Portegijs et al. 2002). Unpaid parental leave is taken up by mothers in 42% of all cases and
by men in 12% of all cases.Two reasons contribute to this uneven distribution; collective agreements in ‘female’
sectors of the labour market support the use of parental leave schemes and the reduction of paid work by 
fathers would have a more negative impact on the shared household budget than the reduction of paid work
by mothers (Schulze & Tyrell 2002).
Paid work
One of the most salient changes that have taken place during recent decades in the labour market refers to the
participation of women in paid work. In 2001 more than half of all women had a paid job of 12 hours or more
per week (as defined by Statistics Netherlands). Some 10 years ago women in the workforce were in a minori-
ty at 39%.Time budget research confirms the considerable growth in women’s participation in paid work. If we
apply the definition of Statistics Netherlands then we can see that men spent more hours than women in paid
work in recent years. The difference between men and women has even increased. In 2000 men on average
spent 38.6 hours per week in paid work whereas women on average spent 27.5 hours.The Netherlands has a
female culture of part-time paid work that is unknown in other European countries.
Although paid work has become a normal part of adult life for women in The Netherlands, there are con-
siderable differences with respect to the time spent in paid labour in different phases of the life course. This
becomes clear if we compare different cohorts: 72% of all women in the age bracket between 25 to under 35
are active in the labour market; In the age bracket between 35 and under 45 women have a paid job in 64% of
all cases and for women between the ages of 45 and under 55 this figure is 55%. Women in the age bracket
between 55 and 65 do paid work in 20% of all cases.
Conspicuous changes in participation in paid work become clear when women have children. In the prece-
ding phase of their lives most women do paid work (if one takes into account every job, independently of the
amount of hours per week, the percentage is 82%). After giving birth to the first child participation drops by
10%.Two thirds of all women who continue to do paid work after having given birth to their first child reduce
the weekly amount of time they spend doing it. During recent years the percentage of women that left the
labour market after becoming a mother decreased considerably. The percentage of women continuing paid
work after motherhood is correlated with the level of education. The higher the educational level, the more
women continue to stay in the labour force after motherhood, and this on top of the fact that participation in
paid labour is positively correlated with educational level before motherhood. Within the last few years, a 
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growing differentiation between women has taken place if we take into account their educational level and par-
ticipation in paid labour before and after motherhood (see Knijn & van Wel 2001).
During the past few years those partnerships where husband and wife participated in paid labour have
become numerous (Reemers 2003). In 1995 41% of all pairs in the age bracket between 15 and 64 were part
of the labour force, be it full time or part time. In 2002 the percentage rose to 55%. In the period between
1995 and 2002 the percentage of households belonging to the type where one of the partners is the only
breadwinner and the other is the home holder dropped from 39% to 30%. In 2002 many couples preferred to
combine a full-time job with a part-time job.This type is chosen by 36%. In only 5% of all cases do both part-
ners have a part time job, but this percentage is growing slowly. If we relate type of job with type of household,
we find that two full-time jobs are to be found by preference among partners without children. Where part-
ners have children, the largest category prefers to have one and a half jobs (44%) but with 36% the bread-
winner and home holder model is still going strong.The amount of work that is of relevance here in order to
differentiate between participation and non-participation in paid labour concerns 11 hours or more per week.
Household work
Since 1975 the Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau has been carrying out research in time budgets of men and
women (Breedveld & Van den Broek 2001).The results show that women spend less and less time on house-
hold chores. In 1997 women spent 25.5 hours on average doing household tasks. In 2000 the average fell to 21
hours.The reduction can be attributed mainly to tasks such as shopping, cooking and washing (Keuzenkamp &
Oudhof 2000).
With respect to men we observe a growing number of hours per week spent on household jobs. In 1975
the average amounted to seven hours a week and in 2000 the corresponding average was 10 hours.The differ-
ence in hours that are invested in household tasks by women and men is being reduced slowly. However, the
lion’s share of household chores is still being done by women.
The average data make differences that exist within different categories of women invisible.There is a great
difference between women with and without young children. Women with young children invest more time in
household jobs than women without children. A lot of women who become mothers for the first time reduce
the amount of paid work in order to be able to fulfil more household tasks and to care for their child.
The growing participation of women in paid work has been accompanied by changes with respect to the
division of labour within the household. According to a recent poll (Gezinsmonitor), in 52% of all families mem-
bers say that the division of labour at home is not taken for granted any longer. Even so people do not talk a lot
about the allocation of household work. In 97% of all families partners say that they do only talk a little about
the division of household chores and the majority does not feel the need to talk more on this subject. If part-
ners discuss household matters, they talk about specific matters and not about the general division of labour.
Relevant themes are ‘who is doing the washing?’ and ‘who fills in the tax form?’ Such questions can lead to 
conflicts in 91% of all partnerships.
The allocation of eight tasks (washing, cooking, cleaning, shopping, administration, gardening, taxation, minor
repairs) reveals that some tasks that are done primarily by women (washing, cooking, cleaning, shopping, ad-
ministration). Men have only one domain where they do more (repairs). Shopping is the activity where both
partners cooperate the most and filling in the tax form is the task where the largest percentage ‘done by
others’ appears and presumably those pairs make use of the professional services of an accountant.
Inter-temporal comparison reveals that changes have taken place in recent decades. With respect to the
indicators mentioned, one can say that in 40% of all households men and women do the same amount of tasks
which does not mean that they invest the same amount of time. In 12% of all families men do most household
tasks and this is a result that we would not have found some 50 years ago.This does not detract from the fact
that in most households the majority of household work is done by women. Since many women have part time
jobs the skewed distribution of household labour is widely accepted within the partnership.
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Extra familial childcare 
Three themes are to be found in this section. The first part deals with the provision of childcare. The second
presents the results of a project that deals with the consequences of flexible childcare for the children.The third
part presents the public discussion that encompasses policy, parental opinion and the place of social science.
Childcare provisions
In order to enhance the participation of women in paid work the authorities have stimulated provisions for
extra familial childcare. In 1989 there were 18,000 places for children up to four years (the age at which most
children enter school) and in 2001 there were 102,000 places (Berg-le Clercg et al. 2002).At the same time the
number of employees in this sector rose from 4,546 in 1989 to 43,611.The percentage of children participating
in extra familial childcare was 4.6% in 1989 and is 22.5% in 2001.
The attitudes of the Dutch population with respect to the use of extra familial childcare and with respect
to the working mother have become milder than in former times. In 1985 43% of interviewees had objections
to extra familial childcare and in 1997 objections were down to 25% (for the flexibility of childcare and its con-
sequences for children see below).
A lot of Dutch parents not only make use of centre-based childcare, they also take their children to play
groups, to families with several children and a care taker who is prepared for this task and to relatives, friends
and informal care takers; they often make use of several forms of care in a given period of the life of the child.
Higher educated women, women with a relatively high number of working hours in paid work and mothers
working in a sector of the labour market with more facilities for childcare have a tendency to opt for centre
care. Women with a lower educational level and fewer hours paid work have a tendency to make use of 
informal extra familial day care for their children. If informal care is being used, parents and parents-in-law and
paid informal care are the favourite choices (Knijn and van Wel 2001).
Flexibility in day care5
Aims and characteristics of the research project
In recent years, parents using the services of centre day care have urged childcare centres to extend their 
flexible childcare facilities, in order to enable them to optimally combine work and family demands. This has
challenged the childcare field to find the right balance between parental needs, child needs, and professional
caregiver needs without reducing the quality of care standards.This research project was started in response to
concerns in the childcare field about possible detrimental effects of flexible childcare on individual children. We
wanted to understand how children experience non-standard childcare hours. Our first aim was to obtain an
insight into the degree to which Dutch parents use flexible child-care facilities. Our second aim was to develop
and test an index for flexible childcare as well as an index that would describe the child’s daily experiences of
stability in centre care. When children have more flexible childcare, this may have some impact on their daily
experiences of stability in care.We expected daily stability in care patterns to be a crucial factor in how children
adjust to flexible childcare. Our third aim was to explore the associations of flexible childcare with daily stability
in care, with the child’s adjustment and with caregivers’ positive behaviour towards the child.
Flexibility
There is a degree of flexibility with respect to the amount of hours children attended day care. Most children
participating in our study attended the day-care centre for five or six half days per week. Only a few children
5 The text in this paragraph is a selection of quotes from the summary of the dissertation of Clasien de Schipper
(2003). Some results of the study are summarised in De Schipper et al. 2003.
attended the centre more than seven half-days (14% in the survey and 2% in the observational study). Recent
findings of the NICHD Early Childcare Research Network (2002) indicate higher levels of problem behaviour
prior to school entry when children spend more hours in non-maternal care. The effects of flexible childcare
may be more negative if children were to attend the day-care centre for a greater number of hours per week.
Main results
Although we found some negative effects of flexible childcare with respect to non-compliance of children, over-
all some flexible childcare in itself appears not to be a decisive factor in relation to adverse effects on child-
care quality and a child’s adjustment to day care. Rather, the organization of (flexible) childcare makes a 
difference to the child’s process of adapting to the day-care setting. A child who experiences less stability and
continuity in (flexible) day care, in particular less caregiver availability, as well as more changes in teaching staff,
and several parallel care arrangements, is less likely to have positive experiences in a day-care setting.
We found, rather unexpectedly, that more daily stability in care was related to lower quality of care for
toddlers and preschool children. In particular, more caregiver detachment and more flatness of affect were re-
lated to higher daily stability in caregivers, peers and programme structure. This result was not in accordance
with previous research on caregiver stability and quality of caregiver-child relationships (Barnas & Cummings
1994, Howes & Hamilton 1992, Raikes 1993). It may be that caregivers are aware of this instability in care and
compensate by being more positively oriented towards these children. Another explanation is that when there
is more daily caregiver stability, caregivers probably know each other better and may be more oriented towards
each other and less towards the children in the group, compared to caregivers who work with a larger number
of different colleagues. It may be the deliberate policy of a day-care centre to prefer more instability in staffing
and grouping patterns in order to combine groups in activities and to extend the child’s interactions with other
children and other caregivers outside his or her own care group.This choice for a so-called ‘open door’ policy
might especially motivate caregivers to involve children in activities and to stimulate their development. Further
research into the relationship between caregiver stability, caregiver involvement and quality of caregiver be-
haviour is needed to discover whether this result was sample specific, and to explore alternative hypotheses to
the present finding.
Independently of the project presented (De Schipper 2003), it is important also to present some results
about inter-temporal and comparative research on the quality of day care for children in The Netherlands.
Based on results of different projects, Fukking & Van IJzendoorn (2004) conclude that Dutch day care, assessed
in an international perspective was better than average in 1996 and on an average level in comparison to
results in 2002. In other words, the quality of day care in The Netherlands is decreasing.This observation refers
to the quality of processes that children experience.The position of Dutch day care seems relatively strong in
the field of infrastructure and personal care and relatively weak with respect to stimulation of cognitive and 
language development. As the basis for an international assessment is not yet ideal, the authors would welcome
the introduction of a permanent standardised national monitoring system.
Public discussion concerning advantages and disadvantages of childcare 
During spring 2002 when political discussions around new political leaders, movements and parties comman-
ded most of the attention of the media and the public, a different topic became front page news, i.e., childcare
and the question of whether it is a risky affair for the development of children.
Carlo Schuengel (2002) observed and commented on the debate. His lucid article is the source of the fol-
lowing information. In her inaugural speech at the Catholic University of Nijmegen at the beginning of 2002,
developmental psychologist Marianne Riksen-Wallraven (2002) spelled out the possible negative consequences
for very young children of going to childcare centres. Her warning was based on results of her own research
and also research done by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) in the
USA, which were not yet published at the point in time when the warning was given (see Belsky 2001, see the
published results in, e.g. Allhusen et al. 2002, Fearon & Belsky 2004 ).The NICHD research project is the most
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elaborate research in the field and includes more than 1000 families in different towns and in different social
classes. Besides the positive consequences of participation of children in childcare centres, it was found that
irrespective of type or quality of childcare the number of hours that young children spend in an institution pre-
dicts the number of behaviour problems that are observed by the professional staff in the centres.
Some scientists commenting on the warning had doubts about its basis. One of the main arguments against
the warning was that it refers only to a small subgroup, i.e., children who attend childcare more than 30 hours
per week; these children on average had four points more on the score for problematic behaviour than those
children who attend the centre about 10 hours per week.The question arises whether this difference is of rele-
vance.This is not only a question of statistical significance but it is also a question of relevance, i.e., of the num-
ber of children to whom the observations apply. Based on several assumptions, one can say that 13% of those
children who use day care many hours a week stand a chance of scoring in the clinical range and 33% have the
chance to score in the sub-clinical range whereas those children who visit day care to a lesser extent have only
a 7% chance of getting a clinical score and 13% have the chance of ending up in the sub-clinical range.
If one compares the effect size of the given research with effect sizes in health research, it becomes obvious
that the given results matter. As there is no objective norm that draws a universal and valid distinction between
unimportant and relevant effects, it is crucial to check the arguments for one position or the other. With 
respect to this, one can cite arguments which refer to biological data. Riksen-Wallraven (2002) points to 
research that children in day care show a different level of stress-related hormones in their blood during a typi-
cal day than children who stay at home. Up until now it is not yet clear whether or not this is the result of 
causal mechanisms but it is an observation that makes it plausible that participation in childcare not only 
pertains to behaviour (which is often devaluated in its objectivity) but also to biological parameters.
As the biological aspect has to be included in future research, the question arises, how can a warning against
childcare for very young children be issued now and does a scientist restrict her- or himself to the publication of
facts or not? Riksen-Wallraven’s step from results to a value-loaded warning can be seen as a task that is com-
patible with the idea of empirical-analytical science, i.e., to stimulate a theoretical and a public debate which
seems to be immobile. Moreover, it makes sense to consider ideology critique in order to destroy false assump-
tions and beliefs. Riksen-Wallraven can be seen as someone who wants to strengthen the arguments of parents
who:
 Doubt that children are endless in their flexibility and can adapt to whatever circumstances in their early life
without experiencing risks;
 Are under pressure to (continue to) do paid work in a tight labour market;
 Bring up for discussion the position of children, as it seems that their perspectives are not always taken into
account in modern society.
It is perceived as important that the role of the scientific specialist does not stop when the results are presen-
ted in numbers and coefficients. Social science also has the task of strengthening the role of parents and chil-
dren within a societal and political environment that very often is indolent to requests which pertain to the
quality of the development of the next generation (Kaufmann 2002).
Family policy
Knijn & Hooghiemstra (2004) wrote an essay in which they describe three fields for family policy in The
Netherlands. These three aspects will be presented partly here and some arguments will be added to finalise
this report.
Fertility
Although the level of family policy measures is relatively small, the level of fertility in The Netherlands is rather
high (total fertility rate is 1.72 in 2000; see Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs 2003).
However, one cannot overlook the fact that the fertility is below replacement level. Official ignorance of this
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fact is deemed to be short-sighted as the population is getting older and the more this process continues the
less it can be changed.This has consequences for all systems of social security and also for the care and cure
system. As those with a higher education remain more and more childless or have only few children, children
are born to those who have a lower income. International comparison shows that the difference in purchasing
power between people with and without children in The Netherlands is greater than in all other countries of
the European Union (Europese Unie 2000) and so the process of polarisation between those with and those
without children may continue (Schulze & Tyrell 2002). Moreover, we may assume that the fertility level will be
reduced where family and marriage are highly valued, women are considered to be the exclusive caretaker and
home holder and provisions to combine paid work and family tasks are scarce (Engelhardt & Prskawetz 2004,
Künzler 2002).
Productivity
The growth in participation in paid work by women has been considerable during recent years. After years of a
policy that stimulates part-time work for women in order to give them the chance to continue to be the main
provider of care and to do most of the household chores, the question arises whether this policy has had a
negative result. It seems that the combination of care and work is possible, but this does not seem to be the
case for family life and professional work. As parents in The Netherlands prefer to do their tasks of care (of
children and relatives) on their own, the Dutch authorities have developed measures that allow for this combi-
nation.The background of these measures is a defensive one as the authorities did not want women to leave
the labour market completely (Hooghiemstra et al. 2002). If observations from other countries can be transfer-
red to The Netherlands it seems plausible to assume that the reconciliation of family roles and professional
roles can only be realised if there is a ‘critical mass’ in the population demanding change of policies for a suffi-
ciently long period of time. The present system of individualised responsibility for building up claims to the 
social welfare system and the institutionalisation of part-time work have presumably restricted the productivity
of the population. It seems about time to establish a family policy that allows for the effective use of the existing
productive human capital and gives parents the guarantee that their children are being cared for at a high 
qualitative level.
Care
The network of relatives is the strongest source of care. Parents have invested more time in their care for chil-
dren in recent years. Old parents receive a lot of attention from their adult children.The fact that Dutch parents
are reluctant to make use of day care may be just as well attributed to cultural orientations as to family policy.
In this situation it must be observed that the political parties seem to want to reduce the legal standards that
apply for day-care provisions. If this plan is to be realised we will either see parents refrain from using the 
provisions, or the level of day care will develop negatively.Very probably the consequences for the development
of human capital would not be positive. If we add this observation to the fact that Dutch women have only 10
weeks of maternal leave and no job guarantee—whereby the health of the child and the mother is exposed to
risks that in principle can easily be removed (Ruhm 2000) —then we must assume that the political system in
The Netherlands is ‘indolent’ (Künzler 2002: 277) with respect to the needs of (potential) mothers, (potential)
fathers and children.
Summarising the facts that fertility is not yet perceived as an important theme on the political agenda, that
reconciliation between paid work and family life is below the requested level that allows for the effective use
and reproduction of human capital and that extra familial care provision must at least maintain or improve its
standards, we must conclude that there is a great demand for an active family policy. According to a speech of
the Secretary of State who is in charge of family policy (on 15 May 2004 during the opening of a symposium at
the 10th anniversary of the Year of the Family organised by the Netherlands Family Council) the Dutch Cabinet
is going to present a plan for an integral family policy in 2004. It will be observed with great attention, as it is
clearly a challenging task.
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KARIN WALL
Portugal
Introduction
From the point of view of family change and family policies, Portugal represents an interesting and challenging
profile. Looked at overall, and considering the last few decades, it undoubtedly belongs to the Southern
European pattern characterised by a strong ideological commitment to the family, demographic trends which
began later than in Northern countries and from a lower base, more family-centred living arrangements and a
low or ‘rudimentary’ profile as far as family policy is concerned. Looked at more closely, with a particular focus
on the 1990s, Portugal may be depicted as a country moving at its own pace and with developments that are
strongly embedded in its social history and national culture and institutions.The impact of the 1974 revolution,
which ended almost 50 years of a right wing dictatorship, bringing in clear-cut changes in values, legislation and
State responsibility for families, strong recognition of women’s work, persistent cleavages between secular and
religious tendencies, and the new logic of partnership between the State and non-profit institutions, are some
of the specific features of the Portuguese national context which may be emphasized.They have contributed to
developments in family patterns and policy which imply some dissimilarities of outcome in relation to other
Southern European countries, such as the prevalence of dual-earner (full-time working) couples, fairly high
divorce rates, emphasis on provision for childcare facilities and links between family policy and policy for gender
equality. Rather than divergence, however, it might be more correct to make an argument of diversity. Within
the ‘Continental’ welfare state model, Portugal reflects a specific pathway which is difficult to place in the 
existing categories and seems to fall somewhere between the ‘Latin Rim’ model and Gauthier’s Continental
‘pro-family/pro-natalist’ model (Gauthier 1996).
Taking family change in Portuguese society as its departure point, this report will seek to provide a summa-
rized review of the trends and issues involved in family change and family policy in Portugal since the late 1990s.
It will be divided into two sections.The first part describes the main changes and trends affecting family life in
Portugal during the last decade.The second seeks to identify the main developments in family policy over the
last few years and to draw attention to some of the challenges raised for the State and public policy in general
by these changes.
Family change 
Demographic trends and family patterns have been changing significantly since the 1970s. The last decade did
not bring any major changes but, rather, further development of previous trends. Using a differentiated 
approach to analyse family life, we can underline four main areas of change.
Change in family formation and dissolution
In common with the rest of Europe, statistics show a pattern of later and less popular marriage, more marriages
preceded by cohabitation and extra-marital childbearing, rising rates of divorce and remarriage and low levels
of fertility (Almeida et al. 2000, INE 2003, Carrilho & Patrício 2004). Compared to previous decades, the 1990s
reveal a more pronounced development in some of these indicators: the marriage rate declined from 7.3 in
1991 to 5.7 in 2001 (still slightly higher than the European Union (EU) average of 5.1), women’s mean age at
first marriage rose from 24.4 to 26.1, Catholic marriages dropped from 72% to 63% and the percentage of bir-
ths outside marriage and of cohabiting couples, albeit lower than in Northern European countries, increased
strongly: births outside marriage now represent a quarter of all live births (only 10% in 1981 and 16% in 1991)
and cohabiting couples almost doubled (from 3.9% in 1991 to 6.9% of the total number of couples in 2001).
Together with the changes that have taken place in the life of couples, divorce has also increased steadily over
the last decade: the divorce rate rose from 1.1 in 1991 to 1.3 in 1996, 1.5 in 1998, 1.8 in 2001 and 2.7 in 2002,
thus bringing it closer to that of Northern European countries than to that of its neighbours in Southern
Europe.
There has been less change over the last decade where fertility is concerned. Fertility rates fell rapidly to
low levels in the 1970s and 1980s but remained more or less stable over the last decade, levelling out at about
1.5 (1.56 in 1991, 1.44 in 1996, 1.48 in 1998, 1.56 in 2000, 1.47 in 2002). As in other countries, the ideal num-
ber of children for Portuguese women is two to three but ‘under-attainment’ is frequent. Three main reasons
are given by the women themselves for not attaining their preferred number of children: difficult living condi-
tions (related to housing, living standards, long dependency of children, educational expenses), reconciliation
problems, and the health or age (too old) of the mother (Cunha 2004). As in France or the UK, under-attain-
ment tends to be linked to a large proportion of one-child families rather than to childlessness.
Change in household and family structures
Some of the most interesting developments have been taking place in family and household composition. In the
1970s and early 1980s, average household size was still high (3.7 in 1970 and 3.4 in 1981) and very large fami-
lies with more than five persons were frequent (16% in 1970 and 11% in 1981). Average family size has since
declined, down to 2.8 in 2001, and very large families are a rarity (only 3% in 2001).This decrease is due to the
fall in fertility and families with many children but also to a decline in complex family households (Aboim 2003,
Wall & Aboim 2003).
Changes in living arrangements during the 1990s followed four main trends.The proportion of one–person
households increased to 17% (up from 14%) and this upward trend was based on an increase at both ends of
the age range: young people leaving home and elderly people living on their own (Guerreiro 2003). However,
such households are still far less numerous than married couples with children (41% in 2001) and, when seen in
a comparative perspective, they are well below the proportions currently found in Northern European coun-
tries. Couples with children also featured a slight downward trend, and couples without children an upward
trend but, overall, it is important to highlight that the family form comprising couples with children still repre-
sents the predominant household pattern.
A third trend is related to an increase in lone parent families (7% of all households in 2001). Up to the
1990s, the increase in lone parent families with dependent children was due more to the effects of divorce and
separation than to births out of wedlock. However, in the 1990s, lone parent households of never-married
single mothers increased much more than those of divorced women (Wall 2003). Of all lone parent families
with dependent children in 2001, over a quarter (26%) were never-married single women (almost double the
proportion in 1991), 58% were divorced or separated and 17% were widows. Another significant feature of
lone parents is that a very high proportion, in particular of single never-married parents, live in complex family
households, usually with their parents (39% of all lone parents; 59% of single lone parents, in 2001).
The fourth and last development is related to the downward trend in complex family households (Vascon-
celos 2003). Contrary to popular myth, these extended or multiple family households were never a predomi-
nant family form in the past (in 1960 they represented 15% of all households and evidence from the past
shows considerable variation, with proportions varying from very low percentages to higher ones that rarely go
beyond 20%). Also, in terms of ideal norms, and with the exception of peasant stem families, neo-local residen-
ce has always been the desired norm for newly formed couples (Wall 1998a). During the last decade, the per-
centage of complex family households dropped to 10%, a much lower number than in the past but neverthe-
less a fairly high one when placed in the European context. A survey carried out in 1999 on couples with chil-
dren who married in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s showed that intergenerational support in case of need
is the most important underlying factor for co-residence with other relatives (Wall 2004a).When support flows
towards the younger generation, lack of housing and economic problems, which hinder access to independent
housing, are the major motives for co-residence. However, the need for newly formed couples to share their
living arrangements with relatives dropped sharply during the late 1980s and 1990s (from about one third to
one fifth of all couples). When support flows in the direction of the older generation, two main reasons are
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cited: support in sickness, on the one hand, and support in cases of solitude or isolation, on the other. The
importance of this last situation, in which adult or elderly relatives are taken in to avoid loneliness, indicates a
more family-oriented culture where living alone may be perceived as deprivation rather than as a positive 
symbol of the individual’s autonomy.
In summary, the increase in economic welfare in Portuguese society has been leading to greater residential
independence of young couples and families with children. Fewer couples start out their family life by living in
their parents’ household. However, a very high proportion of lone parents with dependent children continue to
live with other relatives. Thus, although we may still expect some decline in household complexity due to
improved living and housing conditions and also to a gradual emphasis on the importance of individual auto-
nomy, other factors point to the continued importance of complexity in response not only to intergenerational
support in old age and in solitude, but also as a consequence of a rise in lone parenthood.
Change in the division of labour
The division of labour within the family and the behaviour of families in relation to the labour market have
changed significantly over the last decades in Portugal. Of particular importance has been the increased labour
force participation of women, especially of married women and those with young children, and the rise in
women’s educational attainment.The proportion of economically active women aged 15–64 rose from 18% in
1960 to 53% in 1991 and this trend continued during the late 1990s (62% in 1998 and 65% in 2001).
The overall growth in female employment is related to profound changes in the activity rates of different
age groups. Expansion of female employment in the 1960s was based on the increased activity rates of women
in younger age groups and single women. Marriage and, in particular, the birth of the first child were, until the
1970s, major barriers to continued economic activity.This difference gradually decreased in the following deca-
des, partly due to changes in social values and legislation introduced after the revolution, and partly to the eco-
nomic advantages of female labour and the growth of employment in certain economic sectors as well as the
rapid development of female educational levels (Almeida et al. 2000). By 2001, the activity rates of women in
the childbearing age groups between 25 and 44 had greatly increased and become similar : 83% of women aged
25–34 and 80% of those aged 35–44 were professionally active in 2001. In this context, it is also important to
underline that the majority of women (84%) work full time. This means that, compared to some European
countries where part-time work for women is more dominant, female economic activity implies much longer
hours spent in paid work.
The counterpoint of increased employment among women has been a decline in the traditional household
form of a male breadwinner and a female homemaker and a growth of households where both partners are
employed (Eurostat 2002). Dual participation continued to increase between 1992 and 2000 and now repre-
sents around two-thirds of couples both with children (74%) and without (65%). It is also important to under-
line that the dual-earner full -time worker pattern is the dominant form. In families with children, 66% of cou-
ples were made up of two full-time workers, only 7% had the ‘one and a half ’ model—where he works full time
and she part time—and about one quarter contained a single earner model. This situation contrasts strongly
with countries where the single earner model is still the prevalent model for families with children (Germany,
Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland) or those, such as the UK and the Netherlands, where the one and a
half model is the prevalent form (Eurostat 2002). It is much more similar to the family division of paid labour in
Belgium and France, where 41% and 45% respectively of couples with children are made up of two full-time
working partners.
These changes have had a considerable impact on the reconciliation of work and family life in Portuguese
families. There has been a fundamental shift from a strong family care model, in which young children below
school age were cared for predominantly by stay-at-home mothers or grandmothers, towards a pluralistic
model of care arrangements (Wall 2002a,Torres 2004). A recent survey showed that the majority of children
born in the 1970s and aged between one and two were looked after by their mothers (44%) or by relatives
(34%), whereas only 27% of children born in the 1990s were looked after by their mothers at home or by
close relatives (37%): the other children aged between one and two were either in a crèche (18%), with a paid
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nanny (13%), or with a domestic employee (2%) (Wall 2002a). Reduced care within the family and delegation
of care to formal care institutions for the three to six age group has increased even more rapidly during the last
decade: in the mid-1980s, only 29% of children aged three to five were in preschool education but this percen-
tage rose to 55% in the mid-1990s, to 65% in 1998 and to 76% in 2001 (Wall 2004b).
Some tensions and problems of reconciliation are associated with this process of change. In-depth studies
have revealed three main problems (Wall et al. 2001b, 2001c,Wall & São José 2004). Families who rely strongly
on grandparents feel that this is a positive care solution for very small children but one, which sometimes creates
negative feelings of dependency as well as conflicting views on the education of children. A second problem is
related to an insufficient number of low-cost non-profit and public institutions with long opening hours. Many
families have no family support network to help care for children.1 If they are high-income families, informal and
formal care may be brought in and friends may substitute for family networks; low-income families, on the other
hand, are usually more dependent on low-cost formal care facilities. In Portugal this means having access to
public sector or to third sector publicly-subsidized institutions where families pay according to their means.
However, in spite of expansion during the last decade, the public preschool sector sometimes has early closing
hours2 and the large third sector (which includes preschools and primary schools, long opening hours and
after-school clubs) is not always sufficient and may have waiting lists. In practice, this means that some families
cannot manage to find low-cost formal support for an extensive, all-day delegation of childcare. Some of them
make a gigantic economic effort to pay for private profit-making childcare, while others leave young children
unsupervised after preschool/primary school hours or in the care of an older child. Lone parents with low eco-
nomic means, immigrant families, and poor families with atypical/long working hours in the unqualified services
sector and no family network are the families where the risk of child negligence is highest.
A third problem is related to the overburdening of women.The movement of women into the labour force
has not resulted in an equivalent movement of men into the sharing of home-based unpaid domestic and
caring work. Recent research shows that men are participating slightly more in domestic work, especially in
tasks such as shopping and helping to care for young children and also in routine household tasks (the 1999
survey on couples with children showed that in about one third of all couples with dependent children, men
were participating regularly or always in at least one of the routine households tasks such as cleaning, cooking
or doing the laundry) (Aboim & Wall 2002). However, the disparity between men and women in terms of
hours of paid and unpaid work is still great (Perista 2002).The 1999 time survey indicates that men do more
hours of paid work than women (roughly one hour more, as men on average work nine hours and women
eight hours) but women do more hours of unpaid work (roughly two and a half hours more, since men on
average do one hour and a half hours of unpaid work and women four hours).Taking into consideration both
paid and unpaid work, the survey indicates that the female working day in the employed population is roughly
one and a half hours longer than that of the male. Finally, from a comparative perspective, recent evidence indi-
cates that the current division of domestic and care work reported in Portugal is amongst the most traditional
in Europe. For example, the percentage of Portuguese men who reported that their daily activities include 
looking after children or sick/frail adults without pay is the lowest in Europe (7%, compared to EU-15 average
of 18%; 31% for Portuguese women, compared to EU-15 average of 33%) (European Commission 2003).
1 European comparative reports always portray kinship support networks in Portugal as extensive and strong, meaning
that family networks systematically take on responsibilities and tasks for the welfare of the individual—caring tasks,
monetary transfers and so on—which may be neglected by other welfare delivery institutions. However, evidence
shows that many Portuguese families with children have no support or a low level of support over the course of mar-
ried life and that extended kinship does not play a significant role in support networks; assistance flows mainly from
parents and sometimes from brothers and sisters (Wall et al. 2001a). Informal support networks were also found to
be unevenly distributed in Portuguese society: needy families with low educational levels and a less favourable class
position have the lowest levels of support over the course of married life.
2 The Ministry of Education is responsible for the ‘educational component’ whereas responsibility for the ”social compo-
nent” (canteens, after school activities, etc.) is jointly held by the local authorities and the Ministry of Work and Social
Security. As a result, this latter component has developed slowly and irregularly in the public sector institutions.
Organization of care for frail or sick elderly persons has not followed the same trend as childcare. Levels of
institutionalisation of the elderly population are very low and individuals strongly support the idea that sick/frail
elderly people should be looked after by their family and be cared for at home (Vasconcelos 1998). Evidence
shows that caring is very much concentrated within private households and within the family system (with care
provided mostly by partners and children, but with growing support from formal services). Compared to
Northern countries, only a fairly low proportion of Portugal’s very elderly population over 80 live alone (26%,
compared to 45% for the EU-15), 4% live in a collective household (average 10% for the EU-15) and most of
them either live with a partner (30%) or with their children or other relatives/friends (40%, compared to a
mean value of 19% for the EU-15) (European Commission 2000).With the growing number of elderly people
who need care, there has been an increasing demand for domiciliary care services and day care centres.
Provision comes mainly from private profit-making and private non-profit institutions: in the latter, domiciliary
services are usually available a few hours per day to provide personal care services, cleaning and meals on
wheels. Recent research shows that some individual caregivers, who are mostly women, come under great
strain.The burden is heaviest when caregivers have to juggle work and care responsibilities for a highly depen-
dent elderly person and in situations where the main caregiver is alone, rather than integrated in a kinship 
support network (Wall et al. 2001c).
Change in family values
To understand family values in Portugal, we must look at two main trends. First, the considerable changes which
have occurred in fertility, marriage, and divorce since the 1960s are outward signs of dramatic shifts in the
values and attitudes of individuals over the last forty years: from refusal to generalized acceptance of divorce,
from religious marriage to more secular views of couple formation, from ignorance to knowledge and approval
of family planning, from commitment to a gender-segregated, authoritarian family model to a ‘symmetrical’ orga-
nization where both partners work outside the home and share responsibilities as well as authority (Almeida &
Guerreiro 1993, Almeida & Wall 2001,Vasconcelos 1998,Torres 1996, Wall 1998a, Aboim & Wall 2002). As a
result of these rapid changes, age is one of the most important predictors of attitudes towards the family. 40%
of individuals over 55, but only 18% of those in the age group 25 to 34, think that marriage is indissoluble
(partners should never divorce), and 42% of those over 55, but only 21% of the 25 to 34-year-olds, think that
the man should be the main decision maker in the family (Vasconcelos 1998).
Secondly, comparing family values as recorded by social surveys with corresponding values in other
European countries reveals that the Portuguese remain very much ‘on the average’ in their view of family. It is
interesting to note, however, that traditionalism varies considerably with different aspects of family life: as we
shall see, the Portuguese are not at all traditionalist with regard to women’s work and sharing responsibilities
outside the home, while they are fairly traditionalist in their support for the institution of marriage, for the
importance of children as life’s greatest joy and for the mother’s caring role, and very traditionalist on issues
such as abortion.
As in other European countries, opinion polls consistently report that respondents view family life as
important. In the 1999 European Values Study, 84% of respondents (average for all EU countries: 87%) reported
that the family was ‘very important’ in life (Halman 2001). With regard to marriage and partnership, surveys
indicate that the Portuguese remain fairly traditional. Only one quarter of the population consider marriage as
an old-fashioned institution, and most men (63%) and women (65%) perceive marriage as a life-long commit-
ment (marriage viewed as a life project for two persons is the second most important perception of marriage,
with 48% of men and 57% of women agreeing with this view). In relation to the most important factors in a
successful marriage, faithfulness, mutual esteem, and understanding, but especially the first two factors, are con-
sidered to be very important by a majority of Portuguese respondents, while ‘talking when there are problems’
or a ‘satisfactory sexual relationship’ are seen as very important by lower proportions of respondents.The first
three factors are also considered as very important by a majority of respondents in EU countries, whereas the
last two factors are considered as less relevant by the Portuguese respondents (‘very important’ by 56% and
41% of Portuguese respondents compared to an average of 76% and 62% of respondents for all EU countries).
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Results from recent surveys therefore seem to point to the fact that support for the marriage institution is
strong in Portugal, as well as showing—within a general pattern of commitment to marriage viewed as a 
private, exclusive, and life-long refuge for marital partners—a comparatively low emphasis on the intimate
values of partnership (Aboim & Wall 2002).
Opinions on gender roles and in particular towards working women have shifted sharply. Surveys show a
general agreement that women should go out to work.Women’s work outside the home is perceived not only
as an instrument of individual independence but also as an important source of income for the family (Almeida
& Wall 1995). In the 1999 European Values Study, 79% of Portuguese men and women agree that ‘having a job
is the ideal way for a woman to be independent’ (the average for all EU countries is 76%), and another 90%
think that ‘both husband and wife should contribute to household expenses’ (average for all EU countries: 75%)
(Almeida 2003). Maternity seems to interfere slightly with this attitude towards working women. Although the
Portuguese are more likely than persons in other countries to believe that women first of all want a home and
children (52% agree; average 53% for all EU countries), they are less likely to agree that working women can
have as good a relationship with their children as mothers staying at home (67%; average for all EU countries
74%, 84% for Sweden), and they are more likely to believe that children suffer if their mothers work (73%
believe this, compared to an average of 57% for all EU countries, and only 38% in Sweden).This seems to indi-
cate a fairly strong tension in Portuguese society between work and motherhood, a fact which must be ana-
lysed in the light of men and women’s long working hours and the high proportion of working mothers with
small children.
Views on gender roles inside the family have also changed, but not so sharply. The 1999 European Values
Study shows that the Portuguese, and especially Portuguese women, are less likely to believe that fathers are
capable of educating their children as well as mothers (Almeida 2003), and the 1999 national survey on couples
with children (with wives aged 25–49) shows that while a high proportion agrees that ideally all domestic tasks
should be divided equally between the couple (70%), 30% think that the wife should do everything alone or
with some help from her husband (Aboim & Wall 2002). Egalitarian views on the division of household work
have thus steadily, if slowly increased, but the gap between attitudes and practices is great.The number of peo-
ple who say that household chores should be shared is increasing faster than the number of people who actual-
ly share the work.
Abortion remains a divisive issue in Portuguese society. Surveys repeatedly indicate that the majority of the
Portuguese do not favour abortion, with only a minority agreeing with abortion in certain circumstances such
as pregnancy out of wedlock (40%, the average for all European countries is 53%), the couples not wanting
more children (36%, the average for all European countries is 50%), or women not wanting more children
(36%). Opinions have, however, been changing over recent decades: in the 1990 European Values Study only
20% of the Portuguese favoured abortion in a case of pregnancy out of wedlock, a proportion which doubled
in the 1999 survey.
Family values are firmly rooted in the social structure and vary consistently with educational level, social
class, level of urbanization, age, gender, marital status, and more general ideological patterns such as religious
involvement and political sympathies. Analysis has underlined the importance of social factors, such as the posi-
tion of individuals/families in social and educational structures, and generational factors in determining the stron-
gest variations in family values. In general, the most liberal and less conventional family values tend to flourish
among younger people in the 15–34 year old age group and among individuals with medium to high levels of
education. However, as the proportion of the population with medium/high education is still extremely low
(even within the younger age groups), the weight of less traditionalist values, within the total population, is never
very great. Religious involvement and political preferences seem to play some role, but more so for some indi-
cators (for example, practising Catholics are strongly supportive of the marriage institution and do not favour
abortion) and less so for other areas of the spectrum of family values. People living in the major cities, but espe-
cially in Lisbon, are less traditional than those living in other parts of the country. Unmarried, cohabiting couples
and single or divorced persons also tend to be less traditional than married persons: they are more sceptical
towards the marriage institution and have more egalitarian views.
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Poverty and immigration
As a final comment, it is important in this section to mention two other trends that have strongly affected family
life in Portugal during the last decade.The first is poverty and the socio-economic situation of families. In Portu-
gal, the share of the population at risk of poverty is very high (21% in 1999, compared to 15% EU-15 average)
(Eurostat 2003a) and the persistent risk of poverty, in other words the share of the population in a low-income
category for an extended period of time, is the highest in Europe (14%).The incidence of poverty risk is con-
sistent with the patterns found across all member states.The risk of poverty is comparatively greater for children
and for older people living alone, in particular for older women, for lone parents and immigrant families, for
those living in jobless and one-earner households, and for those with precarious or low-skilled/low-wage jobs.
During the last few years there has been some variation in the socio-economic situation of families. In the
late 1990s the general economic situation was more favourable to families: GDP growth was higher than in the
preceding years, the unemployment rate dropped, from 7.3 in 1996 down to 4.1 in 2001, and there was an
expansion in social spending. Over the last three years the economic climate has become more unfavourable to
families: economic growth has declined, private consumption has fallen sharply, unemployment has been gra-
dually on the increase (5.1 in 2002, 6.3 in 2003, 6.4 in the first quarter of 2004) and social spending has been
cut in various ways as a result of budgetary restrictions.
The second and last trend is related to immigration. Portugal has a long tradition in emigration but has
recently become a country of immigration (Baganha 1997). In the 1980s and 1990s labour migration inflows
were mainly from the former African colonies, in particular from the Cape Verde islands, but during the last
decade there was an increase not only in numbers but also in geographical diversity. Alongside the continued
inflow of African immigrants, labour migrants over the last few years have arrived mainly from Brazil and from
Eastern Europe, mostly from the Ukraine and Moldova, but also from other countries such as China, Russia or
India. Most of these immigrants are young, economically active adults who want to settle and to bring in or to
form a family in the receiving country. However, in terms of family life, the risk of poverty and social exclusion is
high: risk factors are related to labour market segregation leading to low wages and long or atypical working
hours in low-qualified jobs, residential segregation (especially in the African communities) and illegal residence.
In-depth studies have shown that the lives of children and the reconciliation of work and care for young 
children in many of these families are particularly difficult (Wall & São José 2004).
Family Policy
To understand the development of family policies over the last few years and how they have responded to the
changes experienced by families, we must look at two main periods:
 the years from 1996 to 2001, and 
 the last two years (2002–2003).
Compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, both periods feature a more explicit family policy, in the sense that
policy included actions and programmes deliberately designed to achieve specific objectives regarding family
units or individuals in their family roles. However, the basic framework of public response to challenges posed
by family change, as well as the general debate concerning policy goals and family/demographic issues, has been
different. To examine these developments, we will focus briefly on the most significant changes within three
fields of state intervention:
 the economic protection of the family,
 the regulation of marriage and relationships,
 the reconciliation of work and family life.
More detailed information on policy measures and public debate concerning family issues during these years
may be found in previous reports and research on Portugal (Wall 1998, 2001, 2002b, 2004b, 2004c, Almeida &
Wall 2001)
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1996–2001
A socialist government promising a renewed interest in social policy objectives and a strong commitment to
supporting families, especially socially excluded families, was elected at the end of 1995. In spite of economic
constraints and a context dominated by the overriding objective of meeting the Maastricht criteria on mone-
tary union, the economic climate in the late 1990s was more favourable than in the preceding years. In the con-
text of a general strengthening of social policies, family policy underlined four main perspectives during this
period: improving the safety-net for families and redistribution, developing links between family policy and policy
for equality, promoting the reconciliation of the work and family life, and defining new public responses to
recent changes in family life and living arrangements.
In relation to the economic protection of families, there were two major changes.The first introduced more
selectivity in the main cash benefit for families by defining benefit rates, which vary according to three (and later
four) levels of income. Monthly amounts of benefit were increased for the first, second and third income levels;
nevertheless, except for very low-income families (first level) who received a more substantial increase,
allowances continued to represent small contributions to total family income. Different rates of benefit for fami-
lies with many children, with higher benefits for third and subsequent children, were also introduced for all in-
come levels (previously, only low-income families were entitled to this).
Assessment of the development of family benefits during the 1990s shows that, at constant prices, they
increased by 15% between 1991 and 2000 (36% for EU-15; Eurostat 2003b) and that total expenditure for the
main cash benefit for families, after remaining more or less stable in the early and mid-1990s, went up at con-
stant prices from 59,4343 in 1998 to 68,353 in 2000 (Wall 2004c). However, as a percentage of GDP the cost
of family benefits during the 1990s did not change: it continued to represent about 0.5% of GDP, one of the
lowest levels in Europe (together with Spain and Italy) where the average value for the EU-15 was 1.4% in
2000 (Eurostat 2003b).
The second major change was the introduction of income support in Portugal.The ‘Guaranteed Minimum
Income’, a non-contributory benefit accompanied by a social integration programme (monitored by Local
Follow-up Commissions), was created in 1996 for legally resident individuals lacking the resources to satisfy
their basic needs. Adults over age 18, or below age 18 if they had dependent children, became entitled to the
benefit if their economic resources, or those of their household, were below the amounts defined as income
support. Income support entitled an adult to the equivalent of the non-contributory social pension ( 100 in
1996) and the second adult to the same amount. Other adults were entitled to 70% of this amount and 
children to 50%.The 1999 report on the implementation of income support showed that one quarter of the
households on income support contained elderly persons with very low incomes and that, among the remai-
ning households, a large proportion included adults that were either unemployed or employed in precarious
and low-skilled jobs.The introduction of income support led to a vigorous debate in Portuguese society; there
were strong criticisms regarding fraudulent claims and doubts were expressed in relation to the possibility of
achieving the social inclusion of those on benefit (in particular of minority groups such as gypsies).
Changes regarding the regulation of marriage and relationships also led to a vigorous debate on the legal
protection of cohabiting couples (heterosexual and same-sex unions) as well as on the issue of abortion. New
legislation extended the rights of cohabiting couples (to adoption, to joint taxation) and strengthened the rights
of surviving partners. Same-sex unions were initially set aside from this discussion but became a hotly debated
issue after the approval of the above-mentioned law in 1999. New law proposals by the young socialists and
other left-wing parties eventually led to the approval, by a narrow margin, of a new law on the legal protection
of same-sex unions. It established rights, which are similar to those, established for heterosexual cohabiting part-
ners but excluded the right to adoption.
The easing of divorce regulations was another change introduced in the late 1990s. Married couples no
longer have to be married for at least three years before applying for divorce and divorce by mutual consent,
for couples with or without children, may be performed by the civil authorities.
3 thousands of contos (one conto = 1,000 Escudos)
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Finally, abortion and contraception were also major issues throughout these years but there were only minor
changes to the existing 1984 law (extension of the delay for abortion to 24 weeks in cases of malformation of
the foetus). Other proposed changes, including the introduction of the availability of abortion on demand up to
ten weeks of pregnancy, led to a referendum in 1998 in which liberalisation was rejected by a majority of
voters. In the aftermath of the referendum, a discussion on the need for new policy measures was introduced,
mainly by the right and centre-right parties. Concern was expressed in relation to the problems of access to
family planning and the development of sex education in order to prevent undesired pregnancies and to pro-
tect young people from contracting AIDS. It led to the passing of a law on Sexual Education in schools and
Access to Family planning.
In contrast to abortion, the reconciliation of work and family life gained considerable ground during these
years. Explicit recognition of governmental responsibility for this area was emphasized not only through govern-
ment programmes which established specific goals concerning leave arrangements and service provision but
also through an amendment to the Constitution (in 1997) which introduced, in article 59 related to the rights
of workers, the right to a social organization of work allowing for personal fulfilment and for the reconciliation
of work and family life.
Developments in this area followed four main lines: the increased protection of women in the workplace,
before and after giving birth; a movement towards better leave arrangements for working parents with children
at home; a concern to develop and improve care facilities; the promotion of gender equality in leave arrange-
ments and in the workloads of couples. Policy measures taken during the late 1990s structured a reconciliation
model as follows:
 Leave arrangements: paid maternity/paternity leave of 120 days (fully-paid) which may be taken by either
parent after the six weeks taken by the mother, five days fully-paid leave for fathers (to be taken during the
first month after the child’s birth), two weeks of fully-paid daddy leave (to be taken after the 120 days),
unpaid parental leave of three months (full-time) or six months (part-time), the right to a daily reduction of
two hours work during the first year of a child’s life (either parent is entitled), the right to miss 30 days
work (partially compensated) to care for a sick child below age ten, the right to miss two weeks of work
(unpaid) to care for a child over age ten or a sick adult relative.
 Development of childcare facilities: although the increase in the number of crèches was also an objective,4
measures relating to childcare were more centred on service provision for the three to six age group.The
new legislation defined preschool education as optional but also underlined the State’s duty to make the
supply of preschool education universal (see Wall 1998b). Strategies for the development of provision 
passed from an initial model based on the idea of State ownership of a ‘public network’ to a pluralistic
model characterised by institutional differentiation and a shift towards a private/public mix. In the latter,
three main sectors are responsible for provision: the public sector (establishments belonging to local autho-
rities and to the national government), the private non-profit sector which is strongly subsidized by the
government, and the private profit-making sector (the private sector network, including both profit and
non-profit nurseries, covers slightly over half of all provision).The initial goal was to bring the coverage rate
up from 55% in 1995 to 90% of five year olds, 75% of four year olds and 60% of three year olds by the
year 2000; this goal was eventually reached in 2002 (coverage rate of 77%).
2002–2003
General elections in March 2002 led to the formation of a new government on the basis of a coalition between
the PSD (centre right-wing party) and the CDS, the main conservative party. Against a background of growing
economic difficulties and restrictions on social spending, family policy during the last two years underlined new
4 Estimates for 1999 point to a coverage rate of about 16% but there are strong variations by region, with Porto, the
second largest city, having a low rate of 8%, Lisbon an average rate of 16% and some other regions, such as Evora and
Portalegre, having higher coverage rates of 23% and 30%. Policy goals set out in the 2001 national Plan for the
Promotion of Social Inclusion aimed to increase the number of children below age three in crèches to 100,000 users
by the year 2006.
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policy perspectives and objectives. Rather than focus on the strengthening of social protection and on the need
for policy to take into account changing and diverse family forms, governmental concern has endorsed a 
negative outlook on current changes in the family. Governmental actors and agencies have highlighted the nega-
tive consequences of family break-up, the problems of a declining birth rate, the growing impact of parental
incompetence which leads to the institutionalisation of too many children, the disadvantages of lone parent-
hood versus the advantages of the nuclear family made up of first-marriage couples with children and the deva-
luation of household work and home life. Redistribution and the reconciliation of work and family life are still
important underlying concerns but they are now strongly linked to a policy approach emphasizing the preser-
vation of the family (and a preference for a certain model of the family) as its main concern. Family policy in this
context has thus shifted its focus towards three other, rather different, major objectives:
 a commitment to a pro-natalist policy which advocates systematic support for large families with three or
more children;
 a pro-life perspective which endorses a non-liberal approach to abortion and proposes policy measures to
support pregnant women and vulnerable mothers with young children;
 a family-building perspective which underlines the importance of policy goals such as the expansion of
family counselling and mediation services, in order to strengthen family bonds/skills and to prevent marital
dissolution, as well as the development of part-time work to facilitate work/life balance for women who 
In relation to the economic protection of families there were important changes in the main family benefit.
Conditions of entitlement became less restrictive on the one hand, with entitlement linked to legal ‘residence’
instead of employment and social contributions as in the past, and more restrictive on the other, with family
allowances available only for lower income families and not for all families. The new benefit system seeks to
emphasize two main policy principles: support for low-income families and support for large families. Benefit
rates introduced in August 2003 exclude higher income families and vary according to five levels of family in-
come and also according to the age of the child, as previously (higher benefits for children below 12 months).
Support for large families was introduced through new rules for calculating family level of income, which are
more generous for families with more children (see Wall 2004b). An annual extra month of benefit was also
introduced for families in the first level of income.
The changes produced a more significant increase in benefits for very low-income families: for example, a
family with two children over 12 months, where each partner earns the national minimum wage5 receives EUR
25 instead of EUR 20 (second level of income). However, taking into account the strong compensatory aim of
policy changes—to concentrate substantial support on low-income families—the outcome is disappointing, as
family benefits continue to represent a negligible share of total income. Large families, on the other hand, have
lost the differentiation of benefit according to birth order,6 but they have kept the possibility of entitlement to
cash benefits when they have higher levels of income. In other words, with the new rules for calculating family
level of income, even fairly high- income families with three or more children are entitled to family benefits.
Apart from this advantage, however, financial support for large families has remained almost the same. In fact,
the elimination of birth order differentiation practically cancels the impact introduced by the overall increase in
benefit rates, so that a low-income family in the second level of income and with three or four children over
age one receives almost the same amount of benefit as before. Overall, however, it is a policy and a govern-
mental discourse that shows systematic support for large families.There has been no debate or reaction con-
cerning the above-mentioned changes.
Assessment of the impact of the new family benefit in terms of total expenditure and as a percentage of
GDP will only be possible at the end of 2004. However, comparative analysis of expenditure during the first
three months of 2003 and of 2004 indicates that there has been a reduction of 2.6% in total expenditure.
5 EUR 356.6 in 2003
6 The difference in the cash benefit used to be quite substantial: for example, at the second income level, third and sub-
sequent children over age one received EUR 30 instead of EUR 20 in 2002.
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 205
With regard to the regulation of marriage and relationships there have been no changes. However, the increase in
the divorce rate has been a topic for some public debate, with governmental parties and agencies expressing
concern in relation to this development in family life in Portugal. One of the strongest appeals against this trend
was expressed by the Observatory for Family Matters (Ministry for Social Security and Labour). In an official
statement the Observatory regarded this trend as harmful for the stability of the family and considered that
public policies easing divorce regulations are often the catalysts of the problem.
Another issue taken up over the last two years and hotly debated was abortion.The debate was triggered
by criminal proceedings in the region of Aveiro against seven women who carried out illegal abortions. The
‘Aveiro’ trial, involving the women, their partners and medical staff (17 persons in all) began in December 2003
and reintroduced a vigorous discussion, in parliament and in society, on whether legislation on abortion, still
considered a crime, should be changed. In October 2003 a new campaign was started by sectors of society,
which are in favour of a change in legislation, and a petition was handed in to parliament asking for a new refe-
rendum on abortion. The coalition government has stressed that there was a referendum in 1998 and that
there will be no changes in legislation on abortion during the present legislature (2002–2006).
Within the current policy framework of a family building and a pro-natalist perspective, the issue of the
reconciliation of work and family life has been quite high on the policy agenda. Government actors and agencies
have stressed the importance of measures in this field and have focused strongly on the need to improve the
choices of women, in particular through access to more part-time work, to more protection during pregnancy
and childbearing, to longer leave to care for young children and to part-time pension schemes to care for the
very elderly. Policy objectives have thus stressed the State’s responsibility in promoting the work/life balance in a
more family friendly way, especially through leave arrangements and the protection of women workers, rather
than the development of formal care provision.
From the point of view of the protection of women workers and leave arrangements, the package intro-
duced during the 1990s has been maintained and there have been a few developments. For example, there has
been an increase in protection against dismissal from 98 to 120 days after giving birth, the five days paternity
leave has become obligatory, parents are entitled to a four-hour leave per term to go to their children’s school,
and large families’ right to miss work for 15 days (unpaid) to care for sick children over age 10 has been in-
creased by one day for every second child and subsequent children. In relation to part-time work, the new
Labour Law and the regulations which are still under discussion propose an extension to the right to part-time
work during the unpaid parental leave from six to 12 months; the Government has also announced its intention
to promote part-time work within the civil service. Extension of maternity leave, from 120 to 135 days, has also
been promised for 2006 but for the moment the solution has been to extend leave by giving parents an option
between four months of fully-paid leave or five months at 80%.
In the area of service provision, governmental programmes have mainly drawn attention to the need for
new types of services, such as family counselling services (‘Family Support centres’), ‘pro-life’ services to support
single pregnant mothers (Centres for Supporting Life) and services to assess institutions that take in children at
risk, handicapped persons and elderly persons.7 The development of service provisions to help families care for
children and elderly persons was not highlighted in the government’s initial programme (see Wall 2002b) but
new objectives concerning coverage rates for services have now been set out in the National Plan for Inclusion
2003–2005 in December 2003. In relation to childcare services, the goal is to establish a coverage rate of 33%
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7 The latter emerged in the context of the debate surrounding the issue of child abuse, largely triggered off by the Casa
Pia case. Casa Pia is a long-standing non-profit institution which takes in children at risk. Reports of sexual abuse of
children inside the home and the involvement of children in paedophile networks led to the arrest of Casa Pia employ-
ees as well as other persons, some of whom are well-known public figures. Among other issues raised by this case, the
question of child abuse and negligence has featured permanently in the forefront of public debate. In this context,
attention has also been drawn to the fact that there are large numbers of children living in institutions and that many
might have been adopted or been fostered. Governmental agencies and actors have stressed the right of children to
”family life” and changes to the law on adoption have facilitated the process of adoption by scaling back the rights of
biological parents and accelerating the procedures leading up to adoption.
for children below age three and a coverage rate of 90% for children between ages three and six by the year
2010. In relation to services for elderly persons, the aim is to duplicate the number of persons receiving 
domiciliary services and to create new incentives for families who take in elderly persons.
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Spain
Introduction
During the last six years, developments on family issues in Spain have shown, on the one hand, an evolution
which is coherent with the main trends observed in previous years and, on the other hand, emerging new ele-
ments of change in social practices and perceptions. Family structures in Spain continue their rapid convergence
towards the European average.The number of persons per household has decreased, reaching 2.9 by the end
of 2001, according to census data. Household structure has followed the same pattern as in other EU countries:
increasing proportions of one-person households (over 20% in 2001) and a sharp decline in the proportion of
extended families. The most significant recent development in Spain is the fact that young people are staying
with their parents longer than they used to and longer than in other countries in Europe, with the exception of
Italy. This largely explains the increasingly high average size of households, while the elderly have gained con-
siderable autonomy, both in economic and personal terms, and continue living by themselves well after the age
of eighty.
The three main new issues that have emerged as relevant in public debate on the family in recent years are
immigration, social policy and domestic violence. After having been an emigration country for decades and even
centuries, the migratory balance started reversing in 1975, first with the return of previous emigrants and, since
1985, with an increasing flow of incoming immigrants, mainly from Morocco and South America. As of January
2003, the foreign population was estimated at 2.6 million (6.3% of the population). Immigration is mainly con-
centrated in big cities like Madrid and Barcelona, but also in agricultural areas. About half of the foreign workers
are women working as carers of small children or elderly people, a phenomenon that partly compensates for
meagre social policies.The other already visible effect of immigration on the family is through fertility, which has
increased moderately in Spain since 1999, even if it is still among the lowest in Europe (1.26 in 2003). The 
number of marriages with a person from another country has also increased in the last few years in 2002 it
represented 8.5% of all marriages.
In recent years family problems and policies have become an important issue on the political agenda.The
main political parties have explicitly presented programmes related to the family and political leaders have
repeatedly stressed its importance. The main reason for this is the growing concern about Spain’s extremely
low fertility and its feared consequences for population aging, which is now considered to be a social problem
which should be addressed by specific policies. But in spite of this alleged interest, few resources have in fact
been allocated to family policies in the last six years. Spain remains the country with the lowest proportion of
social expenditure for family support in the EU 15.
Domestic and gender violence have recently acquired great prominence. Women’s organisations, political
parties and the media are paying much more attention to this problem than ever before, and the idea that this is
not a private matter is clearly influencing public opinion and politicians to a high degree.The steady increase in
the number of women killed by their partners (from 32 in 1997 to 70 in 2003) has created great public concern.
There have been a number of legislative proposals to give this matter an ‘integral’ response with a mix of re-
pressive measures, protection to threatened women and preventive actions, especially in the field of education. A
new bill was recently (June 2004) presented to parliament by the new government and will be discussed in
autumn. Some of the Autonomous Regions (comunidades autónomas) have already adopted laws on the issue.
Gender relations
The main variable explaining the evolution of gender relations is the increase of women in the labour market.
Global activity rates show a slow but consolidating upward trend. In 1990 the figure was 34.1, in 2003 this figu-
re was 43.3 (Labour Force Surveys). Activity rates by age show a rather different picture as the younger gene-
rations of women account for most of the increase in female activity. For example, the group of women aged
30–34 had in 1990 a labour market participation of 55.2, which increased in 2003 to 72.9, whereas for those
women over 50 years of age the increase is very small or even negative.
According to Eurostat (2002), the proportion of working mothers with children below 15 years old has
experienced in Spain the highest increase in Europe between 1992 and 2000 from 31.9% to 43.7% (with the
exception of Holland where the figures are 47.6% to 67.3%). Working mothers nowadays represent the norm
in Spain if those who do not live in a partnership and those who are unemployed are taken into consideration.
In spite of the rapid change towards the involvement of women in paid work, Spain is still the EU country with
the lowest proportion of dual earner families with dependent children, the average being 59%.
Marital status and the number of children have a direct influence on women’s activity.Those who are sepa-
rated and divorced have a very high activity rate, 72.8% in 2003, close to the figure for men (77.8%). Married
women are slowly increasing their labour market participation (42.8% in 2003) way behind the figure for 
married men (68.1%). Being married or single makes no difference for the economic activity of the latter, but it
does for women.
Table 1.Activity rate by marital status and by sex in Spain in 2003, in percent
Source: Instituto de la Mujer, data from Labour Force Survey 2003
Divorce and separation rates are low compared to other European countries but they are steadily increasing
(from 89,000 to 115,000 between 1997 and 2002), while the increase in the number of marriages has slowed
down (from 200,000 to 209,000). Since the existing divorce law was passed in 1981, divorce and separation is
socially accepted even by the Catholic Church which is much more reluctant towards about.The new govern-
ment that came into power after the 2004 elections has announced changes in the law to speed up the divorce
procedure and eliminate the compulsory previous separation, a measure imposed by the Catholic Church to
give the spouses time to reconsider the final decision to divorce. In practice this has cost time and money for
couples who had already made a clear decision and there is now consensus on the need to make divorce
easier. It is on the political agenda and the government has announced changes in the family law that will include
among other issues the possibility for homosexual couples to get married. If this sounds surprising, considering
dominant traditional social practices, it responds to an overall tolerance towards different ways of life in Spain,
as different surveys and studies have reported. Attitudes towards homosexuality reflect a high degree of accep-
tance, only surpassed by Holland or Denmark and far removed from the ideas of other Southern European
countries. According to a 1998 Eurobarometer, 42% of the Spaniards believe that homosexuals should have the
right to marry, 50% that they should at least have the same rights as married couples and 68% that they should
have the right to inherit form their partner (Malpas 1999: 33–37).
In parallel to the decrease in the number of marriages has been the significant increase in the number of
children born out of wedlock. In 1991 they only represented one in ten births; by the year 2002 the figure had
more than doubled (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2003), a new phenomenon partly related to immigration
and partly to the increase in cohabitation.
Changes in traditional gender roles in the family have only slightly kept pace with changes in women’s activi-
ty, as is the case in many other countries. According to time budget surveys regarding the sharing of domestic
tasks and family care from 1993 until 2001, women spend more than double the time of men on them, even if
they have reduced by 36 minutes the overall time they dedicate to domestic chores, while men have increased
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Both sexes Women Men
TOTAL 55.38 43.9 67.55
Single 65.02 59.05 69.90
Married 55.42 42.79 68.06
Widowed 8.57 7.28 15.09
Separated or divorced 74.55 72.78 77.85
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 SPAIN
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 211
their time to 40 minutes. However, the majority of the population (67.6%) thinks that the dual earner family,
where both men and women work and share family tasks and housework, is the ideal type of family, as 
opposed to the traditional male breadwinner family, only considered as an ideal model by 15%. (Centro de
Investigaciones Sociológicas 2004)
Table 2. Change in the Amount of Time Dedicated to Domestic Tasks by Activity and by Sex
from 1993 to 2001
Source: Instituto de la Mujer surveys regarding time distribution between men and women.
The latest report on the situation of the young in Spain (Informe de la Juventud en España 2000) shows that
young people are still reproducing the traditional model, in assigning domestic tasks to women, especially when
they are married, although there is a high proportion of women wishing to have a full-time job while single and
a part-time job when they live with a partner. A similar trend is observed in education. Even if girls outnumber
boys in the educational system as a whole and get better results, the choice of studies still reproduces tradi-
tional differences: boys are going into technological studies to a greater extent than girls who tend to prefer
humanities or social sciences.
Violence of men against women in the family has become a political and social issue with great visibility in
the media. This is partly related to the seemingly paradoxical fact that, as women have gained autonomy and
influence they seem to have increased their vulnerability, and partly due to the attention that women’s organisa-
tions, political parties and the media are paying to the subject. The main concern is about women who die at
the hands of their current or former partners. Statistics from different sources1 show an increase in the number
of deaths, but data before 2000 were not collected in a rigorous and systematic way. In 2003, according to the
most reliable figures between around 70 women were killed by violence in the home.
There is no very clear pattern of extreme violence towards women. Age, social class, education and ethnic
or cultural background are very diverse. In half of the cases the woman had decided to separate or had already
done so. Opposition to subordination might explain more than the socio-economic characteristics of women
and their killers.
Concern about the number of women killed as a result of gender violence has highlighted other forms of
violence which had remained to a considerable extent concealed. At the same time, women who suffer from
violence increasingly report it. In 1999, there were 29,400 accusations due to spouse abuse, a figure which
doubled in 2003.
New legislation has been passed to regulate the protection of domestic violence victims (Ley 27/2003 de
31 de Julio).These measures are to be provided at the state, regional and local levels.The law aims at speeding
up proceedings when an aggressor is reported in order to avoid situations in which he can meet the victim
before the courts of law have passed sentence, meetings which have proved to be extremely dangerous. An
Observatory of Domestic Violence has been created to supervise the application of the law as well as to el-
aborate statistics that provide more accurate empirical evidence. The government now in power has already
proposed a law that addresses gender violence in the family as a complex phenomenon requiring action from
different approaches (legal, social, economic, educational) in order to get to the root of the problem.
1 Women’s organisations, Instituto de la Mujer (Women’s Policy Office) and Reina Sofía Centre for the Study of Violence.
1993 1996 2001 1993 1996 2001
Women Women Women Men Men Men
TOTAL 7h 58m 7h 35m 7h 22m 2h 30m 3h 5m 3h 0m
Domestic tasks 4h 46m 4h 24m 3h 58m 0h 28m 0h 37m 0h 44m
Housekeeping 0h 29m 0h 28m 0h 27m 0h 43m 0h 49m 0h 55m
Family care 1h 42m 1h 40m 1h 51m 0h 43m 0h 53m 0h 51m
Shopping 0h 47m 0h 50m 0h 53m 0h 21m 0h 26m 0h 26m
Services 0h 17m 0h 14m 0h 13m 0h 16m 0h 20m 0h 14m
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Generational relationships
The relationships between generations are undergoing rapid change. If twenty or thirty years ago the main
issue was generational conflict between children and parents, focus is now on the delayed departure of the 
former to create their own families, the help provided by grandparents to the younger generations and the
increasing difficulties families face when their elderly parents are themselves in need of help.The Spanish popu-
lation is currently slightly older than the European average: 16.7% are over 65 years old (IMSERSO 2002: 55),
but according to Eurostat projections after 2020 the population will be younger, probably until 2040, in spite of
low fertility. The explanation for this is the delayed baby boom that took place during the period 1955–1975
and assures a low dependency rate for several decades.
Recent evidence (Jurado Guerrero 2002) shows that trends in family formation as observed in previous
research in the early 1990s (Fernández Cordón 1997) have not substantially changed. A majority of young peo-
ple continue living with their parents after age 25 and many of them after 30.The standard explanation for the
postponement of residential independence has to do with jobs and housing. Unemployment, especially youth
unemployment, was very high until the early 1990s. Since then it has fallen dramatically, even if it is still high
compared to the EU average. In 2002 it even increased slightly. In addition, Spain has the highest proportion of
temporary jobs (one in three), most of them undertaken by young people. Housing continues to be a big problem
for the transition of young people to adulthood. Prices of new houses have continued to climb, especially in
medium and large cities. For example, in Madrid an increase of more than 10% was recorded between 2001
and 2002. Between 1996 and 2002 prices increased by two thirds. This might explain why in spite of better
work opportunities for the young, residential independence continues to be a problematic issue. Nonetheless,
other factors have been pointed out by researchers (Tobin 2001) like the increase in the number of people in
higher education, a period during which they continue to live with their parents, and the tolerant attitudes of
Spanish parents towards their cohabiting adult children in terms of personal independence. Data from a natio-
nal survey carried out in 1999 by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas records that a majority of the popu-
lation aged between 15 and 29 (90%) who lives with their parents says that decisions regarding their situation
are always openly discussed in the family and in more than half of the cases commonly agreed upon. Young
Spanish people (98%) consider family and friends to be the two most important things in life, after good health,
According to another survey on the situation of young people in Spain (Instituto de la Juventud 2001),
more than half of the people aged 15–29 years who live with their parents would like to leave their family of
origin and live independently. A very large majority in the older group (aged 25–29) express this desire. Among
young people aged between 15 and 29 living with their parents, only 23% may be considered economically
independent, 80% of them lack the monthly EUR 1,000 considered necessary to be able to live alone. The 
amount is quite realistic as those who are already autonomous have an average income of EUR 900. According
to the latest Report on the situation of young people in Spain (Informe de la Juventud en España, 2000) recent
trends show a reduction in the proportion of young people with complete economic independence, an in-
crease in the proportion living in semi-autonomy, i.e., receiving financial assistance from their parents; and finally,
a stabilization of those who are completely dependent on their parents, the majority in this category being
women.The transition from dependence to full autonomy is becoming increasingly a two step process with a
period of residential or financial assistance from the parents in between the two phases.
The evolution of the situation of the elderly has in many senses been the opposite. Senior citizens have
clearly gained autonomy in recent years. Pensions increased by 14% in real terms between 1990–1999 and a
great majority of the population over 65 years of age is covered by the state system (98.9%). 14.5% of the
elderly live below the poverty line2, a figure which is lower in comparison to all other age groups, especially the
younger age group from 16 to 29 for which it is 22%. Economic autonomy, as well as increasing health and phy-
sical well-being is the key to residential autonomy. A great majority of the elderly, eight out of ten live by them-
selves in their own home, which most of them own.There are significant gender differences.Three out of four
elderly men live with their spouses, a figure that drops to 46% in the case of elderly women who more often
2 Defined as 60% of the median of average per capita income.
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than men live alone (17.5% compared to 6.6%) (IMSERSO 2002).This is partly explained by women’s higher life
expectancy and partly by their higher degree of personal autonomy that makes it easier for them to live on
their own.
The youthful elderly, increasingly autonomous, instead of being a burden on their children, are playing a key
role, which is just beginning to be acknowledged, by helping their daughters when they are in the labour market
in domestic tasks and particularly by taking care of their grandchildren. Mothers of today represent the first
generation of women in which a majority is economically active, even when the children are small. For many
women involvement in the labour market would not be possible if they could not count on the help and soli-
darity of the older generation.
According to data from a survey on the reconciliation of work and family life (Tobío, Fernández Cordón
and Agulló 1998), the help of the family network in domestic tasks is important for two thirds of Spanish 
working mothers. It is especially important for young working mothers (below 30 years of age), for those 
working in low-skilled jobs and for lone mothers. The maternal grandmother is the essential person providing
help to two thirds of the interviewees for whom the help of the extended family is important.
Most Spanish working mothers (77%) have a close relative living in the same town, in 56% of the cases
their own mother. In 44% of the cases it is their father, 43% their mother-in-law and in 37% of the cases it is
their father-in-law. Half of the working mothers live in the same neighbourhood as their mother, though seldom
in the same home (11%). The exception is lone mothers who often live with their own mothers3. Among
mothers married or living in partnerships, the proportion of those living with a grandmother is very small (3%),
whereas among lone mothers4 the rate is considerably higher, 29%, but there are big differences according to
marital status. More than half (60%) of single lone mothers live with a grandmother, normally their own mother,
whereas among widows this is only 10%.These differences are partly related to age. Often single lone mothers
are young and very young women who have always lived with their family of origin continue living with them
after the birth of the child. On the other hand, widows are older and normally they have lived in a nuclear fami-
ly for many years before the husband dies.
Table 3. Family nucleus by type, Spain 1991, in percent
Source: Fernández Cordón and Tobío 1998: 67
(Data related to mothers with at least one child below 18 years of age. Census of Population)
Help from grandmothers is clearly related to proximity. Three out of four working mothers with their own
mother living in the same home, building or street are helped by them in taking care of the children.The per-
centage drops to 51% for those living in the same neighbourhood and to 38% for those living in the same town
but in a different neighbourhood.
3 Data from lone motherhood come from a recent report based on a special analysis of the Spanish Census of
Population of 1991 (Fernández Cordón and Tobío 1998)
4 The rate of lone parent families in Spain is small (8.6%) compared to other European countries like Sweden (22.3%),
Denmark (22.0%) or the Netherlands (18.1%) (Fernández Cordón and Tobío 1998).
Married/ Lone Mother Lone Mother Lone Mother Lone Mother TOTAL
Partnership Single Divorced Widow All
One nucleus household 85.9 27.9 63.8 75.7 59.3 83.9
Nucleus with others 14.1 72.1 36.2 24.3 40.7 16.1
Nucleus-without grandmother 11.0 12.4 9.9 14.3 11.6 11.0
Nucleus -with grandmother 3.2 59.7 26.3 10.1 29.1 5.1
All 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 4.Working grandmothers who help take care of the children according to place of 
residence, in percent
Chi square = 50.579, significance = ,000.
(Data refer to interviewees with a mother living in the same town, N=673) (%)
Source:Tobío, Fernández Cordón and Agulló 1998.
Most of the help provided by grandparents has to do with taking care of grandchildren. In almost half of the
cases (46%) the maternal grandmother takes care of preschool children (when they live in the same town and
when working mothers have at least one child under the age of six). In 38% of the cases maternal grand-
mothers take care of the children when they come back home after school, either in their own home or in
their daughters’ home. Often (25%) they prepare meals for their children and grandchildren or they take the
children to school and collect them in the afternoon (19%). The help of the preceding generation seems to 
follow a double logic of consanguinity and gender. On the one hand, consanguineous relatives help more, thus
explaining why mothers help more than mothers-in-law. On the other hand, women help more than men,
which explains why mothers help more than fathers and mothers-in-law more than fathers-in-law. In addition
to help provided by grandparents in everyday tasks, they are the ones who can be counted on in extraordinary
occasions like children’s illnesses or school holidays.
According to this survey, a majority of working mothers (27%) consider that the help of their own mother
is their main resource in order to help them make family responsibilities and employment compatible, followed
by the help of their husband/partner (25%), living near to their job (14%) and the help of other members of
the family (10%).
Intense intergenerational help provided by grandparents is a new phenomenon though based on the
strength of traditional family links. It is related to the rapid increase in female activity, particularly of the young
generation of mothers which takes place in a context of very limited social policies to help reconcile family and
employment. It can be interpreted as a case of change in the relationship between generations produced by
changes in gender relationships. Current working mothers are developing a wide range of strategies, most of
them based on informal and private resources. The main resource they can count on is the help of the pre-
ceding generation of women, who in spite of their differences with the younger generations, give fundamental
practical help by taking care of their grandchildren when the mothers work. In many cases they are a necessary
condition for working mothers to keep their jobs.
Informal family care is still the norm for the elderly who cannot take care of themselves.The social profile of
the carers is very specific: 84% of them are women, 50% between 45–64 years of age, 62% with a low educa-
tional level (primary education or less), 75% inactive. Among men, 45% are retired and among women 60% of
them are housewives (Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales 1995: 217–219). In most cases the help provided is per-
manent (75%). In other cases it can be for certain periods (13%) or in shifts with other members of the family.
In 85% of the cases care is provided every day. Only 15% of the carers interviewed said that they received eco-
nomic compensation from the elderly above the basic expenses that such care implies.
Opinions and attitudes regarding who should take care of the aged population are contradictory, probably
as a reflection of the period of transition that Spain is experiencing nowadays. Nine out of ten carers consider
it is a moral obligation for them to perform the work they are doing, but, on the other hand, five out of ten
think that the state should be doing what they are doing now.When they are asked about the kind of help the
state should provide, 61% mentions a salary for the carer, 14% help in the home, 5% promote the voluntary
sector for these tasks and 4% reduce the number of working hours (Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales 1995:
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Same home Same building Same street Same neighbourhood Same town
Grandmothers who help take 
care of their grandchildren 79.2 56.7 72.7 51.3 37.6
Grandmothers who do not 
help take care of grandchildren 20.8 43.3 27.3 48.7 62.4
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
246–247). Another survey carried out in the region of Andalusia in 1999 shows that 14% of women carers had
left their jobs in order to take care of a member of their family (this includes carers of the chronically sick, small
children, elderly and disabled (García Calvente and Mateo Rodríguez 1999: 42, 55–56).
The offer of complementary services such as help in the home, day centres, carers’ ‘breathe’ services, tele-
assistance, etc. are just beginning to appear.There are no statistics for these services but there is a wide variety
of private-public-voluntary institutions developing initiatives in this area.
There is some awareness and concern at the national government level, as well as in the regions and local
institutions, about the increasing demand for care for the elderly and the decreasing numbers of women avail-
able as carers. There are plans to increase the offer of places in collective residences, as well as some debate
about the private-public mix. But the dominant perspective seems to be to help families so that they can con-
tinue to take care of the elderly at home. For example, the leitmotiv of the Regional Plan for the Elderly of
Madrid is Aging at home, which is supposed to be made possible by different types of community services
(Consejería de Sanidad y Servicios Sociales 1999).
In Spain, intergenerational solidarity has been and still is a substitute for limited social policies for young
children and old people. Beyond the nuclear family, the role of grandparents as carers of their grandchildren and
of middle-aged women of their elderly parents is responding to new needs related to women involvement in
paid work and to the aging. However, in a European perspective, Spanish female activity is still low (though
rapidly increasing).Thus it is doubtful that intense intergenerational solidarity, of which middle-aged women have
been the main actors, will remain constant in the years to come.
The socio-economic situation of families
The economic situation of families has worsened slightly as the long announced economic recovery has not
taken place.The Spanish economy is now on a downward swing, unemployment rose again in 2002 and since
then has been fluctuating around 11%.The employment rate is low compared to the EU average and for the
last three years the pace of job creation has also slowed down.
The number of households with economic difficulties has increased. Data for 2003 show that 55.7% of
them have difficulties in getting to the end of the month, while those households which cannot make any
savings has reached 64.8% (this figure was 63% in 2002) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2004a). In addition,
prices have been increasing well above the inflation rate for a few years now (17% in 2003, for instance).
A significant proportion of Spanish families cannot afford expenses like adequate heating (41.6%), or reno-
vating domestic equipment and furniture (39.7%) or going on vacation at least a week per year (37.4%). In addi-
tion, 16% have housing problems related to noise (22.9%), insufficient space (16.2%) insufficient natural light
(11.7%), damp (13.9%) or pollution (9.7%). Almost half of the population reports not having any problem with
their housing. Most households have a colour TV (99.2%), telephone (96.7%), at least one car (73.1%) and a
microwave oven (64.4%) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2004b: 330–331). According to data from a recent
survey (Encuesta de Hogares sobre Equipamiento y Uso de Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicación) the
number of households with Internet connection reached 25% in 2003, with great differences among the re-
gions: more than 30% in Catalonia, Madrid or the Basque Country, less than 15% in Extremadura or Castilla-La
Mancha.The proportion of people who have used a computer in the last three months is 42.7%.
Access to housing is one of the main problems for Spanish families. Rented dwellings are scarce (11.4%)
and expensive, and buying a house or apartment (which is the norm as 82% of households own the place
where they live) has progressively become out of reach for young people who also experience difficulties in
obtaining a steady and sufficiently well-paid job. The number of families still paying a mortgage has increased
considerably. In 2001, according to census data, three million housing units had not been totally paid off by their
owners, 25% more than in 1991.
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 SPAIN
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 215
Family policies
Recent developments in the field of family policies in Spain show that this country has entered a new era of
explicit family policy. This was already the case of the former conservative government through its Family
Programme (Plan Integral de Protección de la Familia) adopted in 2001 but also of the main opposition Party
(Socialist Party), now in power, which presented its own Programme for the Family. One may say now that,
whatever the political future, there will be an explicit family policy in Spain.
The proposal by the Socialist Party begins by explicitly using the plural ‘families’ in the title Policies for the
Welfare of the Families instead of using the term ‘family policy’.This stresses the fact that all forms of families are
treated on an equal basis: traditional married couples, lone parent families, cohabiting couples irrespective of the
sex of the partners.The types of family policies stressed are: offering resources to families to deal with their res-
ponsibilities, measures to counter the effects of the demographic situation, measures to reconcile work and the
family and others aiming at reducing inequalities between different forms of families in a broad sense.
Among the many specific proposals, some deal with adapting legislation to new family realities: allowing
equal treatment for homosexual couples, including the possibility of marriage, increasing autonomy of lone
parents, counting all members of a family to be considered as a ‘large family’ (i.e., including the elderly depen-
dents). Concerning the economic support to families, one of the leading proposals is to introduce more equity
in the fiscal system by considering fiscal benefits as a reduction of tax due and not, as they are now, a reduction
of taxable earnings. Another proposal is to raise the maximum age for childcare allowance from 18 to 25 years
of age (25 is now the maximum age).To help reconcile the work versus family problem, two measures are pro-
posed involving the father: a ‘daddy’s leave’ (paid and exclusive) of four weeks to be taken during the child’s first
nine months and an extra one year parental leave exclusively for the parent not taking advantage of the present
three year parental leave. The proposed new parental leave will be unpaid, as is currently the case, and thus 
probably not very effective. According to this programme, old age dependency will be addressed by increasing
home care services to cover 60% of all the dependent population and 100% of the handicapped.The number
of elderly care centres will be increased up to a minimum of 80% of the EU average.
Economic support to families in Spain is based mainly on fiscal benefits completed with a means-tested
childcare allowance for families with earnings below the minimum for declaration to income tax. Childcare
allowance was revised in 2002 to cope with inflation and it now amounts to EUR 3,012 per year.The income
threshold for receiving this allowance is at present EUR 7,954.07 per year.
After an important reform of the fiscal system in 1998, a new income tax reform was adopted in 2002 and
implemented in 2003. The reform has introduced many changes related to the family, especially concerning
families with children. Among them a financial compensation to mothers during the three years following the
birth and not limited by the level of income, together with an increase in the reduction for childcare beginning
with the second child instead of the third as before. Due to the importance of all these changes and to make
comparison with the previous situation easier, we have drawn up a table comparing the situation before and
after the reform for all items concerning the family.
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Table 5. Changes in reductions of taxable income for family circumstances in Spain in 2002
Source: Based on data from Nota Informativa de la Dirección General de Tributos, del Ministerio de Hacienda, sobre la Reforma del
Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas y de Otros Impuestos Indirectos, del 21 de junio de 2001, pp.3–7.
Among the above changes, the most relevant and the most widely publicized is the special non means-tested
fiscal benefit to mothers working outside the house. Women with children below the age of three, working
(employed or self-employed) are eligible for this allowance.The father may only get it in case of the death of
the mother or if he has legal and exclusive custody of the child. The amount may reach a maximum of EUR
1,2005 per year for each child below three in the care of the mother. The most peculiar feature of this new
family policy measure is that the reduction of income tax may be paid in advance by a monthly bank transfer of
EUR 100 or it may be claimed at the end of the year when the income tax declaration is submitted.The restric-
tion of employment met with severe criticism and the new government has announced that it will be extended
to all mothers of small children, regardless of their economic activity.
Autonomous Regions have concentrated their new fiscal competence on the economic support of the
family. The Autonomous Regions have only recently been able to legislate on the fiscal system and to a very
limited extent. A 1996 law transferred part of the income tax earnings and a certain legislative capacity in this
matter to the regions.This system was ratified and expanded by a new law passed in December 2001, applic-
able now to all regions. Under the new system, regions receive 33% of the income tax and are able to fix, within
limits, the tax rates for their share and also to establish fiscal benefit based on personal or family situations.This
is how the regions have been able to implement some measures of support for families. One of the first 
regions to do so was the Region of Madrid, establishing a one time income tax reduction (EUR 280 in 2002)
for each birth or adoption, recently extended to the case of family child sheltering. The Region of Galicia has
also implemented a similar benefit (EUR 240 in 2002) but applicable in the year of the birth and the two 
TYPE OF REDUCTION New system (EUR) Law 40/1998 (EUR)
Personal minimum reduction 3,400 3,305.57
Reduction for children First child (aged up to 25) 1,400 1,202.02
Second child (aged up to 25) 1,500 1,202.02
Third child (aged up to 25) 2,200 1,803.03
Fourth child and over (aged up to 25) 2,300 1,803.03
For each child below age three 1,200 300
Old age dependency Subject or ascendants aged over 65 1,200 299.32
Subject or ascendants aged over 75,
for caring expenses 1,000 -
Work outside the house Allowance, in the form of a monthly down 
payment for mothers or fathers with children 
below age three 1,200 -
School material For children between three and 15 years of age - 150
Handicap of subject or ascendants General reduction 2,000 1,803.03
or descendants Reduction for handicap of active workers 2,800 1,690
(between 33% and 65% handicap)
Handicap of subject or ascendants General reduction 2,000 1,803.03
or descendants (between 33% Reduction for handicap of active workers 6,200 2,817
and 65% handicap plus Reduction for caring expenses 2,000 -
reduced mobility)
Handicap of subject or ascendants General reduction 5,000 3,606.07
or descendants (between 65% and Reduction for handicap of active workers 6,200 3,944
100% handicap) Reduction for caring expenses 2,000 -
5 Limited by the amount contributed to Social Security System from the birth of the child up to his/her third birthday.
following years. Large families of this region are also entitled to an income tax reduction between EUR 200 and
EUR 380, according to the number of children. Families that are not obliged to make a tax declaration, because
of their low income, are entitled to a direct allowance of EUR 300 for each child below three years of age.
Other regions have legislated or announced fiscal benefits to families, all of them means tested, in general on
the occasion of birth or adoption or for children below three, probably because there is already a State system
of childcare benefits based on the order of birth. Diversity is the rule in the intervention of the regions as no
coordination at State level exists. Each region defines its own priorities and its own technical and ideological
preferences.
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EVA BERNHARDT
Sweden
Family relationships
Family forms
About one in five of all persons between the ages of 16 and 84 years of age in Sweden are single, that is, they
do not live with a partner and/or with children.This proportion has remained somewhat stable in the last two
decades.Thus, non-family living is a fairly common experience, especially at the beginning and at the end of this
age span. Due to the fact that women are usually younger than their partners, combined with the fact that men
have higher mortality rates and that non-partnered elderly parents are not expected to move in with their
adult children, we find the highest percentage single among women in the age group 75–84 years, about two-
thirds. Among men in the same age group only about one-third are single, and the proportion is declining.
At the other end of the age span, we find substantially increasing proportions single among men in the age
group 16–44 years. For women, the increases are less spectacular, probably because women are more likely to
continue to live with their children after separation or divorce, and will therefore be classified as ‘families’. In the
prime family building years, between 25% and 44.26% of the men were single in 1998, but only 11% of the
women. Single men, not living with partners or with children, may well be parents, but not co-residing with their
biological children. On the other hand, among those cohabiting with children (regardless of whether they are
married or not) a growing proportion is living with the children of their partner from a previous relationship.
This is particularly common among men.Thus, non-standard parenting, that is having non-co-residential (own)
children or co-residing with children of their current partner, has become increasingly common among Swedish
men.
Since the early 1990s there has been a clear tendency for young people to continue living with their
parents for a longer time than before; in this period the proportion of 20–24 year-olds who are still living with
their parents has risen from 30% to 35%. Nevertheless, most young people in Sweden leave their parental
home in a relatively narrow age range between 18 and 23 years, girls generally earlier than the boys. Nest-leaving
age seems to be lower in Sweden than in most other European countries. Recent studies have shown that
young persons from broken homes have a significantly lower average age when leaving home, compared to
those in intact families. Therefore, the relatively high rate of disruption of Swedish co-residential couples 
(married or cohabiting) may have contributed to the low median age of leaving the parental home in Sweden.
The higher education system in Sweden expanded strongly in the 1990s, and continues to do so. Swedish
university students are generally not directly economically dependent on their parents, since they can get subsi-
dized governmental loans to support themselves during the time of study (many also have part-time work).
Nevertheless, the rising costs of being a student, combined with the shortage of student housing, especially in
the metropolitan areas, has no doubt contributed to a particularly late age of leaving home among university
students.
The long-term trend towards smaller families may have shortened the period that a couple has children
living at home, that is the childbearing and child rearing phase of the life. On the other hand, the current trend
towards later ages of nest leaving may have counteracted this to some extent. It is not clear whether the length
of time from the birth of the first child to the time when the last child leaves the parental home has become
that much shorter. What is certain is that this family-building phase occurs later and later during the life of an
individual. This also means that parents, having responsibility for children living at home, are older and older.
Active parenting years generally fall in the age span from the late 20s to the early 50s.
The Scandinavian countries have the highest levels of cohabitation in Europe, and the first co-residential
relationship is almost always a cohabiting union. In Sweden, less than 5% start their partnered life by getting
married. Childbearing in cohabiting unions is quite a common phenomenon, resulting in a situation where about
half of all births are out of wedlock. Among first births in Sweden it is even higher: two-thirds are non-marital,
but 84% of those are born to cohabiting parents.The median age at first birth is lower than the median age at
first marriage. Judging from official statistics, most people do get married eventually, although less so over time:
the proportion that never married has slowly been increasing over the years. In 2001, 17% of 50-year old
women and 25% (one in four) of 50-year old men had never married.This can be compared to 7% and 17%
respectively, who were never married 25 years earlier. However, most of these never-married 50-year olds were
either cohabiting at the time, or had been doing so earlier in their life. Survey data indicate that only a few per-
cent had never partnered before their early 40s. However, marriage is increasingly postponed to later stages in
the life span (higher ages and later unions). Many couples marry between the first and the second child, and
several studies show that pregnancy and childbirth still tend to trigger a change in marital status.
Survey data show that young adults in Sweden overwhelmingly approve of childbearing and child rearing
within cohabiting unions. Nevertheless, a majority of those currently living with a partner expect to marry 
within the next five years. Sending a signal to others that the relationship is a serious commitment seems to be
the most important aspect of getting married. Thus, there is no indication that marriage will disappear as a 
social institution, even if the motivations for marriage may have changed.
The question of homosexual marriages has been in the forefront of media interest for quite some time.
Sweden has had a law about registered partnerships for homosexual couples since 1995. Since then about
3,000 such partnerships have been registered (compared with an annual number of newly contracted mar-
riages of about 40,000). Recently, a proposal to introduce gender-neutral marriages (meaning that same-sex
couples can be wed according to the same marriage law as heterosexual couples) has been discussed by the
judicial committee in parliament. Several of the political parties support this idea, while the Christian democrats
oppose it (and the two biggest parties, the social-democrats and the conservatives have not made up their
mind yet). One possible outcome of this is that Sweden will introduce the same system as already exists in
many other countries, namely civil registration of marriages, leaving it to each individual couple to decide
whether they want to have it confirmed by a religious ceremony. It would then be up to each religious congre-
gation to decide whether they accept homosexual marriages or not.
Demographic situation
By April 30, 2004, Sweden had a population of close to nine million inhabitants. Population growth in the first
quarter of 2004 was greater than any recorded since the mid-1990s. The main reason for the growth was a
considerable immigration surplus, in combination with an excess of births over deaths, in contrast to the situa-
tion that was recorded for the five years between 1997 and 2001, when Sweden experienced negative natural
growth. The birth deficit received fairly modest attention from the media, the government and other social
actors.The reason for this lack of keen interest might have been the fact that Sweden has not yet experienced
a population decrease, as net migration has so far been large enough to offset the deficit of births.
Although fertility decreased dramatically in the 1990s, and was as low as 1.5 children per woman in 1999,
the fertility level is not exceptionally low in Sweden by European standards. It is, however, lower than in neigh-
bouring Scandinavian countries. What is characteristic for Swedish fertility, more than in any other European
country, are the pronounced fluctuations that seem to move parallel to business trends.The effect seems to be
particularly strong for first and third births, while second births have been much less affected. It has been
argued that fertility behaviour in Sweden is more sensitive to fluctuations in employment and economic condi-
tions than is the case in most other countries. The reason for this seems to be Swedish family policy, in par-
ticular the construction of parental leave, where benefit levels are directly related to the income of the parent
in the year preceding the birth (currently 80%). In recent years, when there has been an upswing in the economy,
fertility has risen (total fertility rate (TFR) in 2003 was 1.72 children per woman).
Despite an increase in recent years, the fertility level is still far from the assumed future rate of 1.85 in the
current population forecast. Recent analyses of the Eurobarometer data from 2001 show that the personal
ideal family size among Swedish women aged 20 to 34 is among the highest in the European Union (EU)-15
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group of countries (2.4).Together with France and Denmark, Sweden has the lowest proportion which sees no
child or one child as the ideal, while almost two out of five see a family with more than two children as the
most desirable. So, even if personal ideals may be declining over time, Sweden has a fairly long way to go before
reaching a sub-replacement level of ideal family size, unlike the situation especially in German-speaking coun-
tries.
As is the case in many other European countries, Sweden has for quite some time experienced a trend
toward childbearing at a later age.The median age for the first birth is currently 28.6 years for women and 31.1
for men. Even if most young people express a positive attitude towards having children (only a few percent of
young men and women in a recent survey said that they definitely did not plan to have children) becoming a
parent (ideally of two children), is no longer the strong norm that it was in previous generations. Above all,
young people are not in a hurry to start a family. Having the right partner is definitely important for both men
and women, while a completed education takes first place among women an adequate income to support a
family takes first priority among men.The latter probably reflects the pervasiveness of the breadwinner role for
men, even in a country like Sweden that has come a long way towards equality between men and women.
Generally, higher education for women implies that they have fewer children and that they are more likely
to remain childless. However, a recent Swedish study (Hur många barn får jag när jag blir stor? Barnafödande ur
ett livsperspektiv, Stockholm: Statistiska centralbyrån) looking into the effect of a later start at childbearing gives
another picture of the relationship between the educational level and the average number of children.Women
with a university education have a 50% higher propensity to have a third child than a woman with the lowest
level of education, who in turn is the most likely to stop childbearing after the first child.The negative relation-
ship generally found between level of education and number of children therefore depends mostly on the fact
that women with higher education start childbearing later in life.
The proportion of women who never have any children has been slowly increasing in recent decades.
While only about 11% of the women born in the mid-1940s remained childless, this has increased to about
14% for those born in the late 1950s. Still, these are relatively low figures. The latest population forecast for
Sweden assumes a rise to about 17% childless at the end of the childbearing period, which is still a lot lower
than the current rates in many other European countries. Both the level of childlessness and the proportion of
women having only one child are relatively low in Sweden, and there is nothing to indicate a dramatic increase
in the near future.
The new population forecast of May 2003 from Statistics Sweden (Sveriges framtida befolkning: Befolknings-
framskrivning för åren 2003-2050, Stockholm: Statistiska centralbyrån) indicates that the Swedish population will
reach 10.6 millions in 2050.This forecast is based on the assumption of an annual immigration surplus of 23,000
and a TFR of 1.85 children per woman. Life expectancy is expected to increase to 86.2 years for women and
83.6 years for men, indicating a diminishing gender gap. For the first time, Statistics Sweden has calculated the
expected future distribution of the population according to country of birth.The results show that almost the
whole population growth up to 2020 is due to increases in the foreign-born population and their children (the
second generation). In 2020 this population group is expected to comprise about 20% of the total population.
Increasing life expectancy and larger birth cohorts entering retirement age in coming years, especially from
2005 onwards, means a sharp increase in the (old age) dependency burden in Sweden, as in all Western coun-
tries. It has been suggested that one way of solving this problem is to accept more labour force migration to
Sweden. Currently, only about 5,000 labour migrants enter Sweden each year. Since the 1980s refugees and
family reunification (relatives of earlier migrants, or Swedish-born children of earlier migrants, who bring brides
and grooms to Sweden from their parents’ country of birth) dominate the migration stream.
A detailed study from Statistics Sweden (Arbetskraftsinvandring – en lösning på försörjningsbördan? Stockholm:
Statistiska centralbyrån) of what the level of labour force migration needs to be in the future to counteract the
net loss of people of working age (more people leaving than entering the labour market), shows that between
50,000 and 80,000 labour force migrants need to enter Sweden each year in the period 2010 to 2030. Even if
the recent inclusion of new member states in the EU may mean more labour migration to Sweden than has
normally been the case in past decades, such a high level is judged as quite unlikely for practical and political
reasons. It therefore seems necessary to combine more labour force migration with higher labour force partici-
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pation rates (that more people work until age 65 or even longer) and higher birth rates (even if the latter do
not affect labour supply for another 25 years). Sweden probably has less possibility than most other EU coun-
tries to increase labour force participation rates at higher ages, since these rates are already the highest in
Europe. In 2002 more than four out of five 55–59-year olds were in the labour force, and 57% of those in the
age group 60–64 years (compared to 60 and 27% respectively for the EU average).
A recent government report (Kan vi räkna med de äldre? Stockholm: Finansdepartementet) regarding the
future demographic challenge posed by the increasing dependency burden, warns that it is necessary to take
measures very soon to maintain, and if possible increase, the total labour supply, both for those above 55 years
of age and those in the younger age groups. The demographically favourable situation that prevailed during
those decades when the Swedish welfare state was being constructed has now come to an end.
Gender relationships
Compared internationally, Sweden has possibly come the furthest in the world, when it comes to gender equa-
lity. Considerable progress can be reported in recent decades in terms of female representation on political
bodies. For example, in the election for the EU parliament, which took place in June 2004, 11 out of the 19 can-
didates elected were women, which increased the female representation in the Swedish delegation to the EU
parliament (probably contrary to the trend in most other EU countries). On the other hand, there seem to
have been some setbacks with regard to gender equality in the labour market during the 1990s and in the early
21st century.The gender gap in pay did not decrease during the decade, while gender segregation, in terms of
what kind of jobs men and women hold did decrease.There are also positive developments when it comes to
relationships within the family. Greater gender equality in the home has been achieved through the sharing of
household and childcare tasks. More and more men take an active responsibility for home and children. Men
take parental leave, they deliver and collect children from the day-care centre, they cook and they clean, which
has improved the possibilities for women to develop their careers. Swedish men are clearly encouraged to
develop a primary-care relationship with their children at an early age.This leads to what has been called ‘hands
on fatherhood’, fathers are actively involved in childcare and child rearing, and do not just fulfil their provider
role by bringing home the pay check.
Swedish men are active fathers, even if their use of the benefits of the parental leave system is still fairly
limited (the details of the parental leave system are elaborated under the section Family Policies below).
According to a recent governmental report, 17.5% of the total number of days claimed during one calendar
year are used by fathers (Föräldrapenning, pappornas uttag av dagar: fakta och analys, Stockholm: Socialdepart-
mentet). There also seems to be a polarization since as many as one in four fathers did not take a single day
during the child’s first four years of life, while longer parental leaves by fathers are becoming more common—
one in four takes at least two months.
About one third of all children in Sweden experience a parental divorce or separation. Almost all Swedish
parents have joint legal custody after separation or divorce, even if in most cases the child(ren) live mostly, or
exclusively, with the mother. In Sweden, the children’s right of access to both their parents is considered very
important, as is the active parenting role of fathers.Therefore, men’s limited use of parental insurance is of great
concern to the government and other actors on the social policy scene. This concern about the male-female
relationship in their parenting role arises out of the long-standing emphasis on gender equality in Swedish public
policy and social debate. The Swedish labour organization, recently proposed that the 12 months of leave be
divided so that one-third has to be used by each parent, i.e., four months for the mother and four months for
the father, while the remaining four months could be used according to the wishes of the individual parents.
The results of a new time use survey were published in April 2003 (Tid för vardagsliv. Stockholm: Statistiska
centralbyrån).Total work time, i.e., the sum of unpaid and paid work, was found to be roughly the same for men
and for women, but this is a similarity concealing many differences. Men’s work is mostly paid work, while
women divide their time more or less equally between paid work and unpaid work. Men work daytime and
workdays, and have a clearer distinction between work and leisure time.Women’s work is more evenly spread
over the day’s 24 hours and over the week.Their leisure time is also more fragmented than men’s, and is often
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combined with or interrupted by household work. Women devote about twice as much time to household
work than men do.The most gender-typed household task is laundry.
In evaluating gender relationships in Sweden, it has to be pointed out that Sweden still has quite a gender-
segregated labour market.This is partly related to the fact that many tasks that in other societies are taken care
of at home (usually by a full-time—or possibly part-time—housewife) in Sweden fall within the public sector
(including publicly financed, but privately run institutions and activities). An example of this is childcare: the over-
whelming majority of those employed at the public (or private) day-care centres are women. The generous
parental leave system may also have had some negative effects on women’s career possibilities, as there are stu-
dies indicating that many employers hesitate to give women career-track jobs, because they anticipate that they
will be absent from work for extended periods of time (when they are at home on parental leave taking care
of their newborn children).
A recent governmental report on gender segregation in the Swedish labour market (Den könsuppdelade
arbetsmarknaden. Stockholm: Näringsdepartementet) argues that women’s integration into the workforce has
taken place in three distinct phases during the twentieth century.Women’s formal right to access to paid work,
regardless of civil status or family situation, was already established in the early 1940s, thanks to a 1939 law 
forbidding employers to fire women who married or had children. In reality, it was not until the late 1960s that
what the author of the report calls ‘primary integration’ of women into paid market work can be said to have
taken place.With regard to ‘secondary integration’, meaning that women and men face the same working con-
ditions, career possibilities, job choices, etc., progress has been made during the 1990s, but much still remains to
be done.
The degree of gender segregation in the labour market decreased during the 1990s. This seems to have
been the result primarily of a process where women have increasingly entered previously male-dominated
areas of the labour market.The reverse, men entering previously female-dominated areas, has taken place to a
much lesser extent. During that decade young women were more eager than young men to continue educa-
tion, in particular beyond secondary education.They have also, on average, higher grades.This has contributed
to strengthening their relative position with regard to higher education, which in turn has facilitated their choice
of non-traditional educational and occupational trajectories. The author of the report argues that nowadays 
economically active women, especially those in the younger age groups, do not find it as natural as previous
generations of women to step down, cut back (by working part time), or accept less qualified work just be-
cause they have (or plan to have) children.
It is interesting to note that gender segregation in the labour market was reduced during the 1990s, despite
the fact that the recession, especially in the early half of the decade, unemployment rates and general economic
insecurity could have been expected to counteract such a trend, rather than facilitating it.This is the same period
that witnessed declining rates of childbearing, which was actually a reversal of the trend during the 1980s when
birth rates and female labour force participation increased simultaneously. This is interpreted to indicate that
women’s participation in the labour force nowadays, in the Swedish context, should be regarded as a pre-con-
dition of, and not as a hindrance to, family formation and childbearing.Young women today make their choices
of educational and occupational careers depending on their own individual interests and talents, and are much
less influenced by future family formation and childbearing plans than was previously the case. Their options
have therefore widened considerably, and they no longer accept that children and family are regarded as
obstacles to future employment careers.They are also likely to expect their partners to share responsibility for
home and children on a more or less equal basis.To stimulate (or at least not to counteract) future childbearing
it is important to further reduce the gender segregation in the labour market (and the related gender-specific
roles in the family sphere).
Generational relationships
Most Swedish children up to the age of 17 years (72% in 2002) live with both their biological parents. About
23% live with their mother (and possibly a stepfather) while 5% live with their father (and possibly a stepmo-
ther).Younger children live to a greater extent with both biological parents, with the percentage decreasing as
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the child gets older.The proportion of 16 and 17 year olds who have experienced the divorce or separation of
their parents is 25%, while almost 5% had never lived with both their biological parents.
In 2002 for almost nine out of 10 children between 1 and 17 years old, the parents had joint legal custody,
while in the overwhelming majority of single custody cases it is the mother who has the custody. Parents who
have been married continue to have joint custody after divorce, unless one of the parents files for single custody.
The same rules apply for cohabiting parents, with the exception that they do not automatically get joint 
custody after the birth of the child but have to register joint custody with the authorities. Joint custody does not
necessarily mean that the child lives half the time with the mother and half the time with the father, in the case
where the parents no longer live together. Among children with non-co-residential parents, 17% divide their
time equally between the parents.This represents a dramatic increase from 4% in the early 1990s. Fewer chil-
dren experienced a separation or divorce between their parents in 2001 compared to the years before 1998.
This declining trend seems to be due to fewer separations between cohabiting parents, even though break-ups
are about twice as common among cohabiting parents compared to married parents.
The custody law assumes that it is best for the children if the parents have joint custody, even if they do not
live together. Most likely, this is normally the case, but there are also situations when single custody is to be pre-
ferred.The Ombudsman for children has pointed to the problematic situations which can arise when the courts
regularly decide on joint custody, even in those cases where one parent claims single custody because of abuse
(of the adult partner or of the children).The Ombudsman for children (Barnombudsmannen) has recently sug-
gested a number of changes in rules and regulations in order to strengthen the rights of the child(ren) in such
problematic situations.
Despite the fact that the Swedish welfare state is built on a highly individualized social security system, fami-
ly ties continue to be of importance, especially for care of the elderly. Due to the continuing financial constraints
on the Swedish welfare state, there has been a reversal of the trend, starting in the 1960s, of substituting family
care with public care. Both home help services and institutional care for the elderly have been cut back sub-
stantially, resulting in a situation where families provide a growing proportion of care for ailing elderly adults.The
important role of spouses and offspring (in particular daughters) in the care of the elderly, although seldom offi-
cially recognized, has been documented in several recent studies.
Socio-economic situation of families
Figures from the income distribution survey for 2001 conducted by Statistics Sweden show that the average
income level of Swedish households was slightly below the EU average. On the other hand, Sweden, together
with Denmark, has the smallest spread of household income in the population (the lowest Gini coefficient)
among the EU countries. Nevertheless, trends in economic standards during the 1990s have been particularly
negative for families with children.The most negative development has been for one-parent families with chil-
dren, a category whose situation used to be—and probably still is—less vulnerable in Sweden than in many
other countries. But the economic downturn in the 1990s, with, for Sweden, unusually high levels of unem-
ployment, has hit this group more than others: the lowest disposable income in 2001 was found among single
parents and among those over 75 years of age living alone.
The recession and increased unemployment in Sweden in the first half of the 1990s resulted in distinct de-
clines in average household income, as well as broader income gaps. The latter was a continuation of a trend
that had begun in the 1980s.The improvement in average income after 1995 did not break the trend; in fact, it
was in the late 1990s that income gaps widened the most markedly.The negative trend with regard to employ-
ment during the 1990s was no doubt one of the most important factors behind the fact that, during this 
period, income fell in relative terms mostly for single adults (mostly women) with children and for couples
(married or cohabiting) with many children (meaning three or more). In terms of age groups, income deterio-
rated most for young people. Young households and single adults with children were also the ones reporting
the most difficulties in making ends meet or having cash left over to cope with unforeseen expenditures.
Overall, however, financial vulnerability seems to have risen in every age group, except the very oldest. The 
problem was most pronounced in metropolitan areas.
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However, disposable income in Sweden increased again in the early years of the 21st century. In 2001 the big-
gest increase was observed among young couples without children (8%), while young people (18–29 years old)
living alone only increased their economic standard by 0.8%.They are also the only group with lower living stan-
dards in 2001 than in 1991. Families with children surpassed their 1991 level in 2000.The lowest disposable in-
comes in 2001were found among those over 75 years old living alone and among single parents. Co-residential
couples 30–49 years old without children at home had about twice the median income of those two groups.
The economic standard of children depends on the income levels of their parents together with public sub-
sidies such as child allowance. Children up to the age of 17 years of age live in families where, on average, about
20% of the total income is acquired from such subsidies. Children in one-parent families and children in two-
parent families where only one parent is employed, have the lowest economic standard (about 27% of these
children belong to ‘poor’ families). About 43% of children under 17 years of age living in two-parent families
have both parents working (or studying) full time, while 28% live in families with a father working full time and
a mother working part time.
Swedish children generally have a higher living standard than children in most other countries, and definite-
ly higher than was the case among Swedish children a few generations ago.This was the conclusion of a study
on the welfare of children and adolescents, based on interviews with children between 10 and 18 years of age.
(Barns och ungdomars välfärd, Stockholm: Socialdepartementet). In material terms, they are very well-off: 90%
have their own room, about 50% their own TV set, and over 40% their own mobile phone. A majority reports
no difficulties with their schoolwork, and most of them have good relationships with their parents. On the nega-
tive side, almost 25% report that they have a headache every week, about one-third have sleeping problems,
20% have stomach ache and 42% report that they suffer from stress. Thus psychosomatic problems do not
seem to be uncommon. Another related problem, which has attracted attention in the Swedish media, is the
growing prevalence of overweight among Swedish children: in a recent study one out of five four year olds
were found to be overweight.
Sweden has a well-established system of childcare facilities. As of 1995, municipalities were made legally
accountable for the provision of places for all children of working or student parents. Responsibility for activities
has been transferred from the social service to the school system. During the 1990s, average expenditure per
child in preschool care was cut by about 14%. This was the result of the combined forces of unchanged re-
sources and an increasing number of children in day care. One result of this has been a marked increase in the
number of children per group and per staff member in childcare facilities, both in preschool care and in leisure-
time centres for school children—but particularly for the latter.
Likewise, total expenditure on schools, calculated per pupil, declined during the 1990s, as did teacher densi-
ty per 100 pupils. For both childcare facilities and schools, there has been a noticeable increase in such facilities
outside the public sector. Schools run by non-public bodies were given access to municipal grants in 1992, and
from 1992 to 1998 the number of such schools trebled. The trend to establish independent schools has 
continued.Today, the Swedish school system is being hotly debated. One of the more worrisome trends in the
last decade or so is the decline in the proportion of pupils who achieve full marks and qualify for secondary
education.
Family policies
Family policies and gender equality policies are not two separate entities in Sweden, but are closely interwoven
and constructed to mutually support each other. Swedish family policy, as well as social insurance policies and
labour market policies, is based on the principles of universality and individual rights, which means that a person
is entitled to rights and benefits as an individual, regardless of, for example, family status or (legal) civil status.
Therefore, child and family benefits accrue to parents regardless of whether they are married or cohabiting (or
not even living together). Both parents are entitled to use the benefits of the parental insurance system. The
parental leave system (transformed from a maternal leave system thirty years ago, i.e., already in 1974) is 
probably the most important aspect of Swedish family policy, which also includes child and family benefits and
high quality day care.
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 SWEDEN
ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23 | 225
Currently, the parental leave system stipulates that parents receive parental cash benefits for a total of 480 days
per child, which corresponds to about 16 months, most of which is at 80% of the parent’s qualifying income.
Two months are exclusively for the mother, and two months for the father, which, if not used, cannot be trans-
ferred to the other parent.The ‘daddy’ month was introduced in 1995, and was extended by one more month
in 2002. The remaining months, which are not earmarked, can be claimed either by the mother or the father.
The most important part of the parental leave system is not that it is generous—which it is—but that it is fle-
xible. It is not necessary to use all leave time at the beginning, even if most parents use the overwhelming part
of their total number of days in the child’s first year of life. Indeed parental leave days can be used up until the
child’s eighth birthday.There are handbooks giving advice to parents how to get the most out of the parental
leave system (and parents are well aware of this). This flexibility of the parental leave system, in combination
with the right to return to one’s job, i.e., full job security up to 18 months after the birth of the child, plus the
availability of part-time jobs, makes the combination of work and parenthood in Sweden easier than in most
other countries in the world.This is also one of the basic tenets of Swedish policy for gender equality.
During the 1990s, there was a trend towards less generous provision and decreased coverage for both
social security and family support.There were important changes both in qualification criteria and replacement
levels: that is, who is entitled to support and how much. For example, the levels of replacement in health insu-
rance as well as unemployment insurance were lowered several times during this period. Also, those forms of
support aimed more directly at families with children underwent many changes, e.g. the replacement levels in
the very generous Swedish system for parental leave were adjusted in the same way as for the health insu-
rance.There were also changes in the child allowance and in the housing allowance, to which people 30 years
of age and over without children ceased to be entitled, along with lower allowances. One of the reasons behind
the deteriorating economic situation for households with more than two children is no doubt that this is a hou-
sehold category whose economic situation depends heavily on the housing allowance.
Social assistance expenditure increased markedly during the 1990s, and this expansion was so extensive
that it touched virtually every population group. However, two groups stand out in particular, namely young and
immigrant households, which, no doubt, is a reflection of the deteriorating economic situation of these two
groups. Generally—as with family support, health insurance and unemployment insurance—there has been a
trend in social assistance towards a less generous approach and tougher criteria.
This is also one of the important reasons behind the extensive system of childcare centres (both public and
private) all over Sweden—the provision of childcare should enable parents to combine parenthood with
employment or studies. Essentially the purpose of childcare centres is not only to create conditions, which are
beneficial for children, but childcare is also meant to help parents. It is important to understand that the
Swedish welfare state is based on a dual breadwinner model.The majority of families with children in Sweden
have two incomes, i.e., both parents are employed. Therefore, benefits that encourage work and make work
possible for parents, such as the availability of childcare, tend to be more important than the level of, for 
example, child allowances.
On January 1, 2002, a new regulation setting a ceiling on the fee parents have to pay for their children’s day
care came into force (‘maxtaxa’). At the same time, children of unemployed parents or parents on parental
leave were given a guarantee that they could continue spending 15 hours a week at their day-care centre, in
order not to lose contact with their playmates. These changes led to more children in day care, but did not
affect the average size of children’s groups or the average number of personnel. The average duration, i.e., the
number of hours per week that the children spend at their day-care centre, has decreased, mostly because of
more children of unemployed parents or parents on parental leave, whose time at the day-care centre is limited
to three hours a day.
The construction of parental insurance in Sweden has also been debated in the last couple of years. The
Swedish concern about gender equality in general, and the male-female relationship in their parental role in par-
ticular, has led to a debate about how the months covered by parental insurance should be divided between
mothers and fathers. The most radical idea has been that it should be divided equally—that is, six months for
the mother and six months for the father ; other people have suggested that a better idea would be one third
each for the respective parents, and the remaining four months according to the wishes of the parents. The
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family minister of the current Social Democratic government, apparently with the support of the majority of
the party, argues that dividing the parental leave days equally between the parents would have negative conse-
quences for the children.The reasoning behind this argument is that, since so many fathers do not use all those
days that are currently earmarked for them, the children will have less time at home being cared for by one of
its parents.
Another aspect of parental insurance that has been hotly debated recently is a possible increase in the 
ceiling (Swedish parents get 80% of their previous salary, up to a certain maximum ceiling).The ceiling implies
that those with relatively high salaries (meaning more men than women) do not get 80% of their previous
salary if they stay home with the child.Thus this rule counteracts a more gender equal division of parental insur-
ance. The government promised before the elections in September 2002 that the ceiling would be raised.
However, after the elections the government said that current state finances did not allow this increase, and no
such change was included in the 2004 budget.
A researcher at the Institute for Future Studies (Sara Thalberg, Barnafödandets politik, Stockholm: Institutet
för framtidsstudier) has analysed how the political parties in Sweden argue over issues of family support and
whether low fertility is considered a political problem or not, and if so why.The period 1997–2003 was studied
and it was concluded that there does not seem to be any clear difference in position between the left wing or
the right wing regarding fertility.The Social Democratic party is the party that has most explicitly presented low
fertility as a problem, but also the Christian Democrats have taken an active part in this issue.The Liberal and
Conservative Parties, on the other hand, do not appear to worry much about future demographic develop-
ments. Much of the discourse indicates that there is a connection towards the attitude to the birth rate, on the
one hand, and labour force immigration, on the other, as the two latter parties are more in favour of labour
force migration while the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats show the most negative attitude
towards immigration.
Regarding causes and measures, however, there appears to be a divergence between the political blocs. For
the Social Democrats, the and the Green Party, childbearing is to a large extent connected to work force par-
ticipation, and the decline in fertility during the 1990s is explained by employment insecurity and the economic
recession. The issue is also presented as an issue of gender equality. For the right wing parties, low fertility is
mainly explained by the policies of the Social Democrats, the ruling party during this period.To increase fertility,
these parties advocate increased freedom of choice and more time for families by means of allowances for
parents who stay at home with the children, together with subsidised household services.
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This period has been one of unprecedented expansion of public policy interest and intervention in family life in
Britain and concomitant public expenditure on initiatives and programmes to support families in a variety of
ways.The Labour government came into power in 1997 with a clear manifesto commitment to support families
with children as well as hold families more responsible for the behaviour and care of their members.
Without doubt, this political commitment was in large part a response to both the changing nature of fami-
ly life over the preceding decade and also the impetus given to a more interventionist and explicit family policy
by the highlighting of family concerns through the UN International Year of the Family1994. Growing public dis-
quiet about the consequences of family break-up, the problems of parenting in a more complex society and the
anti- social and delinquent behaviour of a small but visible minority of young people also contributed to a sense
of ‘crisis’ as did the increasing strain parents and employers alike found themselves experiencing as more British
families tried to manage family and working life with little institutional support.
This report reviews how family relations have changed and examines the impact of these changes. It looks
then at the socio-economic position of different family types, before considering the government’s response to
some of these issues and recent family policies.
Family Relations
Changing household structures
One of the major changes over the last few years has been the growth of households to 24.4 million in Great
Britain in 2002 caused chiefly by the growth in one person households.This reflects both the ageing population
with more people living longer and many experiencing longer periods of widowhood. But it also reflects the
increased numbers of people living alone after divorce or separation as well as a growing tendency for some
young people to live alone prior to couple or family formation.This is particularly likely to be men. In 2000, solo
men under 65 comprised 10% of households and the trend is predicted to continue with 14% in 2021
Consequently, couple headed households have declined to 58% of all households and single person house-
holds increased to 29% by 2002. Large households [over 5 people] have halved, falling to 7% in 2002.
Households with dependent children are a declining proportion of all households—only 29% in 2002—but
over the life course raising children will still be experienced by a majority of people. (Social Trends, 2003) 
Marriage and partnership 
Throughout this period, there has been constant scrutiny of the falling marriage rate and popular discussion of
the ‘end of marriage’. It is clear that the marriage rate has been falling steadily over the last twenty years both as
a result of people delaying or eschewing marriage completely or as a result of people divorcing. Britain, like the
rest of Europe has seen the increasing popularity of cohabitation such that for the majority of young people
their initial resident couple relationship is a cohabitation.This may precede marriage with the same partner or
may end in separation. Longitudinal data suggest that only about one in ten of these ‘nubile cohabitations’ conti-
nues as such, though this is likely to be an increasing proportion. Attitudinal data reveal that cohabitation is
increasingly seen as more acceptable whether as the ‘final stage of courtship’ before a marriage or as an altera-
tive to it. (Barlow et al., 2001) 
Cohabitating men and women are predominately young—the peak age is mid to late 20’s though there is
also a sizeable group of older post marital cohabitants. All the evidence suggests that the proportion of people
cohabiting will continue to grow as will the length of cohabitations. It is also projected that the proportions of
people raising children in cohabiting relationships will also rise as will the proportion of older people in coha-
biting couples.These developments have implications for the legal status and protection of people in these rela-
tionships with respect to property and finances on dissolution and death which are currently very topical and
some of which are being tackled through legislation. (Haskey, 2001)
As well as an overall decline in marriages and later age of first marriage, we have seen two other changes.
Firstly, there has been a rise in the proportion of marriages which are second or subsequent marriages for one
or both parties. In 2000, for example, there were 180,000 first marriages out of a total of 306,600. And, second-
ly, there has been an increase in secular marriages over the last fifteen years. By 1998, 61% were civil marriages
and the widening of legally approved secular premises for marriages has encouraged and underpinned this
trend.
Divorce and separation
Over the same period we have seen continuing high levels of divorce and, although the peak figure of 180,000
in 1993 has not been surpassed after a fall in the mid 1990s, the rate has begun to rise slightly in 2001. People
are slightly older now when they divorce reflecting the later age of marriage but marriages are ending earlier
and often this means that very young children see their parents separate.
What is much harder to establish is the proportion of cohabitations which dissolve and the numbers of
children affected as figures are not routinely collected for this.
Research suggests that cohabiting is less stable than marriage, and that these relationships are even more
likely to break up. (Clarke & Wright, 1997). But comparison is not straightforward as some cohabitations are
entered into with very different degrees of commitment and value sets than most marriages. (Smart & Stevens,
2000)
Post separation families
Concern about the impact of divorce and the breakdown of relationships on children continues to be a feature
of public discourse though there is more acceptance of it and a willingness to work with it than there was a
decade ago.The number of British children (aged 16 or under) whose parents divorced reached a peak of 176,
000 in 1993, and since then numbers have fallen. In 2001 146,914 children in England and Wales experienced
parental divorce and the majority were under 10. In part though, this fall also reflects the growth of cohabitati-
on and the numbers of children affected by parental separation in this family type is harder to know. Research
suggests these parents are three and four times more likely to separate than their married counterparts (Clarke
& Wright, 1997) and recent analysis of family change over the period 1999-2001 confirms the higher incidence
of relationship break-up among cophabitants. (Marsh & Perry, 2003) 
A further consequence of such high rates of divorce and relationship failure has been the growth in the
number of stepfamilies. In 2000/01 stepfamilies accounted for 8 per cent of families with dependent children
and they were most likely to be made up of a divorced or separated mother and her children (88%) as the vast
majority of children live mainly with their mothers (Social Trends, 2003).
A recent piece of research examined the perspectives of 467 children aged between 5 and 16 living in
these ‘reconstituted’ families. These researchers highlighted how many children had felt anxious or unhappy
during the separation of their parents, and that many had little understanding of what was happening to them
at that time. Furthermore, some children had experienced upheaval as well as problems with adjustment when
they became part of new families. The authors also noted evidence of poor communication between parents
(especially some fathers) and children, which they felt made the whole process more even more distressing
(Dunn & Deater-Deckard, 2001).
Finally the policy and research spotlight has increasingly been thrown on the role of fathers in separated
families and the extent to which non resident fathers had contact with their children. Research evidence on the
latter is difficult. Early studies suggested more than a third lose contact within two years but recent research
suggest between 15-28 % (ONS 2004) or 9% (Attwood et al., 2003). Where contact is taking place it is often
frequent.The ONS survey reports that 17% of fathers had some form of contact everyday with 8% seeing their
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child daily; 49 % at least weekly and 69% monthly. Between a half and two-thirds had overnight stays at least
once a month (Hunt & Roberts, 2004).
Family formation and fertility
Childbearing is happening later in life and more women of childbearing age are remaining childless. By 2000
women’s average at first birth was 27.1 and fathers’ was 31.7. However, as Britain also has the highest level of
teenage pregnancies in Europe with an average live birth rate of 29 per 1000 girls aged 15 -19, we are also see-
ing a divergence between a minority of very young parents and more highly educated and professional parents
embarking on parenthood in their mid thirties.This delay in childbearing is one factor which has contributed to
both the growth of fertility treatment and also the rise in childlessness, such that it is estimated that over a fifth
of the current cohort of women of childbearing age will be childless, many, but not all, through choice.The rise
in IVF treatment, as well as the increasing age of new mothers has also led to more multiple births (Social
Trends, 2003) 
Another feature of current childbearing is the increasing incidence of babies born outside marriage. In 2001
most children were born to a married couple but around 40% were born outside marriage. This mirrors the
rise in cohabitation, but also reflects a small minority of women having a baby without a live-in and /or current
partner. Recent results from the new Millennium Cohort Study of babies born in 2000/1 have revealed the
marked differences in relationship status of new mothers of among ethnic groups.Young Asians are most likely
to be married, with black mothers having the highest incidence of solo living and white mothers the highest
incidence of cohabiting (Kiernan & Smith, 2003).
The changing nature of the extended family  
The overall aging of the population has had some important changes for the extended family too with increa-
sing numbers of three, four and even five generation families. It is true that there are very few three-generation
households in the UK - an estimated 1% of all households in spring, 2001 (Social Trends, 2002). And Asian fami-
lies are more likely to live in a three generation household than other groups. (Social Trends, 2003) However,
research shows that links between the generations remain important, even when families do not actually share
the same home. National data shows that grandparents live quite close to at least some of their grandchildren-
64% lived within half an hour (Clarke & Roberts, 2003).
A study which compared data from the International Social Survey Programme in 1986, 1995 and 2001,
found that although individuals now have most regular contact with their immediate family, they still keep in
regular touch with wider family members though the three generation links are the most important (Park &
Roberts, 2002).
Three in five grandparents in a recent national survey reported seeing at least one set of grandchildren on
a weekly basis. Furthermore, when asked whom they would turn to, most people would still in the first instance
go to a member of their family rather than a friend if they were ill, ‘depressed’ or had financial problems (Park &
Roberts, 2002). In fact, other evidence shows that many individuals provide regular, long-term care for an older
family member (Wittenberg et. al., 1998) while grandparents are still an important source of childcare for wor-
king parents. Among those with grandchildren under 15, 60% looked after them some of the day and 54%
babysat (Clarke & Roberts, 2003). A small minority do more than this as a recent Home Office report highligh-
ted, as they are bringing up their grandchildren full-time, usually as the result of a family crisis (Richards, 2001).
Grandparents have also been shown to play an important role in children’s lives, even after their parents
have separated or divorced, and some researchers have suggested that regular contact with maternal grand-
mothers can help a child to adjust to a new family situation (Dunn & Deater-Deckhard, 2001).
Yet, it should not be assumed that all family members are happy about providing this support. Recent re-
search found that grandparents who carried out occasional childminding saw this as part of their role. But those
who had become full-time carers, in place of their own children, had usually not expected to take on these res-
ponsibilities, and many struggled emotionally, practically and financially (Richards, 2001). And, the International
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Social Survey Data suggests that a substantial minority of grandparents do feel over-burdened at times, espe-
cially the ‘young’ grandmothers (women aged under 54) who are more likely to be employed as well as providing
care for other family members, such as their own elderly parents (Park & Roberts, 2002).
Finally, a new term, ‘boomerang children’ has been used to describe adults who return to live in the paren-
tal home after a period away. One estimate suggests that over a quarter (27%) of young adults return to live
with their parents at least once, and that one in ten returns home four times before leaving for good.The main
reason given for returning was money problems, but 17% said that they simply missed the family home (Family
Policy Annual Digest, 2002). But clearly the process of transition from dependent child to fully independent
young adult has become more protracted as more enter financially stressful higher education, entry to securer
labour market positions becomes more difficult and for most entering the housing market in their early 20s is
prohibitively expensive.
The dynamics of family life
Family life in Britain has been subject to considerable scrutiny and change over the last decade or so as the
roles of men and women have changed, paid work has become more important and families are combining
work and caring at both ends of the age spectrum. Parenting has been identified as an area where some
parents need help and public support and the whole balance of responsibility between the family and the state
has been under scrutiny.
Working parents
The 1990s saw a steady increase in the proportions of women working in a paid job so that by 2002, 73 % of
women of working age were economically active, a rise from 67% in 1984. More men were active at 84%, but
this was a decline form 89% in 1984. One of the largest increases over this period has been in the proportion
of mothers of young children in employment. A small majority of mothers with a child under 5 (54%) was eco-
nomically active in 2002 and this figure rises as the youngest child gets older so that 79% of women with a child
11-15 was engaged in the labour market. (Social Trends, 2003)
However, this apparent evidence of a shift in gender relations towards equal opportunities for women
should be treated with some caution for a number of reasons. First, this change has not taken place across all
groups. For example, women of Bangladeshi/Pakistani origin have much lower rates of employment, especially
those with few qualifications (Social Trends, 2003). And, most women who continue working and return to
work after childbirth are in ‘couple’ families. Married mothers are more likely to be working than cohabiting
mothers who in turn are more likely to be in employment than lone mothers in Britain. Some of this difference
is explained by the different ages of these groups and their children with both lone mothers and their children
likely to be younger. But some of the difference is also attributable to their different human capital mix of edu-
cation, skills and work experience. Finally, some of it also explainable by the presence of a partner as many of
the mothers in couple families are working part time with full time working partners. So the mix of income and
benefits they are in receipt of are very different The recent government sponsored Families and Children Study
looks at this in considerable detail (Marsh & Perry, 2003).
Secondly, the full/part time divide in women’s employment is a crucial variable in explaining the labour 
market position of men versus women and between partnered and unpartnered women in Britain and under-
lying the clear differences in patterns of employment between mothers and childless women. Overall of the 6.2
million people working part time in 2002, 5.1 million were women (Social Trends, 2003). Some of these part
time workers work less than 16 hours a week though recently mothers’ hours have been increasing. By 2001,
56 % of mothers worked more than 16 hours compared with 42% in 1998 (O’Brien & Shemilt, 2003).
Recent research has looked in detail at the hours of work of mothers and fathers and shown the extent to
which they work atypical hours, often in an attempt to ‘juggle caring and work between them so that they
manage childcare but also as an employment consequence of the move to a 7/24 society.This study shows very
clearly the way in which significant numbers of families with young children have a parent working at times
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when children would be at home such as in the evening, early mornings and week ends all of which raIses ques-
tions about the effect of this type of family shift work on family life (La Valle et. al, 2002; Dex. 2003).
Central to this expansion in mothers’ employment has been the growth in childcare places over this period,
in large part as part of the government’s National Childcare Strategy though also a market response to
demand. Over 100,000 new places have been created for pre-school children since 1998 (NAO, 2004)  and in
total there are now 1.4 million registered childcare places in England as of March 2004 (Ofsted, 2004).
However, it is still a minority of parents who use formal childcare. Family care by the other parent or a grand-
parent and also siblings is often preferred as are informal arrangements and this is not always because of cost
though the availability and cost of formal care is an important barrier to use (Kasparova et al., 2003).The
Daycare Trust recently highlighted how the cost and shortage of childcare restricts employment options for
many women, and especially those from minority ethnic backgrounds, lone mothers, the less well qualified and
mothers of disabled children (Raising Expectations, 2002).There is, moreover, concern that the supply of places
is not secure.The National Audit Office has recently reported that for every two places which open one closes
and the funding base of this expansion is not permanently established (NAO, 2004).
Finally, the growth of women’s employment has not been accompanied by a commensurate increase in
men’s involvement in domestic work. In part this is because in many couple families women are still secondary
wage earners working part time and primary domestic workers. This is less likely to be so in couples where
both work full time especially before the arrival of children and the evidence suggests a more egalitarian divi-
sion of labour exists at home. But there is no doubt that much of the increased discussion about work/life
balance has been fuelled by the concern of both men and women that they are working longer hours at work
and shouldering domestic work and caring on top of this.
A concern with parenting
The 1990 saw a dramatic increase interest in parents and parenting. Initially this focussed both on the costs to
the public purse of growing numbers of lone parent families, especially those where the non-resident father
neither paid adequate levels of child support nor actively parented his children, and concern about anti-social
and delinquent behaviour of a small but visible minority of young people, many of whom were growing up in
communities where adult men were largely absent.While concern about child support has largely subsided as a
public issue, though there are still criticisms that the system is slow, rigid, does not recognise that parental obli-
gation is complex, and importantly, has failed to lift lone parent families out of poverty (Barnes et al., 1998; Davis
et al., 1998), concern about anti-social behaviour continues.
It focuses on the extent to which parents should be held responsible for the misbehaviour of their teenage
children. A major research study, carried out by the Youth Justice Board into the prevention of offending by
young people, identified family conflict or breakdown as well as a family history of problem behaviour as signifi-
cant risk factors associated with young people becoming involved in crime (Beinart et al., 2002). Legislative
initiatives to deal with this have been a feature of the last seven years.
There has also been recognition of the more general difficulties associated with post-separation parenting.
The issue of the role of the non–resident parent, overwhelmingly the father, has been much discussed as, for a
small minority (10%) of separating families, managing post separation contact requires the intervention of the
courts (ONS, 2004) and there is considerable dissatisfaction for some mothers and fathers about this. Some
fathers argue that they are awarded limited contact and little is done to enforce court orders when mothers
flout them, while dissatisfied mothers often feel that contact is awarded even when there is a history or danger
of domestic violence. Several years of consultation has ensued and the Government now proposes little chan-
ge in the law but more active intervention to inform parents and children, increasing the powers of the court
to refer parents who disobey contact orders for counselling or psychiatric intervention and the creation of a
network of child contact centres to provide safe and neutral venues for meetings.
General information about the changing nature of parenting and the stress and stains modern parents feel has
become much more common over this period , reflecting the greater salience attached to ‘supporting parents’.
The National Family and Parenting Institute publishes survey information about parents’ worries.
And, among others thing, these have shown that the majority of parents are concerned about their 
children, are especially anxious about teenagers becoming involved in alcohol and drug abuse and want more
information about coping with 11-18 year olds, who, they felt, were the most problematic group (NFPI, 2001a).
Another survey, which focused on the specific anxieties of minority ethnic parents, found that their chil-
dren’s behaviour was also a major concern. In addition, financial difficulties and school standards were particular
worries for Black parents (NFPI, 2001b).More recently, a survey revealed that though most parents judged
being a parent positively they were also likely to think that they have a harder task than their parents did with
lone and step-parents more likely to say this (Lever Faberge, 2004).
Another key theme in the ‘parenting’ debate has been the role parents should play in their children’s educa-
tion. Government ministers have been keen to remind all parents about their obligation to educate their 
children and their duty to ensure that their children are not violent or abusive to other pupils or teaching staff
(Family Policy Annual Digest, 2002). Therefore there has been considerable emphasis on ensuring children
attend school by tackling truancy levels, trying to reduce school exclusions and also unauthorised absences
[such as holidays in school terms]. Parents are being not only urged to co-operate with schools on this but
sanctioned when children are persistently absent or misbehave. The Government survey of families with 
children has shown that as many as one in ten children has had a parent contacted by school as a result of the
child’s behavioural problems or exclusion from school (Barnes et al., 2004)
However, there have criticisms of this approach, arguing that the government has focused too heavily on
school exclusions and truancy. Instead it is claimed that many persistent ‘non-attenders’ come from families
where basic skill levels are low, and little value is placed on education.Therefore, attention should be given to
changing this culture and encouraging parents to become more involved, before serious behavioural problems
develop (Success in Something, 2002).
Finally, throughout this period there has been growing concern about the state’s own role as a ‘corporate’
parent for those children who are taken into the care of local authorities either because their family temporari-
ly cannot look after them or because   it is deemed unfit and the child is subject to a child protection order.
While the numbers are not great and their stay is temporary for the majority, instances of serious child abuse
leading to the death of vulnerable young children as well as the very poor education, employment and life out-
comes most children in care experience has provoked public ,professional and political interest in this group. In
September 2003 the government published a green paper ‘Every Child Matters’ reviewing this whole issue in the
wider context of all its services for children.
The Socio-Economic Position of Families
Inequalities
A number of social and economic changes over the past 20 years have resulted in an increase in the number of
‘low income’ families in the UK, and the growth of inequality. In particular, the decline of traditional industries hit
some regions especially hard and meant that male unemployment in these areas grew along with the number
of ‘workless’ households. But the growth of low paid, often part time and female service sector or routine
assembly line jobs has not replaced the male manufacturing wages families lost.
At the same time, the distribution of earnings has widened because more value is now placed on those
with education and skills, relative to those without. Furthermore, changing family structures, especially an in-
crease in the number of lone parent families, has meant that more households are now ‘work poor’ and in
receipt of social protection benefits (Family Policy Studies Centre, 2000b).
As a result, while the average household income per head of the population adjusted for inflation doubled
between 1971 and the early 2000s, the distribution of this income became more unequal during the 1980s,
stabilised in the early 1990s, and more recently has shown signs of a further small increase in inequality. Growth
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in self-employment income and unemployment was associated with this growth in inequality (Social Trends,
2002; IPPR 2004). As a consequence 18% of the British population are living in ‘low income’ households 
(defined as below 60% of the median equalised disposable income) (Social Trends, 2002).
Furthermore, wealth statistics show even more inequality. The most wealthy 1% of individuals in the UK
owning 22% of the total marketable wealth, while half of the population owned only 6% of this total wealth
between them (Social Trends, 2003). In addition, although the amount of household disposable income has con-
tinued to grow, the proportion derived from wages and salaries fell from 59% to 54%, as the proportion from
social protection benefits went up. It is clear that most of these benefits are paid to older people, but benefits
are still the only income for a significant proportion of families (Social Trends, 2002). But some types of family
are more at risk of poverty.
Families with dependent children
In the UK, families with children are disproportionately in the lower quintiles of income distribution, and it has
been estimated that around a third of all British children are growing up in households with less than half the
national mean income (Social Trends, 2002).This means that nearly 4 million children were living in low income
households in 2001-2002 (Social Trends, 2003). In fact, using statistics from the mid-1990s and relative measures
of poverty, some analysts have claimed that the UK has the third worst rate of child poverty in the industrialised
world (Family Policy Studies Centre, 2000b).
It is true that there are now more ‘dual earner’ or ‘work rich’ couple families, and some of these parents
claim that they both have to work in order to achieve a ‘satisfactory’ standard of living. But the majority of poor
children are part of ‘workless’ families, where no adult is in employment. Half of the children in workless lone
parent families and two thirds in workless couple families were in low income households and this rose to
three quarters of children when housing costs are taken into account.
There has, perhaps, been most public concern about the number of poor lone parent families. Lone parents
are the family type at greatest risk of poverty with nearly half (45%) of poor children living in a one parent
family, while over half (63%) of all lone parents live in poverty (Family Policy Annual Digest, 2002).They are also
more at risk of experiencing associated disadvantages. For example, they are less likely than ‘couple’ families to
own their own home, and more likely to live in overcrowded conditions (Social Trends, 2002). In addition, the
British Crime Survey in 2001 indicates that they are most at risk of being burgled, mainly because they live on
council estates or in other ‘low income’ housing (Social Trends, 2002). Furthermore, data concerning household
expenditure shows that the average weekly spending by lone parent families is less than half of the amount
spent by two-parent households, and even lower than some pensioner couples (Social Trends, 2002). It seems
that although they are more likely to spend a greater proportion of their income on food than higher income
families, the actual amount is far less in real terms.
Income poverty is associated with all sorts of other deprivations and disadvantages in health and education.
Research has highlighted the relationship between family poverty, food poverty and poor outcomes for children
and shown how mothers often go without food for the sake of their child’s health. Even so their children are
inevitably also affected by poor nutrition. In particular, pregnant women on low incomes are more likely to have
low birth weight babies, and poor children are at greater risk of ill health (Dowler et al., 2001).
A major government survey of families with children has documented in considerable detail the income
and benefits these families receive as well as their socio- economic characteristic, employment status, housing,
health and receipt of services as well as use of childcare (Barnes et al., 2004).The chapter on material depriva-
tion shows very clearly the consequences of poverty for British families and children and echoes an earlier sur-
vey of parents which had shown that many could not provide holidays, activities and other items they conside-
red to be ‘necessities’. In fact, 18% of children in this study lacked two or more of these items, and were descri-
bed by the researchers as ‘necessity deprived’ (Howarth et al., 1999).
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Black and minority ethnic families
Analysis of data from the Family Resources Survey suggests that individuals of Bangladeshi/Pakistani origin are
by far the poorest in Britain, with 60% living in households with less than half the average income (Berthoud,
1998; Social Trends, 2003). Furthermore, children from this background are much more likely to live in these
‘low income’ families than White children. In 1997/98 three quarters of Bangladeshi/Pakistani children were part
of households with less than half-average income, compared with one in three White children (Family Policy
Studies Centre, 2000b).Most of these children are members of ‘workless’ families. Employment rates for this
ethnic group are the lowest in the UK, and in spring 2001 adults with this background, as well as Black adults,
had an unemployment rate which was three times higher than for Whites (Social Trends, 2002).
Although children of Bangladeshi/Pakistani origin are more likely than White children to grow up in a two-
parent family, just under one half of Black families with dependent children are headed by a lone parent, with all
of the disadvantages described above (Social Trends, 2002). And although there is little official data, a report has
highlighted how refugee and asylum seeking children and families face a particularly acute risk of poverty (End
Child Poverty, 2002).
Family Policies
Machinery of policy making
In the UK, historically, no one government department has ever held overall responsibility for the family or fami-
ly policy. Instead, a number of departments have carried some responsibility for policies which, directly or indi-
rectly, affect family life. However since 1997, the ‘New Labour’ government, which came into office with a mani-
festo to increase the support for families has been very much more proactive in its family policy. This has
emphasised a more coordinated approach, with the specific aim of producing solutions to some of the 
problems and concerns described in this report. Furthermore, this government has gone further than any other
in developing ‘explicit’ family policies, especially on parenting, and financial and childcare support for low paid
parents to make work ‘worthwhile’.
Initially, in September1997 the Ministerial Group on the Family  was set up. Chaired by the Home Secretary,
it launched the first consultation document on the family produced by any British government, Supporting
Families, in November 1998.This set out an approach to family policy, as well as a programme aimed at suppor-
ting family life, and it was generally well received.The document also encapsulated the problems in developing a
holistic family policy as its various chapters reflected the initiatives and responsibilities of several government
departments
Since that time the machinery of family policy making has undergone many changes as responsibility even-
tually passed in 2003 from the Home Office where it was felt there had been a disproportionate emphasis on
failing families to the Department for Education and Skills.The DfES had acquired policy responsibility and con-
sequently enormous budgets for programme expenditure in the area of early years’ education and the major
early years’ initiative for disadvantaged children, Sure Start, as well as its more traditional interests in young 
people, schools and education.The new Children and Families Directorate was set up with Margaret Hodge as
Minister with primary responsibility for children’s services, childcare and provision for under-fives, family policy
(including parental support and family law). Ms Hodge also had responsibility for the new reform agenda for
children’s services which the Government set out in the Green Paper Every Child Matters (2003).
The wish to join-up policy making and implementation across departmental boundaries has been given sub-
stance in the variety of cross cutting cabinet committees which have been set up.The most senior is the Cabinet
committee – The Ministerial Group on Children, Young People and Families chaired by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer.There is also, as of 2004, a Ministerial Sub-Committee on the Delivery of Services for Children,Young
People and Families charged to coordinate the delivery of services for these groups chaired by the Secretary of
State for the Department for Education and Skills (DFEE) and also the Active Communities and Family Issues
Committee Cabinet sub-committee chaired by the Home Secretary. Membership is widespread so responsibility
for policy formulation and overseeing of implementation is spread across many ministries
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The government also established the National Family and Parenting Institute in November 1999 as an indepen-
dent charity, though almost all its initial funding came from the government. Its purpose was to provide infor-
mation to parents, run media campaigns, encourage research and, more generally, promote ‘good’ parenting.
Finally these institutions were mirrored in Parliament by several parliamentary groupings most recently, the
Associate Parliamentary Group for Parents and Families launched in March 2002.
The policy issues
Almost every aspect of family life has been put under policy scrutiny but what has clearly emerged over time is
that the Government’s definition of family policy is essentially about the successful rearing of children, i.e.
‘investing in the future’. Family policy formally does not embrace the care of frail elderly or sick adults. This is
the domain of policies towards social care.There have been two key documents. Supporting Families, published
in 1998, outlined the government  progress after one year in office and set out the agenda for action. Every
Child Matters published in 2003 was essentially about the reform of children’s services, which historically have
focussed on deprived children or children and families at risk. However, this document covers all aspects of
children’s services and the whole children’s workforce and proposes various major changes and initiatives affec-
ting all 11 million children (Every Child Matters, 2003).
Supporting families identified five main domains of family policy; a generalised area of support for all parents
with particular input at key stages especially in the early years; financial support for families ; helping families
balance work and home; strengthening marriage and better support for serious family problems. Since 1998 the
debate has moved on and there has been much more action in some of these areas than others. Overall
though this has been an unprecedented period of policy formulation, initiatives and programmes so much so
that it is difficult to summarise them. Perhaps two of the most important areas affecting most families and those
particularly vulnerable have been respectively the initiatives to help working families and those needing to work
with more childcare facilities and subsidies for childcare and the associated campaign to end child poverty.
Tackling child poverty and social exclusion
From the beginning the government focussed on providing better financial support for low income families
(Supporting Families, 1998). Initially it increased child benefit, established the Working Families Tax Credit (buil-
ding on the Conservative Government’s Family Credit ) and began a campaign to tackle poverty in lone parent
families by encouraging lone parents into paid work and reforming child support (monies paid by non-resident
parents). But it also took a broader look at social exclusion, establishing the Social Exclusion Unit at the centre
of the government with a remit to cover all departments. In September 1999, the government published its first
annual report on poverty, Opportunity for all – tackling poverty and social exclusion. This document set out an
‘anti-poverty’ strategy and a number of indicators which could be used to judge its own performance in this
area. It also made it clear that the top priority was (as it apparently remains) the complete elimination of child
poverty within 20 years.
The promotion of employment is seen as the best route out of poverty for those who are able to work. A
number of initiatives have been introduced to achieve this goal, and in particular, from October 1998 New Deals
were made available for five groups of the unemployed, including lone parents receiving social protection bene-
fits.These parents are now offered ‘active’ support in finding and securing work, as well as training and childcare
through practical help and advice.
In addition, Supporting Children through the Tax and Benefit System, published in 1999, and Budget 2000, pro-
vided more detail about financial support for all parents and children, especially ‘low income’ families.The aim of
this was to ‘make work pay,’ and lift working parents out of poverty. So Working Families’ Tax Credit, was paid
through the pay packet or to the non-working partner in cash, and the increases in universal Child Benefit, and
the new Children’s Tax Credit, introduced in April 2001 were recognition of the costs borne by families raising
children.
However, from April 2003, a new, more integrated Child Tax Credit was introduced and paid to the main carer,
replacing all existing income-related child elements of unemployment and low pay benefits. This creates one
system of support for parents who are in low paid jobs or not working, and is intended to make the transition
from welfare benefits to employment easier (and so encourage more parents on benefits to look for work). A
new Working Tax Credit, introduced at the same time, is similarly designed to address poor incentives to work,
and raise the income of the lowest paid.
The Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000, changed the very contentious child support system
for the children of separated parents. The new scheme allows more child maintenance from the non-resident
parent, usually the father to be disregarded, slightly raising the the total income of the parent with care.
Previously all maintenance was set against social security support which led to the argument that the father’s
contributions were just going to the Treasury when the mother claimed income support. Furthermore, this
reform simplified the calculation of the non-resident parent’s contribution and aimed to make the system
quicker and more efficient with tougher sanctions for those parents who fail to meet their financial obligations.
Yet, implementation has been far from easy or complete and by 2004 there were increasing reports of dissatis-
faction with delays and lack of enforcement and the consequent hardship some lone families were experien-
cing.
It is clear that there have been successes.There are, as of 2003, 500,000 fewer children living in households
below average income (Every Child Matters, 2003) but critics say that it is not certain that the government’s
approach will deal with the ‘hard’ cases of poverty in this period. However, research from the Institute of Fiscal
Studies has shown very clearly the enormous increase in child –contingent support from £10 billion in 1975 to
£22 billion per year in 2003. Means tested child –contingent support has expanded and there has been a cor-
responding reduction in universal child benefit as a proportion of income for children.There has been a return
to the use of the tax system as the main delivery vehicle although monies are not now channelled through the
tax payer as they were before (Adam & Brewer, 2004)
Making changes to the tax and benefits system, although clearly important, was only part of the govern-
ment’s approach to ending child and family poverty. They recognised that some individuals and families 
experience a combination of linked problems including low income, poor housing, bad health and family break-
down - becoming ‘trapped’ in a spiral of disadvantage. The remit of the Social Exclusion Unit was to produce 
‘joined up’ solutions to these problems. Scotland had its own programme set out in the Scottish Social Exclusion
Strategy, Wales had the Building an Inclusive Wales plan and Northern Ireland had the New Targeting Social Need
Initiative. Most of the work of these units focussed on specific, locally based projects which aim to reduce tee-
nage pregnancy, support vulnerable young people and, more generally, improve opportunities in the most 
deprived communities, especially for children. Some of their reports have been seminal in challenging former
policy approaches often with well evidenced arguments [www.socialexclusion.gov.uk]
In addition, in July 1998, the government embarked on a major initiative aimed at disadvantaged families
which has become a flagship programme of the administration’s family policy for two reasons. It has grown to
be an enormous and diverse programme of family support and it embodies the concept of ‘early intervention’
as the cornerstone of the policy. Heavily influenced by the USA programme ”Head Start” although significantly
different from it, the Sure Start cross-governmental programme was introduced as part of the strategy for tack-
ling social exclusion. An initial £452 million was made available to establish programmes across England and
Wales, with the aim of working with the most disadvantaged parents and pre-school children to improve their
health, social and emotional development, and their ability to learn. Since then subsequent spending reviews
have increased the monies substantially and by the end of 2004 there were about 500 schemes running in dis-
advantaged communities. Sure Start Scotland was launched in 2000 with the similar emphasis of improving the
life chances of the under fives. There is also an enormous research programme evaluating the effect of this
sustained intervention. Details of the national evaluation are available on its website [www.ness.bbk.ac.uk] 
While the under fives were the target of Sure Start, initiatives to tackle 5-13 year olds ‘at risk’ of social
exclusion were also introduced. One of these was the Children’s Fund established in 2000  to be used to sup-
port a wide range of voluntary and statutory services in England and to help children and families experiencing
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the consequences of poverty. Local consortia could bid for funds to support initiatives and programmes they
wanted to meet their needs. So again a diverse range of support has been funded to tackle disadvantage.
The various initiatives the government have put in place, initially in a piecemeal fashion, are now being 
pulled together into a ten year strategy for children and families.
Supporting working parents 
The govern,ment’s strategy of encouraging poor parents to take employment as the route out of poverty clear-
ly meant that the shortage of affordable childcare had to be addressed from the beginning of the administra-
tion. In 1998 a Green Paper, Meeting the Childcare Challenge, set out a national strategy to increase the supply
of affordable childcare.This document promised a guaranteed nursery school place for all four year olds, doubling
the number of places for three year olds, more after-school provision and an improvement in the quality of this
care through training and regulation. By 2003-2004 there was universal part time education for every three and
four year old and over a million new childcare places had been created through a Neighbourhood Nurseries
programme.
Working parents on low and average incomes were given financial help to meet the costs of formal child-
care initially, through the Childcare Tax Credit but this was subsequently available for a wider range of providers,
including carers who come to the family home.
Various pieces of legislation have been passed to help all parents better reconcile family and work commit-
ments. The European Union’s Working Time Directive was enacted in Britain in October 1998. Although many
exemptions were allowed it did at least signal that employees should not work more than an average of 48
hours each week.The Parental Leave Directive, implemented in December 1999 began to improve parents’ right
to time off when they had a child or when they adopted a child. It also protected them from dismissal if they
had to take time off for urgent family reasons.
In spring 2003, the Employment Act, 2001, gave all mothers improved rights to maternity leave including an
increase in Statutory Maternity Pay, and for the first time ever fathers were eligible for two weeks of paid 
paternity leave, though capped at a low wage level. From April 2003 parents are able to make a written request
for flexible working hours, and employers are obliged to explain why it cannot be accepted.The employee can
appeal against this decision, and take the dispute to a tribunal if necessary.This ‘right ‘was held up as evidence of
the government’s aim to improve the rights of parents to work more flexibly but was seen as a very weak mea-
sure by parents and employee representatives alike. The campaign to increase both the amount of paid leave
and the level of pay continues.
Improving parenting
A major theme of the Government’s family policy from the beginning has been the wish to both help parents in
their parenting and also make them more accountable for the behaviour of their children.This is particularly the
case at school where underachievement and high levels of truancy and exclusion from school for bad 
behaviour had been identified as a problem to be tackled, and on the streets where there was widespread 
concern about juvenile crime and social disorder.
A key inititiative here was the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Here the focus was on parents experiencing dif-
ficulty in controlling their children and led to a whole raft of measures such as the introduction of parenting
orders [involving compulsory parenting classes for the parents of persistent offenders], anti-social behaviour
orders, curfews and the setting up youth offending teams in areas experiencing problems with the aim of dea-
ling more holistically with young offenders and their families, ideally before children have to appear in court for
bad behaviour. In addition to this there has been a completely new emphasis on ‘supporting parents’ more ge-
nerally.
The issue of school truancy has had a very high profile over the past few years, and in April 2002 the
government announced an investment of £66 million to deal with this problem, along with bad behaviour in
school. Teams of welfare officers are now to patrol truancy ‘hotspots’ and directly challenge children who are
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absent without authorisation. There have been several high profile cases of parents being taken to court and
sent to jail for failing to ensure that their children attend school. In addition concern about the growing incidence
of parents abusing teachers caused the government in July 2002 to launch a new campaign warning parents
that their own abusive behaviour towards teaching staff would no longer be tolerated, and threatening prosecu-
tion and even imprisonment for persistent offenders.
Child abuse has been a major concern over this period too. While considerable attention has focussed on
the small but worrying number of cases among children in public care the issue was broadened out to include
the issue of ‘hitting’ children . While public physical chastisement of children, for example in school, has been
banned for some time the more delicate issue of whether parents could ‘smack’ their children became a public
issues in January 2000 when the Department of Health published, Protecting Children: Supporting Parents, a con-
sultation document on the physical punishment of children.The results were published in November 2001, with
apparently most members of the English public expressing the view that the ‘moderate’ physical punishment of
children by their parents is acceptable, and should continue.The government therefore decided (to the dismay
of many voluntary organisations that represent children’s interests) that it would maintain the status quo and
not ban smacking.
Linked to this perhaps is the recognition that changing parents’ parenting practices is a long drawn out 
matter and better provision of help and advice is a necessary prerequisite. To this end, the period has been
characterised by a considerable increase in government support for parenting education, advice and informa-
tion through a variety of outlets, some statutory such as through the work of health visitors but many thorough
the work of the voluntary sector. The government supported the National Family and Parenting Institute and
also gave considerable funds to support the work of a national free-phone helpline for parents, Parentline, as
well as a host of other more specialist voluntary groups working with parents.
Throughout this period although the failings of some families and the need to support parents more has
been recognised the primary role the family as a key unit of initial child rearing has been emphasised. This,
coupled with the exposure of child abuse among children in public care has fuelled the wish to reorganise how
‘looked after’ children are cared for. Adoption of many of these children has been seen as the way forward and
concern has been expressed about the long periods many children stay in unsuitable or temporay care. The
Adoption and Children Actl of 2002  was part of a strategy to speed up and ‘modernise’ the adoption system in
England and Wales, and encourage local authorities to place more children in public care with adoptive parents.
However, this has proved contentious, with demands from birth families for greater involvement and a general
recognition that these highly vulnerable children need more care and resources than are available to date.
Supporting marriage and partnerships
Perhaps more controversial has been the continuing debate, sometimes implicitly rather than actually present in
public discourse, about whether marriage is the best basis for stable relationships, especially for bringing up
children, or whether other kinds of relationship, such as cohabitation can provide an equally valid basis for fami-
ly life. Supporting Families in 1997 raised these issues and the government found itself on the defensive when it
appeared to sanction married relationships more than less traditional family structures. At the same time it chal-
lenged traditional views by abolishing the Married Couples Tax Allowance in April 2000 as part of the welfare
reform programme.Traditionalists argued this further undermined marriage and the Conservatives argued they
would restore it. But the notion that tax allowances are an incentive to marry has little empirical support
though they are seen as an important symbol.
In 2000, a proposed White Paper highlighting marriage as the key to creating strong families, backed by
church groups, some family organisations and with some cross-party support was dropped after some Labour
Party MPs objected to this emphasis, claiming that it was unhelpful to the many families who do not conform to
the ideal. At the same time the campaign for unmarried couples to be allowed to register their relationship as a
civil partnership and therefore gain rights of inheritance, property and next of kin status began provoking 
heated discussions.
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The 2002 Adoption and Children’s Act generated considerable discussion about whether unmarried couples
(including gay partners) could have the right to make a joint adoption application but after much discussion this
was eventually agreed upon. This marked the beginning of the legal status recognition of gay couples. Gay 
couples were one subset of all cohabiting couples and although a much smaller group, they were particularly
well organised to press their case one in the sometimes heated discussions about the legal status of unmarried
couples which ensued.
A major distinction was made by the government between the situation of homosexual couples unable to
marry and so obtain some of the protections of marriage and heterosexual couples, the vast majority of whom
were free to marry if they wished.The campaign then focussed on the issue of giving comparable legal recogni-
tion to cohabiting same sex couples as married couples and the Civil Partnership Act was passed in 2004.
However, the debate is not over.The difference between the legal status of married and unmarried parents
has been further eroded by the decision in the Adoption and Children Act 2002 to give unmarried fathers who
jointly register the birth of their baby with its mother and whose name is on the birth certificate the same legal
rights as married fathers automatically acquire. Campaigners are alive to the ‘myth’ of ‘common law marriage’,
however, and it is likely that in the next few years there will be more initiatives to tackle the lack of financial and
legal  protection long term cohabiting couples, especially those with children, currently experience.
Pardoxically perhaps, this interest in marriage has not been accompanied publicly at least by a comparable
concern, backed by public expenditure at helping people maintain and improve their relationships. A report
from the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Group on Marriage and Relationship Support in 2002 detailed the costs—
both personal and private – of high rates of failed relationships.The authors highlighted how many people do
not know where to go to get help, and recommended that support should be targeted at key moments in
family life which put relationships under strain (like the birth of the first child). They also suggested that there
should be more public education to remove the stigma associated with relationship counselling (The Lord
Chancellor’s Department, 2002a). Howeve, while more funding was allocated to the relationship organisations
to help develop this, the expenditure here is still dwarfed by public expenditure on the consequences of relati-
onship breakdown.
Some concluding comments
Even seven years on it is too early to assess the ‘success’ across the whole of the extensive range of family poli-
cies introduced by the Labour government and described in this report. What is without doubt is that the
government has very successfully changed the whole nature of the debate in Britain about the role of the fami-
ly and its relation to the state.There has been a massive increase in public expenditure in this area, not all of it
widely noticed outside the arenas of policy most affected. Indeed, what has been striking is that this area could
be seen by many as one of the main success stories in British domestic social policy but it receives less public
mention than perhaps it warrents.
One problem is that real success will take time.That is the nature of much of the long term expenditure on
early intervention and the more subtle initiatives to help parents. There are of course criticisms of polices 
ranging from the charge that this is too interventionist—a nanny state to the points that it has failed to meet
some of its main targets and in effect has not gone far enough. For example 
there are already claims that, although poverty rates have fallen, the government is not even on course to
meet its key target which is the complete elimination of child poverty by 2019 (Brewer et al., 2002).
Furthermore, some commentators believe that, without substantial investment, access to childcare will con-
tinue to depend on where families live and, importantly, on their income and employment status. This raises
serious doubts about the future success of an approach which is predicated on entry into employment as the
route out of social and economic deprivation (Raising Expectations, 2002). But there is no doubt that many of
the inititiatives taken in the early years and child and family support will not be easily rolled back.
Overall the government is challenging the traditional British distinction between public policy and the ‘private’
world of the family. Support for parents either financially or practically, however, sits side by side with a much
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more firm approach to parents who for whatever reason fail to help their children succeed at school and more
generally. It remains to be seen how popular and effective this changing relationship will be.
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RUDOLF RICHTER
Austria
In Austria, the demographic situation is similar to that of most EU Member States. It is an ageing society with a
low fertility rate.This has been a major matter of public concern over the past year, leading to a radical change
in the pension system that is still in process. Moreover, efforts have been made to improve the situation of fami-
lies.
The Austrian statistics show a decline in the number of marriages, an increase in cohabitation and an increase
in extramarital births and single parents, though teenage pregnancy is not a problem in Austria. The Austrian
family system has been described as a modified breadwinner system. Gender inequalities exist in several ways. A
high gender discrepancy in income contributes to the fact that men hardly ever take parental leave, though
Austrian law tries to encourage it. Gender inequalities are also seen in the distribution of household chores.The
traditional division of labour still exists, though less so among the younger cohort.
A key problem is how to combine family and work. Austrian women find it difficult to do so, due to a lack
of part-time employment and a scarcity of crèches for children under three, as well as after-school care.
However, the services provided for children between three and school age can be rated as good.
Marital satisfaction for people in Austria is high, but the divorce rate has also risen in the last decade.
Friendly divorces are legally possible. Joint custody was introduced in 2001. As marriages in Austria decline,
other forms of living together become more frequent; cohabitation is the most prominent. Forms of ‘living apart
together’ might also have risen, though they are very difficult to measure. Due to divorce and remarriage, the
number of stepfamilies has increased. In addition, there are more single parents as compared to the numbers a
decade ago.
Though Austria’s population is ageing, generational relations are considered to be good. Mutual understanding
and help prevail. However, to the extent that the so-called ‘generational contract’ in securing pensions is 
breaking apart, there is a policy discussion on generation conflict.
The major family-policy instrument in Austria is the FLAF, a family fund where general tax monies are ear-
marked for family support.This is a major instrument for redistributing money to families and financially suppor-
ting them. In 2002, the child-care benefit (Kinderbetreuungsgeld) was introduced. It grants a certain amount of
money to every mother, regardless of employment. Financial support was also introduced for expanding pre-
school childcare institutions (Kindergartenmilliarde). In addition, family audits for firms as well as communities
were launched, thus raising the awareness of families’ needs. Counselling and parental education are also en-
couraged.
More and more people face the fact that caring is not an issue solely concerning children. In an ageing
population with growing life expectancy, the elderly will need more care.There are several policy measures to
provide the necessary support. The Austrian government just introduced a leave for carers of severely ill chil-
dren or terminally ill persons. Persons taking such a leave are protected from dismissal.
WILFRIED DUMON
Belgium
In the period 2000–2004, three major trends stand out in the socio-political debate on families in Belgium,
namely new developments in marriage as an institution, growing concern about care for family members, and—
last not least—concern about an ageing population and rather stable birth rates that remain below replace-
ment level.
In Belgium, marriages rates tend to go down, while divorce rates tend to rise. People do not seem to be
very concerned about the decline in marriage rates because they see cohabitation as an alternative to mar-
riage. Public attention rather focused on divorce rates. In Belgium, divorce by mutual consent outnumbered
divorce on ground, e.g. divorce because of fault. Lately, the major political parties explicitly expressed their firm
intention to introduce no-fault divorces in Belgium. Divorce mediation has become a widespread practice, in
particular mediation provided by attorneys who already play a major role in settlements by mutual consent.
The legislation taking effect as of June 2003 made marriage an option for same-sex couples. The new law
did not provoke great public debates since it was accompanied by the elimination of unequal treatment be-
tween married couples and cohabiting persons. In particular the tax disadvantages for married persons have
gradually been eliminated.
Care issues are the second major issue of public concern and social policy measures taken in the period
2000–2004.Two rather different developments have stimulated the social-policy debate: the changing division of
labour within the family and population ageing. In Belgium, two major family models are currently discussed in
public: in one model, both partners work full-time; in the other model, the male partner/husband works full-
time and the female partner/wife works part-time. Each of these two models represents around 30% of all
Belgian couple families.The breadwinner model is typically found in less than 25% of all Belgian couple families.
For this reason, child care is practically a basic need for a large section of Belgian families. It should be noted that,
in Belgium, children start going to (pre-)school at a relatively young age. At the age of three, almost all children
are integrated in the educational system. Hence, the main issue is pre-school and out-of-school care. Care is
mainly provided in crèches and by ‘child-minder mothers’. In the period 2000–2004, new trends—mainly focusing
on care providers—have emerged in both of these types of child care.
As regards crèches, new emphasis was put on the involvement of the market sector in the organization of
child care. The regional governments of Flanders and Wallonia gave incentives to companies with the aim of
increasing the number of childcare facilities. The federal government agreed to make a certain amount of the
costs companies incur for care deductible from their taxes. All three governments advocated this measure in
view of the needs for child care and job creation.This shows the growing interlink between family and employ-
ment policies.
In the sector of child care by so-called ‘child-minder mothers’, the attention also focused on the providers,
and in particular on their social protection. After long debates, a special system of social protection was develo-
ped and has been operational since 2003. As most of the ‘child-minder mothers’ as well as the labour unions
have claimed full social protection—a claim also backed by court decisions—this issue remains to be settled.
However, after a long period of decline, the number of ‘child-minder mothers’ has started to rise once more,
probably due to their new entitlement to (partial) social protection.
Care is not limited to the youngest generation, population ageing makes it an issue concerning older people
as well. Care for the elderly is given high priority on the socio-political agenda. In this connection, a number of
new measures were introduced in Belgium, many of them adapted from experiences abroad.They range from
day care for elderly to (in)dependent insurance. All of the measures tend to reinforce the self-help capacity of
the aged.
The current government, which came into power in July 2003, appointed an ‘(under)secretary for family
affairs’ and, in its governmental declaration, announced that it would hold an Assembly on the Family, bringing
together governmental authorities, NGOs and experts. This event took place in spring 2004 and indicates a
growing interest in family affairs on the part of the (federal) government.
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Demark
In recent years, several different family issues have been addressed in Denmark:
Increasing the number of day-care institutions and youth clubs to meet the need of modern dual-career families
for childcare has been given high priority. Furthermore, several municipalities have become more flexible in
assigning daycare places in order to facilitate the integration of non-Danish speaking children and to help them
become bilingual.The quality of institutional childcare is a highly debated issue in the country, as Danish children
spend many hours per day in institutions.Thus, more emphasis has been placed on the qualitative elements of
childcare. A grant permits one parent to stay home to take care of his or her child.
To combat social heritage, different initiatives include a governmental proposal to increase the responsibility of
parents, especially in their involvement in their children’s education. Learning in kindergarten was introduced to
ease the children’s transition to school and staff is being trained to handle these increased demands.
To improve the quality of foster care and early intervention, more attention will be paid to the family’s social
network. Furthermore, more stringent deadlines are being proposed to attain smoother progress. Quality and
continuity in placement are also essential. The quality of foster homes should be improved by instituting man-
datory foster-parent classes.
In order to prevent child sexual abuse, additional precautionary measures are being proposed with regard to
children’s use of the Internet. The municipalities will be put in charge of implementing these measures, given
their closer contact and more immedidate influence on schools, libraries, and other public institutions from
where children gain access to the internet. Other measures to prevent this type of abuse include new guide-
lines for reporting and relaying information of assaults and more effective precautions when hiring personnel.
There has also been a training project directed at all municipal caseworkers involved in placing children and
young people.These courses were designed as an introduction to certain amendments to the law in that field,
to reflect the increased political will to make the casework smoother when placing a child.
Another initiative is aimed at improving the conditions for care of relatives with a disability or with a serious
illness of limited duration. For a period of up to six months, a close relative in good health will be granted leave
from her or his workplace to be employed by the municipality for this type of care.
Maternity leave prior to giving birth is now four weeks for the mother, and leave after giving birth is 14
weeks for the mother and two weeks for the father, without any substitution between parents. Parental leave
was extended to 46 weeks for the father and mother, respectively. However, the parental-leave allowance is
only available for a total of 32 weeks for both spouses, whereas there are no limitations concerning maternity
and paternity allowances, which cover the entire period. While public-sector employees keep their salary, most
private-sector employees receive public allowancesof up to 90% of their pay, i.e. equal to the level of their
unemployment insurance. In the wake of prolonged maternity leave, a major debate is taking place concerning
financing. Most people agree that a maternity fund should cover some of the expenses of maternity leave, but
problems arise when some industries hire more women than men.To deal with this imbalance, a consensus was
reached to establish a decentralized maternity fund.
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SIRPA TASKINEN
Finland
Finland has been rated one of the most egalitarian countries in the world. Universal services and benefits form
a safety net for all citizens, thus decreasing the individual’s dependence on the family or on marital status. One
of the key areas of Finnish equality and family policies has long been the reconciliation of work and family life.
Society supports it by means of various family-leave arrangements, family policy measures ensuring income
transfers and day-care services.
In spite of the legislation, however, there still exist some basic problems both in working life and at home.
Despite a five-year project for eliminating violence against women, there are still concerns about the rate of
spousal abuse. Regardless of women’s high participation in the labour market, their mean annual earnings
remain only about 80% that of men.
Parents with children tend to be gainfully employed more often than the average working-age population.
Compared to other men, fathers with small children do more overtime.Women bear greater responsibility for
children and have been the main users of the various forms of statutory childcare leave.
Although the fertility rate is relatively high, compared to most other European countries, it is slowly de-
clining. Population ageing has raised the issue of financing pensions.There is a need to improve working condi-
tions in order to encourage people to work longer.
The family scene has changed quite profoundly.With the growing divorce rate, the number of single-parent
families has also been rising. Likewise, an increasing number of parents have decided to cohabit without getting
married, even after they have had children. In 2002, legal provision was made for the registration of homosexual
and lesbian couples.
Unemployment has been the main reason for families’ economic difficulties. The 1990s recession brought
about some cuts in benefits, and poverty has been increasing among families with children. Single-parent families
face a greater risk of falling below the poverty line than do other groups. Following a prolonged stable period,
child benefits were raised again in 2004.
In international comparison, Finnish children are quite healthy; and both prenatal and the infant mortality
are among the lowest in the world. However, there is a growing concern for children’s mental well-being. Child
services have deteriorated due to the recession; e.g. net spending per child in day-care facilities has dropped.
Children’s primary health care and preventive services have declined in many municipalities, and there are long
waiting lists for family counselling and therapy. Recovery from these cuts has been slow.
In 2001, in addition to the earlier right to day-care services, all children became entitled to free optional
pre-school education at age six. From 2004 onwards, local authorities have received a government grant to
arrange morning and afternoon activities for schoolchildren in the first and second grades in comprehensive
schools, as well as for all special-education students.
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France
Fertility
As in all other EU Member States, France was confronted during the period from 1970–1995 with a strong
decrease in the fertility rate, which fell from almost 3 to 1.65 by 1994.The end of the 1990s marked a turning
point. The number of births increased from 1998 up to 2001 (with a stable fertility rate of 1.8–1.9). Some
newspapers even speak about a new ‘small baby boom’ in France at the end of the millennium.This fertility level
(which had not been reached from the beginning of the 1980s up to that point) put France at the top ranking
in the European Union, alongside Ireland. Two main arguments may explain this recovery: first, economic re-
covery, which in itself plays a major role in terms of household morale; and second, the importance of childcare
policies, which facilitate reconciliation between work and family life—even if these policies are not developed
enough to cover all existing needs.
Marriage 
As far as marriage is concerned, the trend is comparable.The number of marriages decreased drastically from
the end of the 1960s to the mid-1990s, falling from 380,000 in 1969 to 253,000 in 1994.This meant a decrea-
se in the marriage rate from almost 8 marriages per thousand people to 4.4. An initial increase was first obser-
ved in 1996, mainly due to fiscal reform. However, this recovery was later confirmed in 1999, 2000 and 2001,
with marriage rates of 5 in 2000, 4.9 in 2001, 4.7 in 2002 and 4.6 in 2003. Since 1999, the pacte civil de 
solidarité (PACS) has provided an alternative to marriage for cohabitating homo- or heterosexual couples. By
the end of 2003, a total of 100,000 PACS had been registered (8 PACS per 100 marriages). Hence, the con-
servative argument that PACS could threaten marriage has not been confirmed by the facts.
Main family issues and policies
In terms of family policy, political change marked the period spanning from the Jospin government to the
Raffarin government.This change has had a multifaceted impact on family issues. Because the Jospin government
focused mainly on modernizing family civil law (reforming divorce and parental authority) and on promoting
greater equality between men and women, the right-wing turn initially introduced a very prominent issue: in-
security, with its consequences in terms of family responsibility.
One of the latest reforms concerns promoting ‘free choice’ in terms of childcare. This type of policy,
common throughout Europe, implies that government attempts to facilitate a choice for parents, mainly
mothers, in their decision to remain on the labour market with institutional solutions for childcare, or to stop
working to care for their child until he or she begins school (which in France starts at age three, and even at
two for some 45%). Nonetheless, this policy completely sets aside other main issues that are receiving much
attention in other European countries: the development of equitable public childcare solutions throughout the
country; paid parental leave based on previous salary (80%, as in Sweden or Iceland), and, most of all, the big
question of equal opportunities for women and men, which could lead to distinguishing between maternity,
paternity and parental leave (three months for each as in Iceland, for example). Another main issue on the
agenda concerns ageing and frail dependent elderly, albeit in the wake of the heat-wave crisis seen as a public-
health issue more than as a family issue.
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WALTER BIEN
Germany
The main discussions over the past few years have been related to the question what society will be like in
2010. One attempt to answer this question is the federal Agenda 2010 programme. The discussion revolves
around reconstructing the social system against the backdrop of the current financial and economic constraints,
which explains why the pressure to reduce costs tends to determine the course of the debate. Independently
of this, however, both society and the political system recognize that future societies will also consist of human
beings, such that the power and strength of our future world will be related to the power and strength of the
people living in it. Future society will not exclusively be related to the economic system. Hence, improving
human and social capital—and hence family matters as well—is of the main themes now being discussed in
Germany. Given the current economic limitations, there is a marked preference for solutions involving no addi-
tional costs. Throughout 2003, the issue of balancing work and family was frequently discussed. The following
constitute three different approaches by the federal government:
Alliance for the family
The ‘alliance for family’ will start a long-term, long-lasting economic and family policy. It is based on the consen-
sus that German society needs higher birth rates, the economy needs highly qualified staff and a higher female
employment rate, and children require support from an early age onwards to promote their education.The alli-
ance partners all agreed to make efforts towards creating a family-friendly labour force, employment and occu-
pational culture offering more options in the areas of business culture, labour-force organization, working hours,
human-resource development and family services. Some concrete efforts have been made in the above areas
at the local level in agreements between businesses, politicians and family organizations.
Childcare
Childcare is being discussed not only under the heading of balancing work and family, but also with respect to
the needs of children. This includes further efforts to promote children’s wellbeing during early childhood as
well as educating parents on how to be more responsible. Providing opportunities during the first six years of a
child’s life will strongly influence his or her later choices.Therefore, quality childcare is becoming as important as
quantity, with emphasis on good, affordable care. Childcare is the place where key social skills can be learned.
Child development should be optimized in relation to children’s age, their capabilities and their individual needs
for time.
Family competence
Parents bear the main responsibility for their children’s education. To enable them to fulfil this responsibility,
parents need help. One area in need of support is media competence, especially greater sensitivity for the prob-
lem of children and violence in electronic media. A new law to protect youth enacted on 1 April 2003 manda-
tes age labelling for computer games, thus making it easier for parents to find age-appropriate games for their
children. Another initiative is Look on, which—together with newspapers, television stations and media-related
industry—will provide help for everyday situations, e.g. by a Parent-Child-Media Workshop or a media passport.
Reconstructing the social system under the present economic constraints, as well as promoting human and
social capital, are both interventions taking place in complex, interwoven systems. The main difficulties occur
because most solutions are discussed separately: the pension system, the health system, the labour force, the
education system, fertility, migration, etc. Despite their innate complexity, all are interwoven—especially where
the family is concerned. Hence, these discussions tend to be accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty, dis-
satisfaction and fear, which makes people feel unhappy with their elected leadership.
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Greece
Both family and household structures have changed over the past few years in Greece.The number of house-
holds is increasing over time, while their average size is decreasing.These developments are very closely related
to the rapid increase in non-family households (particularly single-person households). As for family households,
recent developments indicate a variety of changes: a net increase in couples without children and in lone-parent
households, combined with a net decrease in family households.There can be no doubt that the delay in family
formation, the extremely low fertility rates and the increase in the rate of marital breakdown all play a role in
explaining the above trends. In fact, all indicators for divorce, marriage and new family forms show that the pro-
cess of further ‘modernization’ in family formation has been somewhat delayed in Greece when compared to
the rest of the EU. Nevertheless, family ties remain strong and will continue to be a pivotal element in Greek
society.
Over the past few years, Greece has become a net immigration country.This development has had a clear
demographic impact (i.e. immigration flows were the main demographic component of population increase
over the 1990s), as well as an impact on family structures and needs. Despite efforts to regularize illegal immi-
gration, migrant families continue to live with relative uncertainty regarding the legal status of their head of
household. Moreover, given the impact of immigration flows on the composition of the school population, the
integration of migrant children at school has become an important issue.The extremely positive results attained
in school by some of them disguise the difficulties most of them face (especially because of their own as well as
of their parents’ inadequate knowledge of Greek).
Income inequalities as well as relative poverty have increased over the past few years. In particular, the risk
of poverty remains high for certain types of families and households (i.e. elderly and farming households, hou-
seholds where the head works in the primary sector, has a low education level or is unemployed or retired).
Particular attention needs to be paid to the cost of children’s education as borne by their families. The 
existence of a ‘parallel’ education system in Greece (private institutions for primary and secondary education,
and private education functioning as a complement to secondary public education) has led to a strong increase
in the cost of children’s education (which is estimated at nearly 30% of the overall public budget for education).
In addition, youth unemployment remains very high—even among people with a high education level—thus 
leading to a certain gap between expectations and reality.There can be no doubt that the discrepancy between
young people’s (and their parents’) great expectations —primarily due to their increasing education level—and
their unfavourable position on the labour market has become one of the most relevant issues facing family wel-
fare.
Childcare remains one of the main concerns for Greek families. The number of day-care services (public,
municipal and private) is considered inadequate in both number and coverage. Aside from the mother, who still
constitutes the main source of childcare, kinship networks represent the most frequent solution for childcare
services. Over recent years, both the debates on and the policies governing childcare services have been part-
icularly—even exclusively—concerned with reconciling work and family. In general, any measures that could be
considered family-policy initiatives have been further integrated into policies related to employment, social pro-
tection, social inclusion and equal opportunities.
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Ireland
In the past six years, Ireland has undergone rapid economic and social change, which has impacted on the
structure and nature of family life.The 2002 Census of the Population documented the major demographic chan-
ges over the past six years, giving a picture of increasing diversification of family forms and movement towards a
multicultural society. In particular, there is clear evidence of the growth in immigration, the impact of divorce
legislation, increase in family breakdown, a rise in the number of lone-parent families and families with no chil-
dren, and an increase in births outside marriage. Families are becoming smaller, and there is a reduction in the
number of three-generation households.
Family policy has become far more explicit with the appointment of a Minister for Social and Family Affairs,
the publication of The Family Commission (1998), the setting up of a Family Affairs Unit within the Department
of Social and Family Affairs, and the establishment of a Family Support Agency. A change in the policy of non-
intervention in the family has led to increasing recognition of the need for policies to support families at both a
financial and social level. Successive government programmes agreed upon by the social partners have been
important in developing family-policy initiatives.There has been a move away from policies aimed at regulating
families to those that support them.
Despite a period of unprecedented economic growth, the benefits have not been equally distributed across
the population.The Government is lagging behind in its targets for the Anti-Poverty Strategy.The individualizati-
on of the tax system began in 2000, but the result has been that dual-earner families with high incomes are the
major beneficiaries of the system. Government policy to eliminate poverty has been concentrated on increasing
child-benefit and basic social-welfare rates.
Policies related to balancing work and family have been developed during the past six years, with an
emphasis on bringing legislation in line with EU Directives. However, there is little evidence to suggest that such
measures have brought about a more equal distribution of paid and unpaid work between men and women.
Emphasis has been on the need to encourage women to remain in the work force in a climate of labour shor-
tages, rather than to facilitate the integration of work and family life.Thus, much of the policy development has
been based on an economic rather than a family agenda.The provision of childcare for working parents, care of
the elderly and for those with disabilities, remains problematic, with the burden of care remaining with the fami-
ly and particularly with women.
The issue of child abuse within both families and the statutory social-services network has been of particu-
lar concern. A National Children’s Strategy has been published, together with an Ombudsman for Children
being appointed and a National Children’s Office being established to monitor the implementation of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The latest Government initiative during 2003 was a series of national fora to obtain the views of families
and family organizations about their needs and concerns.The resulting report has laid out a possible agenda for
future family policies covering support for parents in their parenting role, increased support for fathers in
undertaking their caring role, increased support for lone parents, help for children affected by family break-
down, the need for increased promotion of the work/family balance, the need to value the work undertaken by
women within the home, policies to support families with relationship difficulties and policies on the family as a
caregiver.The Government is committed to developing a National Strategy for Family Policy during 2004.
One basic question remains to be addressed: that of the Constitutional definition of the family.This is only
now coming onto the political agenda, and the debate is developing on the need to officially recognize family
forms not based on marriage, so that there can be equity and equality between families within legislation and
welfare provisions.
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Italy
The period between the mid-1990s and the first years of the new millennium was one of both stability and
change. Over the past six years, there has been both a continuation of those demographic trends that had
already emerged from the second half of the 1960s onwards, as well as an equally profound revolution in the
age structure of the population. The latter has brought about an increase in the number of elderly and a
decrease in the number of young people; a significant increase in the number of families, as well as a decrease in
their average size; a significant shift in the timing of couple formation; a decline in marriages; and, finally, a slight
but gradual increase in family instability (separations and divorces).The picture shown by the last census is that
of a family whose size is getting smaller and smaller but that is also weaker, more unstable and more fragmen-
ted. In particular, there has been a great increase in one-person households (from 20% in 1991 to 24.89% in
2001). Noteworthy are also the reduction in the proportion of couples with children, the growing numbers of
those without children, the increase of recomposed families and the progressive restrictions on the share of
large and extended families. By the end of 2001, couples with children made up 57.5% of the total family units,
those without children 29.4%, and single-parent families 13%. Needless to say, all these parameters show varia-
tions—marked in some cases—depending on the different areas of the country. Family instability has also
grown considerably in the course of the past decade, due to the rise in separations and divorces. An interesting
aspect, moreover, regards the phenomenon of the ‘long’ family—i.e. the prolonged stay of young adults in their
families of origin. Information from the 2001 Census confirms that, in the past decade, this phenomenon has
increased even more.
In this scenario, the relations between the older and younger generations have undergone radical changes.
For one thing, there is the prospect of increased economic and care responsibilities that today’s meagre demo-
graphic generations will have to bear when they become adult and elderly tomorrow. Second, the traditional
rules that once governed generational relations within the family have become uncertain, i.e. less clear and
more difficult to put into practice. In many cases, these rules produce tensions that give rise to downright per-
verse effects.
Partly in response to these changes, and partly for reasons related to the political scenario and specific
choices made by the government, the period between 1996 and 2000/2001 was also characterized by new
and—in many ways—both original and surprising attention being paid to the family. As evidence of this sub-
stantial change, we can mention the measures of economic assistance for (traditionally less well-off) families
with children, the law on parental leave, the children’s law and the comprehensive reorganization of the system
of services and social assistance. In this respect, Act No. 328/2000 has profoundly reformed the order of the
welfare state.
The right-centre government elected in June 2001 promised to pay renewed attention to the family. Up to
now, however, the reforms achieved in this field are rather marginal and mostly limited to re-proposing mea-
sures introduced by the preceding governments. Eventually, in February 2003, the Minister of Labour and Social
Policies published a ‘blueprint on welfare’ (Libro bianco sul Welfare: http://www.welfare.gov.it). This White Paper
emphasizes the aim of a social policy that recognizes the family as an active subject and a primary actor in the
organization of the welfare system and advances reform proposals on which, however, it would be premature
to express any opinion regarding their possible impact on the quality of family life in the years to come. By the
end of 2003, the Government had approved only three of the multiple and often indeterminate measures men-
tioned in the White Paper: a fund for financing employers who organize day nurseries (crèches), and micro day
nurseries in the workplace for infants and small children; an allowance equal to EUR 1,000 for each second or
subsequent child, by order of birth, born in the period from 1 December 2003–31 December 2004; and a fund
of EUR 161 million aimed at young couples to enable them to purchase their first home.
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MONIQUE BORSENBERGER
Luxembourg
The situation of families in Luxembourg underwent a number of profound changes in the past five years. In
terms of demography, a trend that began some years ago has been confirmed: the number of marriages is
decreasing, while that of divorces and out-of-wedlock births is increasing. In view of these developments, legisla-
tors intend to introduce the legal form of consensual union in analogy to the French pacte civil de solidarité and
abolish guilt as ground for divorce.The two drafts should be adopted prior to Luxembourg’s general elections
in June 2004. Legislation on domestic violence and spousal/child abuse was adopted in 2003, which permits,
inter alia, to bar perpetrators of such violence from entering the home for a certain period of time.
Reconciling work and family life has become a major concern for a growing number of women. In fact,
women’s activity rate rose from 45.7% in 1992 to 51.6% in 2002. To foster this development and reduce 
bottlenecks in childcare delivery, the government has adopted an active approach to extending the provision of
day care, crèches and licensed childcare facilities. Entitlement to parental leave was introduced for three years in
1999 and extended in 2002. Taken up by substantially more mothers than fathers, parental leave is now the
topic of a campaign launched by the Ministry for the Promotion of Women1 to boost the image of fathers looking
after their children.
A major tax reform was introduced in two stages in 2000 and 2001. It led to a reduction in tax rates. Also,
family allowances were raised to assist families with children, while tax concessions for dependent children were
reduced.These measures have helped enhance the re-distributive effects of family policy and improve the situa-
tion of families. In 2000, a law on over-indebtedness was also adopted to address the issue of a growing number
of households in financial difficulties.
There was a substantial change in the situation of people with disabilities in 2003, owing to the introduction
of a special subsistence income and wage schedule for workers in sheltered workshops to be applied from June
2004.This special subsistence income, which is in the amount of the guaranteed minimum income but need not
be paid back, should help ensure the financial autonomy of people with a disability. Moreover, the number of
places in special centres and sheltered workshops has also gone up.The National Action Plan for Employment
includes proposals to reserve a certain percentage of jobs in each enterprise for workers with a disability, but
since non-compliance with this plan does not carry any sanctions, it is scarcely implemented.
Measures targeted to older persons are on top of the government’s policy agenda. To ensure better co-
ordination, responsibility for this matter has been placed in the hands of the Family Ministry2.The government
co-financed the creation or upgrading of a number of residential and nursing homes. Needs development in this
area will require special attention. The greatest challenge now concerns end-of-life care, be it at the patients’
own home or in specially equipped centres with trained staff. A draft bill introducing unpaid care leave for 
nursing terminally ill, close family members is currently being discussed in parliament. Euthanasia, which was the
topic of a report submitted by a special Ethics Commission of the Luxembourg Parliament in 1999, remains
banned. Plans now focus on palliative medicine, and a draft bill on palliative and end-of-life care was tabled in
February 2004.
Youth policy efforts of the Family Ministry involve the co-ordination of sectoral measures with other minis-
tries and the development of an information, assistance and mediation policy. A report by a parliamentary 
commission entitled Youth in distress3 highlighted the difficulties encountered by an increasing number of today’s
children and adolescents and the great demand for places in youth welfare centres.
Just as many other EU Member States, Luxembourg registered a substantial rise in applications for asylum in
the late 1990s, most of them by asylum-seekers coming from former Yugoslavia. The main difficulty for the
Family Ministry was the provision of sufficient accommodation for these people. Luxembourg was the Member
1 Ministère de la promotion féminine
2 Ministère de la Famille, de la Solidarité sociale et de la Jeunesse
3 Jeunesse en détresse
State that admitted the greatest number of asylum-seekers in proportion to the number of inhabitants, but it
was also the country that had a very low refugee recognition rate. 2000 was the first year in Luxembourg’s
history to see the country resort to numerous forced deportations.There is an ongoing inflow of applications
for asylum, though no longer by families, as was the case in 1999, but by unmarried individuals coming from
Africa and countries of the former Soviet Union. In early 2004, the government began addressing the possible
need for developing an immigration policy.
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HANS-JOACHIM SCHULZE
The Netherlands
Changing preferences in the ways of living one’s personal life in the 
period between 1990 and 2000
During the past few decades, we have observed that, after the ‘golden age of marriage and the family’, private
life is no longer almost monopolistically organized as family life with a husband/breadwinner and a wife/home-
maker.Within the past decade, especially between 1994 and 1997, a major change was visible. Before this dem-
arcation line, about 50% of the population wanted to marry immediately after leaving the parental home. From
1997 onwards, a clear majority evidently has wanted to start out living together with a partner before eventual-
ly deciding to marry. As a matter of fact, before marriage and/or birth of the first child, couples now typically
share a long period of cohabitation.
The motivation to have children and the timing of children
In a representative sample, 40% of all interviewees were of the opinion that you can „only feel happy in the
modern world if you have children of your own“. There is almost no difference between the opinions of women
and men; nor do current family status and income really matter. What is relevant are the age, education level
and partnership status of the respondents. Of the women, only 20% of those with a high education level agree;
while 60% of the women with a low educational level agree. These preferences correlate with fertility data.
Childlessness is to be found more often among women who have attained a high level of education.The com-
munity orientation of children („In my opinion, it is a person’s duty to the community to have children“) is only to
be found with 10% of all the respondents. If the ideal age for giving birth to the first child is compared with the
real age using one-year periods, 17% of the women show a discrepancy between the ideal age and its real
counterpart.The factors that correlate strongly with the ideal age for giving birth to the first child are education
level and the age of the mother upon giving birth to her first child.The average age at first fatherhood has been
rising since the 1970s, from about 30 years to 34 in 1992; this corresponds to the average measured at around
1940.The average age of women at first motherhood in 2001 was 29 years.
Family policy
Although government acknowledged in 1995 that it is important to have a family report every two years (star-
ting in 2001), there has been no structural change in family policy.The strongest political contribution under the
heading of family policy are day-care provisions for children under four. In 1989, there were 18,000 day-care
places; and 102,000 places in 2001. During the same period, the number of people working in this sector rose
from 4,546 to 43,611. We have to take into account, however, that in recent years the quality of day care has
diminished and parents have borne a greater share of the costs. In the field of parental leave after the birth of a
child, we can still observe a situation characterized by offering the poorest provisions when compared to coun-
tries in a similar situation. A relatively positive regulation to help reconcile work and parental tasks is still restric-
ted to some segments of the labour market, with no universal solution yet in sight. A regulation enabling people
to exclusively devote certain periods of time in their life to parental care is being discussed. Given the fact that
the most dominant political aim since 2003 has been to reduce public spending, there has been no program-
matic discussion on new family-policy measures and the establishment of an explicit family policy programme.
Moreover, parents and would-be parents both seem to accept the situation as it is, and there does not seem to
be any political movement as yet to set into force the winds of change.
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Portugal
Demographic trends and family patterns in Portugal have been changing significantly since the 1970s.The last
few years did not bring about any major changes but rather the further development of previous trends.
Fertility rates have remained stable (1.5 since the early 1990s), and marriage rates and religious marriages have
decreased steadily, while cohabitation and divorce have increased significantly, especially during the last decade.
The changes in family formation and dissolution, population ageing and the sharp rise in the number of women
working have had a strong impact on family patterns. Families are smaller ; the traditional family household of
couples with children is less prevalent; and there are higher proportions of the population who live alone, in
lone-parent families and in reconstituted families. Women’s participation in the labour market has also led to a
sharp decline in the male-breadwinner model, moving towards the current pattern of dual-earner couples
where both work full-time (i.e. over two thirds of all couples with at least one dependent child). Seen from an
EU perspective, present-day Portugal has an average fertility rate, average marriage and divorce rates, high pro-
portions of dual-earner couples, and changing but still more ‘family-centred’ living arrangements (with lower
proportions of people living alone and higher proportions of couples with children and complex family house-
holds).
With regard to family policies and key issues under discussion, we may distinguish between two main
periods. In the context of a favourable economic climate following the election of a socialist government and
some expansion in social protection, family policy in the late 1990s underlined four main objectives: improving
the safety net for families coupled with the vertical redistribution of wealth; developing stronger linkages be-
tween family policy and equal-opportunity policy; increasing service provision to help families reconcile work
and care responsibilities; defining new public responses to challenges posed by family changes and new living
arrangements. Significant policy measures and legislative changes included the following: the introduction of
income support; more selectivity in family benefits; an increase in maternity leave and the introduction of pater-
nity leave; the establishment of a ‘pact’ for cooperation between the State and third-sector institutions for de-
veloping service provision; new laws establishing more rights for cohabiting couples; and the easing of divorce
procedures. Public debate during these years (1996–2001) focused mainly on issues related to the above-men-
tioned policy measures: poverty and the need for more selectivity (versus universality); the impact of income
support on families and how to deal with fraudulent claims; promoting the reconciliation of work and family life,
as well as more equal workloads inside families; changing the legal regulation of marriage, divorce and relation-
ships. Some other issues, such as abortion, were also hotly debated during this period; but there were no policy
changes in this area (proposed changes to the existing law led to a referendum in 1998 in which liberalization
was rejected by a majority of voters).
The last two years (2002–2003) have witnessed major changes in family-policy perspectives and the
ensuing political debate. Against a background of economic constraints and the formation of a new right-wing
government, as well as growing governmental concern with current trends in demography and family life (espe-
cially the declining birth rate and the rising divorce rate), family policy has continued to emphasize the impor-
tance of vertical redistribution. However, it has also shifted its focus toward three other major objectives: a
commitment to a pro-natalist policy implying systematic support for large families (with three or more child-
ren); an anti-abortion pro-life perspective proposing policy measures to support pregnant women and vulner-
able mothers with young children; a family-building perspective underlining the importance of such policy goals
as the expansion of family counselling and mediation services, in order to strengthen family bonds and prevent
marital dissolution; and the development of part-time work to make it easier for women to balance work and
family. Significant policy measures undertaken over the past two years include the following: setting up a new
family benefit model that only provides family allowances to low-income families; establishing extra financial sup-
port for large families in all the major cash benefits; increasing the parental leave scheme for part-time workers
from six to twelve months; a new law on adoption stressing children’s rights to a happy family life and accelera-
ting adoption procedures; and developing service provision to support vulnerable mothers. Although govern-
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ment actors and agencies have explicitly highlighted these priorities and their concern for protecting childbearing
and the ‘traditional’ family’ (meaning married couples with children rather than lone parents or reconstituted fami-
lies), public debate has focused more intensely on the proposed reorganization of social security and labour
legislation (with the new Labour Law). There is also focus on two events that have been monopolizing public
attention and the media: the trial on child-abuse and paedophile networks involving children from Casa Pia (a
non-profit institution taking in children at risk) and the Aveiro trial involving criminal proceedings against seven
women who performed illegal abortions. The issues of changing social security and workers’ rights, of child
abuse and of abortion (sometimes linked to the issue of a declining birth rate) have thus dominated public
debate.There has been practically no debate on changes to the family-benefit model, on parental leave or on
service provision to families.
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Spain
Over the past six years, Spain has seen a considerable upsurge in the number of immigrants. After having been
an emigration country for decades, the migratory balance started reversing itself in 1975, first with the return of
previous emigrants and, since 1985, with an increasing flow of incoming workers, mainly from Morocco and
later from Central America. As of 1 January 2003, the foreign population in Spain was estimated at 2.6 million
(6.24% of the total population). Since 1999, immigration has also been partly responsible for the moderate but
persistent increase in fertility, although its level is still among the lowest in the EU (an estimated 1.26 in 2003).
The structure of Spanish families has also undergone considerable changes during the last decade.The ave-
rage household size has been rapidly decreasing, reaching 2.9 by the end of 2001. Household structure has fol-
lowed the same path as in other EU Member States: an increasing proportion of one-person households (over
20% in 2001) and a sharp decrease of the proportion of extended families.What is more specific about Spain’s
recent developments is the fact that young people are staying with their parents longer than in any other coun-
try. This explains a good part of the still-high average household size, though older people have gained con-
siderable autonomy.
One of the most remarkable facts concerning family matters during this period has been that family 
problems and policies have become an important issue on the political agenda.The main political parties have
explicitly presented programmes related to family, and political leaders have repeatedly stressed its importance.
The main reason for this is the growing concern over Spain’s very low fertility rate and fear of its consequences
on population ageing. Notwithstanding ideological differences, it may be considered highly probable that explicit
family policies will be adopted by some future government.The negative aspect is that, despite this alleged inte-
rest, insufficient resources have been dedicated to family policies over the past six years. Spain remains the
country with the lowest proportion of social expenditures for family support among the EU-15.
Among the problems addressed, reconciling work and family has received considerable attention.Women’s
increasing participation in the labour force has not been followed by any real change in traditional gender roles.
According to different surveys, men’s participation in care activities still lags behind, preventing any equal sharing
of household and care tasks.The 2002 Law of Reconciliation of Family and Work (Ley de Reconciliación Familiar)
has been a considerable step in the social and political acknowledgement of the importance of this issue,
nonetheless, few sectors and firms have enforced the new arrangements permitted by this law.
The possibility of taking parental leave exists for both parents, with special protection for their job and social-
security status. Despite this, the fact that it is unpaid explains the little use made of it, especially by fathers.
In the past few years, domestic and gender violence have become an issue of great social and political rele-
vance. Women’s organizations, political parties and the media are paying more attention to this problem than
ever before, and the idea that this is not merely a private matter is clearly penetrating public opinion and thus,
the political will. This concern has been heightened by the steady increase in the number of women killed by
their partner (32 in 1997, 70 in 2003).There have been a number of legislative proposals to provide an ‘integral’
response, with a mix of repressive measures, protection to threatened women and preventive actions, especial-
ly those aimed at education. Some Regions (Comunidades autónomas) have adopted laws on the matter. The
Socialist Party (at present in the opposition) announced that, if it were to win the general elections in March
2004, the first law it would present would be aimed at stopping gender violence.
Housing has also become a prominent problem for families in Spain. Rentals are scarce and expensive.
Though Spain is a nation of homeowners (85% of all households), buying a house or apartment has become
progressively out of reach for young people who also experience difficulties obtaining a steady and decently-
paying job. Prices have been increasing well above the inflation rate for a few years now (17% in 2003, for
instance). Family formation suffers from the situation, as is shown by the fact that the proportion of singles
among young people has increased: from 60% in 1991 to 85% in 2001 among 25-year-olds, and from 35% to
60% among 30-year-olds.
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Sweden
Socio-economic situation of families
Sweden, together with Denmark, has the narrowest gaps for household income (the lowest Gini coefficient)
among the EU Member States. Nevertheless, trends in standard of living during the 1990s have had a particu-
larly negative impact on families with children—especially on one-parent families with children. Up to now, this
category has been—and probably still is—less vulnerable in Sweden than in many other countries. However,
the economic downturn in the 1990s, which brought unusually high unemployment levels to Sweden, has hit
this group harder than others: in 2001, the lowest level of disposable income was found among single parents
(and among those over 75 living alone).
Parenting issues
About one third of all children in Sweden experience their parents’ divorce or separation. Although almost all
Swedish parents have joint legal custody following separation or divorce, the child(ren) tend to live, sometimes
exclusively, with the mother. In Sweden, the children’s right to both parents is considered very important, as is
an active parenting role for fathers.Therefore, men’s limited use of parental insurance is of great concern to the
government and to other actors on the social-policy scene. This concern about the male-female relationship
insofar as it affects parenting, comes from the long-standing emphasis on gender equality in Swedish public
policy and the social debate. LO, the Swedish labour organization, recently proposed that the 12 months of
parental leave be divided so that one third has to be used by each parent, i.e. four months for the mother and
four for the father, while the remaining four can be used according to the wishes of the individual parents.
Situation of the elderly
Despite the fact that the Swedish welfare state is built on a highly individualized social-security system, family
ties continue to be important, especially for elderly care. Due to continuing financial constraints on the Swedish
welfare state, there has been a reversal of the previous trend, which started in the 1960s, of substituting family
care with public care. Both home-help services and institutional care for the elderly have been cut back sub-
stantially, resulting in a situation where families provide a growing part of care for elderly relatives. The im-
portant role of spouses and offspring (particularly daughters) in caring for the elderly, though seldom officially
recognized, has been documented in several recent studies.
Future family size
The annual number of births has been increasing over the past two years, exceeding the annual number of deaths.
This stands in contrast to the five years between 1997 and 2001, when Sweden experienced negative natural
growth. The estimated Total Fertility Rate for 2003 is 1.71, up from about 1.5 per woman at its lowest point.
Although increasing, the fertility level is still far from the assumed future rate of 1.85 in the current population
forecast. Recent analyses of 2001 Eurobarometer data show that the ideal family size (IFS) among Swedish
women aged 20 to 34 is among the highest in the EU-15 group (a mean IFS of 2.4).Together with France and
Denmark, Sweden has the lowest proportion viewing no child or one as ideal, while almost two out of five see
a family with more than two children as the most desirable. Hence, even if personal ideals may be declining
over time, Sweden has a fairly long way to go before reaching a sub-replacement level in family size ideals.
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Homosexual marriages
Finally, a few words about an issue that is in the forefront of media interest right now. Sweden has had a law
about registered partnerships for homosexual couples since 1995. Since then, about 3,000 such partnerships
have been registered (compared to the annual number of newly contracted marriages of about 40,000).
Recently, a proposal to introduce gender-neutral marriages (meaning that same-sex couples can be wed accor-
ding to the same marriage law as heterosexual couples) has been discussed by the judicial committee in
Parliament. Several of the political parties support this idea, while the Christian Democrats oppose it (the two
biggest parties, the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, have not made up their minds yet). One possible
outcome may be that Sweden will introduce the same system that already exists in many other countries,
namely civil registration of marriages, leaving it to each individual couple to decide whether they want to have it
confirmed by a religious ceremony. It would then be up to each religious congregation whether it accepts
homosexual marriages or not.
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United Kingdom
This period has been one of unprecedented expansion of public-policy interest and intervention in family life in
Britain and concomitant public expenditure on initiatives and programmes to support families. The Labour
government came into power in 1997 with a clear agenda to support families, as well as to hold families more
responsible for the behaviour and care of their members.
Key aspects of family life
Both the incidence of lone parenthood and of children born outside marriage has increased. Cohabitation is
now the norm before marriage and, for some, has replaced marriage as an institution for both partnership and
parenthood. Childbearing is being delayed, and there is now concern that falling fertility levels may be a 
problem if increasing numbers of women remain childless. It is not clear what proportion of this is through
choice or the growing incidence of fertility problems often associated with later conception.
At the same time, there is much more recognition of the ageing population and changing dependency ratio.
Concern is growing about the financing of care for frail elderly people and the real costs of meeting longer
retirements, which will exceed current capacities.
Both fathers and grandparents have become more visible. The earlier line of reasoning in the debate on 
fathers, which emphasized the issues of non-resident fathers, has been overlaid by a more general focus on fathers
as parents and a concern to enable them to meet their caring responsibilities as well as be in paid work.
National data about grandparents shows they are more heterogeneous in their life circumstances and attitudes
and are not necessarily the readily available source of extra help for parents as the government has previously
assumed. Both fathers and grandparents have become more vocal about their ‘rights’ and there is considerable
dissatisfaction among some fathers’ groups about their position, especially with regard to contact after separa-
tion.
The debate on marriage continues. There is some confusion about divorce reform in England and Wales
once it was decided not to implement all the provisions of the Family Law Act.The ‘privileged’ status of marria-
ge has been challenged by the decision to give cohabiting homosexual couples virtually the same legal rights as
marriage confers on heterosexual couples. This will become law in 2004, but the legal status of cohabiting
heterosexual couples is, as yet, unchanged.
Key policy issues
Policy towards families has been dominated by a focus on those with children and by a concern with reconci-
ling work and family responsibilities. At the same time, the Labour government was concerned with the quality
of parenting and increasing parents’ responsibility for their children’s behaviour, as well as with tackling disadvan-
tage through early intervention and support.
A major platform of the government’s strategy for families has been to encourage and facilitate parents’
paid work. Getting lone-parent families into employment was an early aim and so too was supporting lower-
paid dual-earner families. In both cases, increasing the availability of institutional childcare, and providing subsidies
to families to pay for it, was key.The National Childcare Strategy has generated many more places and enabled
more mothers of very young children to work.
The early intervention programme Sure Start is one of the success stories of this period. Aimed at very
young children in highly disadvantaged areas, the programmes cover health issues and give parents support and
advice, as well as providing opportunities for the social, emotional and educational development of children
under four.
Ending child poverty within 20 years has also been a major theme.There has been a generous up-grading
of the financial support given to families with children, with both a universal and means-tested element. A new
GENERAL MONITORING REPORT 2004 ABSTRACT
264 | ÖIF MATERIALIEN 23
Child Tax Credit was introduced in April 2003. However, it will be very hard to achieve the eradication of child
poverty without tackling inequality more generally.
Finally, the government has been particularly concerned both with that minority of children who behave in
an anti-social or criminal way, and those who cannot live in their ‘own’ family. Legislation has been introduced
that makes parents liable if their children systematically offend, and it also enables local authorities to issues 
curfews on young people in certain areas. Children in public care are identified as a particular risk group with
poor life chances projected on all dimensions. Over the last few years, there have been major attempts to place
these children in ‘new ‘families; but adoption is not appropriate for everybody and other strategies are also
being considered.
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